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1. INTRODUCTION
At 14:46 in the afternoon of Friday, 11 March 2011, Japan was shaken by the 
largest earthquake recorded in the country’s history (Matanle, 2011). However, 
it was not the earthquake which caused the majority of the damage, but the 
giant tsunami following it. The tsunami hit the Pacific coast of Tohoku Region 
– the most northern Japanese region on Japan’s largest island Honshu – with 
waves that reached a maximum height of 9.3 m, causing the inundation of an 
area of 561 km2 (Miyako City Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami Records 
Editorial Committee, 2015). After the water retreated, the destruction slowly be-
came visible in its entirety: About 122,000 buildings were either washed away 
or completely ruined and an additional 1 million buildings were half or partially 
destroyed. To make things worse, the tsunami also resulted in 18,500 people as 
either dead or missing (as of June 2016; Japan Reconstruction Agency, 2016). 
Moreover, the tsunami flooded the nuclear power plant Fukushima Daiichi, caus-
ing a nuclear meltdown and the release of radioactive material into the environ-
ment (Matanle, 2011, 2013). Residents living inside a radius of 20 km2 around 
the power plant were forced to evacuate immediately. Later the evacuation area 
was extended even further (Iuchi, Maly, & Johnson, 2015). The Great East Japan 
Earthquake (GEJE) and Tsunami, as the event was termed, is only one example 
of disasters caused by natural events. Even though the global efforts in disaster 
risk reduction, which were established by the UN member states with the adop-
tion of the International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction (IDNDR) in the 
1990s, slowly come to fruition in some countries, the disaster mortality in other 
countries still remains high (UNISDR, 2015b). Between 1990 and 2013, 1.6 mil-
lion people lost their lives through internationally reported disasters. In the same 
time frame, the economic losses from disasters worldwide have grown steadily, 
reaching an annual average of US$250 billion to US$300 billion each year as of 
2015 (UNISDR, 2015b).
It is expected that the changing temperatures and rising sea levels caused 
through global climate change will result in an aggravation of disaster risks (e.g., 
from heat stress, storms, flooding, landslides, air pollution, drought and water 
scarcity), particularly in urban areas (IPCC, 2014). This trend is exaggerated by the 
continuing trend of urbanization, which is projected to result in 66% of the peo-
ple worldwide to live in cities in 2050 (United Nations, Department of Economic 
and Social Affairs, Population Division, 2014, p. 1). The most rapid urbanization in 
this time frame will occur in the lower-middle and low-income countries, putting 
a lot of pressure on existing cities to expand (United Nations, Department of 
Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, 2014, p. 10). It is an important 
obligation of spatial planners to facilitate that this urban development follows 
certain standards, including safe housing and the provision of basic utilities and 
infrastructure and adequate health services (PreventionWeb, 2015; United Na-
tions, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, 2014). The 
proper management of urban development is of particular importance because 
poorly planned city structures are a distinct driver for disaster risk. Urban devel-
opment can influence the hazard and vulnerability component of risk. If urban 
development alters the environment, e.g., through uncontrolled urban sprawl, or 
a city’s sewage system is unable to drain the arising rain water, this can lead to 
4the aggravation of existing or the emergence of new hazards. On the other side 
the concentration of citizens in hazardous areas leads to an increased vulnerabili-
ty. It is mostly the vulnerable groups of the urban poor who are marginalized and 
therefore forced to live in these parts of the city (PreventionWeb, 2015).
Considering these developments, it becomes clear that there is a need to act. 
Resilience is one of the key concepts to address the challenge of disaster risk. 
If a city is resilient, it is able to “resist, absorb, accommodate to and recover 
from the effects of a hazard in a timely and efficient manner, including through 
the preservation and restoration of its essential basic structures and functions” 
(UNISDR, 2009, p. 24). Following this, the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk 
Reduction 2015-2030, which was adopted by the member states of the Unit-
ed Nations (UN) at the Third UN World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction 
(WCDRR) in Sendai, Japan, on 18 March 2015, states “strengthen[ing] resil-
ience” as its goal (UNISDR, 2015c, p. 12).
The adjustment of existing urban structures is time-consuming and cost-inten-
sive; therefore, a resilient city can most efficiently be achieved when it is first 
developed (UN-Habitat, 2015) or after a disaster has erased the previously exist-
ing city structures (Olshansky, Hopkins, & Johnson, 2012). The time frame after 
the disaster can be considered as a window of opportunity for planners to build 
the city back better or – in other words – to build a resilient city. Although the rel-
evance of spatial planners for the construction of resilient cities seems natural, 
there is little knowledge of spatial planning’s capabilities to achieve this goal so 
far. Drawing from experiences on the reconstruction process after the GEJE and 
Tsunami in Japan’s Miyako City and Ishinomaki City, this dissertation addresses 
this topic and explains which of the local spatial planning options can be used 
to build which aspect of resilience and how the toolkit of spatial planners can 
be improved in order to be more efficient to build urban resilience. Even though 
these spatial planning options differ from country to country and the focus of 
this research on Japan only enables a limited transferability of the research re-
sults, the experiences from Tohoku Region are able to contribute to the ongoing 
discussion about spatial planning and urban resilience after disasters. The work 
is addressed toward spatial planning practitioners and disaster risk researchers 
alike who would like to learn more about spatial planners’ capabilities to build 
disaster resilient cities.
1.1 OBJECTIVE AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS
As outlined above, disaster risks already play an important role for cities across 
the globe and their relevance is expected to increase even further in the future. 
To address this challenge, it is important to acquire knowledge about the coher-
encies of the topic and to develop strategies to deal with them. In the last couple 
of years, the concept of urban resilience was introduced as a promising solution 
for this complex problem. In this context, the vulnerability of cities is supposed 
to be reduced by building resilience – the negative concept of vulnerability re-
duction is therefore exchanged with the positive concept of resilience building. 
Nevertheless, because the use of the concept of resilience for the reduction of 
urban disaster risk is fairly new, the international disaster risk  community is just 
Part A | Chapter 1
5
starting to begin with the development of guidelines and strategies how resil-
ience building can be achieved. In 2010, the UNISDR launched their campaign 
Making Cities Resilient, which intends to “support sustainable urban develop-
ment by promoting resilience activities and increasing local level understanding 
of disaster risk.” (UNISDR, 2015a). The campaign includes the provision of a 
Disaster Resilience Scorecard, which was also used for the research of this dis-
sertation. Another approach to the topic of resilience is the 100 Resilient Cities 
Initiative launched by the Rockefeller Foundation, a nonprofit organization (NPO), 
in 2013 in order to “[help] cities around the world build resilience to the econom-
ic, social and physical challenges that are increasingly part of the 21st century” 
(100 Resilient Cities, 2016). Even though these and other contributions help to 
advance the discussion, the actual role of spatial planning in this context is rarely 
considered. This is the reason why this dissertation attempts to investigate the 
ability of spatial planning to build urban resilience after a disaster. Thereby, the 
focus on the phase after a disaster was chosen because it is distinguished by a 
specific dynamic, which favors change and enables the implementation of plans 
much faster than in regular times. This phase is also called the window of oppor-
tunity and should be used as effectively as possible in order to achieve the aim 
to build a city’s resilience after a disaster. Based on these considerations, the 
research objective of this dissertation is to answer the following two research 
questions:
 › How can spatial planning help to build a city’s resilience after a disaster?
 › How can spatial planning use the window of opportunity effectively to 
improve a city’s resilience after a disaster?
In this context – and based on George and Bennett (2005) – the research aims 
to explain the influence of the independent variable (spatial planning) on the 
dependent variable (a city’s resilience). The occurrence of a disaster as a trigger 
for this process is a background characteristic, which influences the process 
under investigation, but is not further considered in the research. The window of 
opportunity, here interpreted as the chance to support a faster implementation 
of spatial plans in the aftermath of a disaster, is also considered as a background 
characteristic for the research. The definition of the terminology used in the re-
search context can be found in illustration 1.
For the investigation of this topic, the reconstruction process in Japan’s Tohoku 
Region after the GEJE and Tsunami in 2011 was selected. The reasons for this 
are the occurrence of a disaster as a background characteristic for the process 
under investigation. This limited the areas of research to the ones that expe-
rienced a major disaster in the recent past. This framework condition pointed 
towards Japan, a country that experienced one of the most severe disasters 
of this century so far. The tsunami destroyed an enormous area that required 
reconstruction (Miyako City Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami Records 
Editorial Committee, 2015). In addition to this, Japan’s long history with disas-
ters (e.g., earthquakes, tsunamis, landslides) created a vast amount of experi-
ence that was adopted into the country’s disaster risk management and spa-
tial planning system over the years (see Chapter 4). One example for this is 
the country’s existing building code that helps to prevent or at least limit major 
6damages through earthquakes. To preserve this state, the building code is fre-
quently adapted to current standards. These experiences enable the internation-
al community of researchers and practitioners working in the field of disaster 
risk reduction to learn valuable lessons from Japan’s spatial planners. Some of 
these lessons will be collected in this work. Another, more practical reason for 
the selection of Japan as the area of research was the author’s participation in 
the research project Increasing resilience of urban planning (URBIPROOF), a 
project that was funded through the CONCERT-Japan framework by the Fed-
eral Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF) and the Japan Science and 
Technology Agency (JST). The project was conducted by the Institute of Spatial 
Planning (IRPUD) at the TU Dortmund University (Germany), the Department of 
Architecture and Buildings and the International Research Institute of Disaster 
Science (IRIDeS) at the Tohoku University (Japan) and the Agency for the Sup-
port of Regional Development Košice (Slovakia). The aim of the research project 
was to help European and Japanese cities to strengthen their resilience through 
the improvement of their “institutional and societal capacities and urban devel-
opment strategies” (Greiving, Ubaura & Tešliar, 2016, p. x). The project’s funding 
also enabled the realization of several research stays for the completion of this 
dissertation.
HAZARD
"possible, future occurrence of natural or human-
induced physical events that may have adverse 
 effects on vulnerable and exposed elements"
(Cardona et al., 2012, p. 69).
“[t]he potential disaster losses, in lives, health status, 
livelihoods, assets and services, which could occur to 
a particular community or a society over some 
specified future time period.” 
(UNISDR, 2009, pp. 9–10).
DISASTER RISK
VULNERABILITY
“the propensity of exposed elements such as human 
beings, their livelihoods, and assets to suffer adverse 
effects when impacted by hazard events.” 
(Cardona et al., 2012, p. 69). 
RESILIENCE
“the propensity of exposed elements such as human 
beings, their livelihoods, and assets to suffer adverse 
effects when impacted by hazard events.” 
(Cardona et al., 2012, p. 69). 
“[a] serious disruption of the functioning of a commu-
nity or a society involving widespread human, material, 
economic or environmental losses and impacts, which 
exceeds the ability of the affected community or 
society to cope using its own resources” 
(UNISDR, 2009, p. 9).
DISASTER
DISASTER
“[a] seri us disruption of the functioning of a commu-
nity or a society involving widespre  human, material, 
economic or environmental losses and impacts, which 
exceeds the ability of the affected community or 
society to cope using its own resources”. 
(UNISDR, 2009, p. 9)
“the ability of an urban system – […] [and all its 
engineering, political-institutional, socio-economic 
and environmental component parts across temporal 
and spatial scales] – to maintain or rapidly return to 
desired functions in the face of a […] [hazardous 
event], to adapt to change and to quickly transform 
systems that limit current or future adaptive capacity”
(Meerow et al 2016, p. 36)
URBAN DISASTER
RESILIENCE
WINDOW OF 
OPPORTUNITY
The opportunity for improvement that  emerges in the 
aftermath of a disaster. Often also referred to as the 
chance to build back better.
(see Chapter 3.3) 
In the context of this w rk r fers to the spatial 
planning opt ons that are availabe to address disaster 
risk in the risk governance pha ssessment, 
management and c mmunication.
(see Chapter 2.4)
SPATIAL PLANNING
Illustration 1 | Definitions of the main terminology | Own illustration
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1.2 RESEARCH PARADIGM
This dissertation is based on empirical investigations (see Part B), which were 
conducted on the basis of the theoretical background presented in Part A of this 
work. Throughout the research process, aspects from both, the postpositivist 
and constructivist paradigm were used, whereby the emphasis was on the con-
structivist world-view because of the social context of the topic of investigation. 
Before the reasons for this decision are explained, the following paragraphs give 
a short introduction into the postpositivist and constructivist world-view and 
their characteristics.
Postpositivism traces back to Karl Popper, who refined the previously preva-
lent paradigm of positivism in order to address its shortcomings, such as the 
problem of induction (Popper, 1972). Postpositivism understands the world as 
real, objective and measurable. However, this reality can only be insufficient-
ly perceived, which is why science tries to ascertain the truth, but can never 
fully achieve it. Postpositivism expects researchers to remain objective and to 
continuously question their findings (or have them questioned by the research 
community) because the generation of knowledge occurs through the falsifica-
tion of hypotheses (in comparison to positivism, where hypotheses were also 
subject for validation). This means a hypothesis can be maintained as long as it 
could not be falsified and it is the purpose of the scientific community to aim 
for the falsification of as many aspects of a hypothesis as possible in order to 
approach the truth (Popper, 1972). The methodology of postpositivism reflects 
this intention to falsify hypotheses (Guba & Lincoln, 1994). Although the context 
requires an experimental and manipulative methodology, postpositivists also 
broaden their toolkit “by doing inquiry in more natural settings, collecting more 
situational information, and reintroducing discovery as an element in inquiry” 
(Guba & Lincoln, 1994, p. 110).
Constructivism, on the other side, understands realities to be “apprehendable 
in the form of multiple, intangible mental constructions” (Guba & Lincoln, 1994, 
p. 110). This means, that an objective world does not exist and realities solely 
depend on the observer’s perception. In this context, the investigator is also 
considered as a subject to his or her subjectivist perceptions. For constructiv-
ists, knowledge is created through the exchange of the subjective knowledge 
between the researcher and the subject of investigation. The distinction be-
tween ontology (the form of reality) and epistemology (the relationship between 
the researcher and the subject of investigation) dissolves in constructivism. This 
is the reason why constructivist research often uses hermeneutic or dialectic 
methodology, which favors this ongoing exchange. The results from this iterative 
research process than can be used to extract a (new) consensus for research to 
agree on (Guba & Lincoln, 1994).
While the aim of postpositivism is to explain reality and use this knowledge for 
the prediction and control of processes, the aim of constructivism is to under-
stand reality (Guba & Lincoln, 1994). This aspect was an important reason for 
the decision to lean towards a constructivist world-view for this research. Since 
the capabilities of spatial planning to build urban resilience after a disaster have 
not yet been investigated, it was the intention of the research to understand the 
8ongoing processes and develop a theoretical background for further research. 
This point is also visible in the descriptive nature of the research question. Ad-
ditional reasons for the preference of the constructivist world-view are that the 
topic of investigation – the reconstruction process in Tohoku Region after the 
GEJE and Tsunami – involves a variety of social interaction, which could not be 
manipulated in order to meet the requirements of the postpositivist paradigm. 
Furthermore, the topic’s complexity required an iterative rather than a target- 
oriented research process in order to achieve optimal results.
However, even though the social context of this research is important and re-
quires the acknowledgment of various realities, which are shaped through indi-
vidual perceptions, the physical aspect of disasters as the topic under investiga-
tion cannot be denied. The decision to compromise between the postpositivist 
and constructivist paradigm in order to meet the contradictory characteristics of 
disasters and disaster risk correspond with the current understanding in literature 
(IRGC, 2005; Rosa, 1998; also see Chapter 2). As a pragmatic solution, this re-
search understands the physical world as real (and as the subject of investigation 
based on a postpositivist approach), while the people’s perception of this world 
is constructed. This can lead to different understandings of reality, but it can be 
accepted that the majority of people will agree upon hypotheses that have been 
unfalsifiable for a long time – and therefore most likely comply with the truth.
Some of the aspects for the decision about the borrowings from different re-
search paradigms mentioned above, also apply for the selection of a case study 
design. These reasons are explained in detail in the following chapter.
1.3 RESEARCH DESIGN: CASE STUDY RESEARCH
To understand the reasons why a case study design was selected for this dis-
sertation, it is important to understand the main characteristics of this research 
design. There are different understandings of case study designs, which makes 
it complicated to give one generally accepted definition. In his book “Case Study 
Research”, which is frequently cited on this topic, Robert K. Yin gives the follow-
ing definition of case studies (2014):
“A case study is an empirical inquiry that
 › investigates a contemporary phenomenon (the ’case’) in depth and with-
in its real-world context, especially when
 ›  the boundaries between phenomenon and context may not be clearly 
evident.” (Yin, 2014, p. 16, emphasis added)
George and Bennett add one more point to this definition: Case study research 
investigates only a limited number of cases (George & Bennett, 2005, p. 18).
Now, why was a case study design selected for this research? First of all, the 
descriptive nature of the research question points to the suitability of this re-
search design. The exploratory nature of case studies is especially useful for 
the investigation of such research questions. Additionally, the above mentioned 
characteristics match the needs that are required when investigating the re-
search question.
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The reconstruction process of the Tohoku Region after the GEJE that occurred 
in 2011 is still ongoing and therefore a contemporary phenomenon. The main 
objective of this dissertation is to collect the real-world experiences that were 
made in Japan and to make them available as key learning points for other coun-
tries that are required to deal with disasters. It is difficult to distinguish clearly 
between different causes and effects regarding the very complex reconstruction 
process after a disaster. This means it was impossible to set the exact bound-
aries for the investigation in the beginning of the research process. An in-depth 
engagement with each case was needed to understand all relevant factors and 
elaborate the research results. Furthermore, the situation’s complexity makes it 
impossible to manipulate critical processes in a way that is required for quan-
titative research (Blatter, Janning, & Wagemann, 2007, p.  127). In addition, a 
simplification of the relevant processes would have resulted in defective results 
(Yin, 2014, p. 16). This means that the factors of interest in this in-depth case 
study research (or variables as they are called in quantitative research) exceed 
the compiled number of data points. To solve this problem, the research for this 
dissertation was structured based on a theoretical background and incorporated 
various methods as well as sources of data (see Chapter 7; Yin, 2014, p. 17). The 
selection of the reconstruction process in Japan’s Tohoku Region after the GEJE 
and Tsunami, limited the number of possible cases available for investigation. 
This increased the relevance of each case for the investigation and is another 
reason for the selection of a case study design (George & Bennett, 2005, p. 18). 
As explained in Chapter 7, this research is based on two case study sites: Miyako 
City and Ishinomaki City.
Because each research design possesses a specific set of strengths and lim-
itations, it is important to consider them before it is applied. This procedure 
ensures a proper integration of the research results into the overall context and 
helps to address a research design’s limitations in order to reduce their effect on 
the research quality. Therefore, the following two chapters give an overview of 
the strengths and limitations of case study research.
1.3.1 Strengths of case study research
The strengths of case study designs are associated with the reasons why this 
type of research design was selected (see Chapter 1.3). Case studies are es-
pecially strong where quantitative research designs are weak and vice versa 
(George & Bennett, 2005). This chapter introduces the main strengths of case 
study research and explains why these aspects were relevant for the selection 
of this research design.
Case study researchers usually gather a variety of information, including as-
pects that they were not specifically looking for. This inductive approach en-
ables the discovery of new and unexpected variables that quantitative re-
search with its deductive approach and limited numbers of variables can hardly 
achieve. In the next step, these new findings can be used for the development 
of new hypotheses where the existing hypotheses reach their limit (George 
& Bennett, 2005). In addition to this, case studies offer the ability to explore 
causal mechanisms within a case that might be unexpected, but nonetheless 
important. The exclusion of variables that seem unimportant in statistical stud-
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ies, restricts this chance to discover new aspects and relations. Although this 
abstraction is essential for statistical studies, the researcher must be aware 
that it deprives the researcher from developing a comprehensive picture of 
the subject of investigation (George & Bennett, 2005). For this research, these 
two aspect were of importance because of the limited amount of theoretical 
background that existed for the topic. Although the impact of spatial planning 
on disaster risk reduction is recognized, knowledge about spatial planning’s 
ability to build urban resilience was still missing. To gather information to build 
new hypotheses, it was necessary to openly approach the research topic in 
order to experience the important aspects.
Variables that are interesting for social scientists are usually very hard to isolate 
and measure. The contextual framework is essential to figure out all relevant 
factors. This means not only some variables but the entire context of the phe-
nomenon of interest must be considered. Unlike statistical studies, case study 
designs offer this possibility to widen the research frame and contribute to an 
understanding of all relevant correlations. Therefore, case study research is es-
pecially useful to take a closer look at specific processes that are often excluded 
from quantitative research (George & Bennett, 2005). However, this ability of 
case studies to “accommodate complex causal relations” (George & Bennett, 
2005, p. 22) is traded off against the possibility to generalize the research re-
sults. This means the results of case study research can be developed into mid-
dle-range-theories at the most; more general theories can only be investigated 
with a broader data base and much more cases, such as in statistical studies 
(George & Bennett, 2005). In the context of this research, the main variables 
under investigation are spatial planning (independent variable) and urban resil-
ience (dependent variable). The variables cannot be investigated in isolation, as 
it would be the case if statistical methods would be applied because the contex-
tual framework is relevant for the usefulness of spatial planning options to build 
urban resilience. Using a case study research enables the examination of all 
aspects that need consideration. The trade-off against a restricted generalization 
had to be made because the detailed investigation of the relevant processes 
was necessary. How the possible pitfall of overgeneralization was addressed 
throughout the research, is discussed in the following chapter.
1.3.2 Limitations of case study research
Besides the abovementioned strengths of case study research, there are also 
some limitations that go along with this type of research design. It is important 
to understand those weaknesses and know how to handle them in the best pos-
sible way. Many limitations or pitfalls that are connected to case study research 
base on quantitative research standards that are applied to this more qualita-
tive research approach (which does not mean that case study research cannot 
consider quantitative data). The most important points will be addressed in the 
following paragraphs. In addition to these misunderstandings, some important 
pitfalls when conducting case studies will be introduced and discussion will be 
provided as to how these points were handled in the research process.
One critique that is expressed in connection with case study research, is the se-
lection bias. This term descends from a statistical background and “is  commonly 
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understood as occurring when some form of selection process in either the 
design of the study or the real-world phenomena under investigation results in 
inferences that suffer from systematic error” (Collier & Mahoney, 1996, p. 59). 
Such selection bias can occur when the researcher selects the cases for his 
or her research based on the value of the dependent variable and therefore 
willingly or accidentally distorts the results by underestimating the connection 
between the independent and dependent variables. Even though this is a highly 
relevant problem in statistical studies, it does not apply in the same way for case 
studies. This is, for instance, because case study researchers sometimes pur-
posely choose cases that share the same characteristics. However, what might 
be right depends on the individual context. For case study research, the biggest 
problem in connection with selection bias occurs if the researcher selects cases 
in which independent and dependent variables both correspond with the theory 
under investigation and the researcher concludes from results of this small sam-
ple for generality. This problem of overgeneralization also applies when cases 
are limited in some way (e.g., geographically). In this instance, the generaliza-
tion should never exceed the scope of the cases – may it be geographically or 
substantially, when other places share very similar key characteristics (George 
& Bennett, 2005, p. 19). For this research, this limitation of case study research 
was particularly considered for the development of the research results. Since 
the research was limited to two cases, the results can only offer a glimpse of 
spatial planning’s possibilities for the creation of urban resilience in the after-
math of disasters – the results cannot be applied to other places with differing 
contexts or generalized. However, this does not mean, that it is impossible to 
learn from the experiences in Japan, even though the framework conditions in 
other countries are different.
Another constraint of case studies is their inability to estimate the exact weight 
of a certain variable’s influence on the research topic. If this estimation is the 
purpose of research, quantitative research designs like statistical studies should 
be selected. Instead, case studies enable the researcher to get a comprehen-
sive overview about all variables and influences that are relevant for a certain 
outcome. This means, “case studies [generally] remain much stronger at as-
sessing whether and how a variable mattered to the outcome than at assessing 
how much it mattered” (George & Bennett, 2005, p. 25, emphasis in original). 
Related to this, there are some pitfalls that should be prevented: It is important 
to keep in mind that the necessity of a variable for a certain result does not spec-
ify how much it contributed to it. Therefore, it is impossible to draw conclusions 
about the weight of a variable’s influence. Additionally, assertions can only be 
made for investigated cases. It is unreasonable to tell whether a certain variable 
is only necessary in the one special case that was studied, in all similar cases 
or if the findings are generalizable. For this reason, it is more applicable to state 
that a certain condition favors a certain outcome than to specify this contribu-
tion by terming it necessary. The researcher should also beware of transferring 
results from one or few case studies to general validity (overgeneralization – 
also see above) (George & Bennett, 2005, p. 19). As stated above, the results 
from this research were not transferred to other cases with differing contexts. 
Furthermore, the research refrained from rating the degree to which a certain 
condition (in this context: the application of certain spatial planning options) in-
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fluenced a certain outcome (in this context: an increase of resilience). Instead, 
the intention of this research was to assess if and how spatial planning can 
influence resilience.
Case study researchers usually do not select cases based in their representa-
tiveness. Likewise, the acquired results are not representative and should not 
be labeled this way. To reach representativeness, the investigation of a large 
number of cases would be necessary. This would either limit the exploratory 
richness of the research results or result in an unmanageable amount of work. 
Case study researchers must be aware of this trade-off and decide if their re-
search should explain a small number of cases in detail or if a higher degree of 
generalization is more desirable. Case study researchers generally choose to 
sacrifice a wide applicability of their theories for a high degree of analytical abun-
dance (George & Bennett, 2005, p. 19). For this research, the main interest was 
to figure out how spatial planning options are able to build urban resilience after 
a disaster and not to explain the frequency of the occurrence of these factors 
in other cases. This problem could also be solved by paying attention to avoid 
falling into the trap of overgeneralization (see above).
Another accusation case study research has to face is related to its focus on 
understanding entire processes by explaining the interaction of numerous inde-
pendent variables in only a small number of case studies. From the viewpoint 
of quantitative research, this can lead to the impression that the number of 
selected cases is too small to come to reliable results (degrees of freedom prob-
lem). However, because case study researchers understand variables differently 
than it is common in quantitative research, this problem does not directly apply 
(George & Bennett, 2005, p. 19). Case study research usually measures a wider 
set of attributes rather than combining those attributes into one superior variable 
like it is often done in quantitative research. To create a stringent chain of evi-
dence that either corresponds to or falsifies a certain theory or reveals that this 
theory needs adjustments, case study researchers use process-tracing. Instead 
of increasing the number of variables, process-tracing embraces a detailed anal-
ysis of the relations between the dependent and independent variable, which 
bases on a theoretical background (Blatter et al., 2007, p. 158). This approach is 
also pursued in this research (see Chapters 8 and 9). Another related problem, 
that is not specific for case studies, is that the obtained evidence might match 
with more than one theory and it can be difficult to select the most appropriate. 
In cases where this applies, the researcher should try to at least narrow down 
the number of valid explanations (George & Bennett, 2005, p. 19).
Another problem that quantitative researchers often apply to case study research 
is the lack of independence between cases. Although this problem does not di-
rectly translate to case study research, it should be considered in a more general 
way when cases are selected. If the researcher is unaware of a lack of indepen-
dence between cases, he or she can come to false conclusions. This difficulty 
can also be addressed by process-tracing, which enables the researcher to un-
cover possible linkages between cases. However, in research that attempts to 
reveal the influence of one case on another, the lack of independence between 
those two cases can be required and desired (George & Bennett, 2005, p. 19).
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Finally, the nature of case study research can lead to the problem that the re-
searcher gets lost in the variety of available data and collects much more data 
that can explicitly be considered for the analysis (Blatter et al., 2007, p. 180). This 
problem can be addressed through the development and strict application of 
guiding questions for the collection of data (Yin, 2014, p. 89). These questions 
help to structure the research process and keep the researcher focused on the 
collection of information that is relevant for the research topic. The guiding ques-
tions for this research are presented in the following chapter.
1.4 GUIDING QUESTIONS
As discussed above, case study research is characterized by a wide approach 
that considers a variety of aspects rather than focusing on a strictly limited num-
ber of variables. Nevertheless, this strength can only unfold if the researcher 
does not get lost in the complexity of the research process. To avoid this pitfall, 
the researcher is advised to develop specific guiding question, which frame the 
research process and structure the acquisition of data (Yin, 2014, p.  89). The 
guiding questions for this research can be divided into questions addressing the 
theoretical background for the research, these questions are answered in Part A 
of this dissertation. Questions that guided the empirical survey are addressed in 
Part B of this dissertation. Each question was answered based on the evidence 
from various data sources. Information that could not be acquired through other 
sources were retrieved from expert interviews. Further information about the 
data collection process can be found in Chapter 7. The illustration on the follow-
ing page gives an overview of the dissertation’s structure and work and displays 
which guiding question is answered in which chapter.
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2 Disaster Risk
What is Disaster Risk and how can 
spatial planning address it?
3 Resilience
What is Resilience?
What is the window of opportunity?
4 Japan
What were the main goals for the 
recovery process in Tohoku Region?
Which spatial planning options were 
available for the reconstruction 
process?
5 Measuring Resilience
How can resilience be assessed?
Which resilience items can be adressed through spatial planning?
6 Interim Conclusion
7 Case Study Approach
How is the case study research conducted?
8 Case Study: Miyako City
What were the main goals of the recovery process in 
Miyako City?
Which spatial planning options were used to build  
engineering resilience?
Which spatial planning options were used to build  
evolutionary resilience?
Which spatial planning options were able to build  
resilience? Which additional spatial planning options 
would have been useful to build resilience?
How was the window of opportunity constituted in 
Miyako City?
Did Miyako City have any spatial plans for reconstruction 
prepared before the disaster?
How can the preperation of spatial plans for  
reconstruction before a disaster help to use the  
window of opportunity more effectively?
9 Case Study: Ishinomaki City
What were the main goals of the recovery process in 
Ishinomaki City?
Which spatial planning options were used to build  
engineering resilience?
Which spatial planning options were used to build  
evolutionary resilience?
Which spatial planning options were able to build  
resilience? Which additional spatial planning options 
would have been useful to build resilience?
How was the window of opportunity constituted in  
Ishinomaki City?
Did Ishinomaki City have any spatial plans for  
reconstruction prepared before the disaster?
How can the preperation of spatial plans for  
reconstruction before a disaster help to use the  
window of opportunity more effectively?
10 Cross-case synthesis
RESEARCH QUESTION 1: How can spatial planning help to build a city’s resilience after a disaster?
RESEARCH QUESTION 2: How can spatial planning use the window of opportunity effectively to improve a city’s resilience 
after a disaster?
11 Conclusion
What are the main aspects of the research?
Illustration 2 | Research structure and guiding questions | Own illustration
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1.5 CONDUCTING CASE STUDY RESEARCH: AN 
INTRODUCTION TO EACH CHAPTER
The following paragraphs give an overview of the three basic steps that were 
taken to conduct the case study research of this work. It must be kept in mind 
that a qualitative research process – like case study research – works iteratively. 
This means that the steps that are presented in a certain order below some-
times happened simultaneously or in loops throughout the actual research.
Research Design
At the beginning of the research process, a literature review to engage with the 
state of research was conducted. The information gathered through this review 
helped to identify the research gap and served as the basis for the development 
of the research question. After the main research questions were established, 
the dependent and independent research variables were roughly determined 
(see Chapter 1.1). The decision to use a case study design occurred based on 
the underlying research paradigm for this research (see Chapter 1.2) and con-
sidered the research design’s specific strengths and limitations (see Chapter 
1.3). In comparison to quantitative research, the operationalization of variables in 
qualitative research happened iteratively throughout the research process. For 
this reason, it was especially important to develop specific guiding questions 
(see Chapter 1.4) that framed the research process and clarified which data was 
actually required in order to advance the research process. Furthermore, guiding 
questions ensured that the collection of data occurred similarly for all cases and 
enabled the researcher to realize when needed data was unavailable, and when 
the research questions had to be adjusted accordingly (for more information on 
this iterative research process, see below).
The results from the literature review are presented in-depth in the Chapters 
2-5 of this work: Chapter 2 introduces the terms disaster and risk, which are im-
portant for the topic of resilience. The chapter explains the history of the terms 
disaster and risk as well as its elements hazard and vulnerability before it ex-
amines spatial planning options to address disaster risk. The complex topic of 
resilience is presented in Chapter 3. The chapter first gives an overview of the 
development of the concept and explains its relevance for spatial planning. It 
then proceeds to discuss the aspects of urban resilience for this research and 
explains the window of opportunity. The study area is introduced in Chapter 4. 
The chapter includes an overview of the geographical and demographic context 
before it continues to take a closer look at the Japan’s proneness to natural 
hazards in general and the GEJE and Tsunami specifically. The chapter further-
more introduces Japan’s disaster risk management and spatial planning frame-
work. One possibility to assess resilience – the Disaster Resilience Scorecard 
developed by the United Nations Office of Disaster Risk Reduction (UNISDR) is 
presented in Chapter 5. The scorecard was selected as a framework to evaluate 
the influence of spatial planning options on a city’s disaster resilience. The main 
points from all of these chapters are summarized in Chapter 6.
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Field Work
Simultaneously with the development of the research design, the researcher 
was engaged with possible cases. A more detailed description of the research 
procedure during the data collection phase is presented in Chapter 7. The basis 
for this was a comprehensive literature research about the cases, which includ-
ed scientific and non-scientific literature. The knowledge about the cases was 
extended through conversations with local experts that were able to contribute 
specific knowledge about the reconstruction process in various cities in Tohoku 
Region. This phase of “soaking and poking” (George & Bennett, 2005, p. 89) is 
an important part of case study research and offers the researcher the possibility 
to stay open for new and unexpected information he or she might find. Although 
this phase can already be guided by a contemplated research question, it is nec-
essary to reconsider and adapt the question if it seems appropriate. Throughout 
the data collection phase, a large amount of information was collected. This data 
was reviewed for usefulness and the relevant information was rehashed into 
chronological order before it was analyzed. In this way, all relevant dates and re-
lations could be identified and considered for the analysis. Based on the chrono-
logical summary the theory-driven analysis of the collected data was conducted 
(see Chapter 8 for Miyako City and Chapter 9 for Ishinomaki City).
Results and conclusions
After the data was analyzed for each of the case study sites, a case-study syn-
thesis was developed to elaborate similarities and differences, and – even more 
importantly – to answer the research questions by discussing which spatial 
planning options were able to build resilience in Miyako City and Ishinomaki 
City after the GEJE and Tsunami and how spatial planners could possibly be 
enabled to use the window of opportunity effectively (see Chapter 10). Finally, 
the conclusion in Chapter 11 summarizes the main findings of the research and 
presents further research needs.
Part A | Chapter 2
17
2. DISASTER, RISK AND SPATIAL PLANNING
The following chapter introduces the main terminology of disaster risk research. 
The chapter first examines the origins of disaster, as the materialization of risk, 
and then considers the various understandings of risk and establishes the defi-
nition that is used for this research. In this context, hazard and risk as the two 
components of risk are also explained. Based on the general background, spatial 
planning options that are available to address disaster risk are presented. The 
chapter concludes with a summary of the most important aspects.
2.1 DISASTER
Each definition of disaster is closely linked with the environment that developed 
it and with “the purposes or interests of the definer” (Perry, 2007, p. 2). It is es-
pecially difficult to come to a generally accepted definition of disaster because 
disaster researchers stem from various fields, including geography, spatial plan-
ning, sociology and psychology. David Alexander (1993, pp.  13–14) identified 
the following six schools of thought that shaped the term disaster: the geo-
graphical approach (Barrows, 1923; White, 1945), the anthropological approach 
(Oliver-Smith, 1979; Torry, 1979), the sociological (Church, 1974; Dynes, 1970; 
Glass, 1970; Quarantelli, 1978) and psychological (Glass, 1970; Church, 1974) ap-
proach, the development studies approach (Chen, Chowdhury, & Huffman S.L., 
1980; Davis, 1978; Knott, 1987), the disaster health sciences approach (Beinin, 
1985) and the technical approach (Bolt, Horn, Macdonald, & Scott, 1977; El-Sabh 
& Murty, 1988). The following paragraphs take a closer look at the geographical 
approach because of its relevance for spatial planning.
The geographical approach puts natural hazards that cause disasters (e.g., earth-
quakes, tsunami, and volcano eruptions) at the center of research (Perry, 2007; 
Quarantelli, 1998). Within this context “a disaster is viewed as an extreme event 
that arises when a hazard agent intersects with a social system” (Perry, 2007, 
p. 9). Accordingly, the “social system” is solely understood as a passive com-
ponent at risk that is comparable to today’s understanding of exposure. This di-
saster approach is termed socio-technical or hazard focused and follows a realist 
world-view. It dates back to the flood hazard research that geographer Gilbert 
F. White (1945) conducted for his dissertation Human adjustment to floods and 
follows the general understanding of geography as human ecology1 as it was 
proposed by Harlan H. Barrows (1923) at the University of Chicago in the 1920s 
(Alexander, 1993). Later, this perspective was further developed by Burton and 
Kates (Burton & Kates, 1964; Burton, Kates, & White, 1978).
Over the following decades, there was an ongoing exchange of hazard research-
ers with sociologists, whose definition of disaster was shaped by Charles E. 
Fritz. Fritz defined a disaster as “an event, concentrated in time and space, in 
which a society, or a relatively self-sufficient subdivision of a society, undergoes 
severe danger and incurs such losses to its members and physical appurte- 
nances that the social structure is disrupted and the fulfillment of all or some 
of the essential functions of the society is prevented” (Fritz, 1961, p. 655). This 
1 The human ecological understanding of geography addresses the relationship between natural 
environments and human activities (Barrows, 1923, p. 3).
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socio-cultural approach clearly focuses on the vulnerability of social fabric and 
emphasizes the disruption of social order and consequential negative impacts on 
societies as disaster’s main characteristics (Perry, 2007, p. 6). With this content 
in mind, disaster researchers started to understand disasters as social events be-
cause “[t]heir origins, their manifestations, and their consequences are all basically 
social” (Quarantelli, 2005, p.  346). This constructivist understanding of disaster 
as a social construct, was also adopted by proponents of the hazard centered ap-
proach to disaster. In their article Taking the naturalness out of disaster, O’Keefe, 
Westgate, and Wisner (1976) emphasize the importance of socio-economic factors 
for vulnerability and assert that “vulnerability of the population as the real cause of 
disaster” (p. 567) must be included into disaster research. In 2005, David Alexan-
der, who was previously a hazard centered disaster researcher, stated: “[D]isaster 
is not defined by fixed events, or immutable relationships, but by social constructs, 
and these are liable to change” (Alexander, 2005, p. 29).
What does this mean for today’s researchers? Although the discussion about the 
definition of disaster is still ongoing, there is a general understanding of disaster as 
a composition of natural elements (hazards) and social elements (vulnerability): “[T]
here cannot be a disaster if there are hazards but vulnerability is (theoretically) nil, 
or if there is a vulnerable population but no hazard event” (Wisner, Blaikie, Cannon, 
& Davis, 2004, p. 49). Within this very general understanding of disaster, scientists 
in the various fields of disaster research continue to discuss and refine definitions 
of disaster in accordance with their focus. It is an ongoing process and might never 
reach a final conclusion. Nevertheless, because disaster research usually is carried 
out in an inductive way, where case studies are conducted and observations are 
made to derive theories (which is also the case for this dissertation), a generally 
accepted definition of disaster is not (yet) required. Especially “descriptive studies, 
can easily continue in the face of only a little consensus regarding what is meant 
by a disaster” (Perry, 2005, p. 323). In this context, a consensus about the defini-
tion is unnecessary; it suffices if each researcher decides on a definition for his or 
her work (Perry, 2007, p. 15). For this research, this task is done in the following 
paragraph.
Building on Fritz’s definition, the author understands disaster as a social event, that 
is disruptive to a degree where a community can no longer handle the problem au-
tonomously. For the purpose of this research, the author adopts the definition from 
the UNISDR, which defines a disaster as “[a] serious disruption of the function-
ing of a community or a society involving widespread human, material, economic 
or environmental losses and impacts, which exceeds the ability of the affected 
community or society to cope using its own resources” (UNISDR, 2009, p. 9). Ac-
cordingly, events that do not meet these conditions are referred to as “hazardous 
events” in this work.
2.2 RISK
Disasters are the materialization of risks (Britton, 2005, p. 76; see illustration 3). 
Likewise, disaster risk is defined as “[t]he potential disaster losses, in lives, health 
status, livelihoods, assets and services, which could occur to a particular commu-
nity or a society over some specified future time period.”(UNISDR, 2009, pp. 9–10). 
This definition of disaster risk as a potential or a possibility offers humans the op-
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portunity to influence risk and reduce or prevent the undesirable effects it can 
cause; accordingly, a disaster can be understood as a risk that was not managed 
sufficiently (Cardona, 2011, p. 112). Likewise the proper management of a haz-
ardous event can prevent it from turning into a disaster.
To manage risk before it turns into a disaster, two basic conceptual approaches 
that address disaster risk are widely used. They correspond with the realist and 
constructivist world-view introduced above. The socio-technical approach that 
derives from applied sciences and economics is based on statistical predictions 
and the analyses of probabilities. This approach assumes that events can be ob-
jectively measured “in terms of physical damage to persons and ecosystems” 
(Cardona, 2011, p. 109). This simplification has its benefits and downsides. While 
it makes risk quantifiable and countermeasures comparable, the abstraction of 
social aspects can also lead to an oversimplification of complex processes (Car-
dona, 2011, p. 109).
The socio-cultural approach, is based on a constructivist world-view and under-
stands risk as a social phenomenon. It can be further divided into individualist 
and structuralist approaches: The individualistic approaches of psychology un-
derstand risk as the perception of each single individual (Tversky Kahnemann 
1973, 1974, Slovic, Fischhoff Lichtenstein 1981), while proponents of the struc-
turalist approach see risk as a construct of society or culture and consider 
cultural theory to be the most appropriate way to address risk (Thompson & 
Wildavsky, 1982). While the socio-cultural approach allows to take people’s 
varied understandings of risk into account, it lacks operability for public policy. 
In practice, this approach “requires knowledge of individual perceptions and 
social representations, and of the interactions between the different social 
actors” (Cardona 2011: 111). Accordingly, this understanding of risk requires 
comprehensive participation processes. Both, the socio-technical approach 
and the socio-cultural approach have their justification. This is why the research 
community came to the conclusion to comprehend risk as “a social construct 
as well as a physical reality, and the two aspects are intimately linked” (Organi-
sation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2003). For a more precise 
elaboration on this topic, the reader is referred to Mayo and Hollander (1994), 
Rosa (1998) and Renn (2008).
The different fields of research that addressed risk over time, resulted in a va-
riety of definitions in use. At an expert meeting in 1979, that was organized by 
the Office of the United Nations Disaster Relief Coordinator (UNDRO) and the 
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) the 
first attempt to unify the understanding of risk and to clarify its components was 
made (UNDRO, 1980, 5ff). Since then, the definition has been further developed 
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Illustration 3 | Disaster as materialization of risk | Own illustration
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The understanding of risk as composed of the components hazard and vulner-
ability was adopted for this research (see illustration 4). Until recently, the haz-
ard component was commonly considered to be the quantifiable component of 
risk. Researchers relied on the hazard’s (assumed) continuity to forecast future 
events based on past experiences. This view was widely accepted until the influ-
ence of climate change on certain natural hazards was discovered. This changed 
the perception of hazards and will most likely result in different definitions of 
hazards in the future. The discussion about vulnerability, on the other hand, has 
been ongoing since its introduction into the risk context in the 1970s. The rea-
son for this is that the social context of vulnerability leaves a broad interpretive 
framework. The following chapter gives an overview of the two risk components 
hazard and vulnerability and the ongoing discussions surrounding them.
2.2.1 Hazard
Until the 1970s, hazards have often been treated as the main or, in some cases, 
even the only component of disaster risk (Cardona et al., 2012, p. 108; Hilhorst 
& Bankoff, 2004, pp. 1–2; Perry, 2007, pp. 8–9). This changed when the social 
component of vulnerability was introduced, and today the social coherencies of 
risk are at the center of disaster research (Perry, 2007). As the equation above 
shows, hazard is a necessary condition of risk; without hazard there is no po-
tential for disaster. Hazards are the “possible, future occurrence of natural or 
human-induced physical events that may have adverse effects on vulnerable and 
exposed elements” (Cardona et al., 2012, p. 69). Accordingly, the term hazard 
refers to a “threat or potential for adverse effects, not the physical event itself” 
(Lavell et al., 2012, p. 32). The term hazard also includes the “probability and 
magnitude” of an event. Socio-technical risk approaches especially focus their 
technical risk assessment on what they considered to be the objective element 
of disaster risk. They evaluate statistical data to determine a hazard’s probabil-
ity of future occurrence. Based on this knowledge, they intend to address the 
causes for possible negative effects, e.g., through engineering solutions (Renn, 
2008, p. 12).
Recently the research community discovered that this understanding was erro-
neous. The misconception was realized when the influence of climate change 
on weather related physical events like heat waves droughts or floods was 
discovered (IPCC, 2014, p. 53; Lavell et al., 2012). The European Commission 
termed this change of the environment as an “evolving baseline” (European 
Commission, Directorate-General for the Environment, 2013, p.  33). Geologi-
cal hazards, like the earthquake and tsunami this research focuses on, are not 
(yet) linked to the effected of climate change. Nevertheless, there is an ongoing 
discussion about the influence of the climate on geological hazards (McGuire & 
Maslin, 2013), which has not come to a final conclusion. Accordingly, the effects 
RISK = HAZARD X VULNERABILITY
and today it is widely accepted that risk can be defined as a simplified equation 
of hazard and vulnerability (as first proposed by Fournier d’Albe, 1985, p. 77 and 
later adopted by UNISDR, 2004):
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of climate change on disaster risk, are not further considered for this research. 
Readers who are interested to learn more about this topic are referred to Field et 
al. (2012). The recognition of the uncertainty concerning the hazard component 
of risk helps to acknowledge the relevance and understanding of vulnerability as 
the second component of risk (Lavell et al., 2012, p. 37).
2.2.2 Vulnerability
Vulnerability is a concept that was introduced into the disaster risk discussion 
by O’Keefe, Westgate and Wisner (1976) in the 1970s. It was the reply to the 
hazard focused approach of the past and emphasized the importance of so-
cial factors for disaster risk. Including social processes opens the opportunity 
to address disaster risks before they manifest into disasters (Cardona et al., 
2003; Cardona et al., 2012). Vulnerability can be defined as “the propensity of 
exposed elements such as human beings, their livelihoods, and assets to suffer 
adverse effects when impacted by hazard events” (Cardona et al., 2012, p. 69). 
The concept of vulnerability was adopted into various fields, which is why there 
are various conceptual frameworks for vulnerability. Cardona et al. identify the 
following four (2012):
1. The pressure and release (PAR) model (Blaikie, Cannon, Davis, & Wisner, 
1994; Wisner et al., 2004) focuses on less developed countries and em-
phasizes that vulnerability is created through socio-economic conditions, 
such as gender, age or socio-economic status, in everyday life. Although 
the approach acknowledges the necessity of hazards to generate disas-
ters, its main focus is on explaining the various social causes that form 
vulnerability. Hence, the PAR model does not consider factors such as 
building structure or settlement in hazardous zones as components of 
vulnerability (Wisner et al., 2004).
2. The human-environmental approach links vulnerability to a broader hu-
man and environmental context and thereby connects the concept of 
vulnerability with sustainability science (Turner, Kasperson et al., 2003; 
Turner, Matson et al., 2003). The complex concept was developed by 
the Research and Assessment Systems for Sustainability Program and 
emphasizes the importance of considering a system’s various linkages 
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Illustration 4 | Vulnerability and hazard as the elements of risk | Own illustration
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to understand its vulnerability. According to this approach, vulnerability 
is composed of the elements exposure, sensitivity (of human as well as 
environmental components) and resilience (including coping/ response, 
impact/ response and adjustment and adaptation/ response) (Turner, 
Kasperson et al., 2003).
3. The holistic disaster risk approach aims to combine all existing risk per-
spectives into one interdisciplinary concept (Cardona, 2011, p. 111). The 
concept divides vulnerability into exposure, susceptibility and coping ca-
pacity/ resilience. One major part of this approach is the feedback loop 
“which underlines that vulnerability is dynamic and is the main driver 
and determinant of current or future risk” (Cardona et al., 2012, p. 71). 
This approach is also used in the field of spatial planning (MOVE, 2011).
4. The climate change adaptation approach defines vulnerability as “a func-
tion of the character, magnitude, and rate of climate change and variation 
to which a system is exposed, its sensitivity, and its adaptive capacity” 
(IPCC, 2007, p. 21) and was used by the IPCC in its Fourth Assessment 
Report. This vulnerability approach differs from the ones used in disas-
ter risk management because it focuses on gradual changes, such as 
climate change, as an element of vulnerability (IPCC, 2007, p. 21). The 
approach therefore is not intended to explain specific events, but the 
change that occurs between present and future through slowly proceed-
ing stresses.
The variety of these frameworks shows that the discussion about vulnerability 
and its main elements is still ongoing. This makes it complicated to acquire a 
comprehensive picture and develop an individual understanding of the topic. 
The practical application of the four approaches introduced above, shows that 
the PAR model is most commonly used in social science, while the human-en-
vironmental approach finds application in the social-ecological context (Cardo-
na et al., 2012). The climate change adaptation approach is especially useful to 
understand and address slowly changing conditions (like climate change) and 
is therefore widely used in this context, e.g., in the IPCC’s Fourth Assessment 
Report (IPCC, 2007). The comprehensive perspective of the holistic disaster 
risk approach makes it useful for an application in the field of spatial planning 
(MOVE, 2011). This approach’s core element, the feedback loop, which enables 
learning from past experience, was also adopted for this research (see illustra-
tion 5). Although each of the various frameworks emphasizes different points, 
there are elements that are consistently related to vulnerability (Smit & Wandel, 
2006, p. 286) and are also used for this dissertation. These elements are:
 › Exposure and physical susceptibility refers to spatial exposure of people 
and their assets to hazards, based on their location (e.g., living in a flood 
prone area), as well as the physical susceptibility of their built struc-
tures (e.g., buildings that cannot withstand an earthquake). Exposure 
and physical susceptibility are the “hard” components of vulnerability. 
They are closely connected to the hazard (Cardona, 2011, p. 114), and 
spatial planning’s impact on them (e.g., through land-use planning or the 
application of building codes) is obvious. Although some works consider 
exposure as a separate component of risk (e.g., IPCC, 2012), it can also 
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be considered as one element of vulnerability, “because it is implicit in 
the notion of vulnerability. In other words, one cannot be ’vulnerable’ 
unless one is ’exposed’” (Cardona, 2011, p. 113). For this research, ex-
posure is considered to be a component of vulnerability.
 › Fragility or sensitivity refers to the “soft” factors of vulnerability that 
manifest themselves in social, economic and ecological predispositions 
that result in diverse vulnerabilities for different groups of people. These 
aspects usually are not hazard dependent. Determinants for fragility can 
be the gender, age, religion or race of a person (social), a person’s occu-
pation (economic) or his/ her reliance on nature (ecological). Critics state 
that limiting vulnerability to the elements exposure, susceptibility and 
fragility, results in a “negative concept of vulnerability” (Gaillard, 2010, 
p. 220). It restricts vulnerable systems to solely rely on actions from the 
outside to overcome this state. To address this problem and broaden the 
understanding of vulnerability, the concept of capacity was introduced 
in the 1980s.
 › Capacity takes people’s ability to cope with hazards into account and 
“reflect[s] the emergence of the vulnerability paradigm” (Gaillard, 2010, 
p. 222). Capacity increases a system’s ability to recover or evolve and 
can be linked to entire systems, partial groups or individuals. Thereby, 
capacity enables people to actively encounter risks, instead of helpless-
ly enduring them (Gaillard, 2010, p.  222). Capacity can either refer to 
adaptive or coping capacity, whereby adaptive capacity is preparatory 
and directed into the future and coping capacity is responsive and influ-
ences present risk. Adaptive capacity is “[t]he ability of systems, insti-
tutions, humans, and other organisms to adjust to potential damage, to 
take advantage of opportunities, or to respond to consequences” (IPCC, 
2013, p. 2). The term emerged from the climate change discourse which 
made it necessary to adapt to changing climatic conditions without the 
necessity to experience a hazardous event as a trigger, e.g., by adapting 
to climate change based on climate projections. Today the concept has 
a broader context and also includes other changes such as soil erosion 
(UNISDR, 2009, p. 4). Adaptive capacity addresses future risks through 
measures that are implemented today (e.g., changing land-uses to re-
duce future risk), but does not influence today’s risk (Greiving et al., 
2015). Coping capacity on the other hand is defined as “[t]he ability of 
people, organizations and systems, using available skills and resourc-
es, to face and manage adverse conditions, emergencies or disasters” 
(UNISDR, 2009, p. 8). This means coping is the ability of a system to 
immediately react to a hazardous event – and is therefore typically linked 
to a hazardous event as a trigger. In contrast to adaptive capacity, coping 
capacity directly addresses present risks (Greiving et al., 2015).
To conclude, exposure, susceptibility and fragility are system predispositions 
that may cause harm when a hazard interferes with them. Capacity on the other 
hand prescribes the ability to cope with this harm, either before (anticipation, 
adaptation) or while/ after (response, recovery) a hazardous event occurs. Like-
wise, adaptive capacity addresses future risks, while coping capacity addresses 
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present risks. Accordingly, the current adaptive capacity can be used to build to-
morrow’s coping capacity if the appropriate measures are taken. By this means, 
a system’s capacity is able to prevent that a future hazardous event turns into 
a disaster (understood as a serious dysfunction that exceeds a systems own 
resources) or support the recovery process after a disaster occurs.
There is an ongoing debate about the relation between capacity and vulnerabil-
ity (Cardona et al., 2012; Cutter et al., 2008; Gaillard, 2010): Some researchers 
understand capacity – or a lack thereof – as one element of vulnerability (e.g., 
Pelling, 2003; Cardona, 2011; Turner, Kasperson et al., 2003). In this context, vul-
nerability is “seen as the remainder after capacity had been taken into account” 
(Cardona et al., 2012, p. 73).
Davis, Haghebaert, and Peppiatt (2004), on the other hand, called attention to 
the shortcomings of this view by pointing out that capacity and vulnerability 
cannot always be measured on the same scale. In some cases, communities 
are vulnerable in some aspects although they possess considerable capacities 
in other domains. Therefore, it is advisable “to confine all the resources and ca-
pabilities of communities under the term ’capacity’ and to restrict the word vul-
nerability to factors that contribute to putting people at risk” (Davis et al., 2004, 
p. 2). Considering this, capacity and vulnerability are two separate elements that 
are able to mutually influence each other. This understanding is also adopted 
for this research because defining capacity as one component of vulnerability 
restricts the opportunities that the concept of capacity has to offer. This is be-
cause the goal of eliminating a risk is reached when vulnerability is reduced to 
nil. Whether capacity is built on top of this minimized vulnerability, is irrelevant; 
it cannot be considered within this context. To clarify this line of thought, the 
following quote from Jonathan Larson’s rock musical Rent (1996) is used. The 
quote was first used in the context of resilience and vulnerability by Thomas 
P. M. Barnett in his blog (Barnett 2016)2: “The opposite of war isn’t peace, it’s 
creation.”– The quote emphasizes that the absence of a destructive force is not 
necessarily the opposite of this force. To oppose the destructive force of war, 
a productive force – creation – is needed. When transferred into the context of 
disaster risk, this means that the opposite of a disaster is not its absence (which 
can be achieved by reducing vulnerability to nil), but the ability to create (which 
can be achieved through building capacity). Including capacity into vulnerabili-
ty therefore deprives the concept of this ability to create. Although it certainly 
is possible to include these considerations into the concept of vulnerability, it 
seems more appropriate for this research to extract capacity from the concept 
of vulnerability and understand them to interact. This means that building capac-
ity can decrease vulnerability and a decline of capacity can lead to an increase 
of vulnerability. Nevertheless, this interaction is complex and differs for various 
aspects (physical, political-institutional, social, economic, environmental) and 
over time. Consequently, a system is able to hold capacity regarding one aspect 
and still be vulnerable regarding another (Davis et al., 2004). For instance, the 
degree of vulnerability often varies between different socio-demographic groups 
(e.g., poor/ rich, women/ men) and building the capacity of one group does not 
automatically reduce the vulnerability of another.
2 Because Barnett framed the terminology differently, his line of thought is not adopted for this 
research.
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Understanding capacity as a separated element from vulnerability, extends the 
risk equation by another factor. Instead of merely considering vulnerability and 
hazard, the component of capacity is added (see illustration 5). While coping 
capacity directly influences vulnerability, adaptive capacity can only interpose 
its influence delayed in time, which is illustrated by the clock. In accordance 
with the holistic disaster risk approach (Cardona, 2011) and because the ability 
to learn from a disaster, is an important element of disaster risk reduction, the 
learning loop arrow was added. It enables the system to use a disruptive event 
as a chance to build coping capacity and reduce vulnerability to deal with future 
hazardous event. In the best case, this process can prevent a disaster from 
happening.
It is a common perspective to identify capacity with resilience (Cardona, 2011; 
Cardona et al., 2012). The reason for this lies in the aspiration to unify the sep-
arately developed capacity and resilience concepts. As discussed above, there 
is a difference between coping and adaptive capacity, which begs the question 
which kind of capacity is equivalent to resilience. The difference between coping 
and adaptive capacity can roughly be described with the following quote: “While 
coping aims to maintain the system and its functions in the face of adverse 
conditions, adaptation involves changes and requires reorganization processes” 
(Cardona et al., 2012, p. 73) or as Birkmann summarizes: “[C]oping encompass-
es immediate measures that might help to deal with an actual hazard event (im-
pact), adaptation measures should allow for a longer-term adjustment (change)” 
(Birkmann, 2011, p. 1117). This means, coping capacity exists at a specific mo-
ment while adaptive capacity unfolds over a period of time. To answer the ques-
tion regarding the relationship between resilience and capacity, it is important to 
Illustration 5 | The disaster risk framework | Own illustration
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learn more about the emergence and current understanding of the concept of 
resilience. These will be elaborated in-depth in Chapter 3. First, however, spatial 
planning’s ability to manage disaster risk is explained in the following section. 
Nevertheless, it should not be concealed that it was impossible to come to 
a conclusive result about the complex connections between the terminology 
used in the disaster risk context. This especially concerns the relation between 
coping/ adaptive capacity, resilience and vulnerability. For the research of this 
dissertation the outline of the most important aspects will have to suffice.
2.3 RISK GOVERNANCE
Risk governance “deals with the identification, assessment, management and 
communication of risks in a broad context. It includes the totality of actors, 
rules, conventions, processes and mechanisms and is concerned with how rel-
evant risk information is collected, analysed and communicated, and how man-
agement decisions are taken” (IRGC, 2008, p. 4).
In accordance with the Risk Governance Framework established by the Inter-
national Risk Governance Council (IRGC) (2005, 2008) and the application of 
this framework into the context of spatial planning by the URBIPROOF project 
(Dzurdženík et al., 2015), risk governance can be structured into the phases risk 
pre-assessment, risk assessment, risk appraisal and characterization and risk 
management. These phases are framed by a comprehensive communication 
process, which is depicted in the middle of illustration 6.
Risk pre-assessment includes the broad analysis that has to be carried out be-
fore the actual risk appraisal begins. It includes the identification of relevant 
stakeholders for further risk governance process and the development of a com-
mon definition of relevant risks between these stakeholders (risk framing) (Dz-
urdženík et al., 2015).
Risk appraisal is composed of two consecutive steps. First, a scientific analysis 
of the risk’s physical characteristics is conducted. This analysis includes the iden-
tification of the risk determinants hazard and vulnerability (including exposure, 
physical susceptibility and fragility) and assesses possible impacts that can be 
caused through their interaction. In a second step, the results from this analy-
sis are used to assess the social impacts that these risks have for the relevant 
stakeholders. This analysis also includes the consideration of existing capacities 
and is termed concern assessment. The result of the risk appraisal phase, is a 
comprehensive understanding of risks (Dzurdženík et al., 2015).
Risk characterization includes a thorough consideration and scientific analysis of 
the information collected during the risk appraisal phase. This analysis includes 
the estimation of the probability of specific effects to occur and also considers 
mutual influences and trade-offs between different risk determinants. It is pos-
sible to either conduct the analysis based on quantitative (resulting in numerical 
values) or qualitative methodology (resulting in the attribution of categories such 
as high, moderate, low). In any case it has to be considered that the results of 
this risk characterization can be biased and always include uncertainties. Based 
on the risk characterization results, the step of risk evaluation in conducted. Risk 
evaluation includes a normative evaluation and therefore is considered to be the 
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most controversial step in the risk governance process. In this step, decisions 
are made based on personal values rather than scientific evidence. Accordingly, 
the comprehensive participation of all relevant stakeholders is crucial. The step 
of risk evaluation concludes with a categorization of risks as either acceptable, 
tolerable or intolerable. Based on this evaluation, decisions are made if and how 
certain risks are addressed in the risk management phase (Dzurdženík et al., 
2015).
Risk management includes the decision-makers’ decision about strategies to 
address risks that require action, their implementation and monitoring. If risk 
management is carried out successfully, it is able to reduce the impact of these 
risks and minimize negative consequences for the society. The selection of the 
most efficient risk management strategies depends on the risk’s degree of com-
plexity, uncertainty and ambiguity (Dzurdženík et al., 2015).
Communication is a crucial aspect of the risk governance process and should be 
continuously carried out throughout all of the steps introduced above. The ne-
cessity for comprehensive communication and participation processes is based 
on the constructivist understanding of risk as socially constructed, but it is also 
of special importance if normative decisions are made, which is the case during 
risk evaluation (Dzurdženík et al., 2015).
In spatial planning, these risk governance steps can be integrated into the 
framework of the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA). This is useful 
because spatial planners are usually familiar with this procedure for the as-
sessment of environmental impacts of large scale construction projects. Fur-
thermore, the risk governance phases correspond to the steps of the EIA as 
Deciding Understanding
Categorizing the 
knowledge about 
the risk
Communication
Pre-Assessment
Appraisal
Characterization & 
Evaluation
Management
Illustration 6 | IRGC Risk Governance Framework | Own illustration based on Dzurdženík et 
al., 2015, p. 2 and IRGC, 2008, p. 8
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presented in illustration 7. The monitoring step, is not included in the risk gov-
ernance framework, but should still be considered. It enables the review and 
improvement of the course of action used to govern risk.
For each risk governance phase, there are certain spatial planning options that 
can be applied to reach the goal of this phase. The following chapter gives a gen-
eral overview of these options. The spatial planning options for the risk pre-as-
sessment, risk appraisal and risk characterization and evaluation phases partially 
overlap and are therefore subsumed under risk assessment in this research. The 
following chapter therefore explains the spatial planning options for risk assess-
ment, risk management and risk communication.
2.4 SPATIAL PLANNING AND RISK GOVERNANCE
Spatial planning’s relevance for risk governance was first introduced by Raymond 
J. Burby (1998) and David R. Godschalk and colleagues (1999). While this con-
nection was only acknowledged by policy makers and spatial planners at first, it 
is now widely accepted and reflected in the consideration of spatial planning (or 
the related terms land-use planning or urban planning) in policy documents like 
the Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-2015 and – its replacement – the Sendai 
Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030 (Dzurdženík et al., 2015). In 
addition to this, poorly planned urban structures are considered to be one driver 
for disaster risk with the ability to influence the hazard as well as the vulner-
ability component (PreventionWeb, 2015). The following three chapters give a 
general introduction of the spatial planning options used in the risk assessment 
and risk management phase of the risk governance process and explain how 
important continuous communication throughout the entire process is. An elab-
oration of spatial planning options available in Japan can be found in Chapter 4.
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Risk Appraisal
 › Define scope of the decision
 › Identify hazards and estimate frequency using risk scenarios
 › Perform stakeholder analysis/ risk perception through dialogue
 › Start the risk information library
 › Define methodology for frequency and consequences
Risk Management
 › Identify feasible risk management options
 › Evaluate effectiveness, cost and risk of options
 › Assess stakeholder acceptance of proposed actions
 › Evaluate options for dealing with residual risk
 › Assess stakeholder acceptance of residual risk
Risk Characterization 
& Evaluation
 › Estimate and integrate benefits and costs
 › Assess stakeholder acceptance of risk
Risk Pre-Assessment
 › Define problem and associated risk issues
 › Identify potential stakeholders
 › Begin consultation
Monitoring
 › Develop an implementation plan
 › Evaluate effectiveness of risk management process
 › Establish monitoring process
Scoping
Identification &  
Description of Effects
Evaluation of Effects
Integration of IA into 
Decision Making
Monitoring
Illustration 7 | Risk governance and Environmental Impact Assessment | Own illustration based on Dzurdženík et al., 2015, p. 3
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2.4.1 Spatial planning and risk assessment
Risk assessment includes the assessment of hazardous areas and the analysis 
of how these areas intersect with vulnerable land-uses. After the risk is iden-
tified, it has to be evaluated and decisions as to how it should be addressed 
have to be made. During the risk assessment phase spatial planners can, for in-
stance, cooperate on the development on hazard and risk maps. Hazard maps il-
lustrate the spatial impact of different hazards (e.g., landslides, earthquakes and 
tsunamis) and are prepared on the basis of geographical hazard information. If 
hazard maps are extended with the spatial information of vulnerable land-uses, 
risk maps can be developed. Hazard and risk maps serve as an important foun-
dation for the development of risk evaluation maps. Risk evaluation maps add a 
normative component to the deterministic foundation of hazard and risk maps: 
These maps incorporate risk priorities for the different protected goods (i.e., air, 
water, soil, flora, fauna, landscape and human beings) and thereby decide where 
there is a need to act (Dzurdženík et al., 2015). As explained in Chapter 2.3, the 
EIA, can be used to frame the risk governance process. This is especially helpful 
because its intention is to enable the weighing of interests between different 
protected goods and to reach a conclusion.
2.4.2 Spatial planning and risk management
Based on the results from the risk assessment phase, spatial planners have sev-
eral options available to address disaster risk. These can be summarized into the 
following four aspects, which are introduced in the following paragraphs based 
on Greiving and Mägdefrau (2016): minimization of exposure of urban areas, 
differentiated land-use decisions, adaptation of building structures and hazard 
mitigation. The first three options intend to govern risk by reducing the damage 
potential. These are the options where spatial planners carry the main responsi-
bility (Greiving, 2002, p. 8). The last option intends to reduce risk through hazard 
mitigation and requires spatial planners to intensify their cooperation with the 
responsible sectoral planning departments.
2.4.2.1 Minimization of exposure of urban areas
To minimize the exposure of urban areas, the following two options are avail-
able: Preventing the future development of residential land-uses in hazardous 
areas and reducing the amount of existing residential land-uses in hazardous 
areas. The first option, to prevent the urban development of hazardous areas 
that are not yet developed in order to limit an advancement of risk, usually has 
priority because it is easier to implement. To achieve the prevention of the fu-
ture development of hazardous areas, the local spatial planning system must 
provide the possibility to designate hazardous areas and restrict development 
in these zones. These restrictions have to be strong enough to ensure their 
observance. The configuration of planning instruments to achieve the minimiza-
tion of exposure of urban areas, differ from country to county. For Japan, they 
are explained in Chapter 4. The second possibility is to enforce the retreat from 
hazardous areas that are already developed. This possibility is much more com-
plicated because existing settlements are protected by private property rights in 
many countries worldwide (Japan is one of them). Accordingly, the designation 
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of built-up areas as hazardous usually results in the need to pay huge compensa-
tion payments to the landowners in order to make them sell their land and leave 
(Greiving & Mägdefrau, 2016). For this reason, this option is only used occasion-
ally in normal times (“normal times” refers to times in which an area did not 
recently experience a disaster). Nevertheless, the destruction of built structures 
through a disaster opens a window of opportunity for the relocation of citizens 
who used to live in hazardous areas to safer locations (Greiving & Mägdefrau, 
2016; see Chapter 3.3).
2.4.2.2 Differentiated land-use decisions
Different land-use types have different susceptibilities to hazards. For instance, 
residential land-uses are especially vulnerable because they accommodate citi-
zens not only while they are awake, but also when they are asleep. The vulner-
ability of industrial or commercial land-uses can be lower, but depends on the 
actual establishments that are situated in these areas. With the designation of 
areas for specific land-uses, spatial planners are able to prevent their use for 
residential purposes, but enable the establishment of industrial or commercial 
businesses. The decision of which land-uses should be facilitated in areas that 
are exposed to natural hazards is normative and is usually based on the hazard’s 
impact on the area (e.g., inundation depth) and the intention to protect certain 
goods (e.g., human lives, economic assets, critical infrastructure, ecosystem 
services) (Greiving & Mägdefrau, 2016), which is the reason why citizen partici-
pation is of specific importance in this context.
2.4.2.3 Adaptation of building structures
This point aims to reduce the susceptibility of buildings in order to reduce di-
saster risk on the local level. The procedure to achieve the adaptation of building 
structures differs between newly constructed and already existing houses. To 
ensure the realization of resilient building designs for newly constructed build-
ings (e.g., through the exclusion of the ground floor from residential uses), the 
adjustment of building codes or the decree of certain requirements in order 
to get a building permission are useful options. To achieve the adaptation of 
existing buildings, it is important to convince residents and landowners of the 
importance to invest into this endeavor in order to increase their personal safety. 
In this context, risk awareness raising campaigns or incentives can be helpful 
options (Greiving & Mägdefrau, 2016). Furthermore, spatial planners are also 
responsible to provide a sufficient amount of public housing to ensure the safe 
accommodation of people who are unable to afford private houses.
2.4.2.4 Hazard mitigation
While the options introduced above address the vulnerability component of risk, 
it is also possible to take measures to reduce risk by addressing the hazard 
component. In this context, spatial planners are required to work together with 
the sectoral departments that are responsible for the mitigation of the respec-
tive hazard (e.g., water authorities for the protection from river floods). Possible 
measures that fall under this point are the construction of protective infrastruc-
ture (e.g., seawalls or river embankments to protect the city from tsunamis or 
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river floods or slope protection measures to prevent landslides) and the adapta-
tion of the urban structure (e.g., adapting the sewage system to protect the city 
from flooding from heavy rainfall or land raising) (Greiving & Mägdefrau, 2016).
2.4.3 Spatial planning and risk communication
Communication is an essential part throughout the entire risk governance pro-
cess. Nevertheless, the normative nature of the decision of which goods should 
be protected from hazardous events particularly calls for a broad public partici-
pation process (Fleischhauer et al., 2012). The importance to include “relevant 
stakeholders” to “[strengthen] disaster risk governance to manage disaster 
risk” (UNISDR, 2015c, p. 17) has also just recently been emphasized in the Sen-
dai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030 by the UNISDR. There are 
different reasons why the inclusion of citizens is essential. In context of the nor-
mative nature of decisions, the most important reason is to enable the citizens 
to contribute their opinions to the decision-making process. The purpose of this 
is based in the constructivist understanding of risk as being socially constructed 
(Slovic, 1999) and that defining risk is an act of power, which sets the basis for 
the ultimate decisions of how a risk is addressed (Slovic, 2001). Ethical aspects 
require the consideration of the public’s opinion in the decision making process 
because these decisions can directly or indirectly impact the society (Mägdefrau 
& Sprague, 2016). In this context, the involvement of citizens corresponds with 
their empowerment (Arnstein, 1969, p. 216). In addition to this, the contribution 
of the citizen’s knowledge can also improve the quality of decisions and plans 
(Glass, 1979, p. 181). The reason for this is that (according to the constructivist 
understanding of risk) the definition of risk changes with the public’s perception 
of risk. To reach an adequate definition of risk, it is therefore necessary to in-
clude the public’s view on risk (Mägdefrau & Sprague, 2016). This relevance for 
citizen participation grows in relation with the increase of the risk’s uncertainty 
and/ or complexity (Evers, 2012 referring to Hajer & Wagenaar, 2003, p.  10). 
Furthermore, the inclusion of citizens into the decision-making process can in-
crease the transparency of the outcomes and raise the citizens’ “trust and confi-
dence in government, making it more likely that they accept decisions and plans 
and will work within the system when seeking solutions to problems” (Glass, 
1979, p. 181). Including citizens can therefore help to simplify or speed up the 
implementation of the intended measures and plans. Nevertheless, it must be 
considered that there is no guarantee for the citizen’s acceptance, even if they 
are part of the decision-making process (Mägdefrau & Sprague, 2016, p. 297).
Based on Sherry R. Arnstein’s Ladder of Citizen Participation, the level of citizen 
participation can be differentiated by the degree of involvement. The original 
Ladder included eight rungs (manipulation, therapy, informing, consultation, pla-
cation, partnership, delegated power, citizen control), which were categorized 
into three categories (Arnstein, 1969, p. 217).
Mägdefrau and Sprague “separate[d] the different levels of participation be-
tween one-way and two-way forms of communication. One-directional commu-
nication pathways can be considered as a passive form of participation. This 
refers to a one-way provision of information – either from the administration to-
wards the stakeholders/ public (eg information events) or from the stakeholders 
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towards the administration (eg by commenting on draft versions of plans). In this 
form of participation, there is typically very limited to no exchange of information 
and ideas between different parties, nor a continuous or iterative process of 
dialogue” (Mägdefrau & Sprague, 2016, p. 299).
Thereby, manipulation, therapy and information can be considered as one-way 
forms of communication that do not actively include the public into the deci-
sion-making process and are therefore located below the edge of participation 
(see illustration 8).
Manipulation is a factitious form of “participation”, which influences citizens to 
support the decisions taken by those in power. Accordingly, it encompasses 
measures that influence the citizens to accept the will of the authorities (Mäg-
defrau & Sprague, 2016, p. 300). Therapy sees each citizen with a dissenting 
opinion as in need of curing (Arnstein, 1969). Instead of trying to understand 
the citizen’s opinion and solving disagreements through discussions on a level 
playing field, power-holders decide how the people should be “treated” in order 
to “cure” them from their problematic opinion. Therapy tries to keep the inter-
ference with citizens to a minimum and is only conducted in order to simplify 
the implementation of the power-holders interests (Mägdefrau & Sprague, 2016, 
p. 300). Information forms the foundation for two-way forms of communication 
and is therefore an essential part of meaningful participation (Evers, 2012). It in-
cludes the citizens’ provision of material and knowledge regarding ongoing deci-
sion-making processes and the citizens’ privilege and ability to influence the de-
cisions’ outcomes (e.g., through websites, newsletters or information events). 
Information is considered as a one-way form of communication and does not 
intend to interactively discuss opinions. The decision to locate information below 
the edge of participation was taken because information is usually understood 
in a passive way which does not allow influence in shaping the decision-making 
(Mägdefrau & Sprague, 2016, pp. 299–300).
TWO-WAY 
COMMUNICATION
ONE-WAY 
COMMUNICATION
Shared Decision Making
(e.g. collaborative planning and modelling)
Increase in citizen 
power and ability 
to shape 
decision-making
Edge of 
participation
Active Involvement
(e.g. round tables and working groups)
Consultation
(e.g. discussion events and questionnaires)
Information
(e.g. website, pamphlet, info day)
Therapy
(e.g. info with the intent to “cure“)
Manipulation
(e.g. info with the intent to control)
Illustration 8 | Levels of participation | Own illustration based on Mägdefrau & Sprague, 
2016, p. 299; content adapted from Evers, 2012 and inspired by frameworks from Arn-
stein, 1969 and Firus, Fleischhauer, Greiving, Grifoni, & Stickler, 2012
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Consultation, active involvement and shared decision-making are located above 
the edge of participation. Consultation is the lowest genuine form of participa-
tion. It enables citizens to give their opinion on the decision-making process 
and can occur via public hearings or the submission of questionnaires or written 
comments. It is still regarded as a one-way form of communication because the 
public is not actively included into the decision making process and authorities 
are able to disregard public opinions if they do not consider them to be relevant 
enough (Mägdefrau & Sprague, 2016, p. 301). Active involvement is a form of 
participation that allows citizens to seriously engage themselves into the deci-
sion-making process, e.g., through the participation in round tables or working 
groups. The public’s direct exchange with authorities enables their voices to be 
heard and discussed. Active involvement enabled decision-makers to personally 
address the citizen’s concerns and support the consensus building. The citizen’s 
active involvement in the decision-making process “provides the opportunity 
for a higher sense of ownership” (Mägdefrau & Sprague, 2016, p. 302). Shared 
decision-making, as the highest form of participation, is achieved when repre-
sentatives of the government make their decisions in cooperation with the cit-
izens (Fiorino, 1990, p. 229). This means that “all involved persons or parties 
have equal rights” (Evers, 2012, p. 8). Shared decision-making can be found in 
community-led committees, which are entitled to take their own decisions and 
are responsible for their implementation. The difference between active involve-
ment and shared decision making is that the latter includes “equal ownership 
between the involved parties in the decision-making process” (Mägdefrau & 
Sprague, 2016, p. 302). For more information on each step, see Mägdefrau & 
Sprague, 2016.
As explained above, public participation has various advantages. Nevertheless, 
participation processes are also connected to certain disadvantages: These pro-
cesses are money and time consuming and cannot guarantee results. Public 
participation can produce unrealistic expectations, which can lead to disappoint-
ment if these expectations are not met. If participation is implemented in the af-
termath of a disaster, the requirements can overwhelm traumatized citizens and 
place an additional burden on them (Mägdefrau & Sprague, 2016). It is therefore 
advisable to condition the decision of which participation form to use (referring 
to consultation, active involvement or shared decision-making) on the character-
istics of the specific situation.
2.5 INTERIM CONCLUSION
This chapter illustrated that disaster risk can be influenced by three compo-
nents: hazard, vulnerability and capacity. To handle risks, the risk governance 
framework provides three main steps: risk assessment to understand risk, risk 
management to use this information to address risk and risk communication to 
continuously inform all important stakeholders (incl. the public) about ongoing 
processes and include them into the decision-making processes. As this chapter 
explained, spatial planning can play an important role for all of these steps.
For the risk assessment phase, spatial planners are able to provide information 
for the development of hazard maps or simulations and implement EIAs. The 
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risk management phase works towards the reduction of risk either through the 
mitigation of the hazard, the reduction of vulnerability or the increase of capac-
ity. One option that spatial planners have at hand to manage risk, is the mitiga-
tion of the hazard component. In this context, the construction of protective 
infrastructure (e.g., seawalls or river embankments) or the adaptation of urban 
structure (e.g., through widening roads) are useful options. When dealing with 
vulnerability, spatial planning’s influence is most noticeable in connection with 
the “physical” elements of vulnerability – exposure and susceptibility. In this 
context, land-use planning can be used to completely restrict hazardous areas 
from future urban development or guide the land-use in these areas. Moreover, 
the relocation of existing urban land-uses from areas exposed to hazards can be 
necessitated. Building codes or the enforcement of additional requirements for 
the construction of buildings in areas exposed to hazards are able to reduce the 
buildings’ susceptibility and by this means contribute to the reduction of vulner-
ability. In addition to these basic spatial planning options, planners are also able 
to support the increase of community cohesion to reduce social fragility. This 
goal can be achieved through comprehensive risk communication and public 
participation. These processes are especially useful to reduce fragility if they 
are used to incorporate the needs and requirements of vulnerable population 
groups into the decision-making process.
This chapter illustrated spatial planning’s ability to address disaster risks. As a 
next step it needs to be elaborated what this means for spatial planning’s ability 
to build resilience. To address this topic, it is important to get a thorough under-
standing of the concept of resilience and how it is connected to the concept of 
disaster risk introduced in this chapter. Based on this information, the following 
chapter explains the connection between spatial planning and resilience.
HAZARD
"possible, future occurrence of natural or human-in-
duced physical events that may have adverse effects 
on vulnerable and exposed elements" 
(Cardona et al., 2012, p. 69).
“[t]he potential disaster losses, in lives, health status, 
livelihoods, assets and services, which could occur to 
a particular community or a society over some 
specied future time period.” 
(UNISDR, 2009, pp. 9–10).
DISASTER RISK
VULNERABILITY
“the propensity of exposed elements such as human 
beings, their livelihoods, and assets to suffer adverse 
effects when impacted by hazard events.” 
(Cardona et al., 2012, p. 69). 
RESILIENCE
“the propensity of exposed elements such as human 
beings, their livelihoods, and assets to suffer adverse 
effects hen impacted by hazard events.” 
(Cardona et al., 2012, p. 69). 
“[a] serious disruption of the functioning of a commu-
nity or a society involving widespread human, material, 
economic or environmental losses and impacts, which 
exceeds the ability of the affected community or 
society to cope using its own resources” 
(UNISDR, 2009, p. 9).
DISASTER
Illustration 9 | Definitions of disaster, disaster risk, hazard and vulnerability | Own illustration
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3. RESILIENCE
Resilience derives from the Latin term resilire and means to rebound. Back in 
ancient times, the term was used in physics and mathematics to “describe the 
stability of materials and their resistance to external shocks” (Davoudi et al., 
2012). In the 1940s the term was adopted into the field of psychology (for a re-
view of the literature in this field, see Waller, 2001). In 1973, Holling introduced 
a new understanding of resilience. In his article Resilience and stability of eco-
logical systems he argued that systems are not necessarily limited to one state 
of equilibrium. Systems that are exposed to disturbances – as it usually is the 
case in ecology – tend to possess a wider range of adequate possible conditions 
(Holling, 1973, p. 1).
Holling distinguished between two forms of resilience: Engineering resilience (in 
his 1973 article called stability) “is the ability of a system to return to an equilibri-
um state after a temporary disturbance. The more rapidly it returns, and with the 
least fluctuation, the more stable it is” (Holling, 1973, p. 17). This understanding 
equals the understanding of resilience common in physics and engineering and 
matches with the “engineer’s desire to make things work, not to make things 
that break down or suddenly shift their behaviour.” (Holling, 1996, p. 38). This 
understanding of resilience therefore “emphasizes […] the maintenance of a 
predictable world” (Holling, 1973, p. 21). Although a stable state might seem 
desirable from an engineer’s point of view, nature often confronts people with 
unforeseen events and uncertainties that cannot be managed sufficiently with 
the narrow definition of engineering resilience. In this context, the concept of 
ecological resilience is more appropriate. Ecological resilience (in Holling’s 1973 
article simply called resilience) is defined as “the magnitude of disturbance that 
can be absorbed before the system changes its structure” (Holling, 1996, p. 33). 
This means that a system does not have to return to its former state to preserve 
its basic structure; it is aligned to “existence” rather than “efficiency” (Holling, 
1996, p. 33). Due to their ability to reorganize and adapt to new and uncommon 
conditions ecologically resilient systems are more robust to changing environ-
ments (Folke, 2006, p. 257). Accordingly, the engineering understanding of resil-
ience demands a system to bounce back, while ecological resilience enables a 
system to bounce forward (Davoudi et al., 2012).
From ecological resilience to evolutionary resilience
In the following years, Holling’s ecological resilience was widely discussed and 
adapted to various fields: e.g., ecological economics, cultural theory, human ge-
ography and particularly disaster management (Folke, 2006; Manyena, 2006). 
Based on the interdisciplinary work on the topic of resilience, social systems 
were combined with the ecological understanding of resilience and the term so-
cio-ecological resilience was formed (Adger, 2000). This is reasonable, because 
humankind depends on ecosystem services, which links the resilience of eco-
logical and social systems with each other. Although the transfer of resilience 
from ecological to social sciences also has its opponents (Adger, 2000), today 
the socio-ecological understanding of resilience is widely acknowledged. So-
cio-ecological resilience combines the interaction of social systems with their 
surrounding ecological systems and acknowledges their capacity to withstand 
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perturbations (e.g., through hazardous events) by sustaining their self-organiz-
ing ability and learning from the past to build up capacity for the future (Adger, 
Hughes, Folke, Carpenter, & Rockström, 2005) or as Carl Folke states: “In a 
resilient social–ecological system, disturbance has the potential to create oppor-
tunity for doing new things, for innovation and for development” (Folke, 2006, 
p.  253). Furthermore, the understanding contains the idea that systems can 
change over time even if no external disturbance influences them (Davoudi et 
al., 2012). Since this understanding of resilience has similarities to the evolu-
tionary theory (Simmie & Martin, 2010), it is also referred to as evolutionary re-
silience (Davoudi et al. 2012: 302). The understanding of evolutionary resilience 
turns natural scientists’ understanding of the world upside down: What used to 
be understood as well-ordered and predictable, now is viewed as chaotic and 
uncertain (Davoudi et al., 2012).
Holling and his colleague Lance H. Gunderson explain this new understanding 
of resilience with the metaphor of adaptive cycles that they introduced in 2001, 
after working on the topic for many years. The approach tries to link resilience 
with the systems of ecology, politics, institutions and management (Holling, 
2001, p. 391). Each adaptive cycle runs through four different phases that are 
characterized by different levels of potential (meaning possible future options of 
the system), connectedness between the different factors of the system and 
resilience against possible external disturbances (Holling, 2001, pp. 393–394). 
Those four phases are exploitation (r), conversation (K), release (Ω) and reorga-
nization (α); they are depicted in illustration 10. This means, a system’s reaction 
to external shocks depends on the phase it currently remains. During the long 
lasting process between the exploitation and conversation phase (from r to K), 
resources are slowly gained. In return, the backwards oriented and shorter pro-
cess between the release and reorganization phase (from Ω to α) has the poten-
tial for innovations (Holling, 2001, p. 394). The conversation phase is marked not 
only by a high amount of potential and connectedness, but also by a low amount 
of resilience, which resulted in Holling prescribing a system in this phase as “an 
accident waiting to happen” (Holling, 2001, p. 394).
Following the accident, a window of opportunity opens and enables the system 
to invent and test new approaches and structures before it re-enters into anoth-
er adaptive cycle (Olsson et al., 2006). In the disaster risk context, this accident 
is the occurrence of a disaster, which can cause the collapse of the existing 
adaptive cycle and thereby enable the system to enter into a fresh cycle. In this 
context, the disaster can be considered as a trigger to open a window of oppor-
tunity for improvement.
Because adaptive cycles are not isolated from their surroundings, Gunderson 
and Holling developed the concept of panarchy, a word synthesized from the 
Greek God Pan and the word hierarchy. Panarchy stands for the interconnection 
of different adaptive cycles with each other. This connection of adaptive cycles 
that work on different spatial and time scales enables them to interact with each 
other (Holling, 2001). “Each level is allowed to operate at its own pace, protected 
from above by slower, larger levels but invigorated from below by faster, smaller 
cycles of innovation” (Holling, 2001, pp. 398–399). If systems are confronted 
with severe disturbances, it is possible that this connectedness can lead to the 
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complete destruction of certain levels of the panarchy (Holling, 2001). “It is this 
panarchy model of adaptive cycle that underpins the evolutionary meaning of 
resilience” (Davoudi et al., 2012, p. 304).
When resilience is discussed, the distinction between the different understand-
ings can lead to problems. There is a huge difference between the engineering 
resilience, that seeks to bounce back to the original state of equilibrium as fast 
as possible, and the evolutionary resilience, that sees systems in a status of cur-
rent change and disturbance as a chance to change into a more desirable system 
state. This differentiation should be kept in mind when the concept of resilience 
is adapted to the urban context.
3.1 URBAN RESILIENCE
Cities are considered as highly complex and networked systems (Batty, 2007; 
Godschalk, 2003; Meerow, Newell, & Stults, 2016) and the growing size of urban 
area worldwide (United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 
Population Division, 2014) as well as the evolving baseline trend (see Chapter 2) 
are expected to increase these uncertainties and complexities even more. The 
concept of resilience’s ability to comprehend such complex processes offers a 
useful approach to understand and deal with this complexity. This explains why 
the resilience topic quickly grew in popularity between spatial planners after it 
was first introduced into this context in the 1990s (Meerow & Newell, 2016; 
Tasan-Kok, Stead, & Lu, 2013).
The variety of disciplines contributing to the concept of resilience enabled its 
establishment as a “boundary object” (Meerow et al., 2016, p. 39). A boundary 
object is a concept that is broad enough to use it across multiple disciplines, but 
stable enough to retain its meaning (Star & Griesemer, 1989). On the other side, 
this general applicability also results in ambiguity, which complicates the opera-
tionalization of resilience. Accordingly, Klein, Nicholls, and Thomalla (2003, p. 42) 
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Illustration 10 | The adaptive cycle | Own illustration based on Holling, 2001, p. 394
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state: “[T]he problem with resilience is the multitude of different definitions and 
turning any of them into operational tools […]. After thirty years of academic 
analysis and debate, the definition of resilience has become so broad as to ren-
der it almost meaningless.”
As Meerow et al. (2016) describe, the definition of urban resilience is based on 
the corresponding understanding of urban systems: While some scholars focus 
on the socio-technical aspects or urban systems (Geels & Schot, 2007; Graham 
& Marvin, 2001; Guy, Moss, & Marvin, 2001), others emphasize socio-ecological 
networks (Alberti et al., 2003; Pickett, Cadenasso, & McGrath, 2013; Resilience 
Alliance, 2007, 2010). Ernstson et al. (2010) suggest to combine these two un-
derstandings and consider urban systems as composed of both, socio-technical 
and socio-ecological networks. This is reasonable, if one considers urban sys-
tems to consist of various subsystems, which are linked through socio-technical 
and socio-ecological connections. According to the Resilience Alliance (2007) 
and Meerow et al. (2016), urban systems are composed of the following four 
subsystems: the governance network, the social-economic dynamics, the ma-
terial and energy flow network, and the urban infrastructure and form (see illus-
tration 11).
The governance network includes the connections between various actors rel-
evant for the urban system. This includes various governmental levels, nongov-
ernmental organizations (NGOs) and industrial companies (Meerow et al., 2016; 
Resilience Alliance, 2007). Socio-economic dynamics refer to the city’s social 
Governance Networks
States
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NGOs
Waste Energy Materials
Food Water Consumer 
Goods
Buildings Utilities
TransportationEcological 
Greenspace
Mobility
EducationCapitalPublic 
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Demo-
graphics
Equity and 
Justice
 Socio-Economic Dynamics
Networked Material and Energy Flows
Urban Infrastructure and Form
Illustration 11 | A simplified conceptual schematic of the urban system | Own illustration adapted from Meerow et al., 2016, 
p. 45; design inspired by Dicken, 2011
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order, which depends on the city’s demographic structure, its social norms and 
monetary assets. This also includes hierarchies developed and based on an un-
even distribution of wealth and power. These characteristics therefore highlight 
issues of justice in urban systems (Meerow et al., 2016; Resilience Alliance, 
2007). The material and energy flow network includes processes that provide 
a city with required services, such as water, energy or food supply and waste 
removal (Meerow et al., 2016). These facilities often rely on ecosystem services 
(e.g., provision of freshwater, fossil or renewal energy sources, food), which is 
why this layer is linked to the functionality of the environment (Resilience Alli-
ance, 2007). Furthermore, these services require a working utility infrastructure 
and thus are also connected to the built environment. A city’s urban infrastruc-
ture and form is the underlying structure where all the other processes take 
place. It includes the city’s utility infrastructure (incl. communication, energy, 
water/ sanitation and transportation networks), buildings, and green spaces 
(Meerow et al., 2016).
When considering these aspects of the urban system, it becomes apparent that 
a city’s urban infrastructure and form can be associated with the socio-technical 
approach to the urban system. The remaining three – the governance network, 
the social-economic dynamics, the material and energy flow network (which 
relies on the functionality of the environment) – on the other hand, can be con-
sidered as socio-ecological networks.
The understanding or urban resilience is directly connected with these under-
standings or urban systems. Technical structures require a single equilibrium to 
which they can return in order to survive. This corresponds with the engineering 
understanding of resilience. For instance, if an earthquake distorts a building, 
the building can either return back to its former state or, if it crosses a certain 
threshold, collapse. The building, as an engineered structure, does not possess 
multiple states of equilibrium. It therefore is unable to change its structure in 
order to adapt to a changing environment3. Accordingly, an engineer’s resilient 
city includes, e.g., buildings that are able to withstand earthquakes, hazardous 
areas that are free from residential land-uses, and seawalls to protect the city 
from floods and tsunami. These structures are built to protect the status-quo 
against hazardous events. Even though urban infrastructure and form are bound 
to an engineering understanding of resilience, spatial planners infrequently get 
the chance to support the city’s built structure evolve (according to an evolution-
ary understanding of resilience). This is the case after a disaster destroyed the 
pre-existing urban structure and opens a window of opportunity for improve-
ment (see Chapter 3.3). Nevertheless, because urban infrastructure and form 
are rarely adjusted during normal times, it is appropriate to declare that they are 
usually bound to an engineering understanding of resilience.
3 Even though built structure generally cannot change without great expense, there are currently 
new strategies under discussion that are able to address this problem. One example for this is 
the adaptable levee in Germany (“Klimadeich”) that can be raised with only little effort if the cli-
mate change induced sea-level rise requires it. These strategies were developed to deal with the 
growing uncertainties that are related with disaster risk reduction and are helpful to incorporate 
evolutionary resilience into built structures. Nevertheless, these strategies are not yet widely 
applied. Therefore, they are not specifically considered for this research. For more information on 
this topic, see Greiving (2016).
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Socio-ecological networks, on the contrary, possess the ability to change from 
one equilibrium to another when the surrounding conditions require it. They are 
therefore connected to an evolutionary understanding of resilience. These net-
works include political-institutional, social, economic and environmental aspects 
that continuously interact with each other. If a disaster – or any other event – 
disrupts these structures, they are able to evolve to a new state that serves the 
current situation better. Examples for this are the improvement of shortcomings 
in the governmental sector that complicated or delayed the reconstructions pro-
cess or the establishment of NGOs in the aftermath of a disaster in order to 
improve social networks and community cohesion (Birkmann et al., 2010). The 
improvement of these processes helps the system to evolve into a new state 
of equilibrium.
Because of this ability to evolve, the research community currently leans towards 
an evolutionary understanding or resilience. Liao (2012, 3) even declares that 
engineering resilience is an “outdated equilibrium paradigm”. Nevertheless, the 
existence of engineered structures as an important part of cities means that a to-
tal neglect of engineering resilience can lead to shortcomings: It is highly unlikely 
that built urban structure is remodeled after a short amount of time only because 
scientists discovered that this new structure would result in a higher degree of 
urban resilience. In most cases, large scale changes of urban structure only hap-
pen after a disaster demolished the pre-existing urban structures and thereby 
reduced the opportunity costs for this change (Olshansky et al., 2012, p. 176). In 
accordance with Godschalk (2003), it can be summarized that urban resilience 
includes both, engineering and evolutionary resilience: A resilient city possesses 
resilient physical systems to protect it from hazardous events (illustrated in the 
bottom layer of illustration 12) and – at the same time – obtains resilient so-
cio-ecological structures that are able to handle the situation, cope and evolve if 
the physical infrastructure fails (illustrated in the top layer of illustration 12).
In accordance with Meerow et al. (2016), urban resilience can be defined as “the 
ability of an urban system-and all its constituent socio-ecological and socio-tech-
nical networks across temporal and spatial scales-to maintain or rapidly return to 
desired functions in the face of a disturbance, to adapt to change, and to quickly 
transform systems that limit current or future adaptive capacity” (p. 39).
In the context of this research, “maintain or rapidly return” refers to the engi-
neering resilience of the built structure and “to adapt to change, and to quickly 
transform systems that limit current or future adaptive capacity” refers to evo-
lutionary resilience.
Although urban resilience is currently widely applied, it is seldom accurately 
defined who (or what) is resilient to what (Carpenter, Walker, Anderies, & Abel, 
2001; Elmqvist, 2014; Meerow & Newell, 2016; Vale, 2014). The fields of ap-
plication for the resilience concept are various: Cities can be resilient to nat-
ural hazards (Adger et al., 2005; Cutter et al., 2008; Manyena, 2006), climate 
change (da Silva, Kernaghan, & Luque, 2012; Friend & Moench, 2013; Leichen-
ko, 2011; Satterthwaite, 2013), terrorist attacks (Godschalk, 2003; National Re-
search Council, 2002) or economic shocks (Martin & Sunley, 2015; Rose, 2007; 
Simmie &  Martin, 2010), to name a few. The decision which threat should be 
addressed is an important step towards the operationalization of resilience (Car-
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penter et al., 2001) and – similar to the constructivist understanding of risk de-
scribed in Chapter 2.2 – of normative nature. This directly relates to the question 
“Who counts as ’the city’?” (Vale, 2014, p. 197, emphasis in original) or, in other 
words, who is included into the decision-making process. Stakeholders usually 
only represent their own interests, therefore it is especially important to include 
vulnerable population groups into the decision-making process. A necessity 
which is rarely the case in reality (Adger, 2006; Vale, 2014).
While the “who” question has to be answered for each specific case, the ques-
tion regarding the kind of resilience that this research investigates can be more 
generally answered. This research deals with resilience to disaster risks with a 
focus on acute shocks (e.g., earthquakes, tsunamis) rather than slow stresses 
(e.g., climate change, environmental pollution) and focuses on building urban 
disaster resilience. Accordingly, the following chapter explains how urban resil-
ience in the disaster risk context is defined.
3.2 URBAN RESILIENCE IN THE DISASTER RISK 
CONTEXT
On the basis of the information presented above, this chapter returns to the 
question how the concept of resilience fits into the disaster risk context. As ex-
plained in Chapter 2, resilience is often identified with capacity (Cardona, 2011; 
Cardona et al., 2012), which can be differentiated into coping and adaptive capac-
ity. Coping capacity refers to a system’s current state that helps the system to 
deal with the occurrence of a hazardous event. Adaptive capacity, on the other 
hand, is the system’s ability to adjust to changing framework conditions (see 
Chapter 2.2). If compared to the understanding of resilience introduced above, 
it becomes apparent, that engineering resilience resembles coping capacity and 
evolutionary resilience resembles adaptive capacity (see illustration 13).
Engineering Resilience
Evolutionary Resilience
Illustration 12 | Urban resilience consists of engineering and evolutionary resilience | Own 
illustration
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When linked into this context, it becomes clear why resilience is a key concept 
of disaster risk reduction. Nevertheless, many definitions of resilience do not 
acknowledge the twofold nature of resilience. The UNISDR (2009) defines (di-
saster) resilience as “[t]he ability of a system, community or society exposed 
to hazards to resist, absorb, accommodate to and recover from the effects of a 
hazard in a timely and efficient manner, including through the preservation and 
restoration of its essential basic structures and functions” (p. 24). By taking a 
closer look at the understanding or resilience that this definition incorporates, 
its age becomes noticeable: “resist, absorb, accommodate […] and recover” as 
well as “preservation and restoration” all refer to an engineering understanding 
of resilience and the intention to have the city “bounce back” as fast as possi-
ble. As explained above, limiting resilience to engineering resilience is no longer 
state of the art.
In comparison to the UNISDR’s definition, the IPCC (2012a) defines resilience 
as “[t]he ability of a system and its component parts to anticipate, absorb, ac-
commodate, or recover from the effects of a hazardous event in a timely and 
efficient manner, including through ensuring the preservation, restoration, or im-
provement of its essential basic structures and functions” (p. 563). Even though 
this definition’s focus also relies on an engineering understanding of resilience 
(which results from its similarity to the UNISDR’s definition), this definition also 
acknowledges the system’s ability to improve itself as one aspect of evolution-
ary resilience.
The UNISDR’s Disaster Resilience Scorecard for Cities (2015d), which is used to 
operationalize resilience for this research (see Chapter 5), defines resilience with 
a rather normative notion as “the ability of a city to understand the disaster risks 
Illustration 13 | Engineering and evolutionary resilience as parts of the disaster risk framework | Own illustration
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it may face; to mitigate those risks; and to respond to disasters that may occur, 
in such a way as to minimize loss of or damage to life, livelihoods, property, 
infrastructure, economic activity and the environment” (p. 2). In this definition, 
the focus lies on the result “to minimize loss” rather than the system’s ability to 
achieve this aim. It therefore does not specifically address the engineering and 
evolutionary understanding of resilience.
In its publication “How to make cities more resilient: A handbook for local gov-
ernment leaders”, the UNISDR determines the following four spheres of resil-
ience (UNISDR, 2012):
By taking a closer look, it can be noticed that these four spheres correspond to 
three of the layers of the urban system introduced in Chapter 3.1:
 › The political-institutional sphere corresponds with the governance net-
works. It includes the coordination of disaster risk reduction between 
various stakeholders (e.g., the government, NGOs and industry), the 
creation of institutional capacity and responsibility to deal with risk and 
ensures that urban development incorporates the principles of disaster 
risk reduction (UNISDR, 2012). In this research, the political-institutional 
sphere is commonly referred to as political-institutional resilience.
 › The social and the economic sphere correspond with the city’s so-
cio-economic dynamics. These two aspects include the access to basic 
services in case of a disaster, the allocation of safe housing and the 
inclusion of relevant stakeholders in the planning process (social sphere) 
Social
› Guarantee access to 
basic services for all 
and provide post-
disaster safety nets
› Allocate safe land for 
all strategic activi-
ties and housing
› Encourage 
multi-stakeholder 
participation in all 
stages and 
strengthen social 
alliances and 
networking
Political-Institutional
› Foster interdepart-
mental coordination 
and leadership for 
disaster risk reduc-
tion
› Build institutional 
capacity and 
allocate resources
› Regulate urban and 
local development 
with risk reduction 
principles
Economic
› Diversify local 
economic activities 
and implement poverty 
reduction measures
› Plan for business 
continuity to avoid 
disruption in case of 
disaster
› Put in place incentives 
and penalties to 
increase resilience and 
improve compliance 
with safety standards
Environmental
› Protect, restore and 
enhance ecosystems, 
watersheds, unstable 
slopes, and coastal 
areas
› Engage in ecosys-
tem-based risk 
management
› Commit to reducing 
contamination, 
improving waste 
management and 
reducing GHG 
emissions
RESILIENCE
Illustration 14 | The four spheres of resilience | Own illustration based on UNISDR, 2012, p. 18
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as well as the diversification of local economy, business continuity plan-
ning and the provision of incentives to increase the companies’ safety 
standards (economic sphere) (UNISDR, 2012). In accordance with the 
socio-economic dynamics of the urban system, these two spheres are 
jointly considered as the socio-economic sphere, which is referred to as 
socio-economic resilience in this research.
 › The environmental sphere can be linked to the material flow and energy 
networks, since most of the services provided in these networks de-
pend on environmental functions. This sphere includes the protection, 
restoration and improvement of ecosystems, the inclusion of ecosys-
tems into disaster risk management and measures to decrease environ-
mental contamination (e.g., through more efficient waste management 
systems or a decreased emission of greenhouses gases) (UNISDR, 
2012). The environmental sphere is of special importance because peo-
ple are dependent on the functionality of ecosystem services to survive. 
Ecosystem services are “the benefits people obtain from ecosystems” 
(Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, p. 40), e.g., clean air and water. 
For this research, the environmental sphere is commonly referred to as 
environmental resilience.
As explained in Chapter 3.1, these three spheres correspond to an evolutionary 
understanding of resilience. They are supplemented by the fourth layer of the 
urban system, which follows an engineering understanding or resilience:
 › The infrastructural sphere includes urban infrastructure and form. Ac-
cording to Jha, Miner, and Stanton-Geddes (2013), infrastructural resil-
ience refers to “a reduction in the vulnerability of built structures, such 
as building and transportation systems” (p. 11). This includes housing, 
utility and social infrastructure, especially critical infrastructure (Jha et 
al., 2013). The infrastructural sphere is referred to as engineering resil-
ience in this research because this is the only resilience sphere, which is 
following an engineering understanding of resilience.
As illustration 15 shows, this research understands evolutionary resilience to 
be composed of political-institutional, socio-economic and environmental resil-
ience. Evolutionary resilience is supplemented by engineering resilience, which 
incorporates a city’s built structure into the context.
Based on these considerations and the disaster resilience definitions introduced 
above, the definition of urban resilience from Meerow et al. (2016) introduced 
in Chapter 3.1 was adjusted, so that urban disaster resilience can be defined as 
follows:
Urban disaster resilience is “the ability of an urban system – […] [and all its en-
gineering, political-institutional, socio-economic and environmental component 
parts across temporal and spatial scales] – to maintain or rapidly return to de-
sired functions in the face of a […] [hazardous event], to adapt to change and to 
quickly transform systems that limit current or future adaptive capacity” (p. 39).
This definition specifies that comprehensive urban disaster resilience can be 
achieved by taking measures that address all four spheres of resilience intro-
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duced above. Even though building resilience can never ensure complete safety 
from disaster risks, it is an important step towards disaster risk reduction. Fur-
thermore, resilient structures can help to overcome the negative impacts of a 
disaster much faster, if it occurs. Resilient structures can also help to use the 
window of opportunity more effectively. The window of opportunity is the city’s 
opportunity to evolve after a disaster. It can also be used to build a city’s resil-
ience. The following chapter explains the processes that support the window of 
opportunity and how problems regarding it can be addressed.
3.3 THE WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY
Even though a disaster is linked with large scale destruction and the disturbance 
of the political-institutional, socio-economic and environmental structures and 
networks, it also offers the opportunity to review these pre-existing structures 
and improve them where or when useful. This moment is also termed the win-
dow of opportunity or the chance to build back better and is directly linked with 
the evolutionary understanding of resilience (the system is able to evolve). It 
can be noted that this opportunity especially occurs if a disaster is big enough 
to reveal the shortcomings of pre-existing urban structures and networks (Birk-
mann et al., 2010). The Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction also ac-
knowledges the importance of the window of opportunity, when it states: “In 
the post-disaster recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction phase, it is critical 
to prevent the creation of and to reduce disaster risk by ’Building Back Better’” 
(UNISDR, 2015c, p. 19).
The fields for improvement are various and can concern a city’s political-institu-
tional, socio-ecological, environmental and engineered structures and networks 
alike (Birkmann et al., 2010; Olshansky, 2005). In particular, the evolutionary na-
ture of political-institutional, socio-ecological and environmental networks en-
ables them to continuously adapt to changing conditions. On the other hand, 
cities are bound to their urban infrastructure and form, which gradually changes 
over many years under normal conditions (Olshansky, 2005). These structures 
Illustration 15 | The resilience framework for this research | Own illustration
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include the communication, energy, water and sanitation, and transportation 
networks as well as the buildings and green spaces and are especially relevant 
for spatial planners (see Chapter 3.1).
The large-scale destruction of the existing city structure after a disaster offers 
the rare opportunity for the city’s built structure (typically bound to an engineer-
ing understanding of resilience) to evolve and adapt to the changed environ-
ment. From an economic perspective, the disaster leads to a “dramatic increase 
in capital services reaching the end of their useful life […] [which] opens un-
usual opportunities for reorganizing or relocating capital facilities. Strategies of 
replacement may become available that would not be worth pursuing at normal 
rates of capital replacement” (Olshansky et al., 2012, p. 174). In this context, 
the “disaster reduces the opportunity costs of changing things” (Olshansky et 
al., 2012, p. 176). For instance, these improvements can be the relocation of 
residential land-uses or changes of the utility infrastructure (Olshansky et al., 
2012). The ability of a system to use this opportunity to evolve is also termed 
transformative resilience (Gotham & Campanella, 2010).
The sudden loss of built structures after a disaster, creates an urgent need 
to act. A situation that Olshansky et al. (2012) termed “compressed in time” 
(p. 173). Although this time compression is an important factor for the possibil-
ity to improve a city’s built structure after a disaster, it is also a big constraint. 
After a disaster, the citizens want to return back to their previous lives. Which 
makes them demand a fast reconstruction of the known urban structures. Haas 
and Kates already noticed this tendency in their first comprehensive study on 
disaster recovery Reconstruction following disaster (1977): “There is already a 
plan for reconstruction, indelibly stamped in the perception of each resident – 
the plan of the predisaster city. The new studies, plans and designs compete 
with the old” (p. 268). The development of new plans that are able to improve 
the urban structures usually requires a larger amount of time and money than 
the reconstruction of the former urban structures. Accordingly, spatial planners 
are conflicted between speed and careful consideration (Olshansky et al., 2012; 
Olshansky, Johnson, & Topping, 2006; Rubin, Saperstein, & Barbee, 1985). This 
conflict has to be resolved under huge time pressure. Therefore, speedy rebuild-
ing is often considered to be the better option (Olshansky et al., 2012). This is 
the reason why the potential of the window of opportunity is often left unused 
in reality (Birkmann & Teichman, 2010; Serrao-Neumann, Crick, Harman, Schuch, 
& Choy, 2015).
To solve this tension between time and quality, various experts have proposed 
the idea to develop a reconstruction plan before a disaster occurs (e.g., Greiving 
& Schmidt,-Thomé, 2008; Olshansky, 2005; Schwab, 2014; Serrao-Neumann et 
al., 2015). The preparation of a post-disaster plan in advance of a disaster can 
help to speed up the reconstruction planning and ensure that additional chal-
lenges (e.g., climate change or demographic change) are not overlooked in the 
hectic post-disaster planning process (Serrao-Neumann et al., 2015). To achieve 
optimum results, the plan should not only include regular land-use planning, but 
also cover the recovery process after the disaster. Like any plan to manage risk, 
the development of this plan should also be realized on the basis of a compre-
hensive participation process (Olshansky, 2005).
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The question how the development of pre-event developed reconstruction plans 
can help to effectively use the window of opportunity after a disaster, is an-
swered in context of the second research question How can spatial planning 
use the window of opportunity effectively to improve a city’s resilience after a 
disaster? based on the empirical research conducted in Miyako City and Ishino-
maki City (see Chapter 10).
3.4 SPATIAL PLANNING AND RESILIENCE
Parallel to the discussion about urban resilience, there is also an ongoing discus-
sion about resilient urban planning. In this context, the focus is not merely on 
building resilient cities, but adapting spatial planning to meet the changing re-
quirements it has to face. The popularity of the resilience concept in this context 
founds on the growing necessity of spatial planners to deal with increasing un-
certainties and complexities. Evolutionary resilience enables spatial planners to 
break free from the previous understanding of space as “neutral containers, but 
[instead sees them] as complex, interconnected socio-spatial systems with ex-
tensive and unpredictable feedback processes which operate at multiple scales 
and timeframes” (Davoudi et al., 2012, p. 304). This approach to spatial planning 
assumes the breakdown of the Euclidean world-view (Friedmann, 1993) with its 
“hallmarks of certainty, blueprints, forecasting and equilibrium” (Davoudi et al., 
2012, p. 329) and instead emphasizes “fluidity, reflexivity, contingency, connec-
tivity, multiplicity and polyvocality” (Davoudi & Strange, 2009, p. 37) – aspects 
that are also important characteristics of the evolutionary resilience concept 
(Davoudi et al., 2012).
In order to understand and handle these dynamic framework conditions, spatial 
planners should begin to see fluidity as one of the world’s main characteristics. 
In this world, “assuming change and explaining stability [is more appropriate 
than] […] assuming stability and explaining change” (Folke, Colding, & Berkes, 
2003, p. 352). Brendan Gleeson even demands that resilient urbanism “should 
relinquish any belief in […] a stabilised, end-state urban system. The premise 
is evolution, ceaseless in motion and restless in form, for that most essential 
human creation, the city. […] The living must accept the inevitability of evolu-
tion, the necessity of adaptation, and embrace the hope of resilience” (Gleeson, 
2008, p. 2658). Nevertheless, the question how this goal can be achieved for a 
city’s built structure, which has to remain in place for a certain amount of time 
to be profitable, remains unanswered.
When different interests compete, a comprehensive spatial planning approach 
is highly relevant because decisions in favor of the wrong interest may lead to 
drawbacks for the general public (White & O’Hare, 2014). In this context, spatial 
planners can use the evolutionary concept of resilience to link various aspects 
that previously were characterized by silo thinking (Davoudi et al., 2012).
In summary, it can be stated that the concept of evolutionary resilience offers 
spatial planning various new and helpful ideas to address current and future 
challenges. Nonetheless, in reality practitioners continue to use the engineering 
resilience concept even though the research community widely understands 
evolutionary resilience to be the state of the art (Engle, 2011; White & O’Hare, 
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2014). This raises the question if spatial planning – with its history as an engi-
neering discipline and instruments that mostly still serve this paradigm – has the 
ability to build evolutionary resilience (White & O’Hare, 2014) or if it is necessary 
that spatial planning evolves and redefines itself as a “professional practise that 
specifically seeks to connect forms of knowledge with forms of action in the 
public domain” (Friedmann, 1993, p. 482).
The first research question How can spatial planning help to build a city’s re-
silience after a disaster? fits into this context. It intends to understand which 
spatial planning options are useful to build which kind of resilience. To answer 
this question, the spatial planning options to address disaster risk introduced 
in Chapter 2.4 are reviewed for their ability to build engineering, political-insti-
tutional, socio-economic and environmental resilience. Based on the results of 
this analysis, it can be concluded which spatial planning options might currently 
be missing to build a city’s overall resilience.
3.5 INTERIM CONCLUSION
This chapter introduced the concept of resilience and broadly explained its 
application in various fields. Many areas of application either lean towards an 
engineering or evolutionary understanding of resilience. Therefore, the chapter 
clarified why both of these two differing concepts of resilience are important for 
this research: A city’s urban infrastructure and form are the result of engineering 
work. Accordingly, they are bound to an engineering understanding of resilience, 
unless a disaster removes large parts of the built structure and a window of 
opportunity enables the city to evolve. Political-institutional, socio-economic and 
environmental functions, on the other hand, have the ability to (at least theo-
retically) evolve continuously, although this ability is rarely used during normal 
times.
The understanding of resilience elaborated in this chapter serves as a broad 
framework for the examination of the main research questions. In Part B of 
this work, each of the resilience spheres introduced in this chapter (engineer-
ing resilience, political-institutional resilience, socio-economic resilience and en-
vironmental resilience) is investigated for its controllability through the spatial 
planning options for risk assessment, risk management and risk communication 
introduced in Chapter 2. Nevertheless, before this analysis can begin, insights 
into the unique spatial planning options and framework conditions of the re-
search area are provided in Chapter 4. The chapter gives an introduction touching 
on geographic and demographic structure, the impact of the GEJE and Tsunami 
and the spatial planning options available for the reconstruction process. Subse-
quently, Chapter 5 operationalizes resilience and its four spheres engineering, 
political-institutional, socio-economic and environmental resilience to enable the 
determination of the spatial planning options’ influence on their improvement.
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4. JAPAN
Japan was selected as the setting for the case studies because of its long and 
frequent history with disasters. The WorldRiskIndex 2016 ranked Japan in the 
17th position, attesting Japan the highest risk of all developed countries. This 
position is due to Japan’s extremely high exposure to natural hazards, especially 
floods and earthquakes (Japan is the 4th most exposed country in the world). 
At the same time, Japan has a very low vulnerability, which is based on the ef-
fective infrastructure it has in place and its ability to cope with hazardous events 
(Bündnis Entwicklung Hilft & United Nations University EHS). This combination 
of a vast amount of experience and effective strategies to cope with hazardous 
events, makes Japan a valuable study area. Moreover, the ongoing reconstruc-
tion process after the GEJE and Tsunami – one of the largest disasters in the 
younger history – offered the opportunity to investigate the research topic in the 
field.
To understand Japan’s basic characteristics, the following chapters give an over-
view of the country’s geography and its basic governmental structure. Then, the 
demographic development and its consequences for the reconstruction process 
are explained. After an overview of the GEJE and Tsunami, the Japanese disaster 
risk management system is introduced and the most relevant spatial planning 
options to address disaster risk are presented. The chapter concludes with a sum-
mary of the aims and approaches of the reconstruction process after the GEJE.
4.1 JAPAN’S GEOGRAPHY AND GOVERNMENTAL 
STRUCTURE
Japan is located in the northern Pacific Ocean in front of the Asian mainland. 
The island nation consists of four major and more than 6,300 smaller islands 
that amount to an area of approximately 380,000 km2 (Statistics Bureau, Minis-
try of Internal Affairs and Communications Japan, 2015). The country stretches 
over 3,200 km from Hokkaido in the north, over Honshu, Shikoku and Kyushu 
to Okinawa in the far south (Statistics Bureau, Ministry of Internal Affairs and 
Communications Japan, 2015). The majority of Japan’s approximately 127 million 
citizens (as of 2014) lives in the largest cities located in the lowland area along 
the coast because of the country’s mountainous geographical structure; almost 
80 percent of the country is covered with mountains and hills (Karan, 2005; 
Statistics Bureau, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications Japan, 2015).
Japan’s Constitution, which came into effect on 3 May 1947, separates the gov-
ernmental power into legislative, executive and jurisdiction. On the national lev-
el, the legislative power is exercised by the Diet, which consists of the House of 
Representatives and the House of Councilors, the executive power rests with 
the Cabinet, which is composed of the Prime Minister and other Ministers of 
State. The judicial power belongs to the courts (Statistics Bureau, Ministry of 
Internal Affairs and Communications Japan, 2015). Besides the national gov-
ernment, Japan has two levels of local governments: the prefectural and the 
municipal level. On 1 April 2015, Japan consisted of 47 prefectures and 1,718 
municipalities (plus 23 wards (ku) in the Greater Tokyo Area). The number of 
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municipalities has significantly decreased since the beginning of the 21st cen-
tury. For comparison, in March 1999, Japan still consisted of 3,232 municipali-
ties (Statistics Bureau, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications Japan, 
2015). The reason for this reduction is the merging of municipalities “[in] order 
to strengthen the administrative and fiscal foundation of the municipalities” 
(Statistics Bureau, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications Japan, 2015, 
p. 189). The merging of municipalities resulted in some very large-sized munici-
palities (e.g., the current size of Miyako City is ca. 1,260 km2 and the area of Ishi-
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Illustration 16 | Map of Japan’s regions (Okinawa is part of Kyushu Region) | Own 
illustration based on D-maps, 2016a
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nomaki City is ca. 555 km2). Municipalities, with a population of 500,000 people 
or more, are able to receive most of the administrative and fiscal authorities 
usually performed by the prefectural government by becoming cities designated 
by government ordinance. In April 2015, there were 20 of these cities (Sendai 
being the only one in Tohoku Region4). The remaining municipalities break down 
to 770 cities, 745 towns and 183 villages (see illustration 17).
Japan has a long history of centralized governments (Sorensen, Koizumi, & Mi-
yamoto, 2009, p. 35). Although the establishment of the Constitution after the 
Second World War appointed the prefectures with self-administrative powers, 
it was not until 1999 when the prefectures finally were able to use this pow-
er. Until then, they were required to “carry out a number of state functions 
known as Agency Delegated Functions (Kikan Inin Jimu)” (Kadomatsu, 2007, 
p. 4), which also included spatial planning competences. This situation changed 
with the decentralization reform, which was passed in 1999 and intended to “in-
troduce a more limited framework of state supervision over local governments” 
(Kadomatsu, 2007, p. 6). The reform also transferred many spatial planning com-
petences (e.g., zoning) from the prefectures to municipalities. Nevertheless, in 
2006 some of these competences (e.g., responsibility for quasi-city planning 
areas) were transferred back to the prefectural level after it became apparent 
that they could better be coordinated on a higher level (Kadomatsu, 2007; for 
more information about the contemporary Japanese spatial planning system, 
see Chapter 4.6).
Japan’s stagnating economy and the shrinking population in combination with 
the necessity to maintain basic utility and social services, puts a high financial 
burden especially on smaller and rural municipalities. Even though the merging 
of municipalities was supposed to solve some of these problems (Yokomichi, 
2007), many municipalities still suffer with their finances (Ubaura, 2015), a con-
4 Tohoku Region is one of Japan’s eight regions (see illustration 16) and consists of the following six 
prefectures in the northeast of Honshu: Akita, Aomori, Fukushima, Iwate, Miyagi and Yamagata.
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Illustration 17 | Japan’s administrative levels | Own illustration based on Statistics Bureau, 
Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications Japan, 2015, p. 190
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dition which restricts the local governments’ ability to act (also in the context 
of spatial planning). This problem intensifies when the “real debt expenditure 
burden ratio” exceeds 18%. In this case, the municipality is required to obtain 
permission from the national government to issue municipal bonds (Ubaura, 
2015). The demographic development plays an important role in this context be-
cause local governments receive a significant amount of their revenues through 
local taxes.
4.2 JAPAN’S DEMOGRAPHIC DEVELOPMENT
In 2014, Japan had a population of 127.08  million people, which made it the 
tenth most populous country in the world. Nevertheless, Japan’s low total fertil-
ity rate5 (1.43 in 2013) in combination with the country’s small immigration rate 
(in 2014, only about 2.1 million foreign people lived in Japan) lead to a population 
decrease of about 0.2% each year between 2010 and 2014. This development 
is predicted to lead to a population decrease to about 97 million people by 2050 
(Projection from January 2012). At the same time, the number of people who 
are 65 years and older increases. While the number of citizens, who are 65 and 
older, amounted to 26.0% in 2014, there are expected to be 38.8% of people in 
this age group in 2050. The population pyramid illustrates this development (see 
illustration 18). While the pyramid was expansive until the middle of the 20th 
century, the pyramid for the year 2014 was constrictive and this development is 
expected to evolve even further until 2050 (all data in this paragraph are received 
from Statistics Bureau, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications Japan, 
2015, 2016b).
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Illustration 18 | Population pyramid of Japan | Own illustration based on Statistics Bureau, 
Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications Japan, 2015, p. 8
5 Total fertility rate: “The average number of children that would be born alive to a hypothetical 
cohort of women if, throughout their reproductive years, the age-specific fertility rates for the 
specified year remained unchanged” (Statistics Bureau, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Commu-
nications Japan, 2015)
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The demographic development also influences the household sizes and, asso-
ciated with this, the demand on the housing market. The aging population as 
well as the pluralization and individualization of lifestyles results in an increased 
number of one-person households, while the number of nuclear-family and 
three-generation households decreases. In 2010, the average household size 
only consisted of 2.42 people. Despite the shrinking overall population, the 
demand for housing space currently still remains high. This is a result of the 
decreasing household sizes (Statistics Bureau, Ministry of Internal Affairs and 
Communications Japan, 2015, pp. 11–12). The increasing number of elderly peo-
ple also changes the requirements for living space: accessibility becomes more 
important with advancing age. In 2010, citizens who are 65 years or older rep-
resented 37.3% of the private households. Of these households with elderly 
people, ca. 24.8% only comprised one person, while ca. 27.2% were composed 
of couples (Statistics Bureau, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications 
Japan, 2015, pp. 11–12). It can be expected that the growing number of elderly 
people will lead to an increased demand for smaller housing solutions that meet 
the requirements of elderly people.
Of course, all of these developments are important aspects to be considered 
when spatial planners use the reconstruction process after major disasters, 
such as the GEJE and Tsunami, to build cities that are resilient for the chal-
lenges of the  future. This is also the reason why the Basic Act on Reconstruc-
tion in response to the Great East Japan Earthquake specifically mentions the 
importance to include the changing demographic structure in the reconstruc-
tion process (Basic Act on Reconstruction in response to the Great East Japan 
Earthquake, 2011). The following chapter explains why reconstruction work after 
disastrous events is a frequent responsibility in Japan.
4.3 JAPAN’S VULNERABILITY TO NATURAL HAZARDS
Japan’s geography and topography makes the country prone to a variety of nat-
ural hazards, “including earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, flooding, typhoons, 
torrential rain and heavy snowfall” (Iuchi, 2016, p. 20). Many rivers in Tokyo are 
situated in narrow and steep channels above the urban area surrounding them. 
Accordingly, the potential inundation area in case of a flash flood is large. The 
agglomeration of 50% of the city’s population and 75% of its total assets in ar-
eas exposed to floods indicates the importance to manage hydrometeorological 
risks (Iuchi, 2016, p. 20). Furthermore, Japan’s geographic position at the edge 
of four major tectonic plates, the Pacific and the Philippine oceanic plates and 
the Eurasian and North American continental plates, which is also referred to 
as the Pacific “ring of fire” makes the country prone to geological hazards such 
as earthquakes, tsunamis and volcanic eruptions (Barnes, 2003). The country’s 
proneness to earthquakes manifests in the fact that almost 20% of the global 
seismic activity with a magnitude of Mw=6.0 or higher between 2004 and 2013 
occurred in Japan, although the country only covers 0.25% of the earth’s land 
area (Cabinet Office, Government of Japan, 2015a). Japan’s long history with 
earthquakes includes the Great Kanto Earthquake on 1 September 1923, which 
caused a fire in the urban area of Tokyo and resulted in the deaths or missing 
of approximately 105,000 people and the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake that 
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struck Kobe on 17 January 1995 and caused the deaths or missing of 6,437 
people (Cabinet Office, Government of Japan, 2015b). Tohoku Region was also 
frequently affected by earthquakes and tsunamis: On 15 June 1896, the Meiji 
Sanriku Earthquake and Tsunami with a magnitude of Mw=8.3 caused the death 
or missing of approximately 22,000 people. The Showa Sanriku Earthquake and 
Tsunami on 3 March 1933 with a magnitude of Mw=8.1 left 3,064 people dead 
or missing (Cabinet Office, Government of Japan, 2015b; Miyako City Great East 
Japan Earthquake and Tsunami Records Editorial Committee, 2015).
4.4 THE GREAT EAST JAPAN EARTHQUAKE AND 
TSUNAMI
On 11 March 2011 at 14:46, the list of disasters was extended, when the GEJE 
occurred 130 km off Sanriku Coast in the Pacific Ocean (see illustration 19). The 
earthquake with a focal depth of about 24 km reached a magnitude of Mw=9.0, 
making it the largest one in Japan’s history on record (Miyako City Great East 
Japan Earthquake and Tsunami Records Editorial Committee, 2015). Both, earth-
quake and tsunami were caused by the bouncing back of the North American 
Plate after it was dragged down by the Pacific Plate (see illustration 20).
Illustration 19 | Location of the epicenter of the GEJE | Ahlers et al., 2015, p. 91 based on 
Schauwecker, 2011
Epicenter
Sendai
Fukushima
Ishinomaki
Miyako
Fukushima Daichi 
Nuclear Power Plant
Evacuation Zones
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100 km
Illustration 20 | (A) Tectonic around Japan (red rectangle shows location of the GEJE) | (B) 
Schematic diagram of a subduction zone earthquake | Own illustration based on Miya-
ko City Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami Records Editorial Committee, 2015, 
p. 22 citing Okada, 2012, p. 2
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First waves of the tsunami were registered at the Tohoku Coast at the same 
time as the earthquake occurred (e.g., in Kamaishi City and Ofunato City in Iwa-
te Prefecture and Ishinomaki City in Miyagi Prefecture). At this time, the waves 
did not exceed 20cm. Minutes later, the Japan Meteorological Agency (JMA) 
issued a major tsunami warning for the prefectures Iwate, Miyagi and Fukushi-
ma, estimating a tsunami height of 3 m. Later the expected tsunami height was 
increased to 6 m (at 15:14) and 10 m (at 15:30). Unfortunately, some places had 
already been hit by the tsunami by this time and failures in the communication 
network restricted the accessibility of some areas (Miyako City Great East Ja-
pan Earthquake and Tsunami Records Editorial Committee, 2015, p. 23). When 
the largest tsunami waves arrived at the coast, they reached heights up to 9.3 m 
and run-up heights up to 35 m (Iuchi, 2016, p. 20). The water inundated an area of 
about 561 km2 in 64 municipalities in Aomori, Iwate, Miyagi, Fukushima, Ibaraki 
and Chiba Prefecture (Miyako City Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami 
Records Editorial Committee, 2015, p. 27). Overall, the scope of damages was 
recorded with 15,894 people dead, 2,558 missing and 6,152 injured; more than 
120,000 houses were completely and more than a million half or partially de-
stroyed (see table 1).
Iwate, Miyagi and Fukushima Prefecture were most severely affected by the tsu-
nami. The topography of Tohoku’s Pacific coast is characterized by the ria Sanriku 
in northern Iwate Prefecture and the flat plains in and around Sendai City (Miyagi 
Prefecture), which constituted the largest part of the area flooded by the tsuna-
mi (see illustrations 21 and 22 on the next page). The large area of low lying land 
along the coast in Miyagi Prefecture, resulted in 327km2 of the tsunami inunda-
tion area to be located in this prefecture. In addition to this, 112 km2 of Fukushi-
ma Prefecture and 58km2 of Iwate Prefecture were flooded. (Miyako City Great 
East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami Records Editorial Committee, 2015, p. 27).
In Fukushima, the tsunami flooded the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant, 
causing the failure of the reactors’ cooling systems. Despite the reactors’ emer-
gency shut down, the lack of cooling resulted in nuclear meltdowns in the re-
actors 1, 2 and 3, which resulted in the release of radioactive material into the 
environment. The accident, which was – like the nuclear accident in Chernobyl 
in 1986 – rated with a 7 on the International Nuclear Event Scale, resulted in the 
immediate evacuation of a radius of 20 km around the power plant. Later, this 
evacuation zone was extended to react to radioactive contamination that was 
registered outside of this zone (Matanle, 2011, 2013). The nuclear accident put 
Fukushima Prefecture into an even more severe situation than Iwate and Miyagi 
Prefecture. The recovery process in Fukushima Prefecture was excluded from 
the investigation of this work because of its specific focus on the recovery after 
a nuclear disaster.
4.5 JAPAN’S DISASTER RISK MANAGEMENT 
FRAMEWORK
To deal with the multiple disaster risk Japan frequently has to face, a risk man-
agement framework was established in the 1880s and has continuously been 
adapted since then, usually after the occurrence of a significant disaster. Today, 
Human Casualties
Deceased 15,894
Missing 2,558
Injured 6,152
Damaged Buildings  
Completely destroyed 121,806
Half destroyed 278,575
Partially Destroyed 726,176
Table 1 | Overall damages of the 
GEJE and Tsunami (as of 10 
June 2016) | Own illustration 
based on Japan Reconstruc-
tion Agency, 2016a
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Illustration 21 | Sanriku Coast in Miyako City | Photo by author, October 2015
Illustration 22 | Sendai flat plains | Photo by author, February 2015
Illustration 23 | Japan’s four levels of Disaster Management Plans | Own illustration adapt-
ed from Iuchi, 2016, p. 25
› Basic Disaster Management Plan
› Disaster Management Option Plan
› Prefectural Disaster Management Plan
› Municipal Disaster Management Plan
› Community Disaster Management Plan
Prefectural Level
Municipal Level
Community Level
National Level
Part A | Chapter 4
57
the legislative framework for disaster risk management consists of three main 
documents: The Disaster Countermeasures Basic Act organizes Japan’s general 
disaster management while the Flood Control Act and the River Act address 
water related risks (Iuchi, 2016).
The Disaster Countermeasures Basic Act
The Disaster Countermeasures Basic Act (Act No. 223 of 1961) was adopted 
in 1961 as a reaction to the Isewan Typhoon in 1959. Since then it was revised 
various times. The Disaster Countermeasures Basic Act “aims to protect the 
lives, livelihoods and assets of citizens from natural disasters, and to safeguard 
social order, security and public welfare” (Iuchi, 2016, p. 23). The Act provides 
for four levels of disaster management plans: The Basic Disaster Management 
Plan and the Disaster Management Operation Plan on the national level, the 
Prefectural Disaster Management Plan on the prefectural level, the Municipal Di-
saster Management Plan on the level of the municipalities and the Community 
Disaster Management Plan on the community level, addressing local residents 
and enterprises (see illustration 23).
On the national level, the Central Disaster Management Council is required to 
formulate and promote the implementation of the Basic Disaster Management 
Plan. The Central Disaster Management Council is chaired by the Prime Minister 
and consists of all Cabinet members, the heads of major public corporations and 
experts. It is the Council’s responsibility to plan and coordinate the national di-
saster management processes. The Minister of State for Disaster Management 
is responsible to ensure the smooth realization of these tasks (Cabinet Office, 
Government of Japan, 2015a). The Basic Disaster Management Plan sets the 
basis for Japan’s disaster management and all lower scale disaster management 
plans have to consider its content. The plan was first developed in 1963 and has 
been revised continuously since then, including after the Great Hanshin-Awaji 
Earthquake and the GEJE and Tsunami (Iuchi, 2016, p. 24). The plan is structured 
based on hazard types, including natural and accident hazards (see illustration 
24).
Earthquakes
Tsunami
Storm & Flood
Volcano
Snow
NATURAL HAZARDS ACCIDENT HAZARDS
Maritime
Aviation
Railway
Road
Nuclear
Hazardous materials
Large-scale re
Forest res
Recovery /
Reconstruction
Prevention / 
Preparedness
Emergency 
Response
Disaster
Illustration 24 | Hazards addressed in the Basic Disaster 
Management Plan | Own illustration based on Central 
Disaster Management Council, 2016
Illustration 25 | Disaster management phases of the Basic 
Disaster Management Plan | Own illustration based 
on Central Disaster Management Council, 2016
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Each disaster section consists of countermeasures for each of the three phases 
of the disaster cycle “prevention and preparedness”, “emergency response” and 
“recovery and reconstruction” (see illustration 25). These countermeasures are 
implemented on the national, prefectural and local level. In addition, the plan 
sets up lines of action for citizens in order to secure their safety and enable an 
efficient risk management (Cabinet Office, Government of Japan, 2015a, p. 9).
The Disaster Countermeasures Basic Act also requires designated government 
organizations (i.e., 24 ministries and agencies) and designated public corpora-
tions (i.e., 66 corporations, incl. Nippon Telegraph and Telephone (NTT), Bank of 
Japan, Japanese Red Cross) to formulate and implement Disaster Management 
Operation Plans based on the Basic Disaster Management Plan. These plans 
are also developed on the national level (Cabinet Office, Government of Japan, 
2015a).
On the local level, Prefectural Disaster Management Councils and Municipal 
Disaster Management Councils are required to formulate Local Disaster Man-
agement Plans for the prefecture or municipality respectively. Local Disaster 
Management Plans are based on the Basic Disaster Management Plan, but con-
sider local characteristics and need to specify the disaster countermeasures 
accordingly (Cabinet Office, Government of Japan, 2015a).
Community Disaster Management Plans can be established by local residents 
and enterprises on a voluntary basis. Such plans include disaster management 
activities on the community level (Cabinet Office, Government of Japan, 2015a).
The Flood Control Act and the River Act
The Flood Control Act was established in 1949 (Act No. 193 of 1949) and “ad-
dresses public safety by monitoring and protecting citizens and assets through 
mitigating damage from flooding, tsunamis and storm surges” (Iuchi, 2016, 
p. 24). The law specifies the organization of flood control and countermeasures 
to take. Furthermore, it states designated flood control management bodies 
and their cooperation with each other. The Act assigns the main responsibility 
for flood control to the municipalities. Nevertheless, in case that a municipality 
is unable to fulfill this duty on its own, it can establish a cooperation with other 
municipalities’ governments (Kato & Cipullo, 2012, p. 55). One measure to mit-
igate flood risks included in the Flood Control Act, is the designation of rivers, 
which are subject to flood warning by the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Trans-
port and Tourism (in case that the flooding of the river would cause a serious 
damage for the national economy) or the prefectural government (in case that 
the flooding of the river would cause significant damage). In these cases, the 
Ministry or prefectural government is also responsible for the designation of 
hazardous areas along the river (Kato & Cipullo, 2012, p. 58). Currently, there are 
417 rivers designated as prone to flooding and 1,555 rivers hold “water-related 
notifications” (Cabinet Office, Government of Japan, 2015a, p. 26).
In 1964, the current version of the River Act (Act No.167 of 1964) was issued 
to “comprehensively manage rivers to prevent disasters from flooding, tsuna-
mis and storm surges so that the land will be protected” (Iuchi, 2016, p. 24) 
and to ensure the proper utilization of the rivers to enhance the public welfare 
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 (Infrastructure Development Institute Japan, 1999). The Act does not only focus 
on disaster prevention, but also on water use as well as environmental and 
spatial planning issues concerning rivers (Infrastructure Development Institute 
Japan, 1999).
The GEJE and Tsunami resulted in a stronger acknowledgment of the role that 
spatial planning can play to build disaster resilience. For instance, this can be 
recognized in the extensive designation of hazardous areas after the disaster 
(Iuchi, 2016). To give an understanding of the structure and instruments that 
Japan’s spatial planners have available to address disaster risks, the following 
chapter gives an overview of this topic.
4.6 SPATIAL PLANNING IN JAPAN
The complexity of the Japanese spatial planning system becomes noticeable 
in the following quote by Professor Yorifusa Ishida, who was one of the leading 
experts for Japanese spatial planning after 1945 (Watanabe, 2016): “If asked to 
’Describe all the different types of land use planning systems currently used in 
Japanese urban planning,’ how many students majoring urban planning could 
possibly answer correctly? None. Even urban planners would argue over the ’cor-
rect’ answer” (Ishida, 1994, p. 131). Accordingly, it would be presumptuous to as-
sume that the spatial planning system could be fully explained in this work. Never-
theless, the relevance of the Japanese spatial planning regulations for this research 
require an overview of the basic framework conditions and the most important 
planning instruments for the reconstruction process after the GEJE and Tsunami.
The basic structure of Japan’s spatial planning system is established in two basic 
Acts: The National Spatial Planning Act guides the national spatial development 
and the National Land-Use Planning Act established the land-use planning tool-
box to enable spatial planners to reach the goals set in the spatial plans. It should 
be kept in mind, that Japan’s traditional spatial planning (toshikeiikaku) is firmly 
linked to a technocratic top-down approach, which reaches back to the Meiji era 
(1868-1912) and has only recently been challenged through the development of 
the participative machizukuri approach in the 1970s (Hohn, 2000). Accordingly, 
the Japanese mentality prefers engineering solutions over social solutions (Ishi-
nomaki City Planning Division, Employee, 2015).
The National Spatial Planning Act
The Comprehensive National Land Development Act (Act No. 205 of 1950) was 
established in 1950 to regulate Japan’s continuous expansion and growth. In 
2005, the Act was completely revised to adapt it to the changing conditions 
of slowed down growth and set the framework for smart land-use. Moreover, 
its name was changed to National Spatial Planning Act (Act No. 89 of 2005) 
(Bureau of Urban Development, Tokyo Metropolitan Government, 2013). Today, 
the purpose of this Act is to “promote the use, improvement and conservation 
of national land, from a comprehensive viewpoint of policies for the economy, 
society, culture, etc., with consideration for natural conditions of national land” 
(National Spatial Planning Act, 2005). It sets the framework for the development 
of the National Spatial Strategy (National Plan) and the Regional Plans.
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The National Plan is prepared by the national government as the primary doc-
ument to set strategic goals. The current version of the National Plan sets the 
national spatial development targets for the next decade to build “[a] country 
where people can feel safe and affluent”, which is able to “[sustain its] economic 
growth” and maintains a close relationship with “the international communi-
ty” (Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism, 2015, p. 10) and it 
specifies the course of action for the following eight fields: industry, culture and 
tourism, utility infrastructure, national spatial infrastructure, disaster prevention 
and reduction, land and water resources, environmental protection and devel-
oping a society of mutual assistance (Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport 
and Tourism, 2015). Furthermore, the National Plan sets the outline for the de-
velopment of the Regional Plans, which are prepared to specify the concept of 
the National Plan for the local characteristics and translate it into implementable 
measures. Regional Plans are developed by the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, 
Transport and Tourism for each of Japan’s eight regions (i.e., Hokkaido, Tohoku, 
Kanto, Chubu, Kinki, Chugoku, Shikoku, and Kyushu-Okinawa) (Bureau of Urban 
Development, Tokyo Metropolitan Government, 2013, p. 6).
The National Land-Use Planning Act
While the National Spatial Planning Act provides for the establishment of a guid-
ing principle for Japan’s spatial development, the National Land-Use Planning 
Act sets the general framework for the national land-use planning (Bureau of 
Urban Development, Tokyo Metropolitan Government, 2013, p. 9). The National 
Land-Use Planning Act was first established in 1974 to secure the thorough 
and organized development of the national land-uses (Bureau of Urban Develop-
ment, Tokyo Metropolitan Government, 2013, p. 9). In 2005, it was fully revised 
and changed. The National Land-Use Planning Act requires land-use planning on 
three different levels (Iuchi, 2016):
 › The Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism is respon-
sible to develop the National Land-Use Plan on the national level. The 
plan sets a long-term vision for land-uses on the national level. Thereby, 
the plan incorporates the opinions of the prefectural governors (Art. 5, 
National Land-Use Planning Act).
 › Japan’s 47 prefectures are responsible for the development of the Pre-
fectural Land-Use Plans, which are based on the National Land-Use Plan 
and incorporate local characteristics. These plans consider the opinion 
of the prefecture’s city mayors (Art. 7, National Land-Use Planning Act).
 › Municipal Land-Use Plans on the local level are developed by the mu-
nicipal governments. They state the basic goals for each land-use on the 
municipality’s area. Should there be a Prefectural Land-Use Plan for the 
prefecture of the municipality, the Municipality Land-Use Plan needs to 
incorporate the content if this plan (Art. 8, National Land-Use Planning 
Act). Municipal Land-Use Plans are optional and their content is simi-
lar to the Urban Master Plans under the City Planning Act. Therefore, 
only about 40% of the municipalities in Japan have developed Municipal 
Land-Use Plans (M. Ubaura, personal communication, 9 October 2015).
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 › All Land-Use Plans can specify land-uses based on the following classi-
fication types: urban, agricultural, forestry, national parks or natural pres-
ervation. After the land-uses are designated, each land-use is controlled 
by another statutory basis (see illustration 26 on the next page).
After areas are designated with certain land-uses, their designation can only be 
changed with the agreement of the national government (Miyako City Consul-
tant, 2015). Areas that are designated as urban can be structured more precisely 
with the spatial instruments of city planning.
City planning
The City Planning Act of 1968 (Act No. 100 of 1968) and the Building Standards 
Act (Act No. 201 of 1950) set the legal basis for the spatial development in urban 
areas in Japan. While the City Planning Act intends to “promote orderly spatial 
development by enforcing plans, regulations and projects” (Iuchi, 2016, p. 28), 
the Building Standards Act addresses small-scale developments and ensures 
the compliance of minimum building standards (Building Standards Act, 1950).
Based on the City Planning Act, areas that meet certain requirements regarding 
the number of population and urban facilities can be designated as city planning 
areas by the prefecture. The designation is optional, which is why the amount 
of land designated as city planning area varies from prefecture to prefecture 
(Iuchi, 2016). For designated city planning areas, the prefecture or municipal 
governments develop Urban Master Plans, which set a vision for the future de-
velopment of the city. City planning offers a set of land-use regulations (e.g., the 
designation of urbanization promotion and urbanization controlled areas), the 
ability to plan urban facilities (e.g., transport facilities, public spaces) and the im-
plementation of urban development projects (e.g., land readjustment projects) 
(see illustration 27). Typically, local governments are responsible for the applica-
tion of city planning, e.g., by granting permission for land development or the 
construction of buildings, the development of proposed urban facilities or the 
implementation of urban development projects (Iuchi, 2016, p. 28).
Cities with 100,000 or more inhabitants are required to divide the city plan-
ning area into urbanization promotion areas (shigaika kuiki) and urbanization 
controlled areas (shigaika chousei kuiki). While urbanization promotion areas are 
designated for further urban development, the development in urbanization con-
trolled areas is restricted. This process is referred to as senbiki and “is intend-
ed to prevent unregulated urbanization” (Bureau of Urban Development, Tokyo 
Metropolitan Government, 2013, p. 34). Smaller cities are free to decide wheth-
er they want to designate urbanization promotion and urbanization controlled 
areas or not. Therefore, a large amount of city planning areas does not have any 
land-uses applied (referred to as hinsenbiki). Within hinsenbiki areas, most local 
governments do not regulate the land-uses (Iuchi, 2016).
Outside of the city planning areas, municipal governments can optionally desig-
nate quasi-city planning areas (jun toshikeikaku kuiki). This possibility was intro-
duced with the 2000-revision of the City Planning Act to enable the possibility to 
zone land located outside of city planning areas (Iuchi, 2016, p. 30).
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(City Planning Act)
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Agricultural Promotion 
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Targeting Regional 
Forestry Plan
Nature Conservation 
Area
Illustration 26 | Land-uses in the National Land-Use Plan | Own illustration based on Iuchi, 
2016, p 28
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› Development of 
Urban Facilities
Urban Facilities
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Designation of City 
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Government)
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(roads etc.) 
Public Spaces, such 
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Use Zone, Special Land Use District and Special 
Land Use Restriction Zone, etc. can be designated; 
District Plan, Urban Facilities and Urban Develop-
ment Projects shall not be designated.
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Illustration 27 | Basic structure of the city planning system | Own illustration based on Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, 
Transport and Tourism, 2003, p. 2
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Urban promotion areas or quasi-city planning areas can be further divided into 
land-use zones with the intention to “ensure reasonable land use by classifying 
land […] and imposing certain restrictions on buildings and structures” (Bureau 
of Urban Development, Tokyo Metropolitan Government, 2013, p. 35). The City 
Planning Act and the Building Standards Act provide for twelve different types of 
residential, commercial and industrial land-uses (see illustration 29). Each land-
use is associated with certain building standards, e.g., floor area ratios (FAR) 
or building heights (Bureau of Urban Development, Tokyo Metropolitan Govern-
ment, 2013, p. 35).
In addition to the zoning of specific land-uses, spatial planners can also desig-
nate other zones and districts “[i]n order to promote reasonable land use accord-
ing to the characteristics of the given districts” (Bureau of Urban Development, 
Tokyo Metropolitan Government, 2013, p.  35). These districts do not have to 
comply with the land-use zones (see illustration 28) and are intended to achieve 
specific purposes beyond an areas general land-use, e.g., the conservation of 
natural features, fire prevention or disaster prevention (Bureau of Urban Devel-
opment, Tokyo Metropolitan Government, 2013).
District planning was established in 1980 to fill the gap that was left between 
the old City Planning Act and the old Building Standards Act (Bureau of Urban 
Development, Tokyo Metropolitan Government, 2013, p. 104). District plans are 
developed by the responsible municipality “to improve, develop, and conserve 
favorable environments that suit the qualities of each block through uniformity 
in building design, public facilities layout, and the layout of other facilities” (City 
Planning Act, 1968). The plans include propositions for the location of public fa-
cilities (e.g., local roads, local parks, footways), building control and regulations 
(e.g., regarding land-use, FAR, building height and design) and the preservation 
of green (Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism, 2003, p. 7).
District Plans
Other Zones and Districts
Land Use Zones
Urbanisation Control Area (UCA)
Urbanisation Promotion Area (UPA)
City Planning Area
Illustration 28 | The concept of the land-use planning system in City Planning Areas | Ahlers 
et al., 2015, p. 91 based on Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism, 
2003, p. 2
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Illustration 29 | Land-use zones in the Urban Promotion Area | Ministry of Land, Infrastruc-
ture, Transport and Tourism, 2003, p. 4 (slightly adapted)
Category I exclusively low-rise
residential zone
Category II exclusively low-rise
residential zone
Category I mid/ high-rise
oriented residential zone
Category II mid/ high-rise
oriented residential zone
Category I residential zone Category II residential zone
Quasi-residential zone Neighborhood commercial zone Commercial zone
Quasi-industrial zone Industrial zone Exclusively industrial zone
This zone is designated for low  
rise residential buildings. The  
permitted buildings include  
residential buildings which are also 
used as small shops or offices and 
elementary/ junior high  
school buildings.
This zone is mainly designated for 
low rise residential buildings. In 
addition to elementary/ junior high 
school buildings, certain types of 
shop buildings with a floor area of  
up to 150m2 are permitted. 
This zone is designated for  
medium to high residential  
buildings. In addition to hospital  
and university buildings, certain 
types of shop buildings with a  
floor area of up to 500m2 are  
permitted. 
This zone is mainly designated for 
medium to high rise residential  
buildings. In addition to hospital  
and university buildings, the  
permitted buildings include  
certain shops and office buildings 
with a floor area of up to 1,500m2 to 
provide conveniences for the  
local community. 
This zone is designated to protect  
the residential environment. The 
permitted buildings include shops, 
offices and hotel buildings with a 
floor area of up to 3,000m2. 
This zone is designated to mainly  
protect the residential environ - 
ment. The permitted buildings 
include shops, offices and hotel 
buildings as well as buildings with 
karaoke box.
This zone is designated to allow 
the introduction of vehicle-related 
facilities along roads while  
protecting the residential  
environment in harmony with  
such facilities.
This zone is designated to provide 
daily shopping facilities for the 
neighborhood residents. In  
addition to residential and shop  
buildings, small factory buildings  
are permitted.
Banks, cinemas, restaurants and 
department stores are  
constructed in this zone.  
Residential buildings and small  
factory buildings are also  
permitted. 
This zone is mainly occupied by 
light industrial facilities and 
service facilities. Almost all types 
of factories are permitted 
excepting those which are 
considered to considerably 
worsen the environment.
Any type of factory can be built in 
this zone. While residential and 
shop buildings can 
be constructed, school, hospital and 
hotel buildings are not permitted.
This zone is designated for 
factories. While all types of 
factory buildings are permitted, 
residential, shop, school, hospital 
and hotel buildings cannot be 
constructed.
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District plans can also be used as an instrument to designate development pro-
motion districts in order to promote the development of underdeveloped land 
(e.g., for the revitalization of former industrial or factory sites) or to assign disas-
ter prevention block improvement districts (e.g., to advance the construction of 
evacuation roads or evacuation sites or improve the buildings’ fire resistance) 
(Bureau of Urban Development, Tokyo Metropolitan Government, 2013, p. 106).
4.7 SPATIAL PLANNING AND RISK GOVERNANCE IN 
JAPAN
Within this spatial planning framework, planners have certain options available 
to manage disaster risks and increase a city’s disaster resilience. Some of them 
were specifically established in order to handle disaster risks (e.g., the designa-
tion of hazardous areas), others are generally applicable and their use to manage 
disaster risks is just one of their potential applications (e.g., land readjustment 
projects). This chapter will introduce the most important spatial planning options 
that were used in the reconstruction process after the GEJE and Tsunami based 
on their applicability in relation to risk assessment, risk management and risk 
communication (see Chapter 2.4).
4.7.1 Spatial planning options for risk assessment
Spatial planners can support the assessment of risk by contributing to the devel-
opment of hazard maps, e.g., by providing information about vulnerable land-us-
es. In addition to this, spatial planners can carry out EIAs to determine whether 
certain construction plans should not be carried out in order to preserve protect-
ed goods.
Hazard maps and hazard simulations
Hazard maps are an important tool to plan disaster resilient cities, since they 
depict areas that are exposed to certain hazards based on a scientific analysis, 
which includes an area’s topography and the potential magnitude of hazardous 
events (Dzurdženík et al., 2015, 16-17). Thus, hazard maps help to determine 
spatial risks and serve as a basis for the designation of hazardous zones in ac-
cordance with Article 7 of the City Planning Act or Article 39 of the Building Stan-
dards Act (see Chapter 4.5). There are various hazard maps developed in order 
to illustrate potentially endangered areas. After the revision of the Flood Control 
Act in 2001, the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism together 
with the prefectural governments published hazard maps for river floods, storm 
surges and tsunamis. The maps are publicly available on the website of the Min-
istry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism (http://disaportal.gsi.go.jp/). 
The publication of this information did not result in the negative effects, e.g., 
sinking real estate prices in areas exposed to certain hazards, that had been 
anticipated. Sharing the information included in hazard maps, is an important 
aspect to enable the public to prepare for the occurrence of hazardous events, 
e.g., through changing building structures (Iuchi, 2016).
The tsunami hazard maps that were developed in Japan after the GEJE are 
based on the concept of L1- and L2-tsunamis. While L1-tsunamis have an occur-
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rence between once every few decades to once every hundred years, they are 
not as high as L2-tsunamis. L2-tsunamis, on the other hand, are very high, but 
only occur once every couple hundred years or less frequently (Central Disaster 
Management Council, 2011, p. 10; Dzurdženík et al., 2015, p. 30; Iuchi, 2016, 
p.  25). Japan’s disaster resilience concept intends the construction of a sea-
wall along Tohoku Coast, whose height was determined based on the height of 
L1-tsunamis. This means, that the seawall will prospectively protect the land be-
hind it from L1-tsunamis. Nevertheless, during the rare occurrence of a L2-tsu-
nami, the seawall will become washed over and the low lying area behind it 
will become inundated. This course of events was simulated using a computer 
program, which considered the estimated height of the tsunami (calculated on 
the basis of large-scale tsunamis in the past), the intended height of the seawall, 
geographical and topographical characteristics as well as the local infrastructure. 
The simulation results were illustrated in hazard maps, which were then re-
leased to the public (see illustration 30; Dzurdženík et al., 2015, p. 18).
Based on these hazard maps and under consideration of the area’s land-uses, 
spatial planners are able to decide which sections to exclude from future urban 
development and thereby increase the disaster resilience of the city.
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA)
The EIA is an eco-political instrument which enables the forethought of the 
environmental impact of construction projects. This is important to ensure an 
optimum preservation of protective goods such as air, water, soil, flora, fauna, 
landscape and human beings (Ministry of the Environment, Government of Ja-
pan, n. d., p. 10). The EIA is an important instrument to include environmental 
aspects into spatial planning. Currently, EIAs in Japan are conducted based on 
the Environmental Assessment Law, which was enacted in 1997 (Environmen-
tal Impact Assessment Law, 1997). The law established a binding obligation to 
conduct an EIA when required. The necessity to conduct an EIA depends on the 
type of project and its size. Each project that is expected to have a significant 
impact on the environment is classified as Class-1 and generally requires an EIA. 
Illustration 30 |  L2-tsunami 
simulation for 
Tsugaruishi District 
in Miyako City | 
Tsugaruishi District 
Reconstruction Town 
Planning Committee 
2012, p. 10
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Smaller projects are ranked as Class-2 projects (see table 2). Their requirement 
to conduct an EIA is determined through a case-by-case review. Projects that 
require the approval from the national government, receive funding from the 
national government or are conducted by the national government, generally 
require an EIA (Ministry of the Environment, Government of Japan, n. d., p. 4).
Class-2-projects have to pass through a screening to determine whether they 
require an EIA. The screening evaluates the requirement for an EIA on a case-
by-case basis. The final decision is made by the responsible ministry (e.g., the 
Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism for road projects) under 
consideration of the prefectural governor’s opinion (Ministry of the Environment, 
Government of Japan, n. d., p. 9).
If a project requires an EIA, the project proponent is responsible for its imple-
mentation. If spatial plans include projects that require an EIA, the level of the 
planning authority (e.g., municipal or prefectural government) takes on the role 
of the project proponent (Ministry of the Environment, Government of Japan, 
n. d., p. 15). The EIA includes the following steps:
1. Scoping: During this stage, the project proponent identifies all relevant 
stakeholders, defines the assessment methods and compiles every-
thing into a scoping document. The public has the right to review the 
document and submit comments, before the proponent advances it, 
together with the received comments, to the prefectural and municipal 
governments. After the proponent received the opinion from the prefec-
tural governor, which also takes into account the opinion of the municipal 
mayor, the proponent makes the decision about the actual assessment 
methods (Ministry of the Environment, Government of Japan, n.  d., 
pp. 9–10).
2. Identification and description of effects: The next step requires the proj-
ect proponent to implement the selected assessment methods to de-
termine the possible impacts of the planned development on the envi-
ronment. Furthermore, the step also considers the ability of appropriate 
measures to reduce these effects. The goal of the assessment is to 
identify the alternative that keeps the negative impact on the environ-
ment as small as possible (Ministry of the Environment, Government of 
Japan, n. d., p. 11).
3. Environmental Impact Statement (EIS): The results from the assess-
ment are combined into a draft version of the Environmental Impact 
Statement (EIS). This document follows a similar procedure as the scop-
ing document. The draft EIS is made open to the public. Besides the 
public display and the ability to write comments, additional explanation 
meetings are held. The public’s comments and the draft EIS are then 
submitted to the prefectural and municipal government. Based on the 
prefecture’s and municipal’s statement, the proponent reviews the EIS 
and submits it to the ministry responsible for the authorization of the 
project (e.g., the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism 
for road projects) and the Minister of the Environment. The responsible 
ministry prepares its statement under consideration of the Minister of 
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the Environment’s opinion and sends it back to the project proponent. 
Based on this statement, the proponent prepares the final EIS, which is 
submitted to the authorizing ministries, the prefectural and the municipal 
government and made available to the public for one month (Ministry of 
the Environment, Government of Japan, n. d., pp. 12–13).
Class-1 project
(EIA is always required)  
Class-2 project
(case-by-case review if EIA is 
required)
1. Road 
national expressway All
metropolitan expressway 4 lanes or more 
national roads 4 lanes or more, 10 km or longer 4 lanes or more, 7.5 km-10 km
large-scale forest road 2 lanes or more, 20 km or longer 2 lanes or more, 15 km-20 km
2. River
dam, weir reservoir area: 100 ha or larger reservoir area: 75 ha-100 ha
diversion channnel, lake-related develop-
ment
area of land alteration:  
100 ha or larger
area of land alteration:  
75 ha-100 ha
3. Railway
shinkansen (super express train) All 
railway, track length: 10 km or longer length: 7.5 km-10 km
4. Airport runway: 2,500 m or longer runway: 1,875 m-2,500 m
5. Power plant 
hydraulic power plant output: 30,000 kw or over output: 22,500 kw-30,000 kw
thermal power plant output: 150,000 kw or over output: 112,500 kw-150,000 kw
geothermal power plant output: 10,000 kw or over output: 7,500 kw-10,000 kw
nuclear power plant All
6. Waste disposal site area: 30 ha or larger area: 25 ha-30 ha
7. Landfill and reclamation area: exceeding 50 ha area: 40 ha-50 ha
8. Land readjustment project area: 100 ha or larger area: 75 ha-100 ha
9. New Residential area  
    development project
area: 100 ha or larger area: 75 ha-100 ha
10. Industrial estate development project area:100 ha or larger area: 75 ha-100 ha
11. New town infrastructure  
      development project
area: 100 ha or larger area: 75 ha-100 ha
12. Distribution center complex  
      development project
area: 100 ha or larger area: 75 ha-100 ha
13. Residential or industrial land  
      development by specific organizations
area: 100 ha or larger area: 75 ha-100 ha
Port and harbor planning Total reclaimed and excavated land: 300 ha or larger  
Table 2 | List of projects that are subject to the Environmental Impact Assessment Law | Own illustration based on Ministry 
of the Environment, Government of Japan, n. d., p. 5
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4. Integration of EIA into decision making: After the EIS is finalized, the 
project can be implemented. Nevertheless, it is important for the project 
to follow the specific measures that are planned in the EIS document 
(Ministry of the Environment, Government of Japan, n. d., pp. 13–14).
5. Monitoring: To ensure the effectiveness of the intended measure, a 
monitoring can continuously evaluate the environmental conditions from 
the beginning of the project’s construction until its operation. In reality, 
this option is only taken in certain cases (e.g., if the actual impacts of a 
project were uncertain to determine in advance) (Ministry of the Environ-
ment, Government of Japan, n. d., p. 15).
4.7.2 Spatial planning options for risk management
Spatial planning offers a variety of possibilities to manage risks. Some of them 
concentrate on the minimization of vulnerable land-uses at risk, either by re-
stricting all or specific land-uses in hazardous areas, others intend to reduce 
the physical susceptibility of existing or planned buildings to decrease an areas 
overall vulnerability. Another option for risk reduction is to address the hazard, 
e.g., through the implementation of mitigation strategies.
4.7.2.1 Minimization of exposure of urban areas
The Japanese spatial planning system provides different possibilities to control 
urban development in hazardous areas: Preventing the urbanization of unde-
veloped areas can be achieved through the designation as urbanization control 
areas. This option can also be applied for hazardous areas. Another option is 
the designation of hazardous areas, which can be used to restrict residential 
land-uses on undeveloped, but also developed areas. If developed areas are 
designated as hazardous, the residents in this area have to be relocated to safer 
land. In Japan, the preparation of these relocation sites often occurs through the 
implementation of land-readjustment projects. Land readjustment projects are 
an important spatial planning instrument in Japan, which was frequently applied 
for the reconstruction after the GEJE and Tsunami.
Land-use control in hazardous areas
Article 7 of the City Planning Act enables the classification of the city planning 
area into urbanization promotion and urbanization control areas. This option 
was established to prevent unregulated urban development, but is also appli-
cable to prevent unwanted development in areas that are prone to hazards. 
With the exclusion of areas that are exposed to hazards from urbanization 
promotion areas, spatial planners can prevent these areas’ future urban devel-
opment. One example for this is the land along river courses, which should be 
excluded from urbanization promotion areas unless special measures for flood 
control are taken. To ensure that urbanization promotion areas are safe for 
urban development, spatial planners are required to consider an area’s hazard 
exposure before designating is as an urbanization promotion area (Iuchi, 2016). 
Although Article 7 of the City Planning Act enables the prevention of urban 
development in hazardous areas, in reality, this option is often left unused due 
to economic aspects (e.g., high land values). These aspects often pressure 
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spatial planners to enable the urban development of areas that should rather 
be excluded from urbanization promotion areas (Iuchi, 2016, p. 33).
Based on Article 39 of the Building Standards Act, local governments are able to 
designate hazardous areas that are prone to landslides, tsunamis, storm surges 
or floods by enforcing ordinances. These ordinances permanently prohibit future 
residential development in these areas and also serve as a basis for the reloca-
tion of existing residents in these areas (Iuchi, 2016). The designation of hazard-
ous areas can prevent the current and future use of exposed areas for residential 
purposes, even if these areas were formerly included in urbanization promotion 
areas and therefore available for urban development.
History shows that the proactive designation of hazardous areas was only con-
ducted scarcely. Before the GEJE, the overall area designated as hazardous 
amounted to 7,060 ha. After the GEJE an additional area of 15,723 ha was des-
ignated as hazardous (Iuchi, 2016, p. 34). This shows that the intention of Article 
39 of the Building Standards Act to prevent disasters through the proactive relo-
cation of citizens from hazardous areas to safe land, was not met. The designa-
tion of hazardous areas and the associated relocation usually only happens after 
the occurrence of a disaster (Iuchi, 2016, p. 32).
Relocation through relocation programs or land readjustment projects
The designation of hazardous areas in accordance with Article 39 of the Building 
Standards Act usually addresses existing urban areas. Therefore, the designa-
tion enables the implementation of the following two relocation programs:
 › The “collective relocation promotion program for disaster prevention” 
(Bousai no tameno shudan iten jigyou ni kakaru kuni no zaiseijou no 
tokubetsu sochi tou ni kansuru horitsu) (hereafter, group relocation pro-
gram) enables communities to proactively relocate from hazardous to 
safe land. In the past, the program was often used to move citizens from 
remote, hazard-prone areas into existing urban areas to provide them 
with better infrastructure services (Iuchi, 2016, p. 31).
 › The “relocation program for hazardous residential buildings adjacent to 
steep slopes” (Gakechi rinsetsu kiken jyutaku iten jigyo) allows the “pro-
active relocation of individual residents specifically living near collapsible 
slopes in order to prevent damage and loss from slope failure” (Iuchi, 
2016, p. 31). This program focuses on the relocation of individual house-
holds rather than communities, since slope failures usually only affect 
small areas. The program’s flexibility to relocate individual households, 
results in a frequent application of the steep slope relocation program 
(Iuchi, 2016, p. 31).
Besides these relocation programs, relocation of existing settlements can also be 
implemented through land readjustment projects. The importance of land readjust-
ment in Japan is displayed in its characterization as ’The Mother of City Planning’ 
(Toshi Keikaku no Haha) (Sorensen, 2000, p. 217). In the 19th century, when the 
disorganized development of Japanese cities called for adequate planning ap-
proaches, land readjustment was adopted from agricultural planning, where land 
consolidation was successfully used to boost crop yields. Land readjustment has 
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versatile fields of application, but is most frequently applied for the restructuring 
of large areas and for the improvement of public infrastructure. Land readjustment 
projects can either be used for suburban development (kaihatsu) or for the renewal, 
redevelopment or reconstruction of urban areas (Hohn, 2000, p. 221).
This wide application of land-readjustment projects in Japanese spatial planning 
enables their use for the preparation of new relocation sites, the adaptation of 
existing urban structures (e.g., roads or parks) as well as for the readjustment of 
affected areas for the recovery on-site or on raised land. To prevent repetitions, 
the main steps of land readjustment are explained in Chapter 4.7.2.4 because 
the adaptation of existing urban structures is one of the advantages of land re-
adjustment projects. In case that land readjustment projects are implemented 
to prepare a new relocation site, the city administration purchases the required 
land from the previous land owners and sells it to the new residents at the end 
of the process. Nevertheless, the basic steps remain the same (see Chapter 
4.7.2.4). Relocation through land readjustment projects can also happen to im-
plement the group relocation projects mentioned above.
4.7.2.2 Differentiated land-use decisions
In Japan, differentiated land-use decisions can be made through the designation 
of specific land-uses for urban promotion areas or quasi-city planning areas on 
the basis of the City Planning Act. For these areas, spatial planners are able to 
zone land-uses.
Land-use zoning
As explained in Chapter 4.6, there are twelve different types of residential, com-
mercial and industrial land-use zones available to designate the specific land-use 
for a certain area. Using this option is especially useful if residential land-uses in 
a certain hazardous area should be prevented, while the development of com-
mercial or industrial land-uses should be enabled.
After the GEJE and Tsunami, many cities along the ria coastline of Iwate Pre-
fecture used differentiated land-use decisions to utilize most of the scarce plain 
areas by the sea, even though they are simulated to be flooded in case of the 
occurrence of a L2-tsunami. Illustration 31 gives an overview of a typical distri-
bution of land-uses after the GEJE and Tsunami.
Illustration 31 | Land-uses near the ocean | Own illustration based on Ubaura, 2013, p. 7
Residential area Industrial area / Tourism Sea
Green 
tract of 
Land
Apartment Detached house
Cultural facilities
Store
Seawall
Seawall
Seawall
Refugee tower
Tide water 
control forest
Markets / Fisherman
Seafood products
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Usually, areas directly by the sea were restricted to land-uses that require the 
vicinity to the ocean. These land-uses are mainly the fishing and fish processing 
industries as well as tourist attractions and souvenir shops. To ensure the safety 
of people who stay in these areas, it is important to also provide evacuation shel-
ters. Many cities also designated green spaces along the coast. These zones can 
comprise memorial parks and/ or coastal forests. Areas that are located further 
inland, but are still prone to flooding in case of a L2-tsunami, are usually desig-
nated as commercial zones. These areas can also include cultural facilities. By 
excluding residential land-uses from these areas, it should be prevented that 
people are surprised by a tsunami while they are asleep. Residential land-uses 
usually are only designated in areas with an expected inundation depth of less 
than 2 m in case of a L2-tsunami. Nevertheless, buildings that are constructed in 
areas that can be inundated by a L2-tsunami usually require the implementation 
of certain building standards (see next chapter).
4.7.2.3 Adaptation of building structures
Reducing the susceptibility of the city’s built structure is another important 
possibility to increase the city’s disaster resilience. This can either be achieved 
through the implementation of legally binding building codes or additional build-
ing requirements. To ensure that also people who cannot afford to live in private 
housing are provided with appropriate accommodation, spatial planners should 
also ensure a sufficient supply with public housing.
Building codes
The Building Standards Act (Act No. 201 of 1950) is Japan’s main law for the 
promotion of building codes. It was established in 1950 with the aim to “safe-
guard the life, health, and property of people by providing minimum standards 
concerning the site, construction, equipment, and use of buildings” (Hasegawa, 
2013, p. 21) and has been continuously revised since then. Although the Building 
Standards Act generally applies to all buildings in Japan, regional specifics (e.g., 
seismic activity, snowfall) result in varying requirements for different regions 
(Hasegawa, 2013, p. 21). The Act sets building codes regarding the building’s 
structural safety (e.g., regarding permanent, imposed and snow loads, wind 
pressure and seismic force), fire safety and hygienic safety (Hasegawa, 2013). 
Furthermore, the Building Standards Act includes specifications about building 
standards that are related to the land-use zones introduced in Chapter 4.6 (Hase-
gawa, 2013, pp. 22–23). These building standards depend on the land-use zone 
a building is constructed in and cover, e.g., requirements regarding the FAR 
and building heights (Bureau of Urban Development, Tokyo Metropolitan Gov-
ernment, 2013, p. 35). A system of building permissions and interim and final 
inspections throughout the construction work ensures the observance of the 
building code. In case that the requirements of the building code are not met, 
the Designated Administrative Agency can put a halt on the construction work 
(Hasegawa, 2013, p. 22). For more specific information of the content of the 
Building Standards Act, the reader is referred to Hasegawa (2013).
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Additional building requirements
Besides these general requirements for the construction of buildings in Japan, 
it is also possible to demand additional building requirements in certain areas to 
reduce the buildings’ vulnerability. After the GEJE and Tsunami, this option was 
also used in Ofunato City to enable the utilization of as much of the city’s scarce 
flat land as possible (Ubaura, 2016, p. 60). The city administration allowed the 
construction of residential buildings in hazardous areas with an expected inun-
dation depth of less than 2 m, if specific building standards that depend on the 
expected inundation depth in this area were met. Buildings that are constructed 
in type 2A zones, with an inundation depth between 1-2 m, are required to have 
their foundation raised by 1.5 m from the street level. In type 2B zones, with an 
inundation depth of less than 1 m, the buildings need to be raised by 0.5 m from 
the street level (see illustration 32).
Instead of officially requiring adaptations of buildings that are newly construct-
ed, spatial planners can also try to convince the owners of existing buildings 
to adjust their buildings to increase their safety. This can be achieved through 
awareness raising campaigns or the establishment of incentives (e.g., for the 
installation of solar panels to increase the building’s independence from the 
energy supply network).
Provision of public housing
Besides the above mentioned options to increase the safety of private owned 
houses, spatial planners are also responsible to provide a sufficient amount of 
safe housing for people who cannot afford privately owned homes. This require-
ment becomes especially relevant in the aftermath of a disaster, when a signif-
icant amount of people lost their homes and requires shelter. Borrowing from 
Quarantelli (1995), the following three phases of housing recovery can be iden-
tified after a disaster: (1) staying in evacuation shelters, (2) living in temporary 
Illustration 32 | Building requirements in the hazardous area of Ofunato City | Own illustration based on Ubaura, 2016, p. 60
Disaster Hazard Zone (areas inundated by the 3/11 tsunami)
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housing, (3) returning to repaired or new constructed permanent housing. Spa-
tial planners are able to contribute to each of these phases, e.g., by finding safe 
locations for evacuation shelters and temporary housing sites. Nevertheless, to 
increase the engineering resilience of built structures, the construction of public 
housing for citizens who are unable to afford private housing is most relevant.
The right to obtain adequate housing is enshrined in Article 25 of Japan’s Con-
stitution (Kobayashi, 2016, p. 19), which states: “All people shall have the right 
to maintain the minimum standards of wholesome and cultured living” (The 
Constitution of Japan, 1946, Article 25). To provide municipalities with the fi-
nancial ability to comply with this goal, the Public Housing Act (Act No. 193 
of 1951) was established in 1951 (Kobayashi, 2016, p.  15). Public housing is 
constructed, bought or rented by municipal or prefectural governments with 
grants received from the national government (Building Center of Japan, 2016, 
p. 27). It is provided for low-income renters, whose income lies below a certain 
threshold and who are unable to find accommodation on the private housing 
market (Kobayashi, 2016, p. 19). The allocation of housing units is implemented 
through lottery. Nevertheless, it is possible to favor particularly indigent people, 
e.g., elderly or single-parent households (Building Center of Japan, 2016, p. 27).
For the housing recovery after the GEJE and Tsunami, public housing plays an im-
portant role. As of January 2016, 30,000 new public housing units were planned 
in Tohuku Region, of which roughly 50% were already completed (Japan Recon-
struction Agency, 2016b). In comparison to this, roughly 130,000 housing units 
are expected to be privately constructed (Japan Reconstruction Agency, 2016b).
4.7.2.4 Hazard mitigation
In contrast to the other risk management options presented in this chapter, 
which address the vulnerability component of risk, it is also possible to reduce risk 
by mitigating the hazard. One option for this is the installation of protective infra-
structure (e.g., seawalls or river embankments). Furthermore, the raising of land 
and the adaptation of urban structures, which can both be implemented by means 
of land readjustment projects, are able to reduce risk by mitigating the hazard.
Protective infrastructure
Planning and constructing protective infrastructure usually requires the coop-
eration of spatial planners with the sectoral departments in charge (e.g., water 
authorities). One measure taken after the GEJE to increase the future disas-
ter resilience against tsunamis, is the construction of a giant seawall along To-
hoku Coast. The height of the seawall was determined based on the principle of 
Level1-tsunamis (L1-tsunamis) and Level2-tsunamis (L2-tsunamis), which was 
established by the Central Disaster Management Council (2011): L1-tsunamis 
“occur more frequently than the […] largest-possible tsunamis and cause major 
damage despite their relatively lower tsunami heights” (Central Disaster Man-
agement Council, 2011, p. 10). Nevertheless, their damage is not as severe as 
the damage that is caused by L2-tsunamis. L1-tsunamis occur with a frequency 
of once every few decades to once every hundred years (Dzurdženík et al., 2015, 
p. 30; Iuchi, 2016, p. 25). It was the intention of the Central Disaster Manage-
ment Council that the damage from L1-tsunamis should be prevented through 
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the construction of a seawall. For L2-tsunamis, “the frequency of […] occurrence 
is extremely low” (Central Disaster Management Council, 2011, p. 10), they only 
happen every couple hundred years or less frequently (Dzurdženík et al., 2015, 
p. 30). Nevertheless, if they take place, their damage is immense. The GEJE Tsu-
nami falls into this category. The planned seawall does not intend to protect the 
low-lying land behind it against the extreme height of L2-tsunamis. Instead, the 
protection from this rare tsunami type relies on evacuation measures (Central 
Disaster Management Council, 2011, p. 10). This means, that the constructed 
seawall will be flooded should a L2-tsunami occur and the area behind it will 
become inundated. In order to develop the spatial plans after the GEJE and Tsu-
nami, this process was simulated with the help of computer software.
Land readjustment and raising program
In some cases, the construction of a seawall is not sufficient to completely 
prevent the inundation of the area behind it. In cases where an increase of the 
seawall’s height is not desirable, there is another option to solve this problem. 
Many cities in Tohoku Region decided to implement the land readjustment 
and raising program to mitigate the hazard. According to the main intention 
of the Land Readjustment Act, the program is used to reorganize the existing 
urban structures. Specific for this program is that the land is raised before the 
distribution of the housing lots occurs (Iuchi et al., 2015, p. 35). The height of 
this artificial land raise depends on the hazard simulations. In many places, the 
soil to implement the land raising projects is obtained from nearby mountains 
that are cut to establish relocation sites. In Rikuzentakata City, an enormous 
conveyor system was established to transport the needed soil from the nearby 
mountain into the central area of the city. To transport the soil across Kesen 
River, the Bridge of Hope was installed (see illustration 33). The use of convey-
ors instead of trucks enabled a tenfold acceleration of the transportation of the 
soil (M. Ubaura, personal communication, 21 February 2015). This illustrates 
the immense amount of soil needed to implement the planned land readjust-
ment and raising program.
Illustration 33 | The Bridge of Hope in Rikuzentakata City | Photo by author, February 2015
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Adaptation of urban structure through land readjustment projects
The implementation of land readjustment projects is also a useful option for the 
adaptation of urban structure (e.g., to widen roads or establish parks). In this 
context, the land readjustment projects can be used in accordance with their 
original intention to reorganize and improve existing urban infrastructure (Hohn, 
2000, p. 221).
The current Land Readjustment Act (Act No. 119 of 1954) (tochi-kukaku-seiri-ho) 
was issued in 1954. It aims for an organized development of public infrastructure 
and the quality improvement of newly cut building lots (Hohn, 2000, p. 227). 
Land readjustment projects can either be conducted privately or publicly. Private 
readjustment projects require all land owners or tenants to agree to the project. 
If the private project is organized through the establishment of a land readjust-
ment cooperative (tochi-kukaku-sei-ri-kumiai), its implementation still requires 
the agreement of three-quarter of all land owners or tenants. Furthermore, does 
the establishment of the cooperative require the association of at least seven 
parties. Public land readjustment projects, on the contrary, do not require the 
agreement of a certain amount of land owners or tenants to be initiated (Hohn, 
2000, pp. 222–223).
Land readjustment projects after disasters are typically initiated by public author-
ities. The procedure of public land readjustment comprises the following steps 
(see illustration 34; Hohn, 2000, pp. 228–232):
 › The land owners contribute their plots to the land readjustment pool.
 › The land is reduced by the amount of land that is required for the devel-
opment of the public infrastructure (e.g., the widening of roads or the 
development of parks) and an additional amount of land, which is sum-
marized in the reserve area pool. This land is sold after the completion 
of the land readjustment project to balance the expenses for the entire 
project.
 › Public land readjustment projects are accompanied by readjustment 
councils which consist of 10 to 50 members (e.g., land owners, land 
tenants or experts).
 › Before the construction work starts, a Replotting Design Proposal is de-
veloped. This document gives an overview of the intended redistribution 
of the lots.
Before Readjustment After Readjustment
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Illustration 34 | The procedure of land readjustment projects | Own illustration adapted from 
Hohn 2000, p. 229
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 › After the construction work is finished, each land owner receives a lot 
that has a smaller size, but – in most cases – a higher value than the 
old one. The value increase results in the provision of an improved infra-
structure. It is intended to provide each owner with a lot that is equiva-
lent to the former one in relation to its location, area, potential land-uses 
and surrounding conditions.
 › To conclude the land readjustment project, the new lots are registered 
and the land owners are either reimbursed, if the value of their property 
decreased, or have to pay a countervailing charge, if the value of the land 
increased. This step is necessary because the values of the new lots 
usually vary from the values of the former lots.
While the calculation of the land which is required for the construction of ad-
equate infrastructure usually is easy to accomplish, the amount of land that is 
required as reserve area (horyuchi) to break even at the end of the project, is 
complicated. To reduce the financial risk for the project and allow expenses be-
fore the reserve area is sold at the end of the project, the public sector is able to 
grant interest-free loans that correspond with the predicted value of the reserve 
area. Furthermore, the construction of public infrastructure is subsidized by the 
national or local government (e.g., the national government subsidizes the con-
struction of roads that are wider than 12 m with three-quarter of the expenses) 
(Hohn, 2000, pp. 228–230).
4.7.3 Spatial planning options for risk communication
Throughout the entire risk governance process, spatial planners should ensure 
a comprehensive participation process for all relevant stakeholders (incl. the 
public). This includes the continuous information about ongoing processes and 
upcoming decisions and the integration into the decision-making process. Nev-
ertheless, the exact organization of the participation process should be deter-
mined situation-related.
Citizen Participation in Japan
In Japan, the public participation process for spatial planning was established 
with the 1992 revision of the Land-Use Planning Act. The Land-Use Planning 
Act requires a two-stage participation process for the development of master 
and district plans: The first step includes the information of the public about the 
intended goals of the plan in form of public hearings or another form of informa-
tion event. The second participation step includes the public display of the plan’s 
draft version and the opportunity for the public to comment on it (Mägdefrau & 
Sprague, 2016). Based on the forms of participation introduced in Chapter 2.4, 
the legal requirements for public participation in Japan include public information 
about the intention of the plan and consultation regarding the content of the 
plan. After the GEJE and Tsunami, citizen participation conformed to these legal 
requirements, but mostly did not go beyond them. Reasons for this might have 
been the restricted time frame and damaged administrative structures after the 
disaster (Mägdefrau & Sprague, 2016). Nevertheless, there are occasional ex-
amples for public participation processes that went beyond the legal require-
ments (see Chapter 8).
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In Japan, citizen participation is linked to the machizukuri, which can either be 
translated with “community development”, “neighborhood building” or “town 
making” (Sorensen et al., 2009, p. 33). Machizukuri emerged in the 1970s as a 
counter-movement to the traditional highly centralized and technocratic spatial 
planning approach (toshikeikaku). Instead of focusing on economic growth, the 
machizukuri approach intended to improve the environment and living quality 
of people in their neighborhood (Sorensen et al., 2009, p. 35). Over the years, 
machizukuri developed into an integrative and participative bottom-up approach 
on the community level (Hohn, 2000, p. 100; Kadomatsu, 2007, p. 6; Sorensen et 
al., 2009, p. 35). Machizukuri can be established by local governments through 
the enactment of ordinances. These ordinances “are legally binding insofar they 
do not run counter to the statutory law” (Kadomatsu, 2007, p. 6).
Current machizukuri movements usually have the following characteristics in 
common: First, they operate on the small scale level of single neighborhoods. 
Second, their main intention is to establish or manage common spaces (e.g., 
local parks or indoor meeting places). Third, they highlight the importance of 
community participation for the decision-making process and therefore foster 
comprehensive communication processes on the community level (Sorensen 
et al., 2009, p. 40). The last aspect highlights the machizukuri’s relevance for 
citizen participation in Japan. Nevertheless, it should be considered that even 
though machizukuri are officially established by the local governments, they are 
not integrated into the legal spatial planning system. Accordingly, machizukuri 
are mostly run by community members on a voluntary basis. In order to have 
their concerns and needs integrated into official plans, machizukuri have to rely 
on their ability to convince local governments to conform to them (Sorensen et 
al., 2009, p. 47). Local governments are, however, generally able to collaborate 
with machizukuri on the participation level of active involvement or shared de-
cision-making in order to produce legally binding documents that include the 
requirements of the local population (Sorensen et al., 2009, p. 47).
4.8 SPATIAL PLANNING FOR RECONSTRUCTION 
AFTER THE GREAT EAST JAPAN EARTHQUAKE 
AND TSUNAMI
The Reconstruction Process of Tohoku Region is guided by the Basic Act on Re-
construction from the Great East Japan Earthquake (Act No. 76, 2011) (hereafter, 
Basic Act on Reconstruction), which was enacted by the Diet in June 2011. The 
Act “set the policy for reconstruction, enabled the government to issue recon-
struction bonds and establish special zones for reconstruction” (The Law Library 
of Congress, 2013, p. 37). Furthermore, the Act prepared the establishment of 
the Reconstruction Headquarter Response Office and the Reconstruction Agen-
cy. On 29 July 2011, the Reconstruction Headquarter Response Office published 
the Basic Guidelines for Reconstruction in response to the Great East Japan 
Earthquake (hereafter, Basic Guidelines for Reconstruction). The guidelines base 
on the Basic Act on Reconstruction and set the overall vision for the reconstruc-
tion process, which were then specified by setting specific policies and mea-
sures for implementation (The Law Library of Congress, 2013, p. 37).
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According to the Basic Act on Reconstruction and the Basic Guidelines for Re-
construction, the main goal of the reconstruction process is to not only rebuild 
destroyed urban structures but use the reconstruction process as a chance to 
improve and revitalize Japan. In this context, the reconstruction process should 
also be used to address existing challenges Japan has to face: “Innovative mea-
sures shall be implemented to contribute to the resolution of challenges that Ja-
pan is facing, such as declining birthrate and aging population […], global warm-
ing and other issues” (Basic Act on Reconstruction in response to the Great East 
Japan Earthquake, 2011).
Reconstruction measures should correspond to the following three objectives (Ba-
sic Act on Reconstruction in response to the Great East Japan Earthquake, 2011):
1. Creating safe communities
2. Revitalizing the local economy and create employment opportunities
3. Strengthening community cohesion
In accordance with the Basic Guidelines for Reconstruction, the main responsi-
bility for the reconstruction process after the GEJE and Tsunami, rests with the 
municipalities. This is the reason, why the applied approaches vary from place 
to place (Ubaura, 2016, p. 57). Ubaura (2016) distinguishes between two basic 
principles that frame the local reconstruction processes after the GEJE and Tsu-
nami. The first approach intends to create safe communities in order to prevent 
future destruction through similar events to the GEJE. The second approach is 
related to the structural problems that many of the affected villages, towns and 
cities already had to face before the disaster: the decline and aging of popula-
tion and tight financial budgets. These problems intensified even more after the 
GEJE. In response to these challenges, communities should be reconstructed 
based on the compact city principle in order to reduce the maintenance costs 
for utility and social infrastructure and enable people to run their errands by foot 
(Ubaura, 2016, pp. 57–58). Although the selection of both of these principles is 
reasonable, there are problems in implementation. Focusing on the future safe-
ty of communities, the intention to build compact cities often takes a backseat. 
One example for this is the relocation of residential land-uses from low-lying ar-
eas onto hills, while industrial and commercial land-uses are permitted to remain 
in these areas (see Chapter 4.7). In some places, this resulted in the separation 
of residential land-uses from commercial and recreational land-uses, which can-
not be considered to correspond with the aim to shorten the distances within 
the city (Iuchi, 2016, p. 38).
Based on the simulated inundation height (see Chapter 4.7), the most suitable 
reconstruction pattern for an area was selected. In most municipalities an inun-
dation height of more than 2 m resulted in the area’s designation as hazardous. 
Hazardous areas are restricted from future urban development (Ubaura, 2016, 
p. 59). In this case, reconstruction usually involved relocation, land raise or the 
combination of the two options. The reason for the 2-meter threshold lies in the 
disproportionately higher degree of destruction that Japanese traditional wood-
en houses suffer, when they are flooded with an inundation depth of more than 
2 m (Ubaura, 2016, p. 59). For areas with a lower simulated inundation depth, on-
site aggregation or on-site reconstruction were available reconstruction options. 
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All in all, the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism provides for 
five reconstruction patterns to deal with the low-lying area that was affected by 
the GEJE tsunami in order to build safe communities (see illustration 35 A-E be-
low; Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism, 2012; Ubaura, 2015):
A. Relocation: In case that an area is designated as hazardous, it is restrict-
ed from future residential development. This means that the former 
households inhabiting this area have to be relocated to safer areas, usu-
ally inland or on a hill.
B. On-site aggregation: If the construction of a first and secondary levee 
ensures the future safety of the area behind the secondary levee, the 
aggregation in this area is the preferred type of reconstruction. This op-
tion is especially reasonable if a community’s demographic development 
resulted in vacancies.
C. Land raising: In some places, instead of relocating the affected citizens 
to other places, part of the affected land is raised and people are moved 
to this artificially created higher land. The height of the land raise de-
pends on the expected inundation height of L2-tsunamis.
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D. Relocation and land raising: In some cases, the relocation and land rais-
ing approaches are combined. This means, some people stay in their 
former location, which is converted to safe land by the means of land 
raise, other people move to relocation sites.
E. On-site reconstruction with defense facilities: If the construction of pro-
tective measures ensures sufficient safety, the citizens are required to 
rebuild their houses on-site. Usually, an area is considered to be safe if 
the inundation depth in case of a L2-tsunami is less than 2 m. Neverthe-
less, on-site reconstruction does not always involve the reconstruction 
of houses on the exact same spot. In many cases, the reconstruction 
process is used to improve the community’s living environment, e.g., by 
widening roads or adding parks. For this purpose, the land is restructured 
by the means of land readjustment projects (see Chapter 4.7; Ubaura, 
2016, p. 60). On-site reconstruction can lead to problems because even 
though the government considers an area as safe, the perception of the 
local population can be different. This can result in the citizens’ desire to 
relocate instead of returning to their former location. Nevertheless, be-
cause there are no incentives for the relocation from “safe areas”, these 
citizens are required to stay if they cannot afford moving away on their 
own.
The application of these reconstruction patterns in reality is illustrated in context 
of the two case study sites, Miyako City and Ishinomaki City, in Chapter 8 and 
9. The relocation in Miyako City’s Taro District, for example, follows Option D: 
Relocation and land raising: Some citizens rebuild their houses on raised land in 
their former location, while most people move onto nearby Otobe Hill.
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Illustration 35 | A-E: Reconstruction patterns after the GEJE and Tsunami | Ahlers et al., 2015, 
p. 60 based on Ministry of Land Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism, 2012, p. 4-3
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4.9 INTERIM CONCLUSION
Japan has a long history with disasters, which is based on the country’s geo-
graphic location. This history results in a well-developed disaster risk manage-
ment framework, which was introduced in this chapter.
Accordingly, Japan’s spatial planning system offers various options to address 
disaster risks. These options can be assigned to the risk governance phases 
risk assessment, risk management and risk communication: To assess the risk, 
spatial planners can prepare hazard and risk maps or use EIAs to determine the 
influence that a planned development might have on the environment or other 
goods worth protecting. Risk management options include the minimization of 
exposure of urban areas. In Japan, this can be achieved through land-use control 
based on Article 7 of the City Planning Act or Article 39 of the Building Standards 
Act. In case that this control affects existing residential areas, group relocation 
programs are a commonly used option to develop newly designated relocation 
sites. After the GEJE and Tsunami the development of new settlements was 
also implemented through land readjustment projects. Furthermore, differenti-
ated land-use decisions can help to restrict specific land-uses in certain areas 
(e.g., restrict residential land-uses, but admit industrial land-uses). Japan’s Build-
ing Standards Act enables the enforcement of strict building codes when new 
buildings are constructed. In this way it is possible to increase the building’s 
engineering resilience. One final risk management option is the mitigation of the 
hazard, e.g., through the construction of protective infrastructure. In the context 
of spatial planning, risk communication includes the involvement of citizens in 
all important decisions. In Japan, this means the continuous information and 
consultation of all relevant stakeholder, including the public.
It must be kept in mind, that the complexity of the reconstruction process after 
a disaster makes it complicated for spatial planners to decide which of these 
options would result in the best solution. In some cases, planners are compelled 
to select one out of two options, which are equally desirable but incompatible 
(e.g., safety versus compactness, deliberation versus time). In these cases, all 
relevant pros and cons need to be balanced to come to the best conclusion.
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5. OPERATIONALIZATION OF RESILIENCE
To determine how spatial planning can build urban resilience, it is important to 
specify how resilience can be operationalized. Over the past years, many frame-
works to measure resilience have been developed.
To decide which resilience measurement framework should be used for this 
research, Schipper and Langstons working paper “A comparative overview of 
resilience measurement framework” (2015) served as a basis. All of the 16 con-
sidered resilience measurement frameworks in the paper were considered for 
their usefulness for this research. Some of the resilience measurement frame-
works only address certain types of resilience: The ACCCRN framework (Tyler et 
al., 2014), the AIACC framework (Osman Elasha, Elhassan, Ahmed, & Zakieldin, 
2005), the BRACED framework (DFID, 2014) and the TAMD framework (Interna-
tional Institute for Environment and Development, 2014) focus on climate resil-
ience, while the Constas and Barrett Resilience Measurement for Food Security 
(Constas & Barrett, 2013), the framework of the Feinstein International Center 
(Vaitla, Tesfay, Rounseville, & Maxwell, 2012), the framework of the Interna-
tional Institute for Sustainable Development (Tyler et al., 2013) and the SHARP 
framework (Choptiany, Graub, Phillips, Colozza, & Dixon, 2015) focus on agricul-
tural and/ or food aspects. The ARCAB framework (ARCAB, 2012), the CoBRA 
framework (UNDP, 2013), the Characteristics of a Disaster Resilient Community 
(Twigg, 2009) and the USAID framework for community resilience (USAID, 2013) 
specifically address resilience on the community level. The USAID coastal resil-
ience framework (U.S. Indian Ocean Tsunami Warning System Program, 2007) 
emphasizes coastal resilience and the framework of Mayunga (Mayunga, 2007) 
has a capital-based approach.
Because it was intended to use a holistic resilience approach for this research, 
resilience measurement frameworks with a focus on the specific aspects men-
tioned above were excluded from further consideration. The two remaining 
frameworks were the City Resilience Index and the UNISDR Disaster Resilience 
Scorecard for Cities:
 › The City Resilience Index (da Silva, 2014) was developed by Arup Group 
Limited with the support of the Rockefeller Foundation to help cities 
assess their strengths and weaknesses regarding four dimensions of re-
silience (i.e., health and well-being, economy and society, infrastructure 
and environment, leadership and strategy). Each of these dimensions 
are further divided into three goals and each goal includes three to five 
indicators. The document defines city resilience as “the capacity of cit-
ies to function, so that the people living and working in cities – particular-
ly the poor and vulnerable – survive and thrive no matter what stresses 
or shocks they encounter” (da Silva, 2014, p. 3).
 › The UNISDR Disaster Resilience Scorecard for Cities (UNISDR, 2015d) 
is part of the Making Cities Resilient campaign and its ten essentials. 
It was compiled by the companies IBM and AECOM, which are both 
members of UNISDR’s Private Sector Advisory Group, and understands 
disaster resilience as “the ability of a city to understand the disaster 
risks it may face; to mitigate those risks; and to respond to disasters that 
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may occur, in such a way as to minimize loss of or damage to life, liveli-
hoods, property, infrastructure, economic activity and the environment” 
(UNISDR, 2015d, p. 2).
Both of these frameworks offer a variety of indicators to assess urban resilience 
and could have been used in the context of this research. Eventually, the Di-
saster Resilience Scorecard for Cities (hereafter, Disaster Resilience Scorecard) 
was selected because it was published by the UNISDR and builds on the con-
tent of the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction, a document which 
was adopted by all UN member states, including Japan. Accordingly, the content 
of the Disaster Resilience Scorecard can be considered to have a certain impor-
tance for the UN member states.
The Disaster Resilience Scorecard was first published in 2014 to supply cities 
around the world with a toolkit to assess their level of resilience and “to guide 
cities towards optimal disaster resilience, and to challenge complacency” (UNIS-
DR, 2014, p. 3). In 2015, the document was revised and updated to incorporate 
the content of the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction. Currently, the 
document consists of the following 10 essentials:
01 Organize for disaster resilience
02 Identify, understand and use current future risk scenarios
03 Strengthen financial capacity for resilience
04 Pursue resilient urban development and design
05 Safeguard natural buffers to enhance the protective functions offered by natural ecosystems
06 Strengthen institutional capacity for resilience
07 Understand and strengthen societal capacity for resilience
08 Increase infrastructure resilience
09 Ensure effective disaster response
10 Expedite recovery and build back better
Essentials 1-3 basically cover political-institutional resilience and are focused on 
governmental and financial issues. Essentials 4-8 follow an integrative approach 
and are most important from a spatial planner’s point of view. For instance, 
these essentials acknowledge the relevance of land-use planning, building 
codes and the provision of disaster resilient infrastructure to build disaster re-
silience. Finally, essentials 9-10 deal with disaster response and the recovery 
process after a disaster (UNISDR, 2015d, p. 2). Each essential is composed of 
various subjects; subjects are further specified with different resilience items. 
To “measure” these resilience items, the scorecard provides specific indica-
tors, e.g., the percentage of buildings where building codes were implemented 
Table 3 | Essentials from the Disaster Resilience Scorecard for Cities | Own illustration 
based on UNISDR, 2015d, p. 3
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as an indicator for the application of building codes. Even though the Disaster 
Resilience Scorecard intends the measurement of resilience based on numeric 
values, this possibility is not used for this research. The reason for this lies in the 
fact that measuring the results in numbers would require a naturalist world-view 
that considers disaster risk and resilience to be quantifiable and a quantitative 
research approach. This research supposes that not all aspects are quantifiable 
and the understanding of reality bases on people’s perceptions. Accordingly, a 
qualitative research approach was selected, which also requires a qualitative 
assessment of the resilience items introduced in this chapter.
This chapter gives an overview of each of the ten resilience essentials, the re-
silience subjects and the resilience items that constitute it. To enable the reader 
to find each resilience item in the Disaster Resilience Scorecard, even though 
some of their names have been slightly adjusted to suit the research framework 
of this research better, each item is provided with its own code based on its 
number in the Disaster Resilience Scorecard (e.g., UN-4.3.2 refers to item 4.3.2 
Sustainable building design standards).
In accordance with the spheres of resilience introduced in Chapter 3.2, each 
essential is linked to the type of resilience that it can most effectively address 
(engineering, political-institutional, socio-economic and environmental). To con-
nect the various resilience items with the reconstruction process after the GEJE 
and Tsunami, the Basic Guidelines for Reconstruction (2011) were analyzed to 
provide information about this topic. Each subchapter concludes with an eval-
uation of the influence that spatial planners have in the context of this topic. If 
spatial planners can be considered to be the main actor to address a topic, their 
influence on this topic is rated as high (e.g., land-use changes). Certain subjects 
require the consideration through spatial planners, but are also important for 
other actors. These subjects usually require a close collaboration of all actors 
involved. In these cases, spatial planners are not the main actor, but can still be 
considered to be important. For these topics, the influence of spatial planners 
was rated as medium. If spatial planners are one of various actors to address a 
certain topic, the planners influence on this topic was regarded as low. Finally, 
there are topics that spatial planners can either only influence insignificantly or 
not at all. Examples for this are the determination of the city’s budget for resil-
ience building or the development of business continuity plans. For these cases, 
the influence of spatial planning was rated with none.
5.1 ESSENTIAL 1: ORGANIZE FOR DISASTER 
RESILIENCE
Essential 1 [UN-1] aims at the underlying governance structure that enables the 
building of resilience. Organizing and coordinating all relevant processes in ad-
vance of a disaster is a crucial part for the stakeholders’ understanding or their 
role and duties before, during and after a disaster. Therefore, a lead entity (e.g., 
the Mayor) should be established in the city’s administration, which helps to de-
velop a collaborative strategy that is available to the various emergency entities 
in case of a disaster. It is important that all relevant topics – i.e., environmental, 
economic, infrastructure, health, disaster, education, social/cultural – are con-
sidered in a holistic way that acknowledges their relevance for disaster resil-
88
ience. This means that the administrative departments of a city must not only 
discuss these topics with each other, but also with relevant businesses, NGOs, 
academia and citizens to incorporate the stakeholders’ opinions and determine 
their skills and physical resources. Furthermore, the lead entity should ensure 
that the city also cooperates with neighboring municipalities and national and in-
ternational partners that might be able to assist with their knowledge (UNISDR, 
2015d). Since the items and indicators of essential 1 are mainly concerned with 
the coordination and organization of political and administrative processes, they 
can be considered as relevant to build political-institutional resilience.
Organization & Coordination Co-ordination of all relevant pre-event 
planning/ preparation activities, all 
event-response activities and all post-
event activities for the city’s area, with 
clarity of roles and accountability across 
all relevant organizations [UN-1.1.1, UN-
1.1.2, UN-1.1.5]
Participation and coordination of all 
relevant organizations in the structure(s) 
defined [UN-1.1.3]
Co-option of physical contributions by 
both public and private sectors [UN-1.1.4]
Integration of disaster resilience with 
other initiatives
Extent to which any proposal in govern-
ment is also evaluated for disaster resil-
ience benefits or impairments [UN-1.2.1]
Capture, publication and sharing of data Extent to which data on the city’s 
resilience position is shared with other 
organizations involved with the city’s 
resilience, community organizations and 
the public [UN-1.3.1, UN-1.3.2]
Organization & Coordination
To organize and coordinate pre-disaster planning, response activities and post-di-
saster efforts, the roles of all actors in these fields should be clarified in advance. 
In this way it can be ensured that each organization is aware of its role in case 
of an emergency (Reconstruction Headquarters in response to the Great East 
Japan Earthquake, 2011, p. 17). In addition to this, necessary laws and policies 
should be put into place. It is important to decide on a generally accepted au-
thority to coordinate these processes and to establish a strong entity who takes 
over the leadership in case of a disaster [UN-1.1.1, UN-1.1.2, UN-1.1.5]. In this 
context, the Basic Guidelines for Reconstruction aim to analyze the situation 
after the GEJE to enable the sufficient coordination of the recovery process. To 
achieve this goal, it is necessary that all relevant governmental entities collab-
orate and share their information with each other as well as with the affected 
municipalities (Reconstruction Headquarters in response to the Great East Ja-
pan Earthquake, 2011, p. 13). In particular, the importance of cross-scale incor-
poration of emergency responses is stressed (Reconstruction Headquarters in 
response to the Great East Japan Earthquake, 2011, pp. 34–35).
Table 4 | Subjects and items from essential 1 | Own illustration based on UNISDR, 2015d
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The organization and coordination of disaster risk reduction should include the 
participation of all relevant stakeholders [UN-1.1.3]. Participation is not only a cru-
cial aspect for pre-disaster planning processes, but also for the reconstruction 
planning after a disaster. To reach the best results, public and private organiza-
tions, including their abilities and knowledge, must be managed as efficiently 
as possible. In some cases, the establishment of new collaboration forms (e.g., 
New Public Commons), can enhance these processes (Reconstruction Head-
quarters in response to the Great East Japan Earthquake, 2011, p. 14). To opti-
mize the cooperation with different stakeholder and know the local sources that 
can be obtained in case of a disaster, it is important to determine the physical 
resources that public and private stakeholders are able and willing to contribute 
[UN-1.1.4]. These resources can be material, workforce, data, computer equip-
ment or, as mentioned in the Basic Guidelines for Reconstruction, accommoda-
tion for reconstruction workers (Reconstruction Headquarters in response to the 
Great East Japan Earthquake, 2011, p. 13).
Integration of disaster resilience with other initiatives
It is a crucial aspect of resilience building to continuously consider the relevance 
of disaster resilience in context with other aspects. Accordingly, each govern-
mental entity should evaluate possible influences of its policies or programs on 
disaster resilience. This requires that each entity understands and acknowledges 
the existing correlations that its work has for urban disaster resilience [UN-1.2.1].
Capture, publication and sharing of data
To optimize a city’s resilience building, all of the gathered information must be 
shared with the public and relevant organizations. In order to achieve this goal, 
policies that enable stakeholders to share their data should be established. This 
includes the exchange with other cities or initiatives (e.g., climate change or re-
silience initiatives) [UN-1.3.1, UN-1.3.2]. The Basic Guidelines for Reconstruction 
intend the international cooperation with neighboring countries, such as China 
and South Korea, but also the rest of the world. To promote this exchange, Ja-
pan hosted the Third UN World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction in Sen-
dai in March 2015. In addition to this, the exchange with foreign students and 
researchers is an intended goal of the reconstruction process (Reconstruction 
Headquarters in response to the Great East Japan Earthquake, 2011, p. 31).
The influence of spatial planning on essential 1
The role of spatial planning to “Organize for resilience” is to participate in the 
planning process and interact with the other actors involved. Accordingly, spa-
tial planners are one of many actors to participate in this step. Like any other 
administrative entity in their area of responsibility, spatial planners should check 
current land-use planning and building code regulations to identify possible con-
straints and opportunities to build urban disaster resilience (for the relevance 
of land-use planning and building codes to create disaster resilience, the read-
er is referred to Chapter 5.4). The leading role for essential 1 rests with the 
city administration’s lead entity for disaster risk reduction. The lead entity might 
consider to assign certain responsibilities to the city’s spatial planning depart-
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ment because spatial planners usually have a vast knowledge about the spatial 
relations in the city and are experienced with holistic coordination processes. 
Nevertheless, spatial planners usually are just one of many actors to address 
essential 1 and their influence can be considered as low.
5.2 ESSENTIAL 2: IDENTIFY, UNDERSTAND AND USE 
CURRENT AND  FUTURE RISK SCENARIOS
To minimize potential risks (mitigation), prepare for the possible occurrence of a 
disaster (preparedness) and gain the ability to cope with disasters (response), it 
is important to identify and understand the nature of risks (risk assessment) (Dz-
urdženík et al., 2015, p. 11). Accordingly, risk assessment is the main aspect of 
the Disaster Resilience Scorecard’s essential 2 [UN-02]. The essential requests 
cities to conduct a risk assessment in order to increase their disaster resilience 
and to update the assessment data frequently. To achieve the best results, the 
risk assessment should incorporate all relevant stakeholders (see Chapter 2.3) 
and the results of the assessment should be included into the stakeholders’ 
work. The scorecard suggests to conduct the risk assessment on the basis of 
at least two scenarios: one for the most probable and one for the worst case 
(UNISDR, 2015d, p. 13). The risk assessment should include all relevant aspects 
of resilience. Nevertheless, the implementation of the assessment mostly em-
braces political and administrative decisions and the assessment results help to 
enhance political-institutional processes. The items of essential 2 are therefore 
considered as mainly relevant to build political-institutional resilience.
Risk assessment Knowledge of hazards (also called perils) 
that the city faces, and their likelihood 
[UN-2.1.1]
Knowledge of exposure and vulnerability 
[UN-2.1.2]
Understanding of critical assets and the 
linkages between these [UN-2.1.3]
Hazard maps [UN-2.1.4]
Update process Process ensuring frequent and complete 
updates of scenarios [UN-2.2.1]
Risk assessment
Risk assessment includes the determination of the risk components as intro-
duced in Chapter 2.2: hazard [UN-2.1.1] and vulnerability (incl. exposure and, 
even though not specifically mentioned in the scorecard, physical susceptibility 
and fragility) [UN-2.1.2]. For the identification of the hazard component, it is im-
portant to consider, how it might change over time or through the influence of 
certain factors (e.g., climate change can influence the occurrence of typhoons). 
Furthermore, the combination of multiple hazards can increase the extent of a 
disaster (e.g., the impact of the GEJE and Tsunami was larger than the impact of 
the earthquake alone would have been). As explained in Chapter 2.2.2,  exposure 
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refers to the spatial factor of vulnerability, which can be illustrated in hazard 
maps for various hazards (e.g., flood hazard maps) [UN-2.1.4]. Vulnerability as-
sessment should also include the consideration of the fragility of different pop-
ulation groups and their assets (of course the capacities of these groups should 
also be considered). Special attention should be paid to the susceptibility of 
critical assets, so that the structures can either be adapted or emergency plans 
can be prepared to minimize cascading failures [UN-2.1.3]. The risk assessment 
should be based on a comprehensive participation process that incorporates 
the stakeholders’ various perceptions and understandings of risk. Accordingly, 
the results of risk assessment should be widely distributed and used in future 
decision-making processes and response and recovery plans (UNISDR, 2015d, 
p. 13).
To prepare for future disasters, particularly the risk of an earthquake striking 
Tokyo, the Basic Guidelines for Reconstruction envisage to “[a]ssess the risk 
of earthquake and tsunami disaster” (Reconstruction Headquarters in response 
to the Great East Japan Earthquake, 2011, p. 33). This assessment should not 
only look ahead, but also appraise the response to the GEJE with the intention 
to improve processes and technologies wherever necessary (Reconstruction 
Headquarters in response to the Great East Japan Earthquake, 2011, p. 36). The 
Basic Guidelines for Reconstruction also acknowledge the importance of hazard 
maps for risk reduction and require their development (UNISDR, 2015d, p. 10).
Update process
Understandably, risk assessment scenarios are only useful if they are up to date. 
Accordingly, all relevant data has to be updated frequently [UN-2.2.1]. The Basic 
Guidelines for Reconstruction consider this importance when they require the 
revision of the existing Basic Disaster Prevention Plan and the policy of land 
development on the basis of the experiences from the GEJE in order to im-
prove their effectiveness for future disasters (Reconstruction Headquarters in 
response to the Great East Japan Earthquake, 2011, pp. 33–36).
The influence of spatial planning on essential 2
As explained in Chapter 2.4.1, spatial planners can make valuable contributions 
for the assessment of risk. For instance, can they provide their knowledge about 
vulnerable land-uses and their exposure to certain hazards. For the illustration 
of these spatial connections, hazard maps are helpful tools. The type of hazard 
included in these maps can vary from river flooding, storm surges, and tsuna-
mis over volcanic eruptions to earthquakes (Dzurdženík et al., 2015, pp. 15–16). 
If hazard maps are developed in detail, they can also indicate evacuation routes 
and how these routes can be disrupted by hazardous events. Hazard maps are 
developed on the basis of spatial information, which is why spatial planners 
should be involved in their development. Albeit, the input of other stakeholders 
(e.g., emergency responders, traffic planners, and the public) for hazard map-
ping and the remaining risk assessment process is equally important. Hence, 
spatial planners can be understood as valuable contributors for this essential, 
even though they are not primarily responsible. Spatial planners’ influence for 
this essential therefore is determined as medium.
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5.3 ESSENTIAL 3: STRENGTHEN FINANCIAL 
CAPACITY FOR RESILIENCE
Essential 3 [UN-03] addresses the importance of financial capacity to build re-
silience. Without having adequate funding, it is impossible to create a disaster 
resilient city. The essential states several aspects that have to be considered 
in this context: First, it is important to understand the necessity to invest in 
resilient city structures before a disaster occurs. For this purpose, a certain bud-
get must be defined. Building resilience can help to reduce possible negative 
monetary effects that a disaster can cause, e.g., by relocating businesses from 
hazardous areas to safe land. Second, the impact that a disaster can cause for a 
city’s economy has to be determined and funding for the recovery process after 
a disaster has to be allocated. An additional way to enhance a city’s resilience 
is to incentivize citizens and businesses to increase the engineering resilience 
of existing private buildings. To enable all of the required measures, the govern-
ment should consider various ways of funding (UNISDR, 2015d, p. 20). For es-
sential 3, the spheres of resilience vary for the different items. The assignment 
therefore is conducted in the paragraphs below.
Financial plan & budget Adequacy of financial planning for all 
actions necessary for disaster resilience 
[UN-3.1.1]
Capital funding for long run engineering 
and other works that address scenarios 
in essential 2 and essential 8 [UN-3.1.2]
Operating funding to meet all operating 
costs of disaster resilience activities 
[UN-3.1.3]
Contingency funds Contingency fund for post disaster recov-
ery (may be referred to as a “rainy-day 
fund”) [UN-3.2.1]
Financing of resilience expenditures Pursuit of all possible methods of financ-
ing and funding, as required [UN-3.4.1]
Incentives & financing for businesses, 
community organizations and citizens
Affordability of, and help with achieving 
safe housing [UN-3.3.1]
Domestic and non-domestic insurance 
coverage [UN-3.3.2, UN-3.3.5]
Incentives to businesses and non-prof-
it organizations to improve disaster 
resilience – disaster plans, premises etc. 
[UN-3.3.3, UN-3.3.4]
Financial plan & budget, contingency funds and financing of 
resilience expenditure
It is important that the budget appointed to build disaster resilience is adequate 
to perform the required actions [UN-3.1.1]. Accordingly, the direct and indirect 
costs for each action need to be assessed first. This task is usually carried out 
based the experiences from similar disasters in the past. When assessing 
the costs, the trade-off between pre-disaster investments that decrease the 
Table 6 | Subjects and items from essential 3 | Own illustration based on UNISDR, 2015d
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 recovery costs after a disaster should be considered thoroughly. It is useful to 
assign ring-fenced budgets, e.g., for the development of the risk scenarios in es-
sential 2, to ensure that all relevant measures can be implemented [UN-3.1.2]. To 
maintain disaster resilience once it is built, operating costs to perform required 
activities should also be allocated [UN-3.1.3]. To stay able to act after a disaster 
occurred and advance the recovery process as fast as possible, it is important to 
have a sufficient budget allocated for this purpose (“rainy-day fund”) [UN-3.1.3] 
(UNISDR, 2015d, p. 20). The measures that are required to create resilience, are 
expensive and have to be financed in some way. This demands the government 
to be aware of various established financing options, but also consider new and 
innovative ways of financing [UN-3.4.1] (UNISDR, 2015, p. 20). Setting up the 
financial frame increases the political-institutional resilience to act before, during 
and after a disaster.
The dimension of the GEJE and Tsunami together with the nuclear accident in 
the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant was so extreme, that it by far ex-
ceeded the national reverse fund. In addition to using a total of 67.8 billion JPY 
from the reverse fund for the fiscal year 2010 (running from 1 April 2010 until 
31 March 2011). 5.03 billion JPY from the reserve fund for the fiscal year 2011 
were used to address direct emergency needs (The Law Library of Congress, 
2013, p. 39). Nevertheless, the reconstruction process required the provision of 
additional funding. The Basic Guidelines for Reconstruction include basic infor-
mation about the budget provided by the Japanese government (Reconstruction 
Headquarters in response to the Great East Japan Earthquake, 2011, pp. 6–7). It 
was intended that the financial resources “shall basically be borne by the entire 
current generation” (Reconstruction Headquarters in response to the Great East 
Japan Earthquake, 2011, p. 6). Indeed, the supplementary budgets that were 
approved in the fiscal year 2011 were mostly covered through adaptations of the 
national budget: The first supplementary budget of 4 trillion JPY was financed 
through the reduction of the national child benefits and maintaining the high-
way tolling system and the second supplementary budget of 2 trillion JPY was 
covered by the excess budget from 2010. The 12 trillion JPY for the third supple-
mentary budget had to be enabled by reducing other planned expenses for the 
fiscal year 2011 and allocating non-tax revenues. Nevertheless, 11.55 trillion JPY 
had to be financed through the issue of reconstruction bonds (The Law Library 
of Congress, 2013, pp. 39–40). This example shows that even if an emergency 
budget is set aside, large scale disasters can quickly exceed the directly avail-
able funding. Accordingly, decision-makers should consider additional funding 
sources in preparation for a disaster.
Incentives & financing for businesses, community organizations 
and citizens
To improve the position of private homeowners, local businesses and non-profit 
organizations when a disaster strikes, incentives that promote disaster resil-
ience should be created [UN-3.3.3, UN-3.3.4]. This includes the development 
of business continuity plans, the creation of redundancy to prevent failure in 
case of a hazardous event and the improvement of building structures (UNISDR, 
2015d, p. 20). Furthermore, constructional measures can decrease the suscep-
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tibility of a city’s built structure. These measures directly increase the availability 
of affordable housing after the event because stronger buildings are less likely 
to break down in case of a disaster [UN-3.3.1]. To improve the financial situation 
of people, businesses and organizations after a disaster, appropriate domestic 
and non-domestic insurances that cover lives and/ or common or private assets 
should be concluded [UN-3.3.2, UN-3.3.5] (UNISDR, 2015d, p. 20). Even though 
the allocation of funding for the public also addresses socio-economic resilience 
(e.g., by increasing the number of affordable housing or the continuation of busi-
ness proceedings after a disaster), the main purpose of this subject is to ensure 
a possibly smooth continuation of the city’s routine business. Therefore, this 
subject is considered to primarily build political-institutional resilience.
As a post-disaster document, the Basic Guidelines for Reconstruction do not 
include any incentives to promote the structural resilience of private buildings. 
Nevertheless, the guidelines emphasize the importance to promote affordable 
housing for affected people. This is especially important because many people 
who lost their houses did not have insurance coverage against tsunamis. This 
means they depend on special measures, such as the modification of mortgage 
rates, that help them to deal with their persisting housing loan after their house 
is completely or partially destructed (Reconstruction Headquarters in response 
to the Great East Japan Earthquake, 2011, pp. 12–13). In addition to this, short-
term financial support is needed to ensure an ongoing supply with essential 
goods such as shelter (Reconstruction Headquarters in response to the Great 
East Japan Earthquake, 2011, pp. 36–37). The government’s assistance can also 
be required to solve possible legal disputes caused by the disaster, e.g., with 
insurance companies (Reconstruction Headquarters in response to the Great 
East Japan Earthquake, 2011, p. 27).
The influence of spatial planning on essential 3
As the title suggests, essential 3 basically deals with the financial background 
to build urban disaster resilience. Even though the outcomes from these efforts 
also influence areas concerning the responsibility of spatial planners (e.g., the 
provision of affordable housing), the planners influence on financing decisions 
can be considered to be low at the most. Spatial planners are able to submit 
their funding needs, but the final decisions are made by the government.
5.4 ESSENTIAL 4: PURSUE RESILIENT URBAN 
DEVELOPMENT
Essential 4 [UN-04] deals with the city’s built structure and therefore is focused 
on strengthening engineering resilience. Building on risk maps and scenarios 
(see essential 2), this essential intends to improve disaster resilience through 
land-use planning, the application of building codes and innovative design solu-
tions on the small and larger scale. These spatial planning options are highly 
relevant to build disaster resilience because they are able to address the vul-
nerability and hazard component of risk. Planning agricultural, economic and 
residential land-uses can reduce these land-uses’ exposure to hazards. The ex-
istence and application of contemporary building codes can lower the suscepti-
Part A | Chapter 5
95
bility of the city’s built structure. In addition to this, the implementation of new 
designing solutions, such as sustainable urban design solutions and building 
designs can mitigate certain hazards (e.g., greenways or green architecture can 
mitigate heatwaves). Of course these processes all require the participation of 
all relevant stakeholders, including the public. To take full effect, all regulations 
that are used should continuously be revised and updated accordingly (UNISDR, 
2015d, p. 27). Points that directly address the physical infrastructure (e.g., trans-
portation or electricity network) are covered by essential 8.
Land-use effectiveness Vulnerable land at risk (incl. agriculture, 
economic activity and residential) [UN-
4.1.1, UN-4.1.2, UN-4.1.3]
Building codes Existence, application and update of 
building codes designed to address risks 
identified in risk assessment [UN-4.2.1, 
UN-4.2.2, UN-4.2.3]
New development Urban design solutions that increase 
resilience [UN-4.3.1]
Sustainable building design standards 
[UN-4.3.2]
Land-use effectiveness
As explained in Chapter 2.2, the exposure of vulnerable land-uses to hazards 
creates risk. Preventing the new settlement of vulnerable land-uses in hazard-
ous areas or relocating existing vulnerable land-uses from hazardous to safe 
areas, can increase a city’s resilience and simultaneously reduce disaster risk. 
Hazard or risk maps can help spatial planners to determine areas at risk and the 
need for action. If the relocation of land-uses in a certain area is considered to 
be necessary, hazard maps can also be used to find suitable relocation sites. 
To ensure the compliance with land-use decisions, it is important that land-use 
plans have a legally binding effect (UNISDR, 2015d). In Japan, the reduction of 
vulnerable land-uses at risk can be achieved through the application of Article 7 
of the City Planning Act or Article 39 of the Building Standards Act or by desig-
nating specific land-uses to certain areas (see Chapter 4.7).
The Resilience Scorecard specifically mentions the following types of vulnera-
ble land-uses: agricultural land-uses [UN-4.1.1], economic activity [UN-4.1.2] and 
residential land-use [UN-4.1.3].
Keeping agricultural land-uses out of hazardous areas, is important to ensure 
an ongoing supply with food, if a disaster occurs. In Tohoku Region, the inunda-
tion of farming land through the tsunami, resulted in salty soil, which had to be 
removed before agriculture could return to its normal business (Reconstruction 
Headquarters in response to the Great East Japan Earthquake, 2011, p. 22). The 
relocation of agricultural land to safe areas, could solve this problem for the 
future. Nevertheless, when different land-uses (e.g., agricultural and residential) 
compete with each other, spatial planners must consider which land-use should 
take priority for the relocation to safer land. This decision can vary from country 
to country and from case to case. In Japan, the recovery process after the GEJE 
Table 7 | Subjects and items from essential 4 | Own illustration based on UNISDR, 2015d
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is used to revise the existing land-uses. This includes the “conversion from res-
idential to agricultural zones” (Reconstruction Headquarters in response to the 
Great East Japan Earthquake, 2011, p. 12) and the “accumulation of farmland” 
(Reconstruction Headquarters in response to the Great East Japan Earthquake, 
2011, p. 23) to decrease cultivation costs. This means, that the relocation of resi-
dential areas to safe land usually takes the highest priority for the reconstruction 
process in Tohoku Region.
The destruction of important industries or other businesses through a disaster can 
not only result in short-termed economic damages, but deeply cut into a city’s or 
region’s economic potential. Especially industrial establishments can cause mayor 
environmental problems, when they are hit by a hazardous event, and massively 
harm people’s health. One example for this is the accident in the Fukushima Daii-
chi nuclear power plant caused by the GEJE and Tsunami. Therefore, spatial plan-
ners should consider an industry’s exposure and physical susceptibility to certain 
hazards when zoning land-uses. Generally speaking, the smaller a city’s amount of 
economic activity at risk, the stronger is its resilience [UN-4.1.2] (UNISDR, 2015d). 
Of course, trade-off effects between economic and other vulnerable land-uses 
also have to be considered in this context. In Tohoku Region, the economy already 
had its problems before the GEJE and Tsunami. Accordingly, the revitalization of 
the local economy is one mayor interest in the Basic Guidelines for Reconstruc-
tion. Nevertheless, the measures that the guidelines state in this context focus 
on revitalizing the economy rather than increasing the industry’s engineering re-
silience through the relocation to safer land. The guidelines do not state anything 
regarding the future land-use planning for economic activity.
Residential land-uses can be considered to be especially vulnerable because 
citizens spend a significant amount of their time in these areas, many hours 
of this time asleep . While people are able to evacuate on time when they are 
awake during the day, they are in greater danger if a hazard occurs during the 
night. Accordingly, the relocation of residential land-uses to safe land is an im-
portant aspect to build resilience. The Disaster Resilience Scorecard quantifies 
this aspect with the potential population displacement [UN-4.1.3], which means 
the amount of people that live in areas that are exposed to hazards. Since many 
residential buildings are destroyed after a disaster, the reconstruction process 
enables spatial planners to reconsider a city’s preexisting land-uses and relocate 
residents to safer ground. The Basic Guidelines for Reconstruction also take this 
opportunity into account. They request the development of “urban areas and 
mass relocation [to advance the] recovery of central functions of disaster-af-
flicted cities” (Reconstruction Headquarters in response to the Great East Ja-
pan Earthquake, 2011, pp. 10–11). To forward the relocation process, municipal 
governments should consider to buy up hazardous land from private owners 
(Reconstruction Headquarters in response to the Great East Japan Earthquake, 
2011, p. 11). Transformations from one land-use to another, should ensure the 
ongoing utilization of hazardous land (e.g., through the conversion from resi-
dential land-uses to farmland) (Reconstruction Headquarters in response to the 
Great East Japan Earthquake, 2011, p. 12).
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Building codes
To decrease the susceptibility of buildings to hazardous events, the existence 
and application of contemporary building codes is a useful measure. In this way, 
specific building standards are assured and the buildings’ engineering resilience 
is increased. Due to the frequent occurrence of earthquakes in Japan, the Jap-
anese Building Standards Act is strictly applied. The Act specifies standards 
for the structural, fire and hygienic safety of buildings (incl. the necessity to 
withstand seismic forces) (see Chapter 4.7). Nevertheless, the large scale de-
struction from the GEJE Tsunami revealed that the existing buildings were not 
constructed to withstand the destructive force of a tsunami. The importance of 
effective building codes for engineering resilience can be observed when disas-
ters occur in counties with poorly constructed buildings, which often results in 
the destruction of a significant amount of houses and the loss of many lives. 
One example for this is the Gorkha Earthquake, which occurred in Nepal in April 
2015 and severely damages 800,000 buildings (Sharma, Deng, & Cruz Noguez, 
2016). Accordingly, the Disaster Resilience Scorecard requires resilient cities to 
have a building code established that appropriately addresses disaster risks. This 
code should constantly be implemented and frequently updated to the current 
standard [UN-4.2.1, UN-4.2.2, UN-4.2.3].
The Basic Guidelines for Reconstruction also stress the importance of building 
codes to build resilience. The guidelines specifically demand the promotion of 
earthquake-resistant buildings. This applies to residential buildings (Reconstruc-
tion Headquarters in response to the Great East Japan Earthquake, 2011, p. 34) 
as well as to medical and educational institutions or technical infrastructure 
(Reconstruction Headquarters in response to the Great East Japan Earthquake, 
2011, pp. 35–36). Furthermore, the future tsunami risks should be considered for 
the construction of public housing by restricting wooden buildings to zones that 
are not exposed to tsunamis and including evacuation options for buildings that 
are constructed in low-lying areas (Reconstruction Headquarters in response to 
the Great East Japan Earthquake, 2011, p. 13).
New development
In addition to improving the city’s layout (through land-use planning) and built struc-
ture (through building codes), a city’s resilience can also be improved through the 
application of new urban design solutions [UN-4.3.1] and sustainable building de-
sign standards [UN-4.3.2]. These aspects have especially gained popularity over 
the recent years. Urban design solutions are linked with the aspiration to create 
sustainable cities and encourage the development of urban green spaces, water 
retention areas or greenways. These measures can improve the profit from eco-
system services, e.g., by cooling the city or enhancing the percolation of heavy 
rainfall, and thereby contribute to hazard mitigation. In addition to this, urban design 
solutions can also decrease the city’s dependency on traditional technical infrastruc-
ture (e.g., sewage systems). The sustainability approach can also be applied on the 
smaller scale of single buildings, e.g., by applying green building standards such as 
BREEAM, LEED, or Greenstar, that seek to decrease a buildings energy demand or 
enable it to stay comparably cool during heat waves (Reconstruction Headquarters 
in response to the Great East Japan Earthquake, 2011, p. 27).
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The application of sustainable building concepts is also a concern of the Basic 
Guidelines for Reconstruction. For instance, the reconstruction process should 
be carried out based on the compact city concept and take into account new 
options for the use of renewable energy and the improvement of people’s re-
lationship to the environment (Reconstruction Headquarters in response to the 
Great East Japan Earthquake, 2011, p.  9). One option to build resilience, is 
the development of “smart communities” or “smart villages” to improve the 
region’s energy sufficiency, e.g., by introducing solar or wind energy (Recon-
struction Headquarters in response to the Great East Japan Earthquake, 2011, 
pp. 28–29). In addition to this, the creation of “eco-towns” should restore the 
“linkages between the ecosystems of forest, […] countryside […] and sea” 
(Reconstruction Headquarters in response to the Great East Japan Earthquake, 
2011, p. 29).
The influence of spatial planning on essential 4
Spatial planners can be considered as the key player to achieve a resilient urban 
development. They are able to prepare land-use plans under consideration of 
disaster risks and designate hazardous areas in order to transfer the content of 
hazard maps into legally binding documents. Furthermore, they are responsible 
for land-use zoning, which influences the building code requirements. Like any 
work spatial planners have to execute, the planning of resilient city structures 
also requires the collaboration with various stakeholder, including sectoral plan-
ning departments. Nevertheless, the influence of spatial planners on essential 
4 is high.
5.5 ESSENTIAL 5: SAFEGUARD NATURAL BUFFERS 
TO ENHANCE THE PROTECTIVE FUNCTIONS 
OFFERED BY NATURAL ECOSYSTEMS
As introduced in Chapter 3.2, the proper functionality of the ecosystem is an 
important aspect of environmental resilience. In the past, this connection was 
often neglected and people assumed that engineering solutions could over-
come any dependencies from the environment. Recent times, in contrast, are 
characterized by a change of thinking away from the sole dependency on tech-
nical solution to a more sustainable understanding that incorporates people’s 
relationship with nature. This relationship is especially evident in the context of 
ecosystem services [UN-05]. Ecosystem services are functions that are provid-
ed by nature and used by people, e.g., the purification of air and water or the 
provision of food and energy resources. If nature is out of balance, the provision 
of these services can become restricted which can result in negative effects for 
the people who rely on them (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment).
Ecosystem services Awareness of the role that ecosystem 
services may play in the city’s disaster 
resilience [UN-5.1.1]
Ecosystem health [UN-5.1.2]
Impact of land-use and other policies on 
ecosystem services [UN-5.1.3]
Table 8 | Subjects and items from essential 5 | Own illustration based on UNISDR, 2015d
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Ecosystem services
To keep ecosystem services intact, it is mandatory to understand the role that 
they play for a city’s disaster resilience [UN-5.1.1]. Ecosystem services that are 
of special importance to support a city’s resilience “include, but are not limited 
to: water retention or water infiltration; afforestation; urban vegetation; flood-
plains; sand dunes; mangrove and other coastal vegetation; and pollination” 
(UNISDR, 2015d, p. 33). Since the natural resources that supply these ecosys-
tem services are not necessarily located on the city’s territory (e.g., vegetation 
on a mountain might reduce the water rundown), it can be difficult to grasp all 
relevant relationships. Still, the effort should be made in order to understand 
the coherencies between city and nature and the relevance that they have for 
disaster prevention. In a second step, measures to preserve relevant ecosystem 
services should be taken [UN-5.1.2]. The type and scope of these measures 
varies from case to case. Finally, it must be considered that changing land-uses 
can impact the health of ecosystem services, e.g., when a forest is logged off to 
construct new buildings. This impact should always be sufficiently considered in 
land-use planning (see essential 4). Optimally, land-use changes should not have 
negative impacts on ecosystem services [UN-5.1.3] (UNISDR, 2015d, p. 33).
The Basic Guidelines of Reconstruction especially focus on the preservation 
and recovery of the disaster-preventing functions of forests along the coastline 
(Reconstruction Headquarters in response to the Great East Japan Earthquake, 
2011, p. 11). Furthermore, the relationships between the forests, countryside and 
ocean should be considered throughout the reconstruction process, including 
the integration of renewable energies, such as solar or wind power or biomass 
(Reconstruction Headquarters in response to the Great East Japan Earthquake, 
2011, pp. 28–29). Thereby, logging should always occur in a sustainable way, so 
that the forest’s ecological functions remain (Reconstruction Headquarters in 
response to the Great East Japan Earthquake, 2011, p. 24).
The influence of spatial planning on essential 5
For the retention of ecosystem services, spatial planners play an important 
role, especially in regards to land-use planning. The relationship between hu-
mans and nature is very complex. Therefore, a variety of professionals (e.g., 
environmental scientists, water engineers) is needed to define and understand 
a city’s relevant ecosystem services. Spatial planners can be considered as 
one of many actors with influence on the awareness of ecosystem services 
for disaster resilience and ecosystem health, which is why their influence on 
these items can be considered to be medium. Spatial planners influence for the 
consideration of land-use planning’s impact on ecosystem services, however, 
can be considered as high.
5.6 ESSENTIAL 6: STRENGTHEN INSTITUTIONAL 
CAPACITY FOR RESILIENCE
While essential 1 focuses on the collection of information about the responsibil-
ity of different institutions (e.g., governmental or private organizations, providers 
of public services, NGOs) before, during and after a disaster, essential 6 [UN-06] 
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focuses on strengthening the soft skills of these institutions to enable them to 
cope with disasters if they occur. Improving the institutions skills and experienc-
es and enabling the learning from other’s experiences increases the political-in-
stitutional resilience. In addition to this, the education and training of the public 
– optimally provided in various languages – can help to build socio-economic 
resilience, by enabling the citizens to react optimally in case of a disaster. The Di-
saster Resilience Scorecard suggests that institutional capacity should be devel-
oped based on the disaster risk reduction phases “understanding, prevention, 
mitigation, response and recovery planning” (UNISDR, 2015d, p. 37). In Japan, 
the Basic Disaster Management Plan follows a similar structure, by specifying 
countermeasures for the phases prevention and preparedness, emergency re-
sponse and recovery and reconstruction (see Chapter 4.5).
Skills and experience Availability of skills and experience in 
disaster resilience – risk identification, 
mitigation, planning, response and post 
event response [UN-6.1.1]
Public education and awareness Exposure of public to education and 
awareness materials/ messaging [UN-
6.2.1]
Validation of effectiveness of education 
[UN-6.2.2]
Training Delivery Availability, take-up of training [UN-6.3.1]
Languages Accessibility of education and training to 
all linguistic groups in the city [UN-6.4.1]
Learning from others Effort taken to learn from what other cit-
ies, states and countries (and companies) 
do to increase resilience [UN-6.5.1]
Skills and experience
To consider the impact of risks in their work, employees of different institutions 
need a certain knowledge about risks. They need to know how to assess risks 
for their fields of work (e.g., land-use planning, water engineering or healthcare 
sector), and how these risks can be mitigated. Furthermore, they should be 
prepared and know how to respond to a disaster if it occurs. In many cases, this 
knowledge does not exist, which necessitates an appropriate training of the em-
ployees to enable them to incorporate risk reduction into their daily work [UN-
6.1.1]. Some of the knowledge needed can be contributed by external experts, 
as it was the case during the reconstruction process in Tohoku Region, where 
the institutional capacity to recover from the GEJE was enhanced through the 
allocation of reconstruction professionals to Tohoku Region (Reconstruction 
Headquarters in response to the Great East Japan Earthquake, 2011, pp. 13–14). 
Other measures to enhance the region’s institutional capacity after the disaster 
were the collaboration of various governmental offices and ministries and their 
cooperation with the private sector, e.g., through public-private partnerships 
(Reconstruction Headquarters in response to the Great East Japan Earthquake, 
2011, pp. 13–14).
Table 9 | Subjects and items from essential 6 | Own illustration based on UNISDR, 2015d
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Public education and awareness
Understanding risks and the threat that they pose is also of great importance for 
the public. To increase resilience, it is therefore required to teach the population 
awareness and prepare them for possible threats in the future. The first step 
in this context is to prepare appropriate information and distribute it over vari-
ous media channels (e.g., print, teaching material for schools, TV, radio, internet/ 
social media, posters). Of course, it is important to ensure that the provided 
information actually reaches the intended recipient. Therefore, it should be con-
sidered that the most appropriate form of distribution varies with the population’s 
demographics (young people can be reached via Twitter or Facebook, while older 
people can be reached via newspapers) [UN-6.2.1]. To ensure that the provided 
information is effective to educate the public and increase the general aware-
ness, the information campaigns should be evaluated regularly (e.g., through 
telephone surveys) [UN-6.2.2]. While the Basic Guidelines for Reconstruction fo-
cus on the public’s information about the reconstruction process (Reconstruction 
Headquarters in response to the Great East Japan Earthquake, 2011, p. 12), there 
are also measures intended to improve the education of the public in preparation 
of a future disaster, e.g., by promoting the idea to escape (Reconstruction Head-
quarters in response to the Great East Japan Earthquake, 2011, p. 35).
Training Delivery
In addition to supplying the public with information about disaster risks, it is also 
important to train the citizens to prepare them for the occurrence of a disaster 
[UN-6.3.1]. Ideally, this training is based on case studies that determine the best 
way of behavior for disaster risk reduction (UNISDR, 2015d, p. 37). In Tohoku Re-
gion the future training should especially promote the idea to escape rather than 
stay in exposed areas (Reconstruction Headquarters in response to the Great 
East Japan Earthquake, 2011, p. 35). The Basic Guidelines for Reconstruction do 
not further specify the scale and frequency of this future training.
Languages
In countries and cities with a diverse ethnic structure it is especially important to 
provide information material on disaster risk reduction in each relevant language 
[UN-6.4.1]. This is the only way to ensure that every single citizen is able to react 
sufficiently in case of a disaster. In Japan, this point might not seem as important 
as in countries with a more diverse ethical structure because of the small amount 
of foreigners who live in the country (1,7% in 2014) (Statistics Bureau, Ministry 
of Internal Affairs and Communications Japan, 2016b). Nonetheless, just because 
the number of foreigners is small, does not mean that they do not have to be 
addressed: Especially because the Japanese language is complicated to under-
stand by foreigners, it should be considered to at least supply an English version 
of all important documents – a requirement that is often not met at the moment. 
The Basic Guidelines for Reconstruction, however, do not address this topic.
Learning from others
To increase a city’s resilience, it can be helpful to incorporate the knowledge 
that other cities, regions or countries collected. This enables to consider steps 
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that were useful and correct shortcomings in advance [UN-6.5.1]. Japan’s long 
history with disasters emphasized the importance to learn from the past and 
fostered the exchange of knowledge between regions. Accordingly, disasters 
in other cities are frequently used to improve the handling of hazardous events 
in the future. This includes the importance to keep communities together in 
the aftermath of a disaster. In Japan, this importance became apparent during 
the reconstruction process in Kobe after the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake 
in 1995 (Kadoya, 2005). Therefore, it is also mentioned in the Basic Guidelines 
for Reconstruction (Reconstruction Headquarters in response to the Great East 
Japan Earthquake, 2011, p. 33). Furthermore, the Basic Guidelines for Recon-
struction intend the exchange of information with other Asian countries (e.g., 
China, Korea) and an ongoing exchange with international scientists and stu-
dents to enable countries all over the world to learn from Japan’s experiences 
(Reconstruction Headquarters in response to the Great East Japan Earthquake, 
2011, p. 31). In this context, Japan also hosted the Third UN World Conference 
on Disaster Risk Reduction in Sendai in March 2015.
The influence of spatial planning on essential 6
The influence of spatial planning for essential 6 is only determined to be low. 
The reason for this is that spatial planners are only one of many actors that are 
included in the education measures of this essential. This means, spatial plan-
ners should attend the trainings offered for them and help with the preparation 
of the information material for the public (e.g., designating evacuation routes, 
providing maps).
5.7 ESSENTIAL 7: INCREASE SOCIETAL AND 
CULTURAL RESILIENCE
As explained in Chapter 3.2, resilience does not only consist of physical as-
pects but also includes a socio-economic sphere. Building societal and cultural 
resilience [UN-07], is directly linked with the work of grassroots organizations 
and the inclusion of vulnerable population segments in participation processes. 
Grassroots organizations and the involvement of citizens into the planning pro-
cess can also help to increase the social cohesion of communities, which helps 
to build socio-economic resilience. In addition to this, businesses can help to 
build socio-economic resilience by providing their employees with relevant infor-
mation. Furthermore, the preparation of business continuity plans can help busi-
nesses to continue their work after a disaster. One final aspect of this essential 
is the importance to enable citizens to communicate with each other before and 
after a disaster.
Grassroots organizations Coverage of grassroots organization(s) 
throughout the city and effectiveness of 
grassroots networks [UN-7.1.1, UN-7.1.2]
Social connectedness and neighborhood 
cohesion [UN-7.1.3]
Engagement of vulnerable segments of 
the population [UN-7.1.4]
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Private sector/ employers Extent to which employers act as a chan-
nel with employees [UN-7.2.1]
Business continuity planning [UN-7.2.2]
“Systems of Engagement” Use of mobile and e-mail “systems of 
engagement” to enable citizens to re-
ceive and give updates before and after a 
disaster [UN-7.3.1]
Grassroots organizations
Grassroots organizations can play an important role for the increase of societal 
and cultural resilience. The orientation of the grassroots organization thereby 
determines if it directly improves a community’s ability to respond to disas-
ter risks (e.g., emergency responders) or if it improves the community’s social 
connectedness, which can also increase resilience (e.g., churches, youth orga-
nizations, food kitchens) (UNISDR, 2015d, p. 45). To increase socio-economic re-
silience, it is important that these organizations reach certain population groups 
on a frequent basis and that they consider and address the topic of resilience in 
their daily work [UN-7.1.1, UN-7.1.2]. Therefore, grassroots organizations should 
be engaged in emergency response planning and training and be provided with 
all relevant information and data needed (UNISDR, 2015d, p. 44). The work of 
grassroots organizations can increase a community’s social connectedness [UN-
7.1.3], which in turn increases the chance that community members are directly 
approached after a disaster to assure their safety and that help is provided if they 
need it. Furthermore, social cohesion reduces the risk of crime in the aftermath 
of a disaster. To optimally utilize these advantages of grassroots organizations to 
increase resilience, it is important to engage vulnerable citizen groups into their 
work [UN-7.1.4]. Vulnerable population groups can be the poor, the elderly, phys-
ically or mentally disabled, children, non-native speakers, or women.
The Basic Guidelines for Reconstruction recognize the importance of commu-
nity cohesion and social inclusion to build resilience. They therefore mention 
this topic in several passages of the text (Reconstruction Headquarters in re-
sponse to the Great East Japan Earthquake, 2011, p. 14 and 32). To reach the 
aim of community building, the Basic Guidelines for Reconstruction intend the 
introduction of “New Public Commons” that enable the government to work 
together with various organizations (e.g., NPOs, NGOs and local organizations) 
(Reconstruction Headquarters in response to the Great East Japan Earthquake, 
2011, p. 32). The importance to engage vulnerable groups of population into the 
reconstruction process is continuously mentioned in the guidelines. Based on 
Japan’s demographic structure (see Chapter 4.2), special emphasis is put on 
the elderly, but also women, children, the youth, disabled people and foreigners 
should specifically be addressed (Reconstruction Headquarters in response to 
the Great East Japan Earthquake, 2011, p. 14).
Private sector/ employers
Private organizations can operate as multipliers for resilience. One way to do this 
is the introduction and discussion of the topic with the business’s employees 
Table 10 | Subjects and items from essential 7 | Own illustration based on UNISDR, 2015d
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[UN-7.2.1]. Another way is the development and implementation of business 
continuity plans that contain information how the company’s affairs can be han-
dled in case of a disaster [UN-7.2.2]. These plans cannot only improve the com-
pany’s resilience, but also improve the community’s ability to recover its econ-
omy as fast as possible. In this way, the private sector can directly contribute 
to the community’s overall resilience. To prepare for future disasters, the Basic 
Guidelines for Reconstruction intend to support the companies’ intention to con-
tinue their business after a disaster (Reconstruction Headquarters in response 
to the Great East Japan Earthquake, 2011, pp.  33–34). In case of the stable 
supply and food industry, the guidelines specifically mention that business con-
tinuity plans should be developed to assure the continuous supply with these 
essential goods in case of a disaster (Reconstruction Headquarters in response 
to the Great East Japan Earthquake, 2011, p. 36).
“Systems of Engagement”
Especially directly before and after a disaster, it is important for people to re-
ceive current information. With the wide distribution of mobile phones and the 
internet, these ways of communication are an easy and affordable option to 
keep the citizen’s up to date [UN-7.3.1]. Information should be distributed over 
various channels like social media, e-mail or mobile phone apps (e.g., the Jap-
anese earthquake early warning app “Yurekuru Call”). Nevertheless, the GEJE 
showed that these new ways of communication are not always reliable in case 
of a disaster. For instance, the full restoration of the mobile phone network in 
Miyako City after the GEJE took about one month (Miyako City Great East Japan 
Earthquake and Tsunami Records Editorial Committee, 2015, p. 36). Accordingly, 
the Basic Guidelines for Reconstruction stress the importance to have a radio to 
get information in case of a disaster (Reconstruction Headquarters in response 
to the Great East Japan Earthquake, 2011, p. 11). This emphasizes the impor-
tance to spread information over various platforms, so that as many people as 
possible can be reached.
The influence of spatial planning on essential 7
As explained in Chapter 2.4.3, communication is an important aspect for disas-
ter risk reduction. Especially the requirements of vulnerable population groups 
need to be included in the decision-making processes. In this context grassroots 
organizations can serve as a contact to reach certain population groups and 
build community resilience. In case that grassroots organizations specifically ad-
dress spatially relevant topics (like some machizukuri in Japan), spatial planners 
should involve them into the decision-making process. Grassroots organizations, 
strengthening community cohesion and the integration of vulnerable population 
groups therefore are of medium relevance for spatial planners. The preparation 
of information in the private sector and the development of business continuity 
plans, on the other hand, is not relevant for spatial planners. Regarding the pro-
vision of information, spatial planners might be able to provide information (e.g., 
about evacuation routes) or take care of the engineering resilience of communi-
cation networks (this point is addressed in essential 8), but their main influence 
for this subject is low.
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5.8 ESSENTIAL 8: INCREASE INFRASTRUCTURE 
RESILIENCE
Essential 8 addresses the resilience of a city’s critical infrastructure [UN-08]. 
Meeting the aspects of this essential therefore builds engineering resilience, 
which is directly linked with its physical structure. The essential’s first compo-
nent is the existence and maintenance of protective infrastructure, which is of 
major importance to keep the impact of a hazardous event as low as possible. 
In addition to this, a resilient utility infrastructure can increase the probability 
that a city’s basic functions are not or only slightly disrupted by a hazardous 
event. In case that the utility infrastructure still becomes disrupted, a resilient 
system structure helps to recover the important services as fast as possible. 
This extends to other functions like the maintenance of law and order and first 
responders, educational and healthcare services and administrative functions. 
To ensure a continuous supply with the above mentioned services in case of a 
disaster, it is important that the computer systems that store all relevant data 
continue to work. To increase infrastructure resilience, all relevant infrastructure 
should be included in the risk assessment and scenario development addressed 
in essential 2. The risk assessment should consider possible linkages or cascad-
ing effects between different systems, e.g., the consequence of electricity fail-
ure for hospitals (UNISDR, 2015d, p. 51). Simultaneously, the operator of critical 
infrastructure should include risk scenarios for the planning of their systems. To 
achieve a resilient infrastructure, it is helpful if the operators and the city admin-
istration agree on elementary system standards (UNISDR, 2015d, p. 51).
Protective infrastructure Adequacy of protective infrastructure 
and effectiveness of maintenance [UN-
8.1.1, UN-8.1.2]
Utility infrastructure Disaster resilience of the following ser-
vices: communication, electricity, water/
sanitation, gas, transportation [UN-8.2.1, 
UN-8.2.2, UN-8.2.3, UN-8.3.1, UN-8.3.2, 
UN-8.3.3, UN-8.4.1, UN-8.4.2, UN-8.4.3, 
UN-8.5.1, UN-8.5.2, UN-8.5.3, UN-8.5.4, 
UN-8.6.1, UN-8.6.2, UN-8.6.3, UN-8.6.4, 
UN-8.6.5, UN-8.6.6]
Social infrastructure Disaster resilience and structural safety 
of law and order & first responders, 
education facilities, healthcare providers 
and administrative services [UN-8.7.1, 
UN-8.7.2, UN-8.8.1, UN-8.8.2, UN-8.8.3, 
UN-8.9.1, UN-8.9.2, UN-8.9.3, UN-8.10.1]
Computer systems and data Assurance of continuity of computer 
systems and data critical to government 
continuity [UN-8.11.1]
Assurance of continuity of computer sys-
tems and data critical to any of the above 
infrastructure [UN-8.11.2]
Table 11 | Subjects and items from essential 8 | Own illustration based on UNISDR, 2015d
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Protective infrastructure
Protective infrastructure can decrease a city’s exposure, if it adequately match-
es a disaster’s magnitude. Examples for such infrastructure are “levees and 
flood barriers”, “flood basins”, “sea walls” “tornado/hurricane shelters”, “storm 
drains” or “shock absorption capabilities fitted to infrastructure to deal with 
earthquakes” (UNISDR, 2015d, p. 53). To increase a city’s resilience, protective 
infrastructure that matches the type and scale of predictable hazardous events 
should be installed [UN-8.1.1] and maintained frequently [UN-8.1.2]. Neverthe-
less, it must be considered that protective infrastructure can never safeguard 
a city from any possible disaster of any scale. The inundation of Taro District in 
Miyako City through the GEJE Tsunami shows that a seawall can be run over if 
the height of the tsunami wave is big enough. Accordingly, protective infrastruc-
ture should never result in a false feeling of safety and can never be the only 
measure to build resilience.
The Japanese government intends to “restore and build coastal and river dikes 
and strengthen the functions of disaster-prevention/ drainage facilities such as 
floodgates and water shoot pipes” (Reconstruction Headquarters in response 
to the Great East Japan Earthquake, 2011, p. 10), a plan that is currently exe-
cuted. In addition to this, the Basic Guidelines for Reconstruction also provide 
for the development of evacuation buildings, the raise of roads and railroads to 
create setback levees and the restoration of disaster-prevention forests along 
the coastline (Reconstruction Headquarters in response to the Great East Japan 
Earthquake, 2011, pp. 10–11).
Utility infrastructure
According to the Disaster Resilience Scorecard, the resilience of utility infra-
structure depends on three aspects. First, the amount of services lost through a 
disaster should be as small as possible. Second, the number of service days lost 
through the failure of critical infrastructure should be as small as possible. Criti-
cal infrastructure includes operations of special importance for the city’s emer-
gency response, e.g., basic communication systems for police and emergency 
services, basic water and energy systems and the persistence of evacuation 
routes (UNISDR, 2015d, p. 51). Third, the costs for the restoration of the utility 
networks should be as low as possible. These three points apply to the following 
types of utility infrastructure: communication [UN-8.2.1, UN-8.2.2, UN-8.2.3], 
electricity [UN-8.3.1, UN-8.3.2, UN-8.3.3], water and sanitation [UN-8.4.1, UN-
8.4.2, UN-8.4.3]. The resilience of the gas network is measured slightly different 
through its safety and integrity [UN-8.5.1], the amount of customer service days 
at risk [UN-8.5.2], the critical assets service days at risk [UN-8.5.3] and the costs 
for restoration [UN-8.5.4]. The resilience of the transportation network is divided 
into the resilience of the different modes of transportation. The aim is to keep 
the loss of service days for the road network [UN-8.6.1], the railroad network 
[UN-8.6.3], airports [UN-8.6.4], river and/ or seaports [UN-8.6.5] and other public 
transportation networks [UN-8.6.6] as low as possible. Furthermore, it is import-
ant to keep a city’s evacuation routes intact if a disaster occurs [UN-8.6.2].
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The Basic Guidelines for Reconstruction demand that risk assessments are 
based on the largest disasters possible. Based on this assessment, solutions 
for the above mentioned utility networks should be developed to ensure that all 
evacuation and emergency activities can proceed without constraints in order to 
secure people’s life, health and assets and minimize the disruption of socio-eco-
nomic activities (Reconstruction Headquarters in response to the Great East 
Japan Earthquake, 2011, pp. 33–34).
The special importance of a working communication network to build disaster 
resilience is evident because a functioning communication system permits to 
warn the citizens about hazardous events and enables them to evacuate. The 
Basic Guidelines for Reconstruction intend the promotion of new solutions to 
improve the overall communication system in case of a disaster. Some of these 
solutions are the launch of a cloud service (Reconstruction Headquarters in re-
sponse to the Great East Japan Earthquake, 2011, p. 28) and the improvement of 
the reliability of the information system before and during large scale disasters, 
e.g., through the use of satellite systems (Reconstruction Headquarters in re-
sponse to the Great East Japan Earthquake, 2011, p. 36). Of course the recovery 
of the existing communication network (e.g., internet access) or the supply with 
information from the government is an additional important point (Reconstruc-
tion Headquarters in response to the Great East Japan Earthquake, 2011, p. 28).
The Basic Guidelines for Reconstruction also intend to launch new and inde-
pendent “smart energy systems” that rely on renewable energy sources (e.g., 
solar and wind power) and store energy in batteries which can stabilize the 
power supply and provide evacuation centers with energy in case of a disaster 
(Reconstruction Headquarters in response to the Great East Japan Earthquake, 
2011, pp. 28–30). In this way, the dependency on the electricity network and the 
overall gas and/ or oil supply can be reduced. In addition to this, the guidelines 
intend to re-engineer the water and sewage system to improve its earthquake 
resistance. Furthermore, the network structure for oil and gas supply should be 
designed to be more resilient (Reconstruction Headquarters in response to the 
Great East Japan Earthquake, 2011, pp. 35–36).
Reconstructing the transportation network to improve its resilience, is another 
goal of the Basic Guidelines for Reconstruction. This includes the widening of 
arterial roads to prevent congestion from too much traffic (Reconstruction Head-
quarters in response to the Great East Japan Earthquake, 2011, p. 10) and the 
prevention of traffic light failure in case of a disaster (Reconstruction Headquar-
ters in response to the Great East Japan Earthquake, 2011, p. 28). Furthermore, 
the redundancy of the transportation network should be build (Reconstruction 
Headquarters in response to the Great East Japan Earthquake, 2011, p. 28). To 
provide easy access to Tohoku Region in order to advance the reconstruction 
process, the fast construction of the basic logistics network is prioritized. This 
also includes the speedy completion of the Sanriku Longitudinal Expressway 
(Reconstruction Headquarters in response to the Great East Japan Earthquake, 
2011, p. 27). The reconstruction of the railroad network should occur based on 
the local characteristics of each community (Reconstruction Headquarters in re-
sponse to the Great East Japan Earthquake, 2011, p. 27). In reality, this resulted 
in the replacement of the former railway lines Kesennuma Line and part of Ofu-
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nato Line with a Bus Rapid Transit system because the demand for public trans-
portation in the smaller towns and cities along the coast is not large enough to 
justify the reconstruction of the railway tracks after they were destroyed by the 
GEJE and Tsunami (JR Japan, 2016).
Social infrastructure
In addition to a working utility infrastructure, it is also important that basic social 
services are continuously provided if a disaster occurs. This includes law and 
order and first responders and the provision of education, healthcare and admin-
istrative services. In order to ensure the persistence of social services in case 
of a disaster, it is also important that all relevant data is stored safely in robust 
computer systems.
In times of a disaster, it is especially important that law and order and first 
response are secured. Accordingly, first responders and police officers should 
be able to work sufficiently and not be restricted in any way [UN-8.7.1]. This 
can be achieved by providing needed equipment such as additional vehicles, 
pumps or generators (UNISDR, 2015d, p. 52). The Basic Guidelines for Recon-
struction consider this point and intend to “[s]ecure extensive and large-scale 
swift evacuation, relief, emergency and rescue activities conducted by police 
officers, fire fighters, coast guard officers and Self Defense Force members” 
(Reconstruction Headquarters in response to the Great East Japan Earthquake, 
2011, pp. 33–34). Furthermore, it is also important that a city’s prison system 
does not get disrupted by a disaster. This includes the safety of the prisoners as 
well as the maintenance of custody [UN-8.7.2].
The resilience of education facilities is split into three factors. First, it is import-
ant to enhance the structural safety of school building and other educational 
facilities [UN-8.8.1]. Second, the teaching time that is lost after a disaster should 
be kept to a minimum [UN-8.8.2]. This point is influenced by the availability of 
temporary teaching facilities if the original facilities are inaccessible and the abil-
ity of teaching staff to continue their work. Third, the safety of educational data 
should be ensured [UN-8.8.3], this can be achieved by frequently backing up all 
important data. The Basic Guidelines for Reconstruction aim to strengthen the 
resilience of school facilities, through the application of structural measures (incl. 
possible relocation) as well as the social resilience of staff members, through 
special training measures. The continuity of classes after the GEJE should be se-
cured through the allocation of additional teaching staff as well as school coun-
selors to ensure the psychological and physical health of affected children. To 
enable children, whose families’ were severely financially affected by the disas-
ter, to attend school, the guidelines intend monetary assistance (Reconstruction 
Headquarters in response to the Great East Japan Earthquake, 2011, pp. 17–18).
Because a disaster results in a large amount of casualties, the continuation of 
healthcare services is another important point to build resilience. Disaster resil-
ience of the healthcare system is composed of the structural safety of health-
care facilities [UN-8.9.1], the protection of health records and data (e.g., through 
frequent backups) [UN-8.9.2] and the ability to deal with all acute needs that 
occur in connection with the disaster [UN-8.9.3]. The Basic Guidelines for Re-
construction intend to provide disaster-affected people with sufficient healthcare 
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(Reconstruction Headquarters in response to the Great East Japan Earthquake, 
2011, p. 15) and to increase the structural safety of healthcare facilities (e.g., 
earthquake-resistance) to ensure “that medical care can be continuously pro-
vided even at time of a large-scale disaster” (Reconstruction Headquarters in 
response to the Great East Japan Earthquake, 2011, p. 35). In addition to this, 
the efficiency of the healthcare sector should be increased, e.g., by reducing the 
length of hospital stays (Reconstruction Headquarters in response to the Great 
East Japan Earthquake, 2011, p. 15).
A disaster can significantly disrupt a city’s administration, either by destroying 
governmental buildings or by affecting staff members. Still, the basic administra-
tive functions, that directly affect the citizen’s wellbeing after a disaster, should 
be secured [UN-8.10.1]. Depending on the extent of the disaster, these services 
might be the distribution of food stamps, the allocation of temporary housing or 
the record of damages (UNISDR, 2015d, p. 69). The Basic Guidelines for Recon-
struction stress the importance to recover a city’s main governmental building, 
so that a headquarter for the further reconstruction process is secured (Recon-
struction Headquarters in response to the Great East Japan Earthquake, 2011, 
p. 14). Measures to increase the structural safety of administrative buildings in 
preparation for future disasters are also planned (Reconstruction Headquarters 
in response to the Great East Japan Earthquake, 2011, p. 33).
Computer systems and data
The progressive distribution of computer systems increased the importance to 
secure IT structures and the data connected with them. The disaster’s effect on 
IT infrastructure and data that is crucial for the continuation of basic adminis-
trative, educational and healthcare services should be kept to a minimum [UN-
8.11.1]. In addition to this, the stability of computer systems that are relevant for 
the proper provision of the utility infrastructure services should also be ensured 
[UN-8.11.2]. The Basic Guidelines for Reconstruction do not state any specific 
measures for this topic.
The influence of spatial planning on essential 8
To ensure the continuous work of a city’s protective, utility and social infrastruc-
ture, the structural safety of these services must be secured. Spatial planning 
options to build infrastructure resilience include the location of newly planned in-
frastructure (e.g., transmitting or receiving towers) in zones that are not exposed 
to hazards or the relocation of existing critical infrastructure from hazardous ar-
eas to safer grounds. Another option to build resilience is the establishment 
of redundant or alternative infrastructure (Jha et al., 2013, 141ff.). Furthermore, 
the enforcement of building codes can help to adapt building structures accord-
ing to essential requirements (e.g., creating earthquake-resistant buildings) and 
by this means increase a building’s structural resilience (see Chapter 2.4.2). To 
obtain the best results, the selected measures should be based on the risk 
assessment (see essential 2). The various options that spatial planners have on 
hand to build infrastructure resilience illustrate the important role that they play 
in the context of essential 8. Of course, the competence of various sectoral 
planning departments for the supply of utility and social services necessitates 
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the collaboration of spatial planners with the responsible departments. Never-
theless, the influence of spatial planners in this context can be considered as 
high. As explained above, the continuous supply with social services does also 
depend on the ability of people to continue their work (e.g., teachers, doctors, 
administrative staff) and the reliability of computer systems in order to continu-
ously provide relevant data. Spatial planners have no influence on these aspects. 
Therefore, they are not further considered for this research.
5.9 ESSENTIAL 9: ENSURE EFFECTIVE DISASTER 
RESPONSE
Essential 9 [UN-09] asks a city to establish an effective disaster response sys-
tem. This response should be based on risk assessments and scenarios, which 
require a frequent update (see essential 2). Furthermore, all relevant stakehold-
ers identified in essential 1 should be included into the preparation of prepared-
ness and contingency plans to secure a continuous supply of law and order, 
food, basic healthcare and shelter. Disaster preparation involves the installation 
of an early warning system, the existence of emergency response plans and the 
ability of emergency staff members to react properly.
Early warning Existence and effectiveness of early 
warning systems [UN-9.1.1]
Event management plans Existence of emergency response plans 
that integrate professional responders 
and grassroots organizations [UN-9.2.1]
Staffing/ responder needs “Surge” capacity of police also to sup-
port first responder duties [UN-9.3.1]
Definition of other first responder and 
other staffing needs, availability – includ-
ing fire, ambulance, healthcare, neigh-
borhood support etc. [UN-9.3.2]
Equipment & relief supply needs Definition of equipment and supply needs, 
and availability of equipment [UN-9.4.1]
Food, shelter, staple goods & fuel supply Likely ability to continue to feed popula-
tion [UN-9.5.1]
Likely ability to meet needs for shelter/
safe places [UN-9.5.2]
Ability to meet likely needs for staple 
goods [UN-9.5.3]
Likely availability of fuel [UN-9.5.4]
Interoperability & inter-agency compat-
ibility
Interoperability with neighboring cities/
states and other levels of government of 
critical systems and procedures [UN-
9.6.1]
Emergency operations center [UN-9.6.2]
Drills Practices and rehearsals – involving both 
the public and professionals [UN-9.7.1]
Effectiveness of drills and training [UN-
9.7.2]
Table 12 | Subjects and items from essential 9 | Own illustration based on UNISDR, 2015d
Part A | Chapter 5
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This includes the availability of all the equipment that they require and their 
ability to provide this equipment for affected people. In addition to this, each 
city should collaborate with neighboring towns and city and train its disaster 
response with regularly performed drills. The resilience spheres that essential 
9 addresses, differ for the specific items: While many of the subjects (early 
warning systems, event management plans, knowledge about staffing and re-
sponder needs, equipment and relief supply needs and the interoperability and 
inter-agency compatibility) help to build political-institutional resilience, other as-
pects help to build socio-economic resilience (availability of food, shelter, staple 
goods and fuel supply).
Early warning
To maximize the time for evacuation, it is important to have an efficient early 
warning system in place and that the citizens receive the warnings on time 
[UN-9.1.1]. In case of a disaster, this can safe many people’s lives and enable 
emergency responders to get prepared. Early warning systems are frequently 
improved and therefore should be updated on a regular basis. The Basic Guide-
lines for Reconstruction intend to put an alert and evacuation system into place 
(Reconstruction Headquarters in response to the Great East Japan Earthquake, 
2011, p.  10) and especially mention the improvement of tsunami early warn-
ing systems (Reconstruction Headquarters in response to the Great East Japan 
Earthquake, 2011, p. 33).
Event management plans
To be sufficiently prepared for a disaster, it is important to have disaster man-
agement plans established [UN-9.2.1]. These plans should integrate all relevant 
actors (e.g., first responders, grassroots organizations) and cover the follow-
ing aspects: coordination, evacuation, continuity of basic infrastructure (e.g., 
communication, healthcare, law and order (see essential 8)), contribution from 
grassroots organizations and the public (UNISDR, 2015d, pp. 73–74). The Basic 
Guidelines for Reconstruction (Reconstruction Headquarters in response to the 
Great East Japan Earthquake, 2011) do not specifically address this topic, how-
ever, it can be assumed that the development of event management plans will 
be part of the improvement of the “response capability” mentioned on page 34.
Staffing/ responder needs
A disaster multiplies the number of first responders needed. To enable an ef-
fective response, a plan of the surge capacity of the police [UN-9.3.1] and other 
emergency staff [UN-9.3.2] in case of a disaster should be prepared. The capac-
ity of the regular staff can also be assisted by the army or civil defense forces. 
This point is also included in the Basic Guidelines for Reconstruction, where 
an extended “partnership among police, fire department, Coast Guard and Self 
Defense Forces” is demanded (Reconstruction Headquarters in response to the 
Great East Japan Earthquake, 2011, p. 34).
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Equipment & relied supply needs
To respond to the disaster, emergency staff will need certain equipment which 
should also be secured. Equipment might include vehicles, helicopters, rescue or 
medical equipment (UNISDR, 2015d, p. 76). The Basic Guidelines for Reconstruc-
tion do not specifically address this topic. Nevertheless, the improvement of the re-
sponse capacity to future disasters should also incorporate this factor (Reconstruc-
tion Headquarters in response to the Great East Japan Earthquake, 2011, p. 34).
Food, shelter, staple goods & fuel supply
People that are affected by a disaster have certain needs that have to be satis-
fied. Building the ability to meet these needs, increases disaster resilience. One 
of the most important aspects is the citizens’ consistent access to food and 
water [UN-9.5.1]. Another important point is the availability of shelter [UN-9.5.2], 
which can be roughly differentiated between emergency shelter, temporary 
shelter/ housing and permanent housing (Quarantelli, 1995). There should be 
enough space to accommodate every displaced person and the shelter’s loca-
tion should be safe. Furthermore, the supply with critical staple goods should be 
secured [UN-9.5.3]. Staple goods vary from place to place, but usually include 
“sanitation; [p]ersonal sanitary supplies and diapers; [m]edication and first aid 
supplies; [b]atteries; [c]lothing; [b]edding, [b]ottled gas for cooking [and] heat-
ing [as well as] material for immediate repairs or weather-proofing of housing” 
(UNISDR, 2015d, p. 79). Finally, the supply with fuel for emergency and other 
important vehicles should be secured [UN-9.5.4].
Because of the publication a few months after the disaster, the Basic Guidelines 
for Reconstruction do not address the supply with basic goods immediately after 
the disaster. Nevertheless, the guidelines stress certain points that are of major 
importance when dealing with the citizen’s basic needs. These points include 
the creation of a healthy living environment in evacuation shelters (Reconstruc-
tion Headquarters in response to the Great East Japan Earthquake, 2011, p. 37) 
and temporary houses (Reconstruction Headquarters in response to the Great 
East Japan Earthquake, 2011, p. 13). This aspect is of special importance when 
people have to stay in this environment for a longer period of time and also 
includes to help affected citizens to rebuild their lives, e.g., by providing finan-
cial support (Reconstruction Headquarters in response to the Great East Japan 
Earthquake, 2011, pp. 36–37) or organizing cultural or sports events (Reconstruc-
tion Headquarters in response to the Great East Japan Earthquake, 2011, p. 19). 
To secure a community’s supply with basic necessities, the guidelines aim to 
support the restoration and maintenance of “barbers, hairdressers and cleaners, 
architect engineers such as carpenters and plasterers and store managers such 
as restaurants and retailers” (Reconstruction Headquarters in response to the 
Great East Japan Earthquake, 2011, p. 26).
Interoperability & inter-agency compatibility
Because disasters disregard man-made borders, it is important to address risks 
in a holistic way. This can optimally be achieved when neighboring cities and 
countries collaborate with each other [UN-9.6.1]. This interoperability increas-
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es a city’s response capacity and therefore its resilience. Possible fields for 
collaboration that should be assessed in preparation for a disaster could be: 
“[c]ommunication systems; [d]ata [and] [e]mergency management applica-
tions” (UNISDR, 2015d, pp. 80–81). In addition to this, each city should own 
a highly disaster resilient emergency operations center [UN-9.6.2]. This center 
should be able to control all activities that are necessary in case of a disaster and 
carry out the communication between different actors.
The Basic Guidelines for Reconstruction intend the collaboration of local gov-
ernments, relevant organizations and the Self Defense Forces to improve the 
benefits from disaster drills and increase the overall disaster response capacity 
(Reconstruction Headquarters in response to the Great East Japan Earthquake, 
2011, p. 34). To ensure a continuous work in case of an emergency, the engineer-
ing resilience of local government buildings should be improved (see essential 8) 
(Reconstruction Headquarters in response to the Great East Japan Earthquake, 
2011, pp. 35–36).
Drills
Finally, the planned out disaster response should be trained on a regular basis. 
This can be achieved through drills that are held for first responders, volunteers 
and the public [UN-9.7.1]. To ensure their effectiveness, the drills and trainings 
should also be evaluated after they are completed [UN-9.7.2].
After the GEJE, the Basic Guidelines for Reconstruction intend to use experi-
ences to improve the existing disaster training. This includes the promotion of 
“escape” as the preferred action and the availability of evacuation guidance in 
case of a tsunami (Reconstruction Headquarters in response to the Great East 
Japan Earthquake, 2011, p. 35) as well as the enhancement of schools for disas-
ter prevention purposes (Reconstruction Headquarters in response to the Great 
East Japan Earthquake, 2011, p. 17).
The influence of spatial planning on essential 9
Beyond the general participation in preparing the disaster response plans and 
delivering information that is needed to prepare them, spatial planners are not 
further involved in the aspects of essential 9. The influence of spatial planning 
can therefore be regarded as low, with one exception: The provision of safe shel-
ter after a disaster (including evacuation shelters, temporary housing sites and 
permanent housing) falls within the scope of spatial planners. Their influence for 
this aspect therefore is considered as medium.
5.10 ESSENTIAL 10: EXPEDITE RECOVERY AND BUILD 
BACK BETTER
The time after a disaster opens a window of opportunity for improvement (see 
Chapter 3.3). To use this window as effectively as possible, planning the recov-
ery process in advance of a disaster, is a helpful step. Thereby, it is important to 
incorporate the needs of the citizens and their communities into the planning 
process to ensure “that the recovery programmes are consistent and in line 
with the long-term priorities” (UNISDR, 2015d, p. 85).
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Post event recovery planning – pre-event Planning for post event recovery and 
economic reboot [UN-10.1.1]
Shadow financial arrangements for 
processing incoming aid and disbursing 
funds [UN-10.1.2]
Learning loops [UN-10.1.3]
Post event recovery planning – pre-event
Post event recovery plans ideally should be developed before a disaster strikes 
[UN-10.1.1]. In this way, it can be ensured that all important points are consid-
ered and the plan matches a city’s long term development goals. The plan should 
be comprehensive and include the following points (UNISDR, 2015d, pp. 85–86):
 › Location of emergency shelters and temporary housing
 › Intended procedure to remove debris and start repairs
 › Psychological support
 ›  Economic recovery (e.g., interim taxes, incentives)
 ›  Intended adjustment of city layout (e.g., relocation to safer places)
 ›  Measures to provide social equality
Furthermore, the financial frame for the recovery plan should be planned out 
in a realistic way [UN-10.1.2]. This is necessary to ensure that it is actionable. 
In addition to this, procedures should be established that enable the review of 
the processes after a disaster in order to learn from mistakes and improve the 
established approaches for future disasters [UN-10.1.3].
The Basic Guidelines for Reconstruction basically represent the recovery plan 
for Tohoku Region, although they were not developed before the disaster. There-
fore, they include many specifications regarding the points mentioned above. 
They make a point to improve the living environment in emergency shelters 
(Reconstruction Headquarters in response to the Great East Japan Earthquake, 
2011, p. 37) and temporary housing (Reconstruction Headquarters in response 
to the Great East Japan Earthquake, 2011, p. 13), state that the debris from the 
GEJE should be recycled wherever possible (Reconstruction Headquarters in re-
sponse to the Great East Japan Earthquake, 2011, p. 29), demand the provision 
of psychological support for disaster affected people (Reconstruction Headquar-
ters in response to the Great East Japan Earthquake, 2011, p. 15), give informa-
tion about the financial blueprint of the recovery process (Reconstruction Head-
quarters in response to the Great East Japan Earthquake, 2011, pp. 4–8) and 
provide measures to increase social equality, e.g., by promoting the participation 
of women (Reconstruction Headquarters in response to the Great East Japan 
Earthquake, 2011, p. 4). However, the guidelines do not give any specifications 
about intended city layouts beyond the scope of discussing mass relocation 
as an option to increase a city’s resilience (Reconstruction Headquarters in re-
sponse to the Great East Japan Earthquake, 2011, p. 10), since these decisions 
Table 13 | Subjects and items from essential 10 | Own illustration based on UNISDR, 2015d
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are made by each municipality individually. In addition to this, the guidelines 
emphasize the importance to use the experiences from the GEJE to prepare for 
future disasters and dedicate an entire subchapter to this topic (see “Preparing 
for future disaster” in Reconstruction Headquarters in response to the Great 
East Japan Earthquake, 2011, pp. 32–37). One example for this is the analysis of 
people’s actual behavior when they were supposed to evacuate. Understanding 
the citizens behavior can be used to improve the evacuation process for future 
disasters (Reconstruction Headquarters in response to the Great East Japan 
Earthquake, 2011, p. 36). The adjustments of the Disaster Countermeasures Ba-
sic Act and the Basic Disaster Management Plan after the Great Hanshin-Awaji 
Earthquake in Kobe in 1995 (Iuchi, 2016, pp. 23–24) illustrate that the Japanese 
government knows about the importance to learn from past events.
The influence of spatial planning on essential 10
The preparation of a pre-event recovery plan should also include spatial details, 
such as the location of emergency shelters, temporary housing sites or adjust-
ments of the city’s layout. Ideally, these plans should incorporate the city’s long-
term vision and include the proper participation of relevant stakeholders, includ-
ing the public. In this way, the communication and implementation of these 
plans after a disaster can be simplified. The influence of spatial planners for the 
development of such post disaster land-use plans is high. When it comes to the 
determination of available budgets for the reconstruction process, the influence 
of spatial planners is only low. Nevertheless, spatial planners can play an im-
portant role for the development of recovery plans in advance of a disaster by 
coordinating the planning process.
5.11 INTERIM CONCLUSION
Taking the information in this chapter together, it can be stated that the two es-
sentials with the largest influence of spatial planners (essentials 4 and 8), mainly 
address engineering resilience. The large scale destruction of a city’s physical 
structure after a disaster offers the opportunity to build back better and improve 
the city’s engineering resilience (see Chapter 3.3). The toolbox that spatial plan-
ners have available offers a variety of options to address essentials 4 and 8. 
Some examples are the minimization of exposure of urban areas through reloca-
tion or differentiated land-use decisions to prevent certain land-uses in specific 
areas (see Chapter 4.7.2).
When it comes to the improvement of political-institutional, socio-economic and 
environmental resilience, the planner’s role is not as noticeable, but still import-
ant. Especially when dealing with spatially relevant topics, like the development 
of hazard maps (to build political-institutional resilience), the provision of safe 
shelter (to build socio-economic resilience) or securing ecosystem health (to 
build environmental resilience), spatial planners can provide useful contributions.
All resilience items introduced in this chapter were sorted by their ability to in-
fluence them through spatial planning. Furthermore, the type of resilience that 
each specific resilience item can influence most effectively was indicated. For 
instance, a low amount of vulnerable land-uses in hazardous areas is associated 
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with a high engineering resilience. The possible improvement of socio-economic 
resilience in case of the relocation of economic activity (as one vulnerable land-
use), is considered to be secondary in this context and therefore not indicated 
in the table. The table for this analysis can be found in the annex.
Resilience items Codes
Engineering Resilience 
 › Vulnerable land-uses at risk [UN-4.1.1, UN-4.1.2, UN-4.1.3]
 › Building Codes [UN-4.2.1, UN-4.2.2, UN-4.2.3]
 › Urban Design Solutions [UN-4.3.1]
 › Sustainable building design standards [UN-4.3.2]
 › Protective infrastructure [UN-8.1.1, UN-8.1.2]
 › Disaster resilience of utility infrastructure [UN-8.2.1, UN-8.2.2, UN-8.2.3, UN-8.3.1, 
UN-8.3.2, UN-8.3.3, UN-8.4.1, UN-8.4.2, 
UN-8.4.3, UN-8.5.1, UN-8.5.2, UN-8.5.3, 
UN-8.5.4, UN-8.6.1, UN-8.6.2, UN-8.6.3, 
UN-8.6.4, UN-8.6.5, UN-8.6.6]
 › Disaster resilience of social infrastructure [UN-8.7.1, UN-8.7.2, UN-8.8.1, UN-8.9.1, 
UN-8.10.1]
Political-institutional resilience
 › Proposal evaluation for disaster resilience [UN-1.2.1]
 › Risk assessment [UN-2.1.1, UN-2.1.2, UN-2.1.3, UN-2.1.4, 
UN-2.2.1]
 › Pre-event planning for disaster recovery [UN-10.1.1]
 › Learning loops [UN-10.1.3]
Socio-economic resilience
 › Consideration of the citizen’s needs [UN-7.1.1, UN-7.1.2, UN-7.1.4]
 › Social connectedness and neighborhood 
cohesion
[UN-7.1.3]
 › Provision of safe shelter [UN-9.5.2]
Environmental resilience
 › Ecosystem health  [UN-5.1.1, UN-5.1.2, UN-5.1.3]
Because the main focus of this research is on spatial planning’s ability to build 
resilience, only items where spatial planners possess a high or medium degree 
of influence will be further considered. Items where spatial planners can only 
contribute in a minor way or not at all will be left out because these items can 
be more effectively addressed by other actors. To provide an efficient analysis 
framework for Part B of this work, similar resilience items were clustered and 
renamed. The final items to assess engineering, political-institutional, socio-eco-
nomic and environmental resilience are presented in table 14.
Table 14 | List of resilience items considered for this research | Own illustration
Part A | Chapter 6
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6. INTERIM CONCLUSION OF PART A
Part A elaborated the theoretical background of this research by introducing the 
complex topics of disaster risk and resilience. Furthermore, the framework char-
acteristics of the area under investigation were introduced and the concept of 
resilience was further specified to answer the main research questions:
 › How can spatial planning help to build a city’s resilience after a disaster?
 › How can spatial planning use the window of opportunity effectively to 
improve a city’s resilience after a disaster?
To answer these research questions, it is especially important to specifically op-
erationalize the independent variable (spatial planning) and dependent variable (a 
city’s resilience). A task that was achieved in Part A of this work. The time frame 
after the disaster and the window of opportunity are considered as background 
characteristics and therefore do not require an equally profound definition. For 
them the definitions introduced in Chapter 1 are maintained for the further re-
search process. The operationalization of spatial planning and resilience as the 
independent and dependent variable is summarized in the following paragraphs 
to clarify the background for the case study analysis in Part B of this work.
Spatial Planning
There are several spatial planning options available, that are relevant for building 
resilience in the aftermath of the GEJE and Tsunami. Chapter 4 introduced and 
discussed them in-depth based on their association with the risk governance 
phases assessment, management and communication. Table 15 on the next 
page gives an overview of all of these options.
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Spatial planning options
As
se
ss
m
en
t
 › Hazard maps and hazard simulations
 › Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA)
M
an
ag
em
en
t
Minimization of exposure of urban areas
 › Land-use control in hazardous areas
 › Relocation through relocation programs or land readjustment 
projects
Differentiated land-use decisions
 › Land-use zoning
Adaptation of building structures
 › Building code
 › Additional building requirements
 › Provision of public housing
Hazard Mitigation
 › Protective infrastructure
 › Land readjustment and raising program
 › Adaptation of urban structure through land readjustment projects
Co
m
m
un
ic
at
io
n
 › Citizen participation
Table 15 | Spatial planning options considered in the case study analysis | Own illustration
Part A | Chapter 6
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Resilience
Resilience can be assessed through the items introduced in Chapter 5. For each 
of the four resilience spheres – engineering, political-institutional, socio-eco-
nomic and environmental – specific items were identified that can be used to 
assess this type of resilience (see table 16).
Resilience items
Engineering Resilience 
 › Vulnerable land-uses at risk
 › Building Codes
 › Urban Design Solutions
 › Sustainable building design standards
 › Protective infrastructure
 › Disaster resilience of utility infrastructure
 › Disaster resilience of social infrastructure
Political-institutional resilience
 › Proposal evaluation for disaster resilience
 › Risk assessment
 › Pre-event planning for disaster recovery
 › Learning loops
Socio-economic resilience
 › Consideration of the citizen’s needs
 › Social connectedness and neighborhood cohesion
 › Provision of safe shelter
Environmental resilience
 › Ecosystem health  
In Part B of this work, all of these elements will be brought together. For each 
resilience item the spatial planning options used to address this item are ana-
lyzed and their ability to build resilience are assessed. This is done separately 
for the two case study sites Miyako City and Ishinomaki City, before the cross-
case synthesis analyses general findings and draws the conclusion which spatial 
planning option is able to address which kind or resilience.
Based on the elaboration of the topic of resilience in Chapter 5, it can be as-
sumed that spatial planning is especially useful to build engineering resilience. 
This assumption bases on the observation that the resilience essentials with a 
high influence of spatial planning (namely essentials 4 and 8) mainly address 
engineering resilience, while essentials that address the other three spheres of 
resilience are characterized by a smaller influence of spatial planning. The analy-
sis in Part B will show if this impression can be proven to be true.
Table 16 | Resilience items considered in the case study analysis | Own illustration
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7. CASE STUDY APPROACH
This chapter gives an overview of the application of the case study approach 
introduced in Chapter 1 on the two case study sites Miyako City and Ishinomaki 
City. The chapter explains the procedure for the case study selection and the 
methodology that was used for the collection and analysis of the case study 
data.
7.1 CASE STUDY SELECTION
The cases were selected based on the information that was gathered during the 
“soaking and poking” phase that lasted from the URBIPROOF Kick-Off-Meeting 
in May 2013 and the three research stays in November-December 2013, Ju-
ly-September 2014 and February-March 2015. During each of the stays, informa-
tion was collected via literature review, site visits and conversations with local 
experts. Various cities and towns in Iwate and Miyagi Prefecture were visited 
and considered as possible case study sites. This process was important to en-
sure a careful selection of the most qualified cases.
The decision to choose two case study sites was based on the following consid-
erations (Yin, 2014, pp. 63–64):
 › Multiple-case designs enable to replicate or contrast the results from 
the first case study
 ›  Multiple-case designs can eliminate the assumption that the findings 
from the first case study do not apply to any other case
 ›  Multiple-case designs strengthen the research results and increase the 
quality of research
 ›  Limiting the number of case studies to two keeps the amount of work 
still manageable, without losing the advantages of multiple-case designs
Finally, one city in each of the two prefectures was selected: Miyako City in 
Iwate Prefecture and Ishinomaki City in Miyagi Prefecture (see illustration 36 on 
the next page). Both cities suffered severely from the GEJE and Tsunami and 
implemented multiple approaches to recover from their damages.
The selection of these case study sites follows the logic of replication. This 
means, the researcher can either intend to literally replicate the findings from 
one case study in one or multiple other cases or vary certain variables in a con-
trolled manner (theoretical replication) (Yin, 2014, p. 57). Theoretical replication 
can either follow a most or least similar case research design. Most similar 
cases “which, ideally, are cases that are comparable in all respects except for 
the independent variable, whose variance may account for the cases having 
different outcomes on the dependent variable” (George & Bennett, 2005, p. 81). 
Least similar cases, on the other hand, “are similar in outcome but differ in all 
but one independent variable, and the inference might be made that this variable 
contributes to the invariant outcome” (George & Bennett, 2005, p. 82).
The selected cases were expected to allow both literal as well as theoretical 
replication. Literal replication happened in regard to the legally defined spatial 
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planning options that were used in both cases. These options include the legally 
defined framework for the development of hazard maps and simulations, the 
implementation of EIA, the minimization of exposure of urban areas, differentiat-
ed land-use decisions, adaptation of buildings structures, hazard mitigation and 
citizen participation as they are enshrined in the Japanese law (see Chapter 4). 
Both selected cases are located in Japan and are therefore bound to the same 
spatial planning framework. Furthermore, both cities experienced the same di-
saster and suffered from similar effects. Their reconstruction work is based on 
the Basic Guidelines for Reconstruction, which set the basic framework for the 
reconstruction process in Tohoku Region. This means, that both cases possess 
the same background conditions. Accordingly, it can be expected that the literal 
replication of the legally defined spatial planning options and the background 
conditions of both cases will deliver similar results regarding the dependent 
variable (the effect on resilience) (see illustration 37).
Beyond the legally binding spatial planning options, each case study city put an 
emphasis on specific aspects throughout the reconstruction process. These em-
phases are the preservation or creation of community cohesion in Miyako City 
and the economic revitalization of the city center in Ishinomaki City. Trying to 
reach these specific goals included the use of optional spatial planning options 
that were not required or specified by law (this especially refers to participation 
HOKKAIDO
TOKYO
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Illustration 36 | The location of Miyako City and Ishinomaki City in Japan | Own illustration 
based on D-maps, 2016a
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approaches). In this context, the case study selection follows a most similar 
cases research approach: The background conditions for the case study sites 
remain the same, while the independent variable (the optional spatial planning 
options used) varies. This approach is expected to result in different outcomes 
for the dependent variable (the effect on resilience) for the two case study sites 
(see illustration 38).
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Illustration 37 | Literal replication | Own illustration
Illustration 38 | Theoretical replication (most similar cases research approach) | Own illustration
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Finally, it should be mentioned that one reason for the selection of the two case 
study sites was the access to the field that was initialized by Professor Dr. Mi-
chio Ubaura. Without his personal connection to the spatial planners on-site it 
would have been very difficult if not impossible to collect all the information that 
was necessary for this research.
7.2 METHODOLOGY OF DATA COLLECTION AND 
ANALYSIS
After the case study sites were selected, the phase of structured data collection 
started. Due to the nature of case study research, some of the data had already 
been collected during earlier research stays.
As mentioned above, the first phase of “soaking and poking” occurred during the 
Kick-Off-Meeting of the URBIPROOF research project in May 2013 and during the 
three 6- to 8-week research stays in Tohoku Region which were conducted in No-
vember-December 2013, July-September 2014 and February-April 2015. During 
each of these stays, Professor Dr. Ubaura supplied a workplace at the Urban and 
Regional Planning System Lab at the Department of Architecture and Building 
Science at Tohoku University to enable an efficient work throughout these stays 
abroad. The final data collection, including the conduction of the interviews used 
for the case study analysis, was conducted between 27 September and 17 Octo-
ber 2015. During this time, the data collection for the case studies took top priority.
Although the research stays were lead by the guiding questions, it was attempt-
ed to stay adaptive and open for unexpected possibilities to learn more about 
the reconstruction process in Tohoku Region or Japanese traditions in general. 
This included to listen and watch things carefully and unbiased whenever possi-
ble. Of course this intention could not always be met due to human constraints. 
Nevertheless, the note taking and recording of the information given in the inter-
views enabled a later analysis and revision of first impressions.
Gaining access to the field was a complex procedure which was characterized 
by language restrictions, the limited time of local experts due to their ongoing 
efforts to manage the reconstruction process and the high amount of interview 
requests that they get from international researchers. It was only possible to 
gain this access through the personal connections from Professor Dr. Michio 
Ubaura who also was involved in the reconstruction process and collaborated 
with many of the local experts.
To collect the data for the case study analysis, a variety of scientific methods 
were used. To gather the basic information and get an understanding for the 
theoretical background, a literature review was conducted. This review included 
scientific literature as well as internet websites of Japanese authorities (e.g., 
Recovery Agency, Miyako City, Ishinomaki City). Furthermore, statistical data 
was collected. The research’s key part, however, are the various field trips to To-
hoku Region. During these stays, on-site visits and interviews with local experts 
were conducted. It was carefully paid attention to meet the four principles of 
data collection to ensure the continuous quality of the empirical work. This qual-
ity is determined by the criteria “construct validity”, “internal validity”, “external 
validity” and “reliability” (Yin, 2014, pp. 45–46).
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Construct validity refers to the use of the correct research design in order to 
measure the intended phenomena (Yin, 2014, p. 46). This is of special impor-
tance for case study research because the research design depends on the sub-
jective decisions of the researcher. Therefore, the operationalization that serves 
as the research basis and the research itself should be carried out with careful 
consideration. To increase the construct validity of this research, the research 
results are based on multiple sources of evidence that were evaluated based on 
the principle of real data triangulation whenever possible. This means that the 
needed data was collected from different sources with the aim to receive con-
sistent results. The data was then evaluated jointly before the final conclusions 
were drawn. The procedure to use various sources of evidence emphasizes the 
particular strength of case study research and increases the research’s quality 
(Yin, 2014, p. 119).
Internal validity means “[t]he degree to which descriptive or causal inferences 
from a given set of cases are correct for those cases” (Seawright & Collier, 2010, 
p. 334). Internal validity can be achieved easier when only a small number of 
cases is analyzed. Case study research can therefore reach internal validity more 
easily than statistical surveys. To increase the internal validity of conclusions, it 
is helpful if the selected cases possess homogeneous framework conditions 
(Blatter et al., 2007, pp. 137–138), as it is the case with the two selected case 
study sites.
External validity refers to “[t]he degree to which descriptive or causal inferences 
for a given set of cases can be generalized to other cases. It is also called gen-
eralizability” (Seawright & Collier, 2010, p. 330). As discussed above, case study 
research focuses on its strength in internal validity rather than on the generaliza-
tion of research results. This means that any generalization can only happen on 
the analytical level. Analytical generalization enables the researcher to “extend 
[case study findings] to situations outside of the original case study, based on 
the relevance of similar theoretical concepts of principles” (Yin, 2014, p. 237). 
This means, the research results might also be true for other cases with simi-
lar background characteristics. They can, however, not be generalized in a way 
that representative statistical studies permit it. Nevertheless, it should not be 
forgotten that external validity is not the first priority of case study research and, 
to borrow from Small (2009), a ship does not have to fly (p. 28). To prevent the 
mistake of overgeneralization, the results from this case study research are not 
applied to places with different characteristics, even though the selection of 
two case study sites instead of one contributes to an increase of the research’s 
external validity.
Reliability defines the reproducibility of the results by other researchers. 
This can be ensured by operationalizing the subject of research as clear as 
possible (Przyborski & Wohlrab-Sahr, 2014, p.  24). In this research, the op-
erational set was developed based on the literature review in Part A. It in-
cludes all important terms from the research questions: spatial planning, 
resilience, disaster, window of opportunity (see Chapter 6). Of course, an 
operationalization can never completely describe the complexity of the real 
world, which means operationalizations are always abstractions from re-
ality that are determined by a specific researcher. To make the operation-
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alization as comprehensible as possible, they were carefully explained. 
To ensure that future researchers, who investigate the same cases, can come 
to the same conclusion, the needed data for each case was planned out on the 
basis of guiding questions (see Chapter 1.4). The collected data was precisely 
documented in a case study database. Moreover, the research work was con-
ducted and documented as accurate as possible to make it replicable for other 
researchers.
The analysis for the case studies for this research bases on multiple forms of 
documentation (e.g., administrative documents and plans, scientific evaluations 
and news articles), archival records (e.g., maps and statistics), interview tran-
scriptions and direct observations from on field site visits. The collection of this 
data required multiple scientific methods, which will be introduced in the follow-
ing chapters.
7.2.1 Systematic literature review
The data collection for the case study analysis was supported by a systematic lit-
erature review. Different from the literature review that was conducted to com-
pile the state of research in Part A, this literature review – or document review 
– focused on documents and archival records about the selected case studies 
rather than scientific literature. Documents that were of interest were agen-
das or presentations from meetings, administrative documents (e.g., reports, 
planning documents) or articles from newspapers. In addition to this, archival 
records such as Census data, maps and charts that provide information about 
the geographical characteristics of the case study sites were also collected. 
These literature reviews were mainly conducted via systematic internet search-
es, especially on the websites of governmental institutions (e.g., Statistics Ja-
pan, Reconstruction Agency, Miyako City, Ishinomaki City). Additional material 
was collected during the research stays. The majority of the documents and 
archival records were written in Japanese. To still make use of these documents, 
the researcher translated them with the help of the software Google Translate. 
By this means it was possible to obtain a general understanding of the Japanese 
data. Nevertheless, a detailed analysis of these documents was unfeasible. To 
keep an overview of the large amount of data, the collected data was compiled 
in a case study database.
7.2.2 Interviews
“Interviews are an essential source of case study evidence because most case 
studies are about human affairs or actions” (Yin, 2014, p. 113). Principally, there 
are two basic forms of interviews: Interviews that aim for a quantitative data 
analysis and interviews that focus on the qualitative aspects. Quantitative in-
terviews or surveys usually are strongly structured, which means the questions 
are pre-formulated and their order cannot be changed (Bortz & Döring, 2006, 
p. 238). To enable a quantitative evaluation of the collected data, surveys usu-
ally are conducted with a representative group. Their aim is to measure certain 
predetermined effects (Atteslander, 2010, p. 133). Quantitative interviews can 
either be conducted orally (e.g., individual survey, telephone survey) or in written 
form (e.g., postal survey, internet survey).
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Qualitative interviews, on the other hand, are usually partially or slightly struc-
tured and aim at the interpretation of the compiled data (Atteslander, 2010, 
p. 133). Partially structured interview forms (e.g., guided interview, expert in-
terview) are based on an orientation guideline that includes the interviews 
general topics and questions. Nevertheless, the interviewer is free to adjust 
this guideline to the actual content of the conversation and the interviewee 
is free to answer in his or her own words (Misoch, 2015, p. 13). Interviews 
that are only slightly structured (e.g., narrative interviews) completely refrain 
from the use of an interview guideline or questionnaire. This form of inter-
view strongly depends on the researcher’s ability to encourage the interview-
ee’s flow of speech (Misoch, 2015, p. 14). Qualitative interviews are mostly 
conducted orally because of their length (Bortz & Döring, 2006, p. 308). The 
strength of open interview questions is their ability to reveal a person’s knowl-
edge about connections that were previously unknown to the researcher. This 
means, the researcher is able to gain new information without the need to 
specifically ask for it.
7.2.2.1 Expert interview
For the purpose of this research, the specific interview form of expert inter-
views was selected. Expert interviews are characterized by a focus on the inter-
viewee’s specific knowledge about his or her field of expertise that is not part 
of general knowledge (Misoch, 2015, p. 120). In this context, an expert can be 
defined as a person who possesses specific knowledge about a certain topic. 
In many cases this status is associated with a person’s profession (Przyborski & 
Wohlrab-Sahr, 2014, p. 119). The reason to use expert interviews in the context 
of this research, is that the specific knowledge of local spatial planners was 
essential for the analysis of the reconstruction process. Therefore, experts who 
work in this field were selected for the interviews. It was aimed to speak to ex-
perts who work for different institutions for each case study site. It was intended 
to speak to a representative of the city administration, a member of a NGO and 
a consultant in Miyako City and Ishinomaki City. Table 17 on the next page gives 
and overview about these interviews that served as a basis for the case study 
analysis of this research.
When conducting interviews with experts, it is especially important to carefully 
prepare and gain a basic knowledge about the interviewee’s work. The reason 
for this is the verifiable influence of the interviewer’s knowledge on the expert’s 
willingness to share his or her expertise (Misoch, 2015, p. 122). The interviews 
were conducted at the end of a two-year “soaking and poking” phase, during 
which an ongoing engagement with the topic occurred. Accordingly, the inter-
viewer had some general knowledge about the local conditions as well as the 
state of the local reconstruction efforts. This knowledge helped to follow the 
conversation with the experts. Nevertheless, the fact that the research was con-
ducted in a foreign country with existing language barriers resulted in a certain 
imbalance between the interviewer and the experts that could not be prevent-
ed. The influence of this fact on the interviews had to be accepted, and was 
considered for the analysis of the data.
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Interview Guidelines
Expert interviews are a specific form of guided interviews and therefore follow 
equal rules (Przyborski & Wohlrab-Sahr, 2014, p. 120). This means expert inter-
views are based on guidelines, which are developed based on the research inter-
est and which contain all relevant subjects of interest. During the interview, the 
researcher uses guidelines to structure the interview and focus on the relevant 
aspects. If more than one interview is conducted, guidelines enable a certain 
comparability between these interviews. Depending on the research, interview 
guidelines can vary in their level of detail. If the conversation requires it, the inter-
viewer is free to vary the order of questions or topics (Misoch, 2015, pp. 65–66). 
City Expert’s  
occupation
Date of interview Language of 
interview/  
Translation
Location of  
interview
Notes
Miyako City Employee A of 
City Planning 
Division
2 October 2015 Japanese
translated by Prof. 
Dr. Michio Ubaura
Miyako City, Plan-
ning Division
Miyako City Consultant 3 October 2015 Japanese
translated by Prof. 
Dr. Michio Ubaura
Miyako City, Taro 
District, Commu-
nity Restaurant
This interview 
included talking 
to the Consultant, 
Citizen A and 
Citizen B
Miyako City Citizen A 3 October 2015 Japanese
translated by Prof. 
Dr. Michio Ubaura
Miyako City, Taro 
District, Commu-
nity Restaurant
This interview 
included talking 
to the Consultant, 
Citizen A and 
Citizen B
Miyako City Citizen B 3 October 2015 Japanese
translated by Prof. 
Dr. Michio Ubaura
Miyako City, Taro 
District, Commu-
nity Restaurant
This interview 
included talking 
to the Consultant, 
Citizen A and 
Citizen B
Ishinomaki 
City
Member of Down-
town Creative 
Reconstruction 
Committee
7 October 2015 English Ishinomaki City, 
Machi Café
Ishinomaki 
City
Employee of 
Machizukuri
7 October 2015 Japanese
translated by 
Tomoko Otsuka
Ishinomaki City, 
Machi Café 
Ishinomaki 
City
Employee of City 
Planning Division
14 October 2015 Japanese
translated by Prof. 
Dr. Michio Ubaura
Ishinomaki City, 
City Hall
Ishinomaki 
City
Consultant 14 October 2015 Japanese
translated by 
Tomoko Otsuka
Sendai City, 
Central Station, 
Starbucks Café
Table 17 | Interviews conducted in Miyako City and Ishinomaki City | Own illustration
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In this way, the general focus on the main research interest can be maintained, 
while an adjustment of the conversation is possible if a new topic emerges.
The interview guidelines were structured in four phases, based on the standards 
for qualitative interviews (Misoch, 2015, p. 68): The information phase, the intro-
duction phase, the main interview phase and the conclusion phase. Although 
the basic structure of the interviews was similar, they varied in accordance with 
the interviewee. The actual interview guidelines used can be found in the annex.
In the information phase at the beginning of the interview, the interviewees 
were informed about the topic of research and the value of their knowledge 
for the research process. Moreover, the interviewees were assured that their 
personal data would be treated confidentially and asked if they would permit the 
recording of the interview (see illustration 39 on the next page).
The aim of the introduction phase was to ease the beginning of the interview 
and help the interviewee to arrive in the unusual communication situation. For 
this purpose, questions that can be answered without hesitation should be used 
(Misoch, 2015, p. 68). Within the scope of this research, the interviewees were 
asked to introduce themselves and explain their position in the reconstruction 
process (1)6. This also enabled the acknowledgment of their expert status (Przy-
borski & Wohlrab-Sahr, 2014, pp. 122–123). The second question served as a 
stimulus for the interviewees narration (2). The question was intentionally for-
mulated to enable the expert to outline the situation with his or her own words.
After the flow of speech stopped, the researcher built on what was said by 
asking the interviewee to specify certain points and asking questions from the 
guideline that tied in with the previous content of the conversation. Only after 
this phase of immanent questions was finished, the remaining interview ques-
tions from the guideline were asked (Przyborski & Wohlrab-Sahr, 2014, pp. 123–
124). Accordingly, the order of the questions asked differed from interview to 
interview according to the conversation.
The main part of the interview guidelines consisted of questions that where of 
special relevance for the research. To increase the orientation, the questions 
were summarized thematically to cover the topics “engineering resilience”, “so-
cio-ecological resilience”7, “additional challenges” and “window of opportunity”.
The questions regarding engineering resilience, aimed for the identification of spa-
tial planning options that were used to increase this type of resilience (3) and an 
evaluation for their usefulness (4). The second block of questions addressed so-
cio-ecological resilience and queried spatial planning options that were used to in-
crease socio-ecological resilience (5). This question was formulated to explain the 
meaning of socio-ecological resilience by giving examples for items that address 
socio-ecological resilience (community connectedness, involvement of vulnera-
ble population groups). Similarly to the preceding thematic block, the interview-
ees were also asked to evaluate the usefulness of the available spatial planning 
options to reach socio-ecological resilience (6). The third block of questions ad-
7 The decision to use the term “evolutionary resilience” instead of “socio-ecological resilience” 
for this research was made after the interviews were conducted. Accordingly, the interview 
guidelines use the term “socio-ecological resilience” instead of “evolutionary resilience”. Never-
theless, they both refer to the same (see Chapter 3).
6 The numbers in brackets refer to the respective question in the interview guidelines in illustration 39.
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Interview Guideline for Spatial Planners
Information phase
Thank you for the opportunity to interview you to learn more about the reconstruction process 
in [your city]. I am a PhD student at TU Dortmund University in Germany. The main research 
question for my thesis is “How far can spatial planning help to improve a city’s resilience after 
a disaster?”. Therefore, I am very interested in the valuable experiences you gathered through-
out your work in the reconstruction process. I want to collect lessons learned from you and 
use them to help spatial planners in other countries to better understand and use their oppor-
tunities to create resilience after a disaster. I would like to let you know that I will anonymize 
the information you give me in this interview when I use it for my thesis. To make the analysis 
of the interview easier, it would be very helpful to record it. Would this be OK for you?
Introduction phase
(1) First, I would like to ask you to please introduce yourself and tell me what your posi-
tion in the reconstruction process of [your city] is?
(2) Could you please tell me about the reconstruction process after 3-11? Feel free to 
begin wherever you find it appropriate and explain the steps that were most important 
for you. Take your time; I will not interrupt you until you are finished.
Main phase
Engineering resilience
(3) The basic goals for the reconstruction process in response to the Great East Japan Earth-
quake include building infrastructural resilience – what has been done to approach this goal?
(4) Do you think that the available tools and approaches of spatial planning were sufficient 
to build up infrastructural resilience? What do you think could be improved?
Socio-ecological resilience
(5) Besides the sufficient infrastructure, resilience is also increased by socio-ecological 
factors such as community connectedness or participation of vulnerable segments 
of the population (e.g., the elderly). What tools and approaches did spatial planners in 
[your city] use to increase some of the things I just mentioned, like community con-
nectedness or participation of vulnerable segments of the population or anything else 
related to this (socio-ecological resilience)?
(6) Do you think these things were helpful? What would you like to be different?
Additional challenges
(7) The Basic Act on Reconstruction and Response to the Great East Japan Earthquake 
states that the changing needs of an aging society or global warming (e.g., sea level 
rise or rising possibility of heat waves) should be considered throughout the recon-
struction process. Do you feel like this is happening? If yes, how? If no, what would 
help to improve the current situation?
(8) Do you see the uncertainty of future as a challenge? For example, the fact that you do 
not know about the height of a possible sea level rise or changes in weather. How are 
these uncertainties considered?
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dressed the additional challenges that the Basic Act on Reconstruction mentions 
(e.g., demographic change, climate change), if they were addressed in the local 
reconstruction process (7) and how this was achieved (9). Furthermore, the topic 
of uncertainty was addressed to understand if spatial planners did anything to ad-
dress this topic (8). Because it was necessary to streamline the research process 
after the interviews were conducted, the information regarding these additional 
challenges were later excluded from the case study analysis. It is planned to use 
this information in another context (e.g., for the preparation of a scientific article). 
The final block of the main interview phase addressed the window of opportunity 
that, according to theory, opens after a disaster and enables planners to build a city 
back better (see Chapter 3.3). To test this assumption in the field, the interviewees 
were asked if they believed in the existence of a window of opportunity and how 
its influence on the implementation of the reconstruction plans was evaluated 
(10). The topic was concluded with a question regarding the city’s pre-disaster 
preparation of the reconstruction process. The intention was to find out if a recon-
struction plan existed before the disaster and if the experts considered such a plan 
to be helpful in order to use the window of opportunity more effectively (11).
The interview closed with the final phase that offered the opportunity to add 
so far undiscussed information that the interviewee considered important. The 
final phase also has the aim to conclude the interview situation (Misoch, 2015, 
p. 69).
During the entire interview, the researcher carefully paid attention to what was 
said to enable an adaptation of the interview structure if the conversation re-
quired it. In this way, spontaneously mentioned topics that were intended to be 
raised later in the interview, could be discussed earlier and the natural flow of 
conversation could be optimally obtained.
Illustration 39 | Interview guidelines for spatial planners | Own illustration
(9) Were special measures to fulfill the changing needs of an aging society taken into ac-
count throughout the reconstruction process? Was global warming (e.g., sea level rise 
or changing temperatures) considered?
Window of opportunity
(10) Do you think there is a window of opportunity after a disaster? If yes, did this opportu-
nity help plans to be implemented faster?
(11) Before 3-11, did the administration of [your city] already have any land-use plans for 
after the disaster? If yes, were those plans useful? What were the problems? If no, do 
you think it would be helpful to have a recovery plan for the city developed in advance 
in order to use the window of opportunity better?
Conclusion phase
(12) Is there anything else you would like to add?
Thank you for your time! After my return to Germany, I am going to use the information you 
just gave me to understand the possibilities and constraints of spatial planners in the recon-
struction process after a disaster. This information will help me to answer my research ques-
tion. If you are interested, I can send you the results of my research after I am done.
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When conducting interviews, the researcher should be aware of the basic prin-
ciples of social communication. To put it simply, models of communication un-
derstand a conversation as a message that is send out by one person (source) to 
another (receiver). To enable a communication without misunderstandings, it is 
essential that source and receiver use the same “code” for the message, which 
means they are both talking about the same content (Kromrey, 2002, pp. 315–
318). This means, if the communication process gets disrupted, misconceptions 
between source and receiver can occur. This problem is of special relevance 
when interviews are conducted in a foreign language and are translated by a 
third person, as it was the case for this research. The author’s verbal abilities 
in Japanese are very restrictive and communication with Japanese could only 
be performed in English, if the conversational partner was proficient in this lan-
guage, or with the help of a translator. This certainly led to the loss of atticism 
or information between the lines. Even though these circumstances restrict the 
collected data, there was no feasible way to prevent this as it is a general prob-
lem of research conducted in counties that do not speak the researcher’s native 
language. The author kept these difficulties in mind while conducting the case 
study analysis. Another difficulty when carrying out interviews is a possible in-
accuracy of information based on an interviewee’s bias. This can also occur if 
the interviews are conducted with experts (Yin, 2014, p. 113). To deal with this 
problem, it was intended to base conclusions on information from more than 
one resource whenever possible.
The limited number of potential interviewees enabled a careful qualitative anal-
ysis of the collected data. For this purpose, the recordings from the interviews 
were completely transcribed following standard orthography. This procedure 
was selected to ensure that no important information was lost as it can be the 
case if only selected party of an interview are transcribed (Misoch, 2015, p. 257). 
The transcribed interviews were then added to the case study database and 
analyzed in the next step (see Chapter 7.2.4).
7.2.3 Direct observations: Site visits
The complex framework conditions in the field are of particular importance for 
planning as a spatial science. Site visits allow the researcher an active involve-
ment with the area of research and enable a better understanding of the local 
conditions as well as the localization of the collected data. During site visits, 
the researcher can vary the level of detail and make use of various scientific 
methods (e.g., direct observation, mapping or surveys) (Althaus, Grunwald, & 
Kreuzer, 2009, p. 2). Site visits can be useful for the collection of historic devel-
opments, natural conditions, landscape structures, transportation infrastructure, 
pattern of use (e.g., social infrastructure), existing developments, public space, 
population structure, local actors or existing land-use planning (Althaus et al., 
2009, pp. 15–23).
Generally speaking, site visits are a specific form of observations because the 
researcher observes his or her surroundings to collect the needed data in ob-
servations as well as in site visits. Direct observations are especially useful for 
case study research because “the phenomena of interest have not been pure-
ly historical, some relevant social or environmental conditions will be available 
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for observation” (Yin, 2014, p. 113). In the context of spatial planning, these 
relevant conditions are often locatable. Compared to other forms of data col-
lection, observations or site visits are characterized by the fact that the object 
of interest continuously changes. This means that once missed observations 
cannot be caught up (Kromrey, 2002, p. 337). This results in the fact that the 
researcher who conducts observations is forced to decide which information 
is going to be recorded for later considerations and which information is not. 
This increases the subjectivity of observations as a tool for data collection. The 
researcher should be aware of this constraint and attempt to lower the subjec-
tivity of the collected material by recording what he or she observes with the 
help of a camera (Kromrey, 2002, p. 338). The difference between site visits 
and conventional direct observations is that site visits focus on the spatial 
conditions while other observations often focus on the people who inhabit this 
space. This does not mean that site visits never intend to collect data about a 
place’s residents, but site visits try to link the social component with the area 
under investigation.
There are two different types of site visits that vary in their degree of prepara-
tion. Site explorations are useful to gather first impressions and observe specific 
characteristics of the area of research. They can be conducted accompanied 
with local experts or alone. Site explorations are characterized by a more or 
less unstructured approach that allows the researcher to intuitively follow his or 
her own perception of the surrounding area. Despite their formless nature, site 
explorations should still be documented carefully, to enable the later use of the 
collected data. This documentation can take place, e.g., by taking photographs 
or writing down relevant information or ideas for further research (Althaus et al., 
2009, pp. 24–25). Site inspections, on the other hand, are suitable to system-
atically collect data from the field. This requires a careful preparation and the 
knowledge which data from the field is required. The researcher should consider 
in advance which aspects should be recorded and how this recording should 
occur. Useful methods of documentation are photographs, mapping or taking 
notes. The researcher should ensure to have all needed tools available when 
conducting a site inspection (Althaus et al., 2009, pp. 26–29).
The location of this research’s case study sites in a foreign country – from the 
researcher’s point of view – increased the relevance to conduct site visits to 
receive an impression of the local conditions. Accordingly, each stay in Tohoku 
Region was accompanied by a site visit of various cities and villages along the 
coast that were affected by the disaster. During all of these stays, the site visits 
were documented with photographs and by taking notes of important informa-
tion that was supplied. For some of the field trips additional material (e.g., hand-
outs) were supplied.
During the URBIPROOF project’s Kick-Off-Meeting from 12  May till 16 May 
2013, the group of researchers visited Iwanuma City, Natori City, Ishinomaki 
City, Minamisanriku Town, Kesennuma City and Rikuzentakata City. The field trip 
was accompanied by Professor Dr. Ubaura who also prepared a brochure with 
information about the visited area and answered questions about the recon-
struction process.
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During the first research stay in Sendai, which lasted from 2 November till 24 
December 2013, a second site visit of the affected area along Tohoku Coast took 
place (from 14-15 December 2013). This time, the researcher visited Iwanuma 
City, Natori City, Ishinomaki City, Onagawa Town, Minamisanriku Town and Kes-
ennuma City.
The second research stay from 28 July till 6 September 2014 was also used to 
make several site visits. On 18 August 2014 the researcher visited Natori City, 
on 29 August 2014 she went to Ishinomaki City and from 31 August till 1 Sep-
tember 2014 a trip to Miyako City, Otsuchi Town, Kamaishi City, Ofunato City 
Rikuzentakata City and Kesennuma City was undertaken.
During two weeks of her third research stay (18 February till 4 March 2015), 
the researcher was accompanied by 14 students from TU Dortmund University. 
Together with Prof. Dr. Michio Ubaura and Prof. Dr. Christian Dimmer the group 
undertook a field trip to Iwanuma City, Natori City, Ishinomaki City and Rikuzen-
takata City (20-21 February 2015). Afterwards, the group stayed in Ishinomaki 
City from 21-27 February 2015 to conduct additional field work. During this time, 
an additional field trip to Onagawa Town was conducted. During the Third UN 
World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction, that took place in Sendai from 
14-18 March 2015, the researcher took the chance for additional field trips and 
visited Arahama Ward in Sendai City (15 March 2015), Kesennuma City, Min-
amisanriku Town, Ishinomaki City, Onagawa Town and Sendai City (17 March 
2015) and Ibasho Café in Ofunato City (19 March 2015).
All of the above mentioned site visits were characterized by a high degree of 
spontaneity in regard of the data collection. Everything that seemed important 
was photographed and documented, so that it was available for further use in 
the future.
Finally, during the last research stay from 27 September till 17 October 2015, 
more organized site inspections of the case study sites were conducted. The 
purpose of these inspections was to document the current status of the recon-
struction process at specific locations. Despite the former site visits, this more 
focused approach to data collection in the field was helpful to locate the recon-
struction projects on a map and understand the spatial connections between 
them. These site inspections were conducted between 30 September till 3 Oc-
tober 2015, when the researcher visited Ishinomaki City, Minamisanriku Town, 
Kesennuma City, Rikuzentakata City, Ofunato City, Kamaishi City, Otsuchi Town 
and Miyako City. Further site inspections were conducted in Ishinomaki City (7 
and 14 October 2015) and Higashi-Matsushima (13 October 2015). All important 
information as well as the researcher’s personal impressions were documented 
in a field diary and with photographs even more carefully than during the former 
research stays. Furthermore, various expert interviews (see above) were con-
ducted during this time. In addition to these interviews, two of the site visits 
in Miyako City were also accompanied by an employee of the city’s Planning 
Division, who answered several questions about the ongoing reconstruction 
process in Taro District and Kuwagasaki District. These interviews did not follow 
a specific guideline. Nevertheless, the content was carefully noted to enable its 
consideration for the case study analysis (see table 18).
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City Expert’s  
occupation
Date of  
interview
Language of 
interview/ Trans-
lation
Location of  
interview
Miyako City Employee B of 
City Planning 
Division
3 October 2015 Japanese
translated by Prof. 
Dr. Michio Ubaura
Miyako City,  
Taro District
Miyako City Employee B of 
City Planning 
Division
3 October 2015 Japanese
translated by Prof. 
Dr. Michio Ubaura
Miyako City, 
Kuwagasaki 
District 
7.2.4 Data Analysis
After the data collection phase, the researcher had an extensive amount of infor-
mation available. Although interesting, substantial parts of this information were 
redundant for answering the research and guiding questions. It was important to 
set aside this information in order to keep the focus on the main research topic. 
The preparation of the collected data for analysis included the write up of field 
notes and the transcription of the interviews. The aim of this step was to edit the 
data to make it understandable for the reader. To better understand the process-
es in the case study cities, the collected data was rehashed into chronological 
order before it was analyzed.
The data was analyzed based on the principles of qualitative data analysis and 
occurred in two coding cycles. “Codes are labels that assign symbolic meaning 
to the descriptive or inferential information compiled during a study” (Miles, Hu-
berman, & Saldaña, 2014, p. 71). They can be used to structure large amounts 
of data and enable the detection of patterns. For the coding of the data, the 
data analysis software MAXQDA 12 was used. For the analysis of the data, it 
is important for the researcher to maintain an adequate distance. This aspect is 
especially relevant for case study research because the “soaking and poking” 
phase inevitably leads to a certain closeness to the subject under investigation. 
This important aspect was also considered for this research by challenging the 
decisions made throughout the data analysis phase.
The first coding cycle used the resilience items developed in Chapter 5 as provi-
sional codes. In addition to the resilience items, the additional topics with rele-
vance for the research were also added to the coding list: demographic change, 
climate change, window of opportunity and uncertainty. The first coding cycle 
enabled to structure the large amount of data and to match relevant information 
with the specific aspects of the research (Miles et al., 2014, p. 72). The codes 
that were used during this phase are listed on the next page in table 19.
Table 18 | Interviews during the site visits in Miyako City | Own illustration
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Resilience Codes
 › Engineering Resilience 
 › Vulnerable land-uses at risk
 › Building Codes
 › Urban Design Solutions
 › Sustainable building design standards
 › Protective infrastructure
 › Disaster resilience of utility infrastructure
 › Disaster resilience of social infrastructure
 › Political-institutional resilience
 › Proposal evaluation for disaster resilience
 › Risk assessment
 › Pre-event planning for disaster recovery
 › Learning loops
 › Socio-economic resilience
 › Citizen participation
 › Social connectedness and neighborhood cohesion
 › Provision of safe shelter
 › Environmental resilience
 › Ecosystem health  
Additional Codes
 › Demographic change
 › Climate change
 › Window of opportunity
 › Uncertainty
The second coding cycle applied descriptive and in vivo codes which were con-
secutively developed. These codes were used to label the processes that were 
undertaken to address the resilience and additional challenges coded during the 
first coding cycle. This approach lead to a versatile list of codes, which is illustrat-
ed in table 20 based on the frequency of application (excluding codes that were 
only applied once or twice).
Because of their consecutive development, these codes do not directly corre-
spond to the spatial planning options identified in Chapter 4. Nevertheless, it can 
be noticed that most of these spatial planning options are included in the list of 
codes. This is the result of the iterative research process, which based the com-
pilation of the spatial planning options in Chapter 4 on the experts’ statements 
about the most relevant spatial planning options for the reconstruction process.
After the second coding cycle, each resilience item and additional challenge was 
matched with the spatial planning options (and other relevant aspects) that were 
mentioned in their context. The table with the matching patterns was compiled 
with MAXQDA and then further processed in Microsoft Excel.
Table 19 | Codes used for the first coding cycle | Own illustration
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Codes
 › Sectoral Planning
 › Participation
 › Land-use planning
 › Relocation
 › Reconstruction Committee
 › Financing
 › Protective Infrastructure
 › Temporary Housing
 › Aim
 › Beyond legal requirements
 › Reconstruction Plan
 › Information
 › “It’s difficult”
 › Public housing
 › Evacuation facilities
 › Restoration of community infrastructure
 › Community Association
 › Permanent houses
 › Time
 › Land readjustment
 › Compact city
 › Revitalization
 › Building Codes
 › Public and private sector
 › Private reconstruction projects
 › Population
 › General reconstruction
 › Flexibility
 › Land raise
 › Education
 › Hazard maps/ Hazard simulation
 › Happiness
 › Reconstruction projects
 › Prioritization
 › Analysis
 › Cross-border coordination
For each data chunk the relevant information was summarized and used for the anal-
ysis of each aspect presented in Chapter 8 for Miyako City and Chapter 9 for Ishi-
nomaki City. To conclude the research, a cross-case analysis based on the relevant 
spatial planning options was conducted. The results of this analysis are presented 
in Chapter 10, before the final conclusion for this research is drawn in Chapter 11.
Table 20 | Codes developed during the second coding cycle | Own illustration
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8. CASE STUDY A: MIYAKO CITY
This chapter provides the results from the case study analysis of Miyako City. 
After an introduction of the city’s geographic and demographic structure and the 
impacts of the GEJE and Tsunami on the local structures, the main goals of the 
recovery process in Miyako City are introduced. Based on this general informa-
tion, the following guiding questions introduced in Chapter 1.4 are answered:
 ›  Which spatial planning options were used to build engineering  resilience?
 ›  Which spatial planning options were used to build evolutionary  resilience?
 ›  Which spatial planning options were able to build resilience? Which addi-
tional spatial planning options would have been useful to build  resilience?
 ›  How was the window of opportunity constituted in Miyako City?
 ›  Did Miyako City have any spatial plans for reconstruction prepared  before 
the disaster?
 ›  How can the preparation of spatial plans for reconstruction before a 
 disaster help to use the window of opportunity more effectively?
8.1 INTRODUCTION OF MIYAKO CITY
Miyako City is located in northern Japan’s Iwate prefecture (see illustration 41 on 
the next page). The city’s current area was established through the great Heisei 
amalgamation which merged the formerly independent parts of Miyako City with 
Taro Town and Niisato Village in 2005 and Kawai Village in 2010 (Statistics Bureau, 
Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications Japan, 2014, Table No. 62). To-
day, the city spans an area of 1,259.15 km2 and borders the Pacific Ocean in the 
east, Morioka City in the west, Iwaizumi Town in the north and Tono City in the 
south (Miyako City, 2015a, p. 15).
The city had a population of 59,430 people in 2010, before the disaster occurred. 
In 2015, 56,569 people were left (Miyako City, 2015a). One important reason for 
this decrease are the casualties of the GEJE and the migration of people in the af-
termath of the disaster. Another reason takes effect in the longer term: Like many 
smaller cities in Japan, Miyako City has to deal with a demographic change which 
is characterized by a shrinking and aging population (see illustration 40). This leads 
to a growing number of elderly people while the number of children remains low.
Illustration 40 | Population 
development of Miyako 
City | Own illustration 
based on Brinkhoff, 
2016a (population 
1995-2015); National 
Institute of Population 
and Social Security Re-
search, 2013 (estimates 
for 2015-2040)
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Illustration 41 | Location of Miyako City | Own illustration based on D-maps, 2016b
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Employment in Miyako City differs between districts. The urban district of Mi-
yako area is characterized by manufacturing and the tertiary industry (especially 
wholesale, medical care and welfare). Many of the more rural neighborhoods 
intensely rely on the fishing industry (Kuwagasaki District, Taro District) or agri-
culture (Niisato District and Kawai District) (Miyako City, 2015a).
8.2 THE GREAT EAST JAPAN EARTHQUAKE AND 
TSUNAMI IN MIYAKO CITY
In Miyako City, at about 14:46 the GEJE was felt with an intensity of 4.9. The first 
wave of the tsunami arrived at 15:01, the highest wave, with a height of more 
than 8.5 m, was measured at 15:26. Nevertheless, this data might be erroneous 
due to the destruction of Hitachibama Beach tidal station through the tsunami 
(Miyako City Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami Records Editorial Com-
mittee, 2015). The tsunami inundated an area of 10 km2 and left 467 citizens 
dead and 94 missing. Additional 33 citizens were injured (Miyako City Great East 
Japan Earthquake and Tsunami Records Editorial Committee, 2015, p.  27). A 
look at the age structure of the victims shows that more than 65% of the people 
who died in the disaster were 60 years or older (Miyako City Great East Japan 
Earthquake and Tsunami Records Editorial Committee, 2015, p. 38). When com-
pared with the amount of residents aged 60 and above in 2010 (~40%) (Miyako 
City, 2015a), the high number of elderly victims indicates a special vulnerability 
for this age group.
The tsunami completely destroyed 5,968 houses and partially damaged about 
3,120 (see table 21). Of all buildings damaged, 4,449 were dwellings, while 
4,639 were non-dwellings. Considering the number of houses in Miyako City 
before the GEJE (39,907), about 23% of houses were affected and about 15% 
of houses were completely destroyed (Miyako City Great East Japan Earthquake 
and Tsunami Records Editorial Committee, 2015, p. 27).
Number of completely damaged houses 5,968
Number of houses with large-scale destruction 1,335
Number of partially destroyed houses 1,174
Number of damaged houses 611
Total number of damaged houses 9,088
8.3 POST-DISASTER RECONSTRUCTION PLANNING 
IN MIYAKO CITY
After the disaster, the city administration developed a “Post-Disaster Recon-
struction Plan”. The plan sets the main goals to rebuild the city of Miyako. The 
plan incorporates the aim of the city’s Comprehensive Plan, a city wide plan that 
was adopted before the disaster and included objectives for the period from 
2011-2019. The Comprehensive Plan intended to create “an oasis where ’for-
ests, rivers and the ocean’ and people can coexist” (Miyako City, 2012a, p. 1 cit-
Table 21 | Damaged houses after the GEJE and Tsunami in Miyako City | Own illustration 
based on Miyako City Planning Division, 2015, p. 27 
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ing the Comprehensive Plan; Miyako City, 2015b). The Post-Disaster Reconstruc-
tion Plan intends a speedy recovery after the disaster. In this way, the goals that 
were set by the Comprehensive Plan are expected to be reached by 2019, even 
though the GEJE and Tsunami caused obstacles (see illustration 42).
The Post-Disaster Reconstruction Plan’s time frame lasts from 2011 till 2019, 
whereas the first three years are called the “recovery period”, the second three 
years are called the “revival period” and the last three years are called the “de-
velopment period” (see illustration 43).
The plan builds on three pillars and develops the intended measures accordingly. 
Thereby, each pillar can be assigned to one of the types of resilience introduced 
in chapter 3.2.
Restoring people’s houses and living
This point focuses on the social aspects of the reconstruction and includes the 
recovery of daily life of affected people by rebuilding their communities in a com-
pact way. This enables the citizens to run their daily errands by foot. Commu-
nity functions to be recovered include education, employment, healthcare and 
welfare. Thereby the reconstruction process should put an emphasis on elderly 
people and their special needs (Miyako City, 2012a, p. 2). Measures for this pillar 
include help to find new employment possibilities where needed, the provision 
of healthcare and education services, financial support and the strengthening of 
community cohesion (Miyako City, 2012, p. 4). These measures mainly address 
the social aspects of socio-economic resilience because they put the people and 
their communities in the center.
Time
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Illustration 42 | Reconstruction leading the way to achieve the aim of the Comprehensive 
Plan | Own illustration based on Miyako City, 2012a, p. 1
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Reconstructing industry and the economy
To recover the city’s economy, the plan intends to revitalize the agricultural, for-
estry, fishing and tourist industries wherever they were affected by the disaster. 
Furthermore, the city center should be revitalized and the city’s manufacturing 
industry should be strengthened. To resume economic activities as fast as pos-
sible, the reconstruction and revitalization of the city’s port was another target 
(Miyako City, 2012, pp. 4-5). This pillar mainly focuses on the economic aspects 
of socio-economic resilience, especially on the revitalization of the local industry.
Rebuild safer communities
To minimize the potential damages in case of another tsunami, the plan intends 
the revision of the city’s land-use plans, the possible relocation of residential 
land-uses and public facilities and the installation of protective infrastructure 
(e.g., tide barriers) and evacuation sites. Furthermore, disaster-resilient transpor-
tation networks (incl. road and railways) should be build and the disaster-resis-
tance of the energy (e.g., through the promotion of renewable energy), water/ 
sanitation and communication networks should be improved. All of these mea-
sures aim at the improvement of the city’s engineering resilience. In addition to 
these structural changes, the city’s disaster prevention and risk management 
system should be reviewed and improved wherever possible to ensure an op-
timal disaster preparedness (Miyako City, 2012a, p.  5). These aspects mainly 
focus on the improvement of administrative processes and therefore address 
political-institutional resilience.
The plan emphasizes the importance to include the citizen’s view in the planning 
process (Miyako City, 2012a, p. 8). This was achieved by holding meetings for 
town reconstruction in all 33 affected districts. During these meetings, the re-
construction planning process was explained and the citizens were encouraged 
to communicate their opinions. In addition, the Planning Division conducted a 
survey questionnaire in July 2011 in order to gather the citizen’s views and ideas 
for the reconstruction. This questionnaire also queried where the affected citi-
zens intended to live in the future. To speed up the planning process and to save 
valuable time and personnel resources for the reconstruction planning in the ten 
most affected districts, the city’s Planning Division used the information from 
these questionnaires to directly develop the district plans for the 23 city districts 
with 40 or less destroyed houses (Miyako City Planning Division, Employee A, 
2015; Ubaura & Akiyama, 2016, p. 487).
Citizen participation in districts that suffered the loss of 100 or more houses was 
more comprehensive: In Taro District, Kuwagasaki District, Atago/ Tsukiji/Koganji 
District, City Center District, Fujiwara District, Sokei District, Takahama District, 
Kanehama District, Tsugaruishi District and Akamae District (see illustration 44 
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Illustration 43 | Time frame of the reconstruction process in Miyako City | Own illustration 
based on Miyako City, 2012a
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for the districts’ locations), 20 to 30 citizens were selected to participate in Re-
construction Town Planning Committees, which were responsible to develop a 
reconstruction plan for the district based on the requirements of the Post-Disas-
ter Reconstruction Plan (Miyako City, 2012a; Miyako City Planning Division, Em-
ployee A, 2015). The committees were supported by a consultant and local spa-
tial planners. Throughout their four meetings, the committees developed draft 
versions for the District Reconstruction Town Development Plans. These plans 
were discussed with the wider public, before they were submitted to the mayor 
in February 2012 (Ubaura & Akiyama, 2016). For a more elaborate summary of 
the committees’ work, see Chapter 8.4.3.
Table 22 gives an overview of the damages in the ten most severely affected 
districts.
Besides the cooperation with selected citizens in the Reconstruction Town Plan-
ning Committees and the exchange at the meetings for town reconstruction and 
the preview meetings, all citizens were given information about the planning 
processes through the distribution of the “District Reconstruction Urban De-
velopment News”. This newspaper was published continuously to support the 
reconstruction process and offer the citizens the chance to contribute their ideas 
via letter, e-mail or in person. The gathered opinions were then included in the 
discussions at the next committee meeting (Miyako City Planning Division, Em-
ployee A, 2015).
Based on the District Reconstruction Town Development Plans and the informa-
tion gathered from citizens in the 23 less affected districts, the city administration 
developed the final plan called “Miyako City: The Great East Japan  Earthquake 
Taro District
Center District
Kuwagasaki District
Atago/ Tsukiji/
Koganji District
Fujiwara District 
Sokei District
Takahama District
Kanehama District 
Akamae District 
Tsugaruishi District
Illustration 44 | Map of the ten most severely affected districts in Miyako City | Own illustra-
tion based on Miyako City, 2012b, p. 5
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District Reconstruction Town Development Plan”. It includes the plans for all 33 
affected districts, and was adopted by the city council in March 2012 (Miyako 
City, 2012b, 2014a; Miyako City Planning Division, Employee A, 2015). Due to 
the time restrictions, this plan mainly includes residential land-uses, although 
the committees also decided on various other aspects such as the location of 
industry, social services or transportation networks. The reason for this trimmed 
version of the plan is that the responsibility for residential land-uses solely rests 
with the city’s Planning Division while other aspects require the agreement of 
sectoral planning divisions (e.g., social affairs, transport). The exchange between 
the different departments would have taken too long to complete the plan on 
time. In other cases, ideas from the committees had to be disregarded because 
their implementation would have been too expensive or time-consuming. In all 
of these cases, the Planning Division employees discussed the respective rea-
sons for their decision with the citizens. This means that the “Miyako City: The 
Great East Japan Earthquake District Reconstruction Town Development Plan” 
especially focuses on short-term projects and solutions, while additional proj-
ects included in the committees’ district plans (e.g., the future location of Route 
45) will be reviewed and discussed in the future (Miyako City Planning Division, 
Employee A, 2015).
8.4 BUILDING RESILIENCE IN MIYAKO CITY
This chapter takes a closer look at engineering resilience, political-institutional 
resilience, socio-economic resilience and environmental resilience and the re-
silience items to assess them, as they were introduced in Chapter 5. For each 
item, the spatial planning options used during the reconstruction process are 
considered and explained.
Table 22 | Damages in the most severely affected districts of Miyako City | Own illustration based on Taro District Recon-
struction Town Planning Committee, 2012; Kuwagasaki District Reconstruction Town Planning Committee, 2012; Atago/ 
Tsukiji/ Koganji District Reconstruction Town Planning Committee, 2012; Central District Reconstruction Town Planning 
Committee, 2012; Fujiwara District Reconstruction Town Planning Committee, 2012; Sokei District Reconstruction Town 
Planning Committee, 2012; Takahama District Reconstruction Town Planning Committee, 2012; Kanehama District Re-
construction Town Planning Committee; Tsugaruishi District Reconstruction Town Planning Committee, 2012; Akamae 
District Reconstruction Town Planning Committee, 2012
Name of District Flooded area Maximum  
inundation height
No. of  
damaged 
buildings
Percentage of damaged 
buildings completely 
destroyed
Taro 121.2 ha T.P. +7.1-14.7 m 1,076 84 %
Kuwagasaki 39.1 ha T.P. +5.4-9.0 m 800 88 %
Atago/ Tsukiji/ Koganji 12.2 ha T.P. +3.4-7.0 m 312 75 %
City center 48.4 ha T.P. +3.3-5.2 m 1,270 14 %
Fujiwara 40.9 ha T.P. +2.3-5.0 m 497 25 %
Sokei 113.4 ha T.P. +2.3-7.0 m 729 30 %
Takahama 42.0 ha T.P. +3.4-15.0 m 259 47 %
Kanehama 29.4 ha T.P. +10.8-13.0 m 242 94 %
Tsugaruishi 83.5 ha T.P. +5.0-11.7 m 830 54 %
Akamae 82.9 ha T.P. +6.0-13.0 m 340 74 %
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8.4.1 Engineering resilience
Engineering resilience can be assessed by using the items vulnerable land-uses 
at risk, building codes, urban design solutions, sustainable building design stan-
dards, protective infrastructure, disaster resilience of utility infrastructure and 
disaster resilience of social infrastructure. The following chapters explain how 
all of these aspects were addressed during the reconstruction of Miyako City.
8.4.1.1 Vulnerable land-uses at risk
One important goal to achieve engineering resilience is to reduce the exposure 
of vulnerable land-uses. The UNISDR’s Disaster Resilience Scorecard specifical-
ly addresses agricultural land [UN-4.1.1], economic activity [UN-4.1.2] and poten-
tial population displacement (or residential land) [UN-4.1.3] (UNISDR, 2015d). As 
explained in Chapter 4.7, land-use planning is a useful option to reach this goal. 
The importance of land-use planning for the reduction of vulnerable land-uses 
at risk in Miyako City is addressed in the Post-Disaster Reconstruction Plan, 
which intends to create a safe place to live, to reduce the economic activity at 
risk to a minimum and to revitalize agricultural land (Miyako City, 2012a). Nev-
ertheless, planning certain land-uses can demand additional coordination with 
sectoral planning departments (e.g., Environmental Division, School Education 
Division), which can take much time and effort. In Japan, this problem especially 
concerns land that is not designated as urban in the Land-Use Basic Plan. Such 
land falls within the scope of different ministries. For example, the Ministry of 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries is responsible for agricultural and forestry ar-
eas. To change these designation is a complex and time consuming process and 
needs the approval of the national government. The completion of the District 
Reconstruction Town Development Plan for Miyako City was a pressing issue. 
Accordingly, the plan only addresses the reduction of residential land-uses at 
risk, other topics, although partially included in the citizen’s proposal, were not 
adopted because the coordination with the responsible sectoral planning divi-
sions would have taken too long (Miyako City Planning Division, Employee A, 
2015). This chapter therefore focuses on residential land-uses.
The post-disaster reconstruction of Miyako City includes the following approach-
es to reduce vulnerable land-uses at risk:
 ›  Minimization of exposure of urban areas: Land-use control in hazardous 
areas
 ›  Minimization of exposure of urban areas: Relocation through relocation 
programs or land-readjustment projects
 ›  Hazard Mitigation: Protective infrastructure
 ›  Hazard mitigation: Land readjustment and raising program
The construction of the seawall to mitigate the hazard and reduce vulnerable 
land-uses at risk is considered in Chapter 8.4.1.5 on protective infrastructure. 
The preparation of hazard maps as the basis for the designation of hazardous 
areas is discussed in Chapter 8.4.2.2. This chapter discusses the additional mea-
sures that are taken to reduce vulnerable land-uses at risk through the designa-
tion of hazardous areas and the relocation of affected citizens to control urban 
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land-uses in hazardous areas. Furthermore, the chapter also examines the pos-
sibility to mitigate the hazard through the raising of the ground.
Minimization of exposure of urban areas: Land-use control in 
hazardous areas
The designation of hazardous zones after the GEJE is based on hazard maps. 
The preparation of these maps is further explained in Chapter 8.4.2.2. The maps 
follow the concept of “more frequent less height tsunamis” (L1-tsunami) and 
“less frequent large height tsunamis” (L2-tsunami) (Central Disaster Manage-
ment Council, 2011, p. 10; Dzurdženík et al., 2015, p. 30; Iuchi, 2016, p. 25) and 
consider the construction of seawalls along the coastline. While the construc-
tion of seawalls along the coastline of Tohoku will protect the cities from future 
L1-tsunamis, the extreme height of L2-tsunamis can overflow the seawall and 
inundate the low lying land behind the concrete structure. In Miyako City, the 
areas, with an inundation height of 2 m or more after the occurrence of a L2-tsu-
nami, are designated as hazardous. For these areas, residential land-uses are 
prohibited (see Chapter 8.4.1.2). These areas are also excluded for the relocation 
of residential areas.
One example how the hazard maps guided the decision making for the recon-
struction is Kuwagasaki District. After the GEJE, the citizens in the Reconstruc-
tion Town Planning Committee of Kuwagasaki intended to relocate to higher 
ground. Nevertheless, after the construction of the planned 10,4  m seawall 
along the harbor, the previous area of Kuwagasaki District will not be designated 
as hazardous. This means that the local citizens would not get any subsidies for 
a relocation to higher grounds. It was therefore immutable for them to rebuild 
on-site (Miyako City Consultant, 2015).
Minimization of exposure of urban areas: Relocation through 
relocation programs or land-readjustment projects
One option to reduce the residential land-uses at risk, is the relocation of people 
to safer places. In Miyako City’s Taro District, this was achieved through the de-
velopment of completely new settlements. In Tsugaruishi District, on the other 
hand, the affected residents moved to fill in an existing settlement, which was 
not affected by the disaster. In Miyako City, the relocation of affected citizens 
followed several steps, which are explained in the following paragraphs.
 ›  Before the relocation can start, it is important to find a sufficient reloca-
tion site. In case of Miyako City, the decision to relocate was taken based 
on the citizen’s opinion. If the prerequisite that the previous residential 
area was designated as hazardous was given, the citizens at the commit-
tee meetings discussed possible relocation sites, which had to be locat-
ed outside the hazardous zones. The city’s spatial planners checked the 
possible locations for their feasibility. The check included the relocation 
site’s distance to existing settlements, the potential to build appropriate 
infrastructure and the expenditure of the project. Furthermore, additional 
risks that are linked with the relocation, e.g., an increased risk of land-
slides when relocating onto a hill, must be considered. One example 
for the decision between different options for  relocation is Tsugaruishi 
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District: Half of the community wanted to move into the existing village 
of Tsugaruishi, the other half wanted to move onto a nearby hill. Nev-
ertheless, the relocation onto the hill would have been very expensive 
and the road to the new settlement would have been very steep and 
long. Therefore, the local spatial planners convinced the people that a 
collective relocation into the existing village would be a more convenient 
solution (Miyako City Planning Division, Employee A, 2015).
One aspect that has to be considered when planning the relocation site 
is the number of required housing lots. In Miyako City, the number of 
planned lots per site was based on the affected citizen’s information 
gathered through a survey which was conducted shortly after the GEJE. 
This survey inquired where the people planned to live and whether they 
intended to repair their house, construct a new house, live in a private 
rental apartment or in public housing (Miyako City, 2014b). However, the 
planning for reconstruction takes time and people tend to change their 
opinion in the meantime. The reason for this might be that they decide 
to move away or they realize that they will not be able to afford the con-
struction of a new house. This development usually results in too many 
lots for private houses and a shortage in public houses. To correct this 
problem in Taro District, the allocation of private and public houses was 
changed as follows: First, a smaller area with three to four story public 
houses was planned, but because of the decreased demand for private 
housing lots, the area for public houses was expanded. This also enabled 
the reduction of the building’s height to two stories (see illustration 45) 
while still increasing the overall number of public housing units (Taro 
District Citizen B, 2015).
 › After the selection of a relocation site, the area’s land-use has to be 
designated for residential uses. As described in Chapter 4.6, the Land-
Use Basic Plan provides for the following five general land-uses: urban, 
agricultural, forestry, national park and nature conversation. To obtain the 
local Planning Division’s responsibility for the relocation site and enable 
the ability to carry out land readjustment projects, which are one instru-
ment of spatial planning to implement relocation projects, the site must 
be designated as urban area. However, in many cases the relocation 
sites are located on forested hills and therefore fall within the scope of 
the Forest Act. This means, before any further planning can take place, 
the designation has to be changed. The permission for this change can 
only be granted by the national government and the process is compli-
cated and time consuming (Miyako City Consultant, 2015). For example, 
this was the case for Otobe Hill in Taro District (Miyako City Consultant, 
2015).
 › For the implementation of the relocation projects, the city administration 
had to purchase the adequate land. This required the land owner’s agree-
ment to sell their land8. The comprehensive citizen participation during 
8 The Japanese law also provides the ability of land confiscation in case that a land owner refuses 
to sell his or her land. In reality, this option is rarely used because property rights play an import-
ant role in Japan. Instead, spatial planners try to persuade land owners to agree to their plans by 
offering subventions or compensation payments (Hohn, 2000)
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the planning process created a broad acceptance of the reconstruction 
plans by the citizens. Due to this, the land owners were very cooperative 
to sell their land and the purchase was carried out smoothly (Miyako City 
Planning Division, Employee A, 2015).
 › Land readjustment projects are an important spatial planning instrument 
in Japan (see Chapter 4.7) and are also used for the planning procedure 
of relocation projects after a disaster. Nevertheless, the procedure to 
plan the land-use of the new urban area differs from land readjustment 
projects in existing areas, where the land owners contribute their land 
into the land readjustment pool. One aspect that is different is that the 
city administration purchases the entire property before the project be-
gins and resells it to the new residents after the project is completed. 
The instrument of land readjustment is used to plan the plots for private 
and public housing, transportation networks and parks (see illustration 
46 on the next page).
 › After the plans are finalized, the construction work to prepare the land 
for settlement can start. The construction can involve elaborate proce-
dures such as blasting operations because many relocation sites are lo-
cated on hills.
 ›  After the housing lots are planned, affected people, who were interest-
ed to live on the relocation site can request housing lots that they prefer 
to purchase. Due to the complexity of the large-scale relocation proj-
ects, people were only allowed to make a first and second wish for the 
location of their lot. The final distribution of the lots was made through 
lottery drawing, whereby it was attempted to fulfill the people’s wishes 
in the best possible way. To maintain existing communities and prevent 
the decline of residents in certain districts, affected people were only 
able to select a relocation site within their former district. The reason for 
this was that the larger relocation projects generally progressed slower 
than the smaller projects. An unrestricted selection of relocation sites 
Illustration 45 | Construction of public houses in Taro District | Photo by author, October 2015
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would have resulted in a concentration of citizens in districts where the 
relocation projects finished first because the citizens wanted to move 
into their permanent houses as fast as possible. However, after most 
citizens moved to their new permanent houses, the remaining lots that 
are still vacant are free for purchase by everyone (Miyako City Planning 
Division, Employee A, 2015).
 ›  The construction activities on the relocation site in Taro District were 
planned to begin at the same time. Therefore, there were several de-
tails that had to be discussed before the construction could begin. One 
important issue was the design of the demarcation between the hous-
ing lots (Miyako City Consultant, 2015). Nevertheless, these discussions 
between the future neighbors of the relocation site were not part of the 
official participation process. To enable the citizen’s exchange about rele-
vant topics, one of the city’s consultants voluntarily collected the names 
and addresses of the future residents and organized a well-attended 
meeting (Miyako City Consultant, 2015). This shows that the relocation 
process requires a major amount of coordination and support for the 
local citizens to run smoothly.
Hazard mitigation: Land readjustment and raising program
As explained in Chapter 4.7, land readjustment and raising programs are one 
option to mitigate the hazard and by this means reduce vulnerable land-uses at 
risk. There are multiple areas in Miyako City where the raising of land is planned. 
Nevertheless, compared to other cities in Tohoku, the amount and extent of land 
raising projects in Miyako City is low. One example for a land raise project is 
the area west of highway 45 in Taro District, which will be raised up to 3 m (see 
illustration 47) to adapt the land to highway 45, which will also be raised.
Illustration 46 | Land-use plan for the relocation site in Taro District | Miyako City, 2015c, p. 5
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Because this project is implemented in an area with an existing urban land-use, 
the project’s step follow the classic steps of a land readjustment project as de-
scribed in chapter 4.7.2.1 more closely. Therefore, the project’s main steps are 
only briefly described below:
 › The land owners contribute their plots to the land readjustment pool.
 › The land is reduced by the amount of land needed for the development 
of public infrastructure and the land for the reserve area pool.
 › The readjustment council is established. It consists of local citizens and 
experts and discusses the developed Replotting Design Proposal and 
accompanies the entire planning process.
 › The Replotting Design Proposal is developed. It gives an overview about 
the intended land-uses and lot distribution after the completion of the 
land readjustment projects (see illustration 48 on the next page).
This plan considers the specific local conditions and only plans appropriate 
land-uses for the reconstruction site. This includes that residential land-uses are 
only allowed for areas that are not designated as hazardous. To decrease the 
future resident’s exposure to tsunamis, the area west of highway 45 is raised. In 
many cases, land raise projects use the soil that is removed from the hills when 
constructing relocation sites.
After the Replotting Design Proposal is accepted, the construction work on the 
site can begin. During this step, the land is raised according to the plan. Further-
more, the transportation network is adjusted and new parks are established.
Illustration 47 | Map of the land raise project in Taro District | Map adapted from Miyako City, 
2013, p.17
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After the construction work is finished, the replotted lots are distributed to the 
land owners.
 ›  Depending on the change of the property value, the new housing lots 
are registered and their new owner either collects or delivers the settle-
ment money.
 ›  Finally, the reconstruction of the new houses on the land readjustment 
site can begin.
All of these spatial planning measures were used to decrease the exposure of 
vulnerable land-uses. In Miyako City, the reconstruction process initially focused 
on the reduction of residential land-uses at risk. Nevertheless, the interview 
with the city’s Planning Division showed that this decision is solely an act of pri-
oritization and additional land-uses will be addressed in the future (Miyako City 
Planning Division, Employee A, 2015).
Illustration 48 | Land-use plan of land readjustment project in Taro District | Miyako City, 
2015c, p. 13
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8.4.1.2 Building Codes
Building codes are an important spatial planning option to increase engineering 
resilience (see Chapter 5). Provided that they are adequate to address relevant 
risks [UN-4.2.1] and are continually enforced [UN-4.2.2] and updated [UN-4.2.3]. 
Due to its long history with earthquakes, Japan has established a mandatory set 
of building codes, which are defined in the Building Standards Act (see Chap-
ter 4.7). In Miyako City, the enforcement of building codes is a measure used 
to reach the requirement of the Post-Disaster Reconstruction Plan to reinforce 
buildings to increase their disaster resilience (Miyako City, 2012a, p. 3).
Miyako City’s District Reconstruction Town Development Plan specifies how 
the implementation of additional building standards can increase a building’s 
resilience. As mentioned above, the height of L2-tsunamis will overflow the 
constructed seawall and inundate the area behind it. While the construction of 
residential buildings is completely restricted in the hazardous zone with an in-
undation height of 2 m or more, the construction of residential buildings in ar-
eas with an inundation height below 2 m is restricted as follows: Residential 
buildings that are constructed in areas with an inundation height of 1 to 2 m are 
required to have their foundation raised 1.5 m from the street level. Furthermore, 
no living rooms are permitted on the building’s first floor. Residential buildings 
that are constructed in an area with an inundation height of 1 m or lower, are 
compelled to have their foundation raised 0.5 m above the street level (Miyako 
City, 2012b, p. 3).
8.4.1.3 Urban design solutions
Creating a city where people and nature can coexist like it is the aim of the 
Miyako City Comprehensive Plan (Miyako City, 2015b) calls for sustainable ur-
ban design solutions [UN-4.3.1] like the development of urban green spaces, 
water retention areas or greenways (see Chapter 5.4). The land-use plan for Taro 
District includes multiple parks that promote diverse ecological and social func-
tions. As described in Chapter 8.4.1.1, the parks were designed as part of land 
readjustment projects.
One example is the Three King View Park on top of the relocation site on Otobe 
Hill (see illustration 49 on the next page). The park has the purpose to serve as 
an observation point to overlook the entire district and the ocean (see illustration 
50).
This view is especially important for the local fishermen who depend on their 
ability to see the ocean to pursue their business. The construction of Three King 
View Park with its comparatively large amount of parking spaces enables this. 
Furthermore, the park provides space for the settlement’s water reservoir and a 
monument reminds of the GEJE.
Another park is located at the edge of the new settlement. Its purpose is the 
establishment of a multigenerational playground, which offers sports equipment 
for the elderly as well as play equipment for children. Creating a park like this 
does not only increase the health of the local population, but can also help to 
increase community cohesion (see Chapter 8.4.3.2).
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Illustration 49 | Three King View Park in Taro District (Miyako City) | Miyako City, 2015c, p. 16
Illustration 50 | View from Three King View Park in Taro District (Miyako City) | Photo by 
author, October 2015
Illustration 51 | Elevation of the remaining seawall in Taro District (Miyako City) | Photo by 
author, October 2015
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8.4.1.4 Sustainable building design standards
Sustainable building designs [UN-4.3.2] can reduce a city’s energy demand, in-
crease the share of renewable energy and increase the independence of energy 
supply systems, which enhances the systems disaster resilience. The Miyako 
Renewable Energy Plan has all of these points on its agenda (Civic Life Depart-
ment, Environment Division, 2013). One measure to promote the development 
of sustainable building design standards is the subsidization of the installation of 
photovoltaics (PV) on private houses with up to 200,000 JPY (Miyako City, 2016). 
Since the city’s Environmental Division holds the responsibility for this aspect, 
spatial planners are required to collaborate with their colleagues at this sectoral 
planning division in order to address this point.
8.4.1.5 Protective Infrastructure
The construction and maintenance of effective protective infrastructure [UN-
8.1.1, UN-8.1.2] is an important aspect of the Japanese approach to increase 
resilience, which is also adopted in Miyako City. This becomes clear in the city’s 
Post-Disaster Reconstruction Plan that states that the establishment of pro-
tective infrastructure (e.g., tide barriers or seawalls) is one important aspect 
to create disaster resilience (Miyako City, 2012a, p. 5). In this regard, protec-
tive infrastructure is understood as the first line of a multilayered disaster resil-
ience approach. The installation of protective infrastructure can help to reduce 
the damage to a minimum – however, as the GEJE showed, disaster resilience 
should never solely rely on it (Miyako City, 2012a, p. 3).
The multilayered concept becomes noticeable when taking a look at the deter-
mination of the tsunami seawall’s height: The height was determined through a 
computer simulation based on the concept of L1-tsunami and L2-tsunami (see 
Chapter 4.7.1). The height of the seawall is designed to protect the city from 
L1-tsunamis, but not from L2-tsunamis. This emphasizes the importance to not 
solely rely on protective infrastructure, but also use additional soft measures to 
build resilience.
In Taro District, the existing tsunami-seawall with a height of 10 m was raised by 
70 cm to compensate the land subsidence caused by the GEJE (see illustration 
51) (Miyako City Planning Division, Employee B, 2015). In the future, this will 
be the second defense line against tsunamis because another seawall with a 
height of 14.7 m along the shore is planned. This two-line defense system is 
planned to protect the land behind the second seawall from L1-tsunamis (Mäg-
defrau, 2018).
The ability of protective infrastructure to increase resilience can be observed 
in Kuwagasaki District. Although the district also has a long history of dealing 
with tsunamis, there was never a seawall constructed. The reason for this is the 
historic importance of the local port. After the GEJE, the people wanted to re-
locate to higher ground. Nevertheless, the tsunami simulation revealed that the 
construction of a 10.4-meter-high seawall is able to protect the entire area of the 
district from L1- as well as L2-tsunamis. This means, the former residential area 
is safe to live and the people are able to reconstruct their houses on-site. This 
also means that the people cannot receive any subsidies for relocation, which is 
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why the people agreed to reconstruct on-site. Nevertheless, to improve the local 
infrastructure, the reconstruction in Kuwagasaki District is also implemented as 
a land readjustment project (Miyako City Consultant, 2015).
8.4.1.6 Disaster resilience of utility infrastructure
Utility infrastructure combines communication networks [UN-8.2.1, UN-8.2.2, 
UN-8.2.3], electricity [UN-8.3.1, UN-8.3.2, UN-8.3.3] and gas [UN-8.5.1, UN-
8.5.2, UN-8.5.3, UN-8.5.4] networks, water and sanitation networks [UN-8.4.1, 
UN-8.4.2, UN-8.4.3] as well as transportation networks (incl. roads, evacuation 
routes, railroads, airports, ports and other public transportation networks) [UN-
8.6.1, UN-8.6.2, UN-8.6.3, UN-8.6.4, UN-8.6.5, UN-8.6.6]. The disaster resilience 
of these services is of special importance, so that their continuous provision 
in case of a disaster is ensured as far as possible. The importance to improve 
the disaster resilience of utility infrastructure is reflected in Miyako City’s re-
construction process, which intends the establishment of independent energy 
supply systems and disaster resilient water/ sanitation, electricity and commu-
nication networks and the reconstruction and improvement of the transportation 
system (incl. road, train and bus networks, ports and the development of new 
and safe evacuation routes) (Miyako City, 2012a; Miyako City Planning Division, 
Employee A, 2015).
The local spatial planners had to prioritize the reconstruction of residential areas 
over other aspects because of the immense time pressure after the disaster. Si-
multaneously, the planning for disaster resilient utility infrastructure was mostly 
postponed because it required the exchange of various sectoral planning depart-
ments. In some cases, projects were also postponed because the city’s current 
budget is too limited to implement them at the moment (Miyako City Planning 
Division, Employee A, 2015). Nevertheless, this does not mean that the projects 
will not be realized in the future and some projects to increase the disaster resil-
ience of the city’s utility infrastructure are already realized.
Transportation
One example for the revision of the transportation network, is the transfer, wid-
ening and raise of highway 45 in Taro District. To improve the street’s ability as an 
evacuation route and prevent traffic congestions in case of a disaster, its width 
is increased by 5 m, from 12 m to 17 m (see illustration 52). In addition to this, 
17m
10m 3,5m 0-3m3,5m2m2m 8m
12m
Illustration 52 | Widening of Highway 45 in Taro District (Miyako City) | Own illustration based 
on Miyako City, 2013, p. 14
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moving the road from its former location up to 45 m inland and a raise up to 3 m 
should ensure that the road will not become flooded in case of a tsunami (Miya-
ko City, 2013). This is an important aspect to ensure that people are not cut off 
from evacuation and become trapped. The entire road project was planned out 
as part of the land readjustment project described in Chapter 8.4.1.1.
Energy
The blackout in Miyako City after the GEJE and Tsunami displayed the weak-
nesses in the city’s energy supply system. One goal of the reconstruction pro-
cess therefore is to build disaster resilient energy supply networks (Miyako City, 
2012a). Furthermore, the accident at Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant lead 
to the realization of the risk that is connected with nuclear energy. As a con-
sequence, the new disaster resilient energy supply system is intended to use 
clean resources such as “solar, wind, wave and water power” (Miyako City, 
2012a, p. 6). To reach this goal, the supply with renewable energy on the disaster 
affected sites should be advanced. This includes the installation of large-scale 
power generation facilities like the solar power plant in Taro District to locally pro-
duce energy (see illustration 53) or the support of the installation of solar power 
systems on private houses (Civic Life Department, Environment Division, 2013). 
The independent energy production on the household level (e.g., through solar 
panels on the roof) is especially useful to increase the household’s autonomy in 
case of a disaster.
While the Planning Division possesses a certain responsibility for the planning 
of the utility networks, it must be considered that it is dependent on the coop-
eration with the respective sectoral planning divisions. In case of the energy 
supply network, this is the Civic Life Department’s Environment Division. This 
mandatory cooperation complicates and prolongs the planning process, which 
resulted in the delay of these aspects.
Illustration 53 | Solar power plant in Taro District (Miyako City) | Photo by author, October 2015
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8.4.1.7 Disaster resilience of social infrastructure
The disaster resilience of social infrastructure is just as important as the one 
of a city’s utility infrastructure. Social infrastructure includes the police and first 
responders [UN-8.7.1] whose continuous work is of special importance in case 
of a disaster, the disaster resilience of the prison system [UN-8.7.2], the educa-
tion facilities [UN-8.8.1] and the health care and emergency facilities [UN-8.9.1]. 
Furthermore, the basic administrative functions should be secured [UN-8.10.1]. 
In the context of spatial planning, this can be done by locating them outside of 
hazardous zones, so that they will not be affected by any hazardous events.
As the Post-Disaster Reconstruction Plan states the restoration of education-
al, healthcare and welfare facilities in a short period of time after a disaster to 
enable the city’s population to continue their lives as normal as possible, was 
an important effort (Miyako City, 2012a, p. 3). However, to ensure the safety of 
public facilities by relocating them into safe areas, requires the Planning Divi-
sion’s cooperation with the responsible departments of the city administration 
(e.g., the School Education Division for the relocation of schools). One example 
for this is the relocation of the police office, the hospital and additional social 
facilities to the border of the new settlement on Otobe Hill, which was planned 
as part of the land readjustment project (Taro District Citizen A, 2015). The relo-
cation of other public facilities (e.g., the administration office, elementary and 
junior high school) was also discussed. However, because these facilities were 
only insignificantly affected by the GEJE and are not located in the hazardous 
area, their relocation to the hill could not be subsidized, which is why they will 
stay where they have been (Miyako City Consultant, 2015). Another example is 
the relocation of the City Hall, which is currently located directly adjacent to the 
water and which was flooded up to the second floor (Miyako City Great East 
Japan Earthquake and Tsunami Records Editorial Committee, 2015, p. 32). It will 
be relocated and its former site will be utilized by less vulnerable land-uses (Taro 
District Citizen A, 2015).
8.4.2 Political-institutional resilience
Political-institutional resilience can be achieved through proposal evaluation for 
disaster resilience, the implementation of risk assessments, pre-event planning 
for disaster recovery and the use of learning loops. All of these items are dis-
cussed in detail in the following paragraphs.
8.4.2.1 Proposal evaluation for disaster resilience
The importance to check proposals for their benefits or impairments for disaster 
resilience [UN-1.2.1] becomes more and more important as time passes. While 
the major impact of a disaster enables changes in the city’s structure and the 
fresh memories of the people prevents the development of vulnerable land-us-
es in hazardous areas, perceptions can change in the long run. Therefore, each 
spatial plan should be checked for its compliance with Miyako City’s intention 
to create and maintain safe communities (Miyako City, 2012a). While this is the 
case at the moment (e.g., there are no residential buildings located within the 
hazardous area), only time will tell if this point will also be considered in 10, 50 
or 100 years from now.
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8.4.2.2 Risk assessment
When dealing with risks, knowledge about the dimension of possible hazards [UN-
2.1.1], the city’s exposure and vulnerabilities [UN-2.1.2] and an understanding of 
critical assets and their linkages with each other [UN-2.1.3] are important aspects 
to facilitate resilience (Dzurdženík et al., 2015, p. 14). Risk assessment combines 
all of these elements. Spatial planning’s contribution to risk assessment focuses 
on the preparation of hazard maps [UN-2.1.4], which provide valuable information 
for the risk assessment. In Miyako City, the hazard maps were prepared based on 
the concept of L1-tsunamis and L2-tsunamis (see Chapter 4.7.1)
The determination of hazardous areas is based on computer simulations (see 
illustration 54). While areas with an inundation depth of 2 m or higher, caused by 
a L2-tsunami, are designated as hazardous and the construction of residential 
buildings is prohibited, areas with a lower inundation depth are generally avail-
able for residential uses (although additional requirements are set for areas with 
an inundation depth of more than 1 m, see Chapter 8.4.1.2). In Miyako City, the 
designation of hazardous zones followed an equivalent standard for the entire 
area of the city (Miyako City Planning Division, Employee A, 2015).
In order to be useful, the risk scenarios need to be updated frequently [UN-2.2.1]. 
This can be required because general information about relevant risks change or 
because land-use adjustments decrease the exposure to certain hazards, while 
the exposure to other hazards is increased. One example is the increased risk 
of landslides which results from the relocation of residential land-uses onto the 
hill. This increase should be included in the risk assessment, so that citizens can 
be informed about the risks and prepare themselves accordingly (Miyako City 
Planning Division, Employee A, 2015).
Illustration 54 | Results of the L2-tsunami simulation for Taro District (Miyako City) | Taro 
District Reconstruction Town Planning Committee, 2012, p. 10
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8.4.2.3 Pre-event planning for disaster recovery
To optimally use the window of opportunity after a disaster, it is helpful to be 
prepared in advance [UN-10.1.1]. With regard to spatial planning this would re-
quire a spatial vision that the reconstruction process can follow once a disaster 
occurs. Nevertheless, the field work revealed that this is easier said than done. 
Although Miyako City has a long history of tsunamis, there was no plan that pro-
vided the city with possible relocation sites or additional information that could 
have been useful to use the short amount of time after the disaster in the best 
possible way. However, the city’s Comprehensive Plan, which was adopted in 
2011 and usually is revised every five years, was used to guide the reconstruc-
tion process. Although the plan was prepared completely disconnected from 
the disaster, its content served as a vision for the reconstruction process. While 
spatial planners and citizens agreed that a pre-event prepared land-use plan for 
the time after the disaster would have been helpful (Miyako City Planning Divi-
sion, Employee A, 2015; Taro District Citizen B, 2015), the reasons why it was 
not developed are comprehensible: The citizens were not interested to discuss 
possible relocation options before the occurrence of the disaster because they 
were unable to imagine the extent of the devastation. Furthermore, the existing 
seawall in Taro District caused the district’s citizens to feel safe (Taro District 
Citizen A, 2015; Taro District Citizen B, 2015). In addition to this, it is impossible 
to foresee the actual location where the tsunami may hit the coast, how far it 
may reach inwards into the city and the degree of the damage that it may cause. 
Therefore, the land-use plan could never include all relevant aspects for the re-
construction process (Miyako City Planning Division, Employee A, 2015).
There are certain points that the interviewees considered to be useful to be in 
place before the disaster in order to enable a smooth start of the reconstruction 
process. There should be guidelines for the local spatial planners that includes 
the main planning procedures after a disaster. These guidelines should explain 
where to begin and which steps to take. This is of high relevance because the 
decision what to do first was very complicated for the staff of the Planning 
Division (Miyako City Planning Division, Employee A, 2015). The citizens should 
have selected a leader for their community beforehand or they should have 
built a core group consisting of various leaders from different associations (e.g., 
commerce association or fire prevention association). Having a strong leader 
is an important factor of success for the reconstruction process (Taro District 
Citizen B, 2015). Local spatial planners usually lack the experience to plan and 
implement the reconstruction process after a disaster and pre-event prepara-
tion rarely occurs in reality. Therefore, the involvement of experts can help to 
increase the quality of the reconstruction process. For instance, the consultant 
agency proposed the comprehensive participation process which resulted in the 
smooth implementation of the reconstruction projects in Miyako City (Miyako 
City Planning Division, Employee A, 2015). Furthermore, the citizens are certain 
that the planning process would never have been possible without the help from 
these experts (Taro District Citizen B, 2015).
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8.4.2.4 Learning loops
Learning loops are an important aspect to create resilience [UN-10.1.3]. With 
regard to spatial planning, learning from past disasters especially concerns the 
city structure and its reinforcement and reorganization processes to increase 
resilience (Miyako City, 2012a, p. 2; for more on this interpretation of learning 
loops, see Chapter 8.4.1).
In addition to this, political-institutional processes can be improved to prepare 
the system for risks and to increase its ability to cope with hazardous events. For 
these processes, the lessons learned from previous disasters are very valuable. 
For instance, the GEJE taught that actual disasters can go far beyond anticipa-
tion. This means, people should not solely rely on built infrastructure, but expect 
the unexpected and live with these uncertainties. The most important point is 
the people’s ability to evacuate (Miyako City Planning Division, Employee A, 
2015). In case of a tsunami, people must evacuate and not return for at least one 
hour (Miyako City Consultant, 2015).
It is also possible to learn from disasters that occurred elsewhere. The planners 
and consultants of Miyako City integrated an important lesson from the Great 
Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake, which occurred in Kobe in 1995, into the reconstruc-
tion process: the importance to keep the communities together. This is the rea-
son why the city administration constructed temporary housing sites for each 
community to enable the people to stay together with their neighbors (Miyako 
City Planning Division, Employee A, 2015). The advantages of this approach are 
discussed in the following chapter.
It is important to also preserve the memories from the GEJE. To reach this goal, 
the city administration of Miyako City intends to establish a tsunami heritage 
site in Taro District. This building will not only preserve the experiences from the 
tsunami for the local citizens, but also enable to share the lessons learned with 
visitors from elsewhere (Miyako City, 2012a, 2012b).
8.4.3 Socio-economic resilience
Socio-economic resilience can be achieved by addressing the following items, 
which are discussed in the following chapters: citizen participation, social con-
nectedness and neighborhood cohesion and the provision of safe shelter.
8.4.3.1 Consideration of citizen’s needs
The relevance of grassroots organizations for spatial planners basically encom-
passes their ability to participate as one stakeholder in the planning process. 
This cooperation can intensify if the grassroots organization focuses on a field 
where the coordination with the city’s planning section is required (e.g., when a 
grassroots organization focuses on designing local playgrounds). The wider the 
coverage of the city’s area with grassroots organization is [UN-7.1.1] and the bet-
ter they are able to use their networks [UN-7.1.2], the better they can represent 
the local citizens in the participation process. Grassroots organizations are espe-
cially important for the participation process after a disaster because the contact 
person of a local grassroots organization is easier to identify and contact and – in 
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the best case – he or she can represent the interests of a larger group. In Miya-
ko City, the selection of the reconstruction committee members also occurred 
based on the people’s affiliation with local organizations (e.g., the leader of the 
fire department) (Miyako City Planning Division, Employee A, 2015). Besides the 
integration of grassroots organizations, the participation process also needs to 
engage vulnerable segments of the population [UN-7.1.4]. This is especially im-
portant to incorporate their special needs into the planning process.
The Post-Disaster Reconstruction Plan for Miyako City acknowledges the im-
portance of public participation for the reconstruction process. It states that 
“citizens, community groups, civil organizations, companies and businesses” 
(Miyako City, 2012a, p. 1) should be integrated and it emphasizes the importance 
of the “participatory and cooperative efforts of citizens and [the] local govern-
ment working in partnership” (Miyako City, 2012a, p.  8). The comprehensive 
participation process in Miyako City was proposed by one of the consultants 
that were engaged into the planning aid project by the national government’s 
Ministry of Land, Infrastructure Transport and Tourism (Miyako City Planning Di-
vision, Employee A, 2015). The city administration was very sceptic about such 
a comprehensive participation process because citizen participation in Miyako 
City failed in the past (Miyako City Consultant, 2015). Nevertheless, the con-
sultant was able to convince the administration and reconstruction committees 
were established for the ten most affected districts. These committees were 
supported by local spatial planners and consultant companies.
The importance of citizen participation for the reconstruction process and its 
various types were described in Chapter 2.4.3. In Miyako City, spatial planners 
focused on information of the citizens, consultation for the 23 less affected dis-
tricts and active involvement for the ten districts where citizen committees were 
established to develop their own district plans. Even though the participation 
process in Miyako City was very comprehensive and exceeded legal require-
ments, the final decision about the plans was made solely by the city administra-
tion – which means that the citizens were not included in this step, e.g., through 
collaborative planning. One example for this is the decision about the relocation 
site in Taro District, which was finally taken by the city administration after the 
local residents had proposed various areas (Miyako City Consultant, 2015).
Citizen information
The information of the citizens built the basis for the more meaningful participa-
tion tiers of consultation and active involvement. The city administration ensured 
the provision of comprehensive information for the citizens (including a report of 
all damages). This enabled the citizens to get involved in any further reaching ac-
tivities (e.g., the participation in the community committees). The distribution of 
information was also able to prevent rumors, inside and outside the region, from 
spreading (Miyako City, 2012a). The city of Miyako distributed the information 
about the reconstruction process through the “District Reconstruction Urban 
Development News”. The newspaper was published continuously throughout 
the district reconstruction planning process (October 2011 till March 2012) and 
was delivered to each household in Miyako City (Miyako City Planning Division, 
Employee A, 2015). The “District Reconstruction Urban Development News” 
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also informed the citizens about their opportunity to submit their opinion to the 
city administration. The comments from the local citizens directly entered into 
the discussion process at the Reconstruction Town Planning Committee meet-
ings (Miyako City Planning Division, Employee A, 2015).
Some of the aspects from the citizen’s district plans could not be adopted into 
the final version of the plans, for example because the projects were unrealis-
tic or too expensive. In these cases, the spatial planners informed the citizens 
about their decision and explained the reasons why the decision was taken, so 
that the local people could easily understand the reasons for the decision-mak-
ing (Miyako City Planning Division, Employee A, 2015; Taro District Citizen A, 
2015). One example for this is the relocation of people in Tsugaruishi District. 
Half of the community wanted to relocate onto a hill, which would have been a 
very inconvenient and expensive solution. Therefore, the spatial planners con-
vinced the people that the relocation together with the rest of their community 
into the existing settlement of Tsugaruishi District would be the more conve-
nient solution (Miyako City Planning Division, Employee A, 2015).
Citizen consultation
Consulting the local citizens was another element of the participation process 
in Miyako City. At the beginning of the planning process, the city administration 
conducted a survey to enable the spatial planners to get to know the needs and 
recommendations from the citizens and include them into the further planning 
process (Miyako City, 2012a). The “District Reconstruction Urban Development 
News” continuously encouraged the people to submit their opinions about the 
reconstruction process. Furthermore, the city administration performed meet-
ings for town reconstruction in all 33 affected districts. The purpose of those 
meetings was to inform the citizens about the reconstruction process and to en-
able them to contribute their opinions. To save time, the city’s Planning Division 
used the information that was received through the consultation of the citizens 
to directly develop the reconstruction plans for the 23 districts with 40 or less 
destroyed houses (Miyako City Planning Division, Employee A, 2015; Ubaura & 
Akiyama, 2016, p. 487).
Citizen’s active involvement
For the ten districts with more than 100 affected households, the city estab-
lished Reconstruction Town Planning Committees, which were responsible to 
develop the districts reconstruction plan with the help from consultants and 
local spatial planners (Miyako City Planning Division, Employee A, 2015). The 
city administration selected the 20-30 citizens per district that participated in 
the Reconstruction Town Planning Committees because time was short after 
the disaster. The selected people were people with a certain function within 
the community, such as the chief of neighborhood associations, the chief of the 
parents and teacher association or the chief of the fire department (Miyako City 
Consultant, 2015; Miyako City Planning Division, Employee A, 2015). The com-
mittees consisted of a mixture of affected and unaffected citizens because the 
district plan should contain the entire area of the district, not just the affected 
parts (Miyako City Planning Division, Employee A, 2015). The approach to select 
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the committee members resulted in the fact that only a small number of partic-
ipants (7%) were woman and only 5% of the city’s 204 committee members 
were 50 years or younger (Ubaura & Akiyama, 2016, p. 487). The active involve-
ment of the citizens in the ten most affected districts is a specifically interesting 
example of how socio-economic resilience can be built. Therefore, the following 
paragraphs give a comprehensive overview of this process.
The Reconstruction Town Planning Committees were supported by consultants 
as well as local spatial planners. The committees started their work in October/ 
November 2011, seven to eight months after the disaster, and held four monthly 
meetings in each district (Miyako City Planning Division, Employee A, 2015). The 
first local study meetings were used to explain the planning process, introduce 
the time schedule and gather first ideas on town reconstruction, land-use plan-
ning and transportation networks (e.g., evacuation routes). The purpose of these 
meetings was solely to collect ideas; it was not intended to come to a consen-
sus at this point (Ubaura & Akiyama, 2016). At the meetings, the people were 
able to draw their ideas into the plan, which was later edited by the consultant 
to incorporate the people’s ideas. These edited maps then provided the basis for 
the discussion at the next meeting (Miyako City Consultant, 2015).
At the second local study meetings, in November/ December 2011, the results 
from the first meetings were presented and discussed more precisely. An em-
phasis was to narrow down the options for land-use planning, transportation 
and protective infrastructure. The advantages and disadvantages for possible 
reconstruction solutions (e.g., relocation or land raising) were discussed and all 
districts agreed to determine the relocation sites based on “technical studies” 
(Miyako City Consultant, 2015; Ubaura & Akiyama, 2016, p. 489).
For the third local study meetings, which were held in December 2011/ Janu-
ary 2012, the city administration prepared a preliminary draft plan that covered 
most points that were discussed in the first and second committee meetings. 
Nevertheless, some points had to be disregarded because they were technically 
infeasible, ineffective or unnecessary. The aim of these meetings was to agree 
on a draft version of the District Reconstruction Town Development Plans; a 
goal which was achieved in most of the districts with the exception of Fujiwara, 
Sokei and Taro District (Ubaura & Akiyama, 2016). Between the third and fourth 
local study meeting, the draft plan was publicly displayed for several days and 
the citizens were able to submit their opinion at preview meetings. At these 
preview meetings, the substantial part of the plan was presented by committee 
members. In this way the citizens’ comprehension should be enhanced and the 
consensus building should be facilitated. To ensure professional competence, 
city officials also attended the meetings and added technical and financial de-
tails. Most preview meetings closed with an agreement on the draft plan. The 
only exception being Fujiwara, Sokei and Taro District (Ubaura & Akiyama, 2016).
At the fourth and final local study meeting, in January/ February 2012, the draft 
plans were modified according to the citizens’ comments from the preview meet-
ings and the final District Reconstruction Town Development Plans were devel-
oped (Ubaura & Akiyama, 2016). These plans were once more publicly discussed 
in a second meeting for town reconstruction and finally all districts agreed on the 
final version of their district’s reconstruction town development plan. All ten plan 
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proposals were submitted to the mayor in February 2012 (Ubaura & Akiyama, 
2016). After the draft plans were received, the Planning Division developed the 
final version of each plan and combined them into the “Miyako City: The Great 
East Japan Earthquake District Reconstruction Town Development Plan” (Miyako 
City, 2012b), which was adopted in March 2012 and is currently implemented 
(Miyako City Planning Division, Employee A, 2015). With the submission of the 
draft District Reconstruction Town Development Plans to the mayor, the official 
participation process concluded (Miyako City Consultant, 2015).
The active involvement of citizens in the planning process went beyond the legal 
requirements for participation in Japan (see Chapter 4.7.3). The participation was 
based on the voluntarily commitment of the involved consultants, spatial plan-
ners and citizens because there is no institutional system to make the people 
participate actively in the planning process (Miyako City Consultant, 2015). For 
example, the citizens were very interested in discussing their thoughts about 
the reconstruction process in the first year after the disaster. This meant that 
the consultant held meetings in her office that often lasted from one evening 
until the next morning to meet the requirements of the local population (Miyako 
City Consultant, 2015). In the interview, a citizen of Taro District confirmed, that 
many local activities (e.g., the establishment of a community café) could only 
be achieved with the help of the consultant (Taro District Citizen A, 2015). This 
displays the importance of personal commitment for a successful participation 
process. In the end, the comprehensive participation process paid off and re-
sulted in a wide acceptance of the plans by the local citizens. One indicator for 
this is the fact that local land owners cooperated by selling their land to the city 
authority, if it was needed for the realization of the planned relocation projects. 
This wide acceptance helped to implement the plans much faster and enabled 
the development of the relocation sites by 2015 (Miyako City Planning Division, 
Employee A, 2015).
After the official participation process ended, the people in Taro District did not 
want to end their discussion. To continue their dialogue, the citizens estab-
lished a machizukuri. Although machizukuri are an important element of spatial 
planning on the community level, they are not integrated into the legal spatial 
planning system, which is why there are no subsidies for their establishment 
(see Chapter 4.7.3.; Miyako City Consultant, 2015). The establishment of such 
an association therefore is another example for the voluntary commitment of 
individual experts: Because the vice mayor was against the establishment of 
the machizukuri and the consultant was contracted by the city, she could not 
officially support the local citizens with their efforts. To still assist the citizens, 
the consultant supported the establishment of the machizukuri in Taro District 
in her free time (Miyako City Consultant, 2015). Today, the machizukuri does not 
only discuss topics with relevance for Taro District (e.g., the relocation of Taro 
District’s police office and hospital), but also issues that concern the entire city 
(e.g., the relocation of Miyako City Hall) and the city administration is interested 
in the citizen’s opinion on these topics (Taro District Citizen A, 2015).
To inform the people about the work of the machizukuri the association pub-
lishes a monthly newspaper, which is distributed to all 1,000 households in Taro 
District. It informs about current discussions and community activities (Miyako 
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City Consultant, 2015). Nevertheless, it is complicated to reach the people and 
encourage them to get involved in the voluntary work of the machizukuri (Taro 
District Citizen A, 2015).
To finance the activities of the machizukuri, the citizens obtained the redirection 
of a 10 million JPY-budget, which was originally intended for the realization of 
local events (e.g., sports festivals). In Taro District, for the management of the 
machizukuri, e.g., for copies, office material or the publication of the monthly 
newspaper, which costs 50,000 JPY per issue (Miyako City Consultant, 2015).
8.4.3.2 Social connectedness and neighborhood cohesion
Social connectedness and neighborhood cohesion [UN-7.1.3] is an important fac-
tor of socio-economic resilience. The importance to keep communities together 
in the aftermath of a disaster, was demonstrated by the reconstruction process 
in Kobe after the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake in 1995. In Kobe, people were 
moved into the temporary housing sites based on their vulnerability, which re-
sulted in segregated housing sites with old people and many cases of solitary 
death (kodokushi) (Kadoya, 2005). The city administration of Miyako City based 
its actions on these experiences made in Kobe and set community building as 
one important aspect for the city’s reconstruction process. This included to keep 
existing communities together when moving them into the temporary housing 
sites as well as the revitalization of communities after the relocation into the 
temporary houses (Miyako City, 2012a, p. 11; Miyako City Planning Division, Em-
ployee A, 2015). Although this process took more time, the city administration 
prioritized keeping the communities together (Miyako City Planning Division, 
Employee A, 2015).
Temporary Housing
In Taro District, there were four evacuation places directly after the disaster, 
but the people were all united at one place. Elderly citizens were evacuated 
into a hotel. Each temporary housing site was constructed for one of the dis-
trict’s neighborhoods (e.g., southern neighborhood, central neighborhood) and 
the people were mutually moved from the evacuation shelter to the temporary 
housing site after their site was constructed. At this point, the people from the 
evacuation shelter were also reunited with the elderly, who stayed at the hotel, 
to ensure the maintenance of the existing social structure (Miyako City Consul-
tant, 2015). Even though the city administration tried to keep people from each 
district together when moving them into temporary houses, the process had 
its weak points and some people still got separated from their former neigh-
bors. This especially happened when people decided to move into empty regular 
apartment buildings, which are called “quasi temporary houses” and are dis-
persed all over the city (Miyako City Planning Division, Employee A, 2015; Taro 
District Citizen A, 2015). For this reason, the community cohesion could not be 
completely ensured in all cases (Taro District Citizen A, 2015).
Permanent Housing
The relocation to permanent houses occurred based on the people’s former 
districts and their information from the survey, which was conducted at the be-
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ginning of the relocation process. At first, people were only allowed to select a lot 
for their permanent house that was located within their district. The reason for this 
was to keep the communities together and to prevent the population decrease 
in districts where the relocation sites finished behind schedule (Miyako City Plan-
ning Division, Employee A, 2015). Although communities were not forced to move 
together, spatial planners tried to convince them of more convenient solutions in 
case it was reasonable (e.g., in Tsugaruishi District) (Miyako City Planning Divi-
sion, Employee A, 2015). Nevertheless, keeping neighborhoods together during 
this step was complicated: For instance, one citizen of Taro District intended to re-
locate together with his existing community. This was impossible because of two 
reasons: First, some people from the community wanted to stay in Taro District, 
the other half wanted to move out of Taro District. Second, the remaining people 
were interested in housing lots with different sizes. Some wanted to buy a lot 
with 250 m2, while others preferred a lot with 500-600 m2. The group was forced 
to split because the land development had already started and the bigger and 
smaller lots were not planned next to each other (Taro District Citizen A, 2015).
Citizen Participation
Another aspect that increased community cohesion was the participation pro-
cess, which was explained in detail in the previous chapter. The ability of affected 
as well as non-affected people to participate in the reconstruction committees, 
resulted in a mutual consideration of all important aspects for the recovery of 
the district as a whole. The result of this was the quick agreement of local land 
owners to sell their land to the city, which enabled a fast implementation of the 
reconstruction projects (Miyako City Planning Division, Employee A, 2015).
To have a meeting place for the local people, one of the city’s consultants es-
tablished a community café in Taro District (Miyako City Consultant, 2015). This 
way, the people have a place to meet and exchange about their current issues.
Considering special requirements of elderly people
To enhance community cohesion, it is important to meet the special require-
ments of different population groups. In Miyako City, the group of elderly peo-
ple especially needs to be considered because of the ongoing demographic 
change. Concerning this topic, the Post-Disaster Reconstruction Plan stresses 
the importance to create livable neighborhoods and intends to build houses that 
meet people’s special requirements, specifically addressing elderly people (Mi-
yako City, 2012a). One measure to achieve this goal is the planned recovery of 
Miyako City’s city center based on the compact city concept. This involves the 
concentration of important urban functions at one place and establishes the 
accessibility on foot (Miyako City, 2012a).
To address demographic change, the relocation of affected people onto empty 
lots in existing settlements was planned. One example for this is the relocation 
of people in Tsugaruishi District. After the spatial planners convinced the citizens 
of the convenience of the solution, they agreed to move into the existing settle-
ment of Tsugaruishi District, which also helped to counteract vacancies caused 
by demographic change (Miyako City Planning Division, Employee A, 2015).
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In Taro District, the people initially intended to relocate the entire village (in-
cluding not affected households, social infrastructure and shops) onto Otobe 
Hill. This would have been a convenient solution, with short distances. Never-
theless, because there was no subsidy to relocate non-affected facilities and 
private houses, this plan could not be pursued and the district administration 
and elementary and junior high school had to stay where they were (Miyako City 
Consultant, 2015).
8.4.3.3 Provision of safe shelter
To ensure socio-economic resilience, it is important to provide safe shelter in 
the three phases after the disaster [UN-9.5.2]. First, the people are accommo-
dated in evacuation shelters, where they stay between a month up to one year 
(Iuchi et al., 2015, p. 39). The establishment of evacuation buildings can save 
lives in case of a disaster. It is important that all population groups are con-
sidered, when planning evacuation routes to reach these evacuation shelters. 
This especially concerns vulnerable population groups (e.g., the elderly) and 
is the reason why their needs should be especially addressed throughout the 
planning process (Miyako City, 2012a). After the GEJE, elderly affected people 
in Taro District were accommodated in a hotel instead of the regular evacua-
tion shelter to ensure them with a minimum of comfort and privacy (Miyako 
City Consultant, 2015).
After the temporary housing units are established, people begin to move into 
their temporary homes, where they often stay for several years (Iuchi et al., 
2015, p. 39). One important factor to secure a healthy living environment for the 
residents of the temporary housing units was the coherence of existing com-
munities that was an important aspect of the reconstruction process in Miyako 
City (Miyako City Planning Division, Employee A, 2015).
Still, it is important for the citizen’s healing process after a disaster to move into 
permanent houses. Only this way they are able to move on with their lives and 
fully process their experiences (FEMA, 2009, p. 4). This is the reason why the 
completion of permanent houses for the affected people should not take too 
long – even though there are various aspects that need to be considered when 
planning and constructing these houses (Miyako City, 2012a). In Miyako City, 
the permanent housing sites were planned based on the results from a survey, 
which was conducted at the beginning of the reconstruction process. In this 
survey, the people were able to state where they were planning to live after the 
reconstruction of the city (Miyako City Planning Division, Employee A, 2015). At 
the point of the survey, many affected people declared their interest to build a 
new privately financed house. However, as time went by many of them realized 
that they were unable to finance the construction of a private house. The rea-
sons for this are numerous: the compensation for their old house was to small, 
they did not have enough savings or the bank denied to give them credit (either 
because they already had a credit for their old house or they were too old). This 
resulted in a raised demand for public housing units. At the same time, the 
demand for private housing lots decreased, partly because the people decided 
to move into public houses instead, partly because they decided to move away 
from the city. To ensure a sufficient housing supply for all people, it is important 
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that spatial planners are able to react to this changing demand. For instance, in 
Miyako City the original plan was changed: While the number of private housing 
lots was decreased, the number of public houses was increased (Taro District 
Citizen B, 2015).
8.4.4 Environmental Resilience
Environmental resilience can be achieved by preserving or restoring ecosystem 
health, in case that it is disturbed. The following chapter explains how this aspect 
was addressed in Miyako City.
8.4.4.1 Ecosystem health
Ecosystem health is one important factor of environmental resilience. It re-
lates to people’s dependence on ecosystem services (e.g., clean air and wa-
ter) to survive. As an example, healthy forests are able to secure timber wood 
for the construction of buildings or for the generation of energy. It is therefore 
important to know about the importance of these ecosystem services [UN-
5.1.1] and to preserve the forest’s health or restore it when it is disturbed 
(e.g., through a disaster) [UN-5.1.2]. The goal of Miyako City’s Comprehensive 
Plan to create “an oasis where ’forests, rivers and the ocean’ and people can 
coexist” (Miyako City, 2012a, p. 1 citing the Comprehensive Plan; Miyako City, 
2015b) shows that there is a general awareness of the importance of nature 
and the health of the ecosystem. This goal is also reflected in the Post-Disaster 
Reconstruction Plan, which intends the revitalization of the forests. Never-
theless, a closer look reveals that this intention is directly linked to the revi-
talization of the local timber industry (Miyako City, 2012a, p. 4). How exactly 
the sustainable coexistence between humans and nature regarding forests is 
intended to be achieved remains unclear. Nevertheless, there are some exam-
ples of measures taken to improve the health of the ecosystem. One of them 
is the intended distribution of renewable energy sources, such as “solar, wind, 
wave and water power” (Miyako City, 2012a, p. 6) on the large as well as on 
the smaller scale.
According to the UNISDR’s Disaster Resilience Scorecard, spatial planners 
should consider the importance of healthy ecosystems for a city’s disaster 
resilience when developing land-use plans. This includes the determination of 
impacts that intended land-uses can have on ecosystem services [UN-5.1.3]. 
One instrument to reach this aim is the EIA (see Chapter 4.7.1), which, for ex-
ample, has to be conducted for the “construction of roads, dams, railways, air-
ports and power plants” (Ministry of the Environment, Government of Japan, 
n. d., p. 4). Even though the construction of the giant seawall along the coast 
of Tohoku can be expected to have severe impacts on the coastal ecosystem, 
the Environmental Assessment Law does not require the performance of an 
EIA for this case (see Chapter 4.7.1). Although this simplifies the planning and 
construction process, it also results in the neglect of the ecosystem health in 
favor of safety (Bird, 2013). 
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8.4.5 Spatial planning measures to build resilience
The following chapter summarizes the spatial planning options that were used 
to build engineering and evolutionary resilience in Miyako City, elaborates which 
spatial planning options were especially useful and identifies room for improve-
ments.
Which spatial planning options were used to build engineering 
resilience?
In Miyako City, spatial planning for reconstruction based the designation of haz-
ardous areas to prevent urban development in areas that are exposed to hazards. 
In a second step, people who used to live in these areas were either relocated 
or the area of their former home was raised (the second option was used less 
often). Both of these spatial planning options intend to achieve the minimization 
of exposure of urban areas. The preparation of the new residential areas was 
achieved through the implementation of group relocation programs or land re-
adjustment projects. The absence of built structures in the affected areas after 
the disaster favors these planning processes. Thereby it is important that the 
planning instruments are applied with a certain degree of flexibility, so that they 
can be adapted to the changing situation in the post-disaster city. Furthermore, 
the projects should be implemented efficiently because the reconstruction of 
the city is a time sensitive issue (Miyako City, 2012a).
In addition, the need to implement additional building requirements (e.g., raising 
a house’s ground floor) in areas that can get affected by future L2-tsunami and 
the general application of the legally binding building codes ensured that the 
resilience of the city’s built structure was also increased. The construction of 
protective infrastructure in form of the seawall along the coast helps to mitigate 
the hazard.
In many cases, the utility infrastructure was improved. This especially con-
cerns the transportation network, which was thoroughly improved by readjust-
ing intricate and widening narrow roads. For this purpose, spatial planners also 
made use of land readjustment projects. The social infrastructure was only 
relocated to safer ground, when it was significantly affected by the GEJE and 
Tsunami. For all other facilities the relocation could not be funded. It needs to 
be considered that the planning of many of these aspects requires spatial plan-
ners to work in cooperation with sectoral planning departments. This concerns 
the Environmental Division, when sustainable building standards should be 
achieved or the School Education Division, when schools have to be relocated. 
In these cases, the required coordination lead to an extension of the planning 
process.
In summary it can be said that the influence of spatial planning options to build 
engineering resilience can be regarded as significant. This especially concerns 
items which include the change of land-uses or building codes. Nevertheless, 
spatial planners can also give important impulses for resilience items that re-
quire the cooperation with sectoral planning departments (e.g., utility or social 
infrastructure).
Part B | Chapter 8
173
Which spatial planning options were used to build evolutionary 
resilience?
Political-institutional resilience includes the preparation for hazardous events 
by assessing the risk and creating strategies to handle them. This includes the 
cooperation of spatial planners, especially for the preparation and provision of 
spatial information, like hazard maps. The preparation for a disaster concerns all 
units of the city administration, thus also the Planning Division. Currently all spa-
tial plans in Miyako City are checked for their accordance with the aim to build a 
disaster resilient city. It could therefore be assumed that the disaster helped to 
raise the awareness and the political-institutional resilience. Nevertheless, only 
time can tell if these achievements will be maintained in the future.
The reconstruction process after the GEJE and Tsunami revealed that guidelines 
with necessary steps to take after a disaster would have been a useful tool 
for spatial planners to start the reconstruction work. None of the local spatial 
planners was experienced with the reconstruction process after a large scale di-
saster, which complicated the decision where to begin and prolonged the start. 
The opinions regarding the pre-event development of a spatial reconstruction 
plan was regarded as useful, but infeasible. Instead, the reconstruction process 
was based on the city’s existing Comprehensive Plan. The case of Miyako City 
shows, that spatial planners are able to contribute to the increase of political-in-
stitutional resilience. These contributions are constituted of the assistance for 
risk assessment (e.g., by preparing hazard maps), their responsibility to inte-
grate disaster risks into spatial plans and the improvement of the spatial plan-
ner’s ability to handle a hazardous event if it occurs (e.g., through the develop-
ment of guidelines).
Socio-economic resilience can be built by including citizens into the planning 
process, keeping existing communities together and providing safe shelter 
through all phases of the reconstruction process. The comprehensive participa-
tion process in Miyako City notably brought community members closer togeth-
er, which lead to great advantages for the city (Miyako City Planning Division, 
Employee A, 2015). Some of these advantages are the acceleration of the im-
plementation of the land-use plans, which supported spatial planner’s efforts to 
build engineering resilience (Miyako City Planning Division, Employee A, 2015). 
The analysis shows that building socio-economic resilience cannot be achieved 
by strictly following legal requirements because they are not extensive enough 
to enable a truly meaningful interchange between the city administration and 
the local citizens. As the example of Miyako City shows, building socio-eco-
nomic resilience requires the personal dedication of all people involved: spatial 
planners, consultants and the local citizens.
The EIA is an important instrument for spatial planners to determine the impact 
of certain construction projects on ecosystem health. It should therefore conse-
quently be applied before large construction projects are implemented. Unfortu-
nately, this was not the case for the construction of the seawall in Miyako City. 
Ignoring the impacts of this project for the environment is counterproductive for 
the intended improvement of the relationship between man and nature, which 
is the main goal of Miyako City’s Comprehensive Plan. Achieving this goal of a 
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respectful relationship to nature would also result in an increase of environmen-
tal resilience. However, this goal cannot be achieved if the instrument to ensure 
a responsible handling of nature is not applied.
Which spatial planning options were able to build resilience? 
Which additional spatial planning options would have been useful 
to build resilience?
Generally speaking, the existing options that spatial planners have in their rep-
ertoire are able to build resilience. Nevertheless, the engineering background of 
the discipline results in the fact that most spatial planning options are able to 
build engineering resilience more easily than evolutionary resilience.
In Miyako City, evolutionary resilience could especially be built through the com-
prehensive participation process and the concentration on the maintenance of 
existing communities. This approach enabled a significant increase of social re-
silience, which was also confirmed by a spatial planner of the city’s Planning 
Division (Miyako City Planning Division, Employee A, 2015). Nevertheless, this 
increase of social resilience was only enabled by the personal effort that the 
local spatial planners, the city’s consultants and the involved local citizens put 
into the planning process, since such a comprehensive participation process is 
not legally required.
Political-institutional and environmental resilience leave some room for improve-
ments: Political-institutional resilience could be enhanced by the development 
of reconstruction guidelines with a list of relevant steps for a successful re-
construction process. Environmental resilience could be improved through the 
consistent application of the EIA to ensure the health of the ecosystems along 
Tohoku Coast.
8.5 USING THE WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY
This chapter discusses the constitution of the window of opportunity in Miyako 
City, how well the reconstruction process was prepared in advance of the disas-
ter and which options could be taken in order to improve the ability to use the 
window of opportunity more effectively.
How was the window of opportunity constituted in Miyako City?
One spatial planner of the city’s Planning Division stated in an interview that he 
does not perceive the development of the built infrastructure as an improve-
ment of the city structure. He bases this estimation on the large scale destruc-
tion of the city structure, which still needs to be restored (Miyako City Planning 
Division, Employee A, 2015). The estimation is justified because the city is cur-
rently still under construction and it will take more time until the city will be able 
to completely recover from the GEJE. This means, that the evaluation whether 
the window of opportunity could be used to improve engineering resilience can-
not conclusively happen until in several years. Nevertheless, according to the 
analysis in Chapter 8.4, it can be stated that the destruction through the GEJE 
and Tsunami could be used to build engineering resilience, e.g., by minimizing 
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the amount of vulnerable land at risk through relocation. In contrast to this, 
the same spatial planner understands the building of socio-economic resilience 
through the preservation of existing communities and the comprehensive par-
ticipation process as an opportunity enabled by the disaster that the city used 
(Miyako City Planning Division, Employee A, 2015).
Did Miyako City have any spatial plans for reconstruction prepared 
before the disaster?
Before the GEJE happened, Miyako City did not have any plan for the city’s 
spatial reconstruction after a disaster. The superordinate spatial plan that existed 
was the city’s Comprehensive Plan, which set the guiding principle for the city’s 
future spatial development. The plan was adopted in 2011, before the GEJE, 
and was completely unrelated to the possible occurrence of a disaster. The plan 
therefore did not make a point regarding the location of temporary housing sites 
or intended adjustments of the city’s built structure. This meant, that the local 
spatial planners and the involved consultants had to start from scratch after the 
GEJE occurred; a process that was very complicated and time consuming (Mi-
yako City Planning Division, Employee A, 2015). At least, the spatial vision of the 
Comprehensive Plan could be adopted as the main aim for the reconstruction 
process and thereby support the spatial planners.
How can the preparation of spatial plans for reconstruction before 
a disaster help to use the window of opportunity more effectively?
Having a spatial plan for the city’s reconstruction after a disaster prepared in 
advance, can speed up the planning process and enable the spatial planners to 
use the time after a disaster more effectively. Nevertheless, all interviewees in 
Miyako City agreed that the development of such plans would have been very 
complicated if they would include spatial details. The reasons for this are that 
it was impossible to foresee the actual impact of the disaster in advance and 
prepare the plan accordingly. Furthermore, local people were not interested to 
discuss possible options for relocation in advance of the disaster because they 
did not expect it to happen (Miyako City Planning Division, Employee A, 2015; 
Taro District Citizen A, 2015). Instead of the preparation of a spatial plan for re-
construction, it was suggested to prepare guidelines, which include all relevant 
steps to take after the disaster (Miyako City Planning Division, Employee A, 
2015). Such guidelines could assist the spatial planners and speed up the recon-
struction process. This would help them to use the window of opportunity more 
efficiently.
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9. CASE STUDY B: ISHINOMAKI CITY
To extent the experiences from Miyako City in Iwate Prefecture, this chapter pro-
vides insight into the reconstruction efforts in Ishinomaki City, which is located 
in Miyagi Prefecture. The chapter gives an overview about the city’s geographic 
and demographic structure, explains the impacts that the GEJE and Tsunami 
had and illustrates the main goals of the reconstruction process in Ishinomaki 
City. Furthermore, the chapter addresses the following guiding questions:
 ›  Which spatial planning options were used to build engineering  resilience?
 ›  Which spatial planning options were used to build evolutionary  resilience?
 ›  Which spatial planning options were able to build resilience? Which addi-
tional spatial planning options would have been useful to build  resilience?
 ›  How was the window of opportunity constituted in Ishinomaki City?
 ›  Did Ishinomaki City have any spatial plans for reconstruction prepared 
before the disaster?
 ›  How can the preparation of spatial plans for reconstruction before a 
 disaster help to use the window of opportunity more effectively?
9.1 INTRODUCTION OF ISHINOMAKI CITY
Ishinomaki City is located in the north-east of Miyagi Prefecture (see illustra-
tion 55 on the next page). It is the most severely affected city by the GEJE and 
Tsunami. Like in Miyako City, Ishinomaki City’s current size of 554.5 km2 was 
also obtained through the Great Heisei Agglomeration in 2005 (Statistics Bureau, 
Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications Japan, 2016a). Today, the city 
consists of the formerly independent parts Ishinomaki City, Kahoku Town, Ogat-
su Town, Kanan Town, Monou Town, Kitakami Town and Oshika Town (Statistics 
Bureau, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications Japan, 2014, Table No. 
62). The only neighboring town which remained independent is Onagawa Town, 
whose land-side is now completely surrounded by Ishinomaki City. Besides 
Onagawa Town in the east, Ishinomaki City borders the Pacific Ocean in the east 
and south. Ishinomaki City’s western neighbors are Higashi-Matsushima City, 
Misato Town and Wakuya Town. In the north it borders Tome City and Minami- 
sanriku Town. Kitakami River runs through the city of Ishinomaki. The river divides 
into two streams at the border of the city, resulting in two river mouths: Old Kita-
kami River flows into Ishinomaki Bay in the city’s south and Kitakami River flows 
into the Pacific Ocean in the east of Ishinomaki City. Ishinomaki City is located 
at the edge between the flat coastline in the south of Miyagi Prefecture and the 
ria coastline, which reaches farther north. This results in the fact that the west-
ern part of Ishinomaki City is flat, while its eastern part is hilly and mountainous 
(Ishinomaki City, Construction Department, City Planning Division, 2009, p. 10).
In 2010, before the GEJE occurred, Ishinomaki City had a population of 160,826 
people, which corresponded to an average population density of ~290 people 
per km2. However, it must be considered that the majority of Ishinomaki City’s 
population lives in the central district, while the towns that were incorporated in 
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Illustration 55 | Location of Ishinomaki City | Own illustration based on D-maps, 2016b
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2005 tend to have a much lower population density (Statistics Bureau, Ministry 
of Internal Affairs and Communications Japan, 2014, Table No. 62). This difference 
in population density was (and still is) reflected in the land-uses of Ishinomaki’s 
districts: The more densely populated Ishinomaki District is constituted of the 
city’s highest amount of residential area and area with other uses (incl. industri-
al). Nevertheless, this district was still largely rural with about 50% of the area 
occupied by forests and wilderness. In Ogatsu, Kitakami and Oshika Districts 
the amount of forest and wilderness is even higher, constituting between 75 
and almost 90% of the districts’ land. In Kanan and Monou District, farmland is 
the major land-use, constituting 53%, resp. 47% of the area (see illustration 56).
In 2015, Ishinomaki City had only 147,236 citizens, which is a decrease of about 
8.5% (Statistics Bureau, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications Japan, 
2016a). 3,600 of the lost population died or went missing during the GEJE and 
Tsunami (as of June 2013; Ishinomaki City Reconstruction Department, 2013, 
p. 1). Nevertheless, Ishinomaki City already had to struggle with the effects of 
demographic change before the disaster. They included both, a shrinking overall 
population and an increased number of elderly citizens (Ishinomaki City, Con-
struction Department, City Planning Division, 2009, p.  11). This demographic 
trend is expected to continue and predictions say that the population of Ishino-
maki City will shrink to 109,021 people by 2040 (see illustration 57 on the next 
page). However, because the number of members per household decreases, 
the number of households in Ishinomaki City increases despite its shrinking 
population. Between 1970 (with 42,447 households) and 2000 (with 57,259 
households), the number of households increased by about 35%. From 2000 
until 2005, the number of households started to decrease slightly by about 1% 
(Ishinomaki City, Construction Department, City Planning Division, 2009, p. 11).
Before the GEJE and Tsunami, Ishinomaki City was well known for its fishing 
and fish processing industries. Other important sectors were the shipbuilding 
Illustration 56 | Land-uses in Ishinomaki City (as of 1 October 2003) | Own illustration based 
on Ishinomaki City, Construction Department, City Planning Division, 2009, p. 22
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and pulp industry (Klien, 2016, pp. 40–41). Nevertheless, the city had to struggle 
with economic problems even before the disaster occurred. This manifests in the 
decreasing number of employed people in the industrial and agricultural sector. 
Between 1990 and 2005 the number of people working in the industrial sector 
decreased from 89,178 to 77,409 people. The decrease of workers in the agricul-
tural sector was even more severe. While 9,811 farmers worked in Ishinomaki 
City in 1980, the number had decreased to 5,583 farmers in 2005. In the fishery 
industry, the number of workers also decreased, while in 1978 8,630 fishermen 
worked in Ishinomaki City, in 2003 the number had decreased to 3,618 (Ishino-
maki City, Construction Department, City Planning Division, 2009, pp. 13–14). 
A development which puts much pressure on Ishinomaki’s city center is the 
downturn of the commercial sector. Both, the number of wholesale and retail 
businesses as well as the employees in this sector decreased between 1994 
and 2004. Nevertheless, this trend was accompanied with an increase of sales 
floor area, which is a result of the expansion of large-scale retail stores, which 
were opened along the Sanriku Expressway (Ishinomaki City, Construction De-
partment, City Planning Division, 2009, p. 15).
9.2 THE GREAT EAST JAPAN EARTHQUAKE AND 
TSUNAMI IN ISHINOMAKI CITY
Ishinomaki City was the most severely affected city by the GEJE and Tsunami 
considering casualties as well as destroyed buildings. The tsunami reached the 
coastline with a height up to 8.6 m (measured in Ayukawa District) (Ishinomaki 
City Reconstruction Department, 2013, p.  1). In Ishinomaki City, the tsunami 
inundated an area of 73 km2, which amounts to approximately 13% of the city’s 
area, leaving 3,162 people dead and 438 missing (as of 30 June 2013; Ishinoma-
ki City Reconstruction Department, 2013, p. 1).
Illustration 57 | Population development of Ishinomaki City | Own illustration based on Brink-
hoff, 2016b (population 1995-2015); National Institute of Population and Social Security 
Research, 2013 (estimates for 2015-2040)
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As table 23 illustrates, the tsunami completely damaged 20,039 houses. Ad-
ditional 13,048 houses suffered from large-scale destruction and 23,615 were 
partially destroyed. Considering the estimated number of 74,000 houses before 
the GEJE and Tsunami (Editorial Office of the Ishinomaki Kahoku, 2014, p. 53), 
this means that 76,6% of Ishinomaki City’s housing stock was affected and 27% 
was completely destroyed by the disaster.
9.3 POST-DISASTER RECONSTRUCTION PLANNING 
IN ISHINOMAKI CITY
In the first year after the GEJE and Tsunami, the basic concept for the reconstruc-
tion process was discussed and decided (Ishinomaki City Consultant, 2015). The 
official process began on 15 May 2011, two months after the GEJE, when the 
city administration organized a first meeting with experts to discuss the recon-
struction process for Ishinomaki City. Starting from this meeting, the Basic Re-
construction Plan Citizen Committee (hereafter: Ishinomaki Citizen Council) was 
established. The council met a total of eight times between 1 June and 8 No-
vember 2011 and was responsible for the development of the Ishinomaki Basic 
Reconstruction Plan; it consisted of various stakeholders (e.g., representatives 
of the Ishinomaki Chamber of Commerce and Industry, the fishing industry, 
medical associations, Man-bow, the children’s committee, and resident’s rep-
resentatives from various districts) (Ishinomaki City, 2013a; Kobayashi, Onoda, 
Hirano, & Ubaura, 2016).
To include the citizen’s opinion into the Basic Reconstruction Plan, the city ad-
ministration established a second council, which was responsible for the imple-
mentation of a citizen survey. The intention behind this survey was to gather 
information about the current situation of the citizens and their plans regarding 
their future housing situation (Kobayashi et al., 2016).
These two councils were overlooked by a Steering Committee, whose main 
responsibility was to discuss the recovery plans. After the draft version of the 
Basic Reconstruction Plan was completed, the local public was involved through 
opinion exchange meetings and the ability to submit written comments. After 
this round of participation, the Basic Reconstruction Plan was finalized and ap-
proved by the city congress in December 2011 (Ishinomaki City Planning Divi-
sion, Employee, 2015).
The plan sets the three main principles, policy steps and intended measures for 
the reconstruction process and covers the time frame from 2011 till 2020. The 
period from 2011-2013 is called the “reconstruction period”, the second period, 
Table 23 | Damaged houses after the GEJE and Tsunami in Ishinomaki City | Own illustration 
based on Ishinomaki City Reconstruction Department, 2016, p. 1
Number of completely damaged houses 20,039
Number of houses with large-scale destruction 13,048
Number of partially destroyed houses 23,615
Number of damaged houses N/D
Total number of damaged houses 56,702
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from 2014-2017, is called the “regeneration period” and the final phase, from 
2018-2020, is called the “Take-off period” (see illustration 58).
The plan includes the following three main principles, which can each be as-
signed to one of the types of resilience (see Chapter 3.2):
Disaster-resistant city
The Basic Reconstruction Plan intends to use the reconstruction process for the 
improvement of Ishinomaki City’s utility infrastructure in order to make it disas-
ter-resistant for the future, specifically stating the electricity and water supply 
networks. This also includes the expansion of new energy resources to broaden 
the used energy sources and make the energy system less failure-prone (Ishi-
nomaki City Reconstruction Department, 2013, p. 12). This principle especially 
focuses on the improvement of the city’s engineering resilience because it ad-
dresses the improvement of the disaster resilience of the built infrastructure.
Business renewal
Recovering Ishinomaki City’s economy is another important aspect of the Basic 
Reconstruction Plan. To reach this goal, the plan intends to revitalize the local 
industries, including the paper industry, pulp industry, animal feed industry, fer-
tilizer industry and laminated board production industry on the one hand and the 
agricultural and fishing industries on the other hand (Ishinomaki City Reconstruc-
tion Department, 2013, p. 12). This aspect addresses socio-economic resilience 
with an emphasis on the economic continuity of local businesses.
Vibrant community with bonding and cooperation
The third principle intends to create vibrant communities with strong social con-
nections. To reach these goals, the Basic Reconstruction Plan intends the local 
citizens’ support through the city authorities, their communities, companies, the 
university as well as non-profit organizations (Ishinomaki City Reconstruction 
Department, 2013, p. 12). This principle aims at the improvement of socio-eco-
nomic resilience with a focus on social aspects such as community cohesion.
The plan sets an overall budget of 1 trillion JPY for the ten-year reconstruction 
process of Ishinomaki City, a budget that corresponds to a regular budget of 100 
years. This means, that the reconstruction process after the GEJE condenses 
the activities of the public authorities from 100 years into ten years (Ishinomaki 
City Planning Division, Employee, 2015).
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Illustration 58 | Time frame of the reconstruction process in Ishinomaki City | Own illustra-
tion based on Ishinomaki City Reconstruction Department, 2013, p. 12
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Another important aspect of the reconstruction process, although not addressed 
in the Basic Reconstruction Plan, is the revitalization of the city center of Ishi-
nomaki City, which is intended to counteract the city’s urban sprawl that has 
been ongoing since the 1980s (Otsuka, 2014; Downtown Creative Reconstruc-
tion Committee, 2013). In connection with the demographic development, the 
urban sprawl results in an increased financial burden for the city administration 
in order to keep up the basic utility infrastructure for the entire area of the city 
(Ishinomaki City Planning Division, Employee, 2015). The concentrated develop-
ment in the city center based on the compact city policy attempts to solve this 
problem (Otsuka, 2014).
After the Basic Reconstruction Plan was established, the Steering Committee 
was transferred into the Ishinomaki Revival and Town Building Council (hereafter: 
Town Building Council). The Town Building Council consists of representatives 
from the local, prefectural and national government, private consultants, repre-
sentatives from academia and supporting expert groups (e.g., ArchiAid, Japan 
Institute of Architects (JIA)). To organize the wide range of reconstruction efforts, 
the Town Building Council is subdivided into three working groups: The Urban 
Area Working Group is concerned with recovery aspects in the urbanized area of 
Ishinomaki City. This area includes the part of the city, which used to be Ishino-
maki City before the Great Heisei Agglomeration in 2005. The Peninsula Working 
Group is concerned with recovery projects in the remaining, more rural area on 
the peninsula. The third working group focuses on Public Housing. Each working 
group is constituted similar to the Town Building Council, consisting of repre-
sentatives from the government, private consultants, representatives from aca-
demia and supporting expert groups. The council and the three working groups 
are all chaired by university professors (see illustration 59 on the next page).
During the second year after the GEJE, the Town Building Council had to de-
cide on the actual reconstruction plans in order to proceed with the projects 
(Ishinomaki City Consultant, 2015). This time pressure to proceed resulted in a 
low amount of public participation. To speed up the reconstruction planning, it 
was primarily controlled by the public sector. The private sector was only able 
to introduce their expectations and opinions into the three working groups and 
therefore had to rely on the working groups approval in order to have their ideas 
realized. In illustration 59 the public opinion is included in the right part of the 
figure.
In the third year after the GEJE, the implementation of the planned reconstruc-
tion projects started. A process that is still ongoing (Ishinomaki City Consultant, 
2015). In October 2015, each of the three principles for reconstruction – safety, 
industry and housing – had been progressed to about 40-50%, which means 
that there is still lots of work that needs to be done. The construction of housing 
is planned to be finished in 2017 (Ishinomaki City Planning Division, Employee, 
2015).
9.4 BUILDING RESILIENCE IN ISHINOMAKI CITY
Building resilience involves the consideration of engineering resilience, politi-
cal-institutional resilience, socio-economic resilience, and environmental resil-
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ience. The following chapters give an overview of the spatial planning options 
that were used in Ishinomaki City in order to build these four spheres of resil-
ience based on the resilience items introduced in Chapter 5.
9.4.1 Engineering resilience
The following chapters elaborate how the resilience items vulnerable land-us-
es at risk, building codes, urban design solutions, sustainable building design 
standards, protective infrastructure, disaster resilience of utility infrastructure 
and disaster resilience of social infrastructure were addressed throughout the 
reconstruction process of Ishinomaki City to build engineering resilience.
9.4.1.1 Vulnerable land-uses at risk
The reduction of vulnerable land-uses at risk combines agricultural [UN-4.1.1], 
economic [UN-4.1.2] and residential land-uses [UN-4.1.3]. The reconstruction 
process in Ishinomaki City uses the following approaches to reduce vulnerable 
land-uses at risk:
 ›  Minimization of exposure of urban areas: Land-use control in hazardous 
areas
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Illustration 59 | Organization structure of the reconstruction process in Ishinomaki City | Own illustration based on Ko-
bayashi et al., 2016, p. 266
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 ›  Minimization of exposure of urban areas: Relocation through relocation 
programs or land-readjustment projects
 ›  Hazard Mitigation: Protective infrastructure
The option to reduce risk through the artificial elevation of land is not used for 
residential land in Ishinomaki City. Instead of raising the land, residential land-us-
es will be protected through the construction of a two-tier levee and a river em-
bankment. The reason for this decision is, that even after the GEJE and Tsunami 
destroyed many buildings in Ishinomaki City’s central area, a significant amount 
of buildings withstood the disaster and still remain in the area. Raising the land 
of the city center would have resulted in the need to demolish all of these build-
ings and rebuild them on top of the raised land (Ishinomaki City, Downtown 
Creative Reconstruction Committee Member, personal communication, 24 Feb-
ruary 2015).
In Ishinomaki City, one of the main measures to reduce the exposure of vulner-
able land-uses to hazards is the construction of protective infrastructure. This in-
cludes the construction of a first and second levee along the coastline as well as 
the construction of a levee along the river mouth of Old Kitakami River to protect 
the city center. These measures will be discussed in Chapter 9.4.1.5. The prepa-
ration of hazard maps as a tool to prepare the land-use measures discussed in 
this chapter, will be reviewed in Chapter 9.4.2.2. This chapter discusses the ad-
ditional measures that were taken in order to protect vulnerable land-uses from 
hazards in case that the protective infrastructure fails.
Minimization of exposure of urban areas: Land-use control in 
hazardous areas
In Ishinomaki City, hazardous zones are designated based on hazard maps, 
which are developed on the basis of computer simulations. The hazard mapping 
is elaborated in detail in Chapter 9.4.2.2. The map considers the construction of 
a seawall along the coastline and uses the tsunami distinction between L1- and 
L2-tsunamis.
The reconstruction process in Ishinomaki City intends that all future residential 
areas should be safe from both L1- and L2-tsunami. This protection will be en-
sured through the construction of a first and second levee along the coast as 
well as a river embankment along both mouths of Kitakami River. Thus, areas 
which are not protected against future tsunamis were designated as hazard-
ous in accordance with Article 39 of the Building Standards Act. For instance, 
this is the case for the area between the first and second levee in Minamiha-
ma-Kadonowaki District, which is located directly by the ocean. The area will be 
excluded from the future development of vulnerable land-uses and is planned 
to be developed as a memorial park. People who used to live in this area are 
subject to a group relocation project to Hebita District (Ishinomaki City, Down-
town Creative Reconstruction Committee Member, 2015; Ministry of Land, In-
frastructure, Transport and Tourism, 2011). Another example for the designation 
of hazardous areas based on Article 39 of the Building Standards Act is the area 
between the first and second levee in Kama-Okaido District, which will also be 
prone to flooding in case of a L2-tsunami. This area is also restricted from future 
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residential development. Nevertheless, due to the areas vicinity to the city’s in-
dustrial port, the area is free for the development of industrial land-uses in order 
to integrate the industrial sites with the harbor. The residents who used to live 
in the hazardous area, are also subject for the group relocation project to Hebita 
District (Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism, 2011).
Minimization of exposure of urban areas: Relocation through 
relocation programs or land-readjustment projects
In order to reduce the vulnerable land-uses at risk, the administration of Ishino-
maki City planned the relocation of residential land-uses from hazardous to safe 
areas. The people in Ishinomaki City were free to choose where they wanted to 
relocate to and if they wanted to relocate as part of a group relocation project 
or individually.
The city administration developed six relocation sites within Ishinomaki District 
and additional 46 relocation sites in the suburbs. The six relocation sites in Ishino-
maki District (see table 24) were projected to cover an area of about 123 ha with 
2,950 houses for 7,570 residents (Ishinomaki City Reconstruction Department, 
2013).
The relocation of affected citizens in Ishinomaki City followed several steps, 
which are explained in the following paragraphs.
 › The number of required houses was determined with two question-
naires, which were conducted by the city administration in May 2011 
and May/ June 2012. The questionnaires surveyed the relocation plans 
of the affected citizens and served as a basis for the selection of the 
relocation sites (Ishinomaki City, 2013e; Ishinomaki City Reconstruction 
Department, 2011). Besides the information from the questionnaires, 
time was another important criterion for the selection of relocation sites 
in Ishinomaki City. The city administration mostly selected larger sites, 
which were located in the suburbs because the number of land owners 
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 17 Completion
4 7 10 1 4 7 10 1 4 7 10 1 4 7 10 1 4 7 10 1 Target year
(1) Shin Hebita
46.5 ha
Design, etc. 2019
X Construction 
(2) Shin Hebita South
27.4 ha 
Design, etc. 2019
X Construction
(3) Shin Hebita South 2
13.7 ha
Design, etc. 2019
X Construction
(4) Akebono North
5.6 ha
Design, etc. 2017
X Construction
(5) Shin Watanona
17.8 ha
Design, etc. 2017
X Construction
(6) Shin Watanona West
11.1 ha 
Design, etc. 2017
X Construction
Table 24 | Timeline for the six reconstruction projects in Ishinomaki District (X = Planning decision) | Own illustration based 
on Ishinomaki City Reconstruction Department, 2016, p. 34
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in this area was smaller than the number of land owners in the city’s 
urban area (Ishinomaki City Consultant, 2015; Ishinomaki City Planning 
Division, Employee, 2015). This sped up the negotiation process and 
helped to start the relocation faster. However, to implement Ishinomaki 
City’s vision to build a compact city, options that would have densified 
the city’s existing residential areas, could have been more appropriate. 
One option for this could have been the relocation of affected people 
from Minamihama Area onto Hiyoriyama Mountain, which is a safe loca-
tion. There are many old houses on the mountain, which are owned by 
people who are also getting old. This area could have been modernized 
by means of redevelopment projects in order to increase the buildings’ 
capacity. The problem with this idea was that the houses are privately 
owned and the negotiation with the land owners would have taken time 
and time was lacking (Ishinomaki City Consultant, 2015). Another option, 
which was discarded for the same reason, would have been the densi-
fication of the city center through the construction of new buildings on 
empty lots (Machizukuri Employee, 2015).
 › While some of the relocation project sites were already designated as 
UPA, the large scale developments in the suburbs, e.g., Shin Hebita Dis-
trict, were located in URA and designated as agricultural land. Accord-
ingly, the land had to be redetermined before the land readjustment proj-
ects to develop the land could start (Ubaura, Miyakawa, & Nieda, 2016).
 › The land for the relocation sites in Ishinomaki District is developed 
through the implementation of group relocation programs or publicly 
initiated land readjustment projects (Ishinomaki City Reconstruction De-
partment, 2013). Land readjustment projects are a useful spatial plan-
ning instrument to build the technical infrastructure and green spaces of 
residential areas (See Chapter 4.7).
 › The construction work for the six relocation projects in Ishinomaki Dis-
trict started between the end of 2012 and the end of 2013. While the 
construction work in the three smaller relocation sites (Akebono North, 
Shin Watanona and Shin Watanona West) concluded in the beginning 
of 2016, the construction work of the larger projects in Hebita are still 
ongoing and are scheduled to be completed in 2019 (see illustrations 
60 and 61).
 › After the construction work is finished, the housing sites are available 
for disposal. The distribution of housing lots started in 2014 and is 
scheduled to finish in 2017 (Ishinomaki estate information browsing 
WEB site, n. d.). People were able to apply for housing sites individ-
ually or as part of a group relocation project. In cases where the ap-
plications for one site exceeded the number of available housing lots, 
the future residents were selected via lottery. Many households, who 
intended to relocate to the city center, decided to apply individually 
because the application as a group did not provide any advantages for 
the relocation sites in this area. In the suburbs the situation differed 
and people were able to relocate together with their community more 
easily (Machizukuri Employee, 2015).
188
 › With the distribution of the lots to the new land-owners through a lot-
tery, the relocation process concludes and the land-owners begin with 
the construction of their new homes.
Agricultural land
In Ishinomaki City, 1,771 ha of agricultural land were flooded by the tsunami. 
This area equals 20% of the overall agricultural land in Ishinomaki City. The es-
timated damage for the agriculture and forestry industries was estimated with 
63.4 billion JPY. The recovery of the agricultural land took place through desalini-
zation and replanting with rice. No additional land-use planning measures were 
taken in order to reduce the future exposure of the agriculture land (Ishinomaki 
City Reconstruction Department, 2013).
Economic activity
The most important industries in Ishinomaki City before the disaster were paper, 
pulp, animal feed, fertilizer and laminated board production. Due to the location 
of these industrial sites directly by the ocean, they were completely destroyed. 
In addition to this, many agricultural and fishing businesses, which were vital 
for the city’s food supply, were also affected. The reconstruction required the 
cooperation between businesses because not the entire former industrial area 
will be designated for future industrial land-uses. This means that the industrial 
businesses are required to move closer together (Ishinomaki City Reconstruc-
tion Department, 2013).
9.4.1.2 Building Codes
Japan’s strict building codes to reduce risks (especially the impact of earth-
quakes) [UN-4.2.1] also apply to the reconstruction of Ishinomaki City. These 
Illustration 60 | Land-use plan for Shin Hebita District (Ishinomaki City) | Ishinomaki Estate 
Information Browsing Website, n. d.
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building codes are continually enforced [UN-4.2.2] and updated [UN-4.2.3]. Due 
to this frequent update, the newly constructed buildings that replace the old 
building stock, which was destroyed by the tsunami, will possess a larger en-
gineering resilience than the former buildings (Ishinomaki City, Downtown Cre-
ative Reconstruction Committee Member, 2015).
In addition to these general building codes, it is also recommended that people 
should not use the ground floor of their houses for residential uses. Instead, 
these areas should be used for shops or parking spaces in order to keep the 
people safe if a tsunami occurs. For houses that only consist of residential uses, 
the people are recommended to sleep on the first floor to be safe at night (Ishi-
nomaki City, Downtown Creative Reconstruction Committee Member, 2015).
9.4.1.3 Urban design solutions
Part of the reconstruction process of Ishinomaki City is the establishment of 
two urban parks and a green promenade along Old Kitakami River, which con-
tribute to a sustainable urban design [UN-4.3.1]. The advantage of such areas 
can be the regulation of the city’s climate and the absorption of possible heavy 
rainfalls – problems that are expected to increase with progressing global warm-
ing (see Chapter 5.4)
On Nakaze Island, where the Ishinomaki Mangattan Museum is located, a park is 
planned. Another park, the Ishinomaki Tsunami Memorial Park, is planned direct-
ly by the sea in Minamihama District, an area which is restricted for future urban 
development (Ishinomaki City Reconstruction Department, 2016). The design for 
the park includes a pond and wetlands, a pine tree forest along the coast and an 
evacuation hill (see illustration 62 on the next page; Ishinomaki City, n. d.).
Another large scale project is the planned green promenade along Old Kitakami 
River. The promenade should make the planned river embankment more attractive 
for the citizens and increase the embankments functions (Ishinomaki City, 2013f).
In addition to these large scale projects, the city administration also includes 
smaller green spaces and retention areas in the newly developed relocation 
sites. One example for this is Shin Hebita District, which includes the develop-
Illustration 61 | Construction site in Hebita District | Photo by author, September 2015
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ment of various smaller and larger parks and green spaces as well as a reten-
tion basin. The urban design for this relocation site also won the Special Urban 
Landscape Award for urban development projects in the fiscal year 2016 by the 
Urban Design Center, which accentuates its innovative approach (see illustration 
60; Urban Design Center, n. d.).
The revitalization of the inner city is another important point for spatial planning 
because the sprawl of the city increases the (financial) burden on the city ad-
ministration (Ishinomaki City Planning Division, Employee, 2015). Therefore, it is 
intended to concentrate the urban development on the city center. This process 
is still ongoing and it will take some time to know if this goal can be achieved.
9.4.1.4 Sustainable building design standards
If buildings are constructed in accordance with sustainable building design stan-
dards, it can reduce their susceptibility against natural hazards, e.g., if they are 
energy-self-sufficient [UN-4.3.2]. In Ishinomaki City, the restricted time after the 
GEJE and Tsunami resulted in an exclusion of additional aspects such as the 
consideration of sustainable building design standards. The main primary task 
was to build new housing for the affected people as fast as possible. Aspects 
like the selection of sustainable building material (e.g., recycled material) or ad-
ditional ecological aspects were not considered (Machizukuri Employee, 2015).
The city intends the installation of solar panels on private houses to increase 
their independence from the energy supply system and also set up incentives 
to support this intention (Ishinomaki City, 2016d). If these plans are going to 
be realized depends on the time and money available to maintain such installa-
tions (Ishinomaki City, Downtown Creative Reconstruction Committee Member, 
2015).
Illustration 62 | Design of the Tsunami Memorial Park in Minamihama District (Ishinomaki 
City) | Ishinomaki City, n. d., p. 2
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9.4.1.5 Protective Infrastructure
In Ishinomaki City, the construction [UN-8.1.1] and maintenance [UN-8.1.2] of 
effective protective infrastructure is a vital aspect to increase the city’s engi-
neering resilience (Ishinomaki City Consultant, 2015; Ishinomaki City Planning 
Division, Employee, 2015). The construction of a two-tier levee system along 
the coast and the river embankment along Old Kitakami River enable the on-
site reconstruction in Ishinomaki’s city center and parts of the severely affected 
Minamihama District. However, the people of Ishinomaki are aware that the 
construction of protective infrastructure alone is not enough to stay safe in case 
of a hazardous event. Therefore, enabling the people to evacuate in case of a 
hazardous event and prepare them for this situation is another important as-
pect in order to build resilience (Machizukuri Employee, 2015). This includes the 
construction of evacuation facilities, such as tsunami evacuation towers, the 
designation of tsunami evacuation buildings, and the set up and maintenance of 
evacuation routes and locations (see illustration 63; Ishinomaki City Reconstruc-
tion Department, 2016).
The specialty of the two-tier levee system in Ishinomaki City is that it is in-
tended to protect all residential areas not only from L1-, but also L2-tsunamis 
in order to enable the citizens to feel safe (Ishinomaki City Planning Division, 
Employee, 2015). The system was planned in cooperation between Ishinomaki 
City, the prefectural and national government (Ishinomaki City Planning Division, 
Employee, 2015) and is designed in the following way: The construction of a 
T.P. 7.2-meter-high seawall along the shore is supposed to protect the low lying 
land behind it from L1-tsunamis (Ishinomaki City Reconstruction Department, 
2016). The height was decided by the prefectural government, which is respon-
sible for the construction of the seawall, based on the height of historical tsu-
namis. The higher L2-tsunamis will overtop this seawall and flood the area be-
tween the first and second levee. However, the second levee, which is either 
constructed as a raised road or a raised green space (depending on the location) 
Illustration 63 | Map of planned protective infrastructure in Ishinomaki District (Ishinomaki 
City) | Ishinomaki City, 2016b, p. 32 
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will prevent the water to flood the residential areas behind. The height of this 
secondary levee varies between T.P. 3.5 m and T.P. 4.5 m (Ishinomaki City Con-
sultant, 2015; Ishinomaki City Reconstruction Department, 2016).
The GEJE Tsunami ran up Old Kitakami River and caused severe flooding along 
the riverside. Therefore, it is planned to construct a river embankment with a 
height between T.P. 4.1 m and T.P. 7.2 m along the river in order to protect the 
neighboring areas (Ishinomaki City Reconstruction Department, 2016). Kitakami 
River is considered a Class A river, with major importance for the national econ-
omy and people’s wellbeing. Thus, its administration falls under the competence 
of the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism in accordance with 
the River Law (Infrastructure Development Institute Japan, 1999). Accordingly, 
the national government is responsible for the construction of the river embank-
ment along the river mouth. However, the development of the project is planned 
to be made in accordance with the city administration’s plan for the new city 
center (Ishinomaki City Reconstruction Department, 2013).
To enable the people to evacuate in case of a tsunami, it is important to have a 
sufficient number of evacuation buildings available. These can either be specifical-
ly constructed tsunami evacuation towers or regular apartment buildings that are 
high and robust enough to be used as evacuation buildings in case of a tsunami. 
To increase the number of evacuation facilities in the central area in comparison 
to before the GEJE and Tsunami, the newly constructed public housing buildings 
with six or seven floors will be officially designated as evacuation facilities (Ishino-
maki City, Downtown Creative Reconstruction Committee Member, 2015).
9.4.1.6 Disaster resilience of utility infrastructure
This item considers all measures taken in order to increase the disaster resilience 
of Ishinomaki City’s communication networks [UN-8.2.1, UN-8.2.2, UN-8.2.3], 
the electricity [UN-8.3.1, UN-8.3.2, UN-8.3.3] and gas [UN-8.5.1, UN-8.5.2, UN-
8.5.3, UN-8.5.4] networks, the water and sanitation networks [UN-8.4.1, UN-
8.4.2, UN-8.4.3] as well as the transportation networks (incl. roads, evacuation 
routes, railroads, airports, ports and other public transportation networks) [UN-
8.6.1, UN-8.6.2, UN-8.6.3, UN-8.6.4, UN-8.6.5, UN-8.6.6]. The recognition of the 
importance to improve the disaster resilience of the city’s utility infrastructure 
is reflected in Ishinomaki City’s Basic Reconstruction Plan. The first principle 
states that the city’s utility infrastructure should not simply be restored, but 
improved in regard to its disaster resilience (Ishinomaki City Reconstruction De-
partment, 2013).
Despite their importance, aspects like the improvement of the utility infrastruc-
ture – beyond the recovery of the basic functions – initially had to be set aside. It 
was the city administration’s priority to ensure people a safe environment, sup-
ply them with housing and recover the local industry (Ishinomaki City Planning 
Division, Employee, 2015).
Transportation
One important issue regarding the transportation network was the reconstruc-
tion of the local wharves, which included raising the descended land in order to 
Part B | Chapter 9
193
keep the wharfs above sea level. The reconstruction process for all wharves in 
Ishinomaki City was scheduled to be finished in 2016. (Ishinomaki City Recon-
struction Department, 2013)
There are various measures to improve the city’s road network, with a special 
focus on arterial roads that double as evacuation routes in case of a hazardous 
event. For instance, raising and widening the east-west connection in Minami-
hama District will prevent the road to become inaccessible in case of a tsunami. 
In addition to this, the road network is planned to be extended through the con-
struction of additional arterial roads in order to secure a smooth traffic stream 
and a safe evacuation in case of a tsunami. These projects also include the con-
struction of a new bridge in the north of the city center in order to shorten the 
connection between the east and west parts of Highway 398 (Ishinomaki City, 
2016b).
Planning the new road network, is especially challenging because of the coop-
eration needed in order to plan and implement the projects. This includes the 
coordination between various sectoral planning divisions on the level of the city 
administration (e.g., City Planning Division, Infrastructure Development Division) 
as well as the coordination between different administrative levels (e.g., munic-
ipal and prefectural level). The responsibility of different administrative levels is 
based on the type of road – while the city is responsible for the construction and 
maintenance of local roads, the prefecture is responsible for the construction 
and maintenance of highways (e.g., Highway 398) (Ishinomaki City, 2016a).
Energy
One aim for the improvement of the energy supply system is the equipment of 
buildings with solar panels in order to improve their energetic independence. 
This is especially important for buildings where people gather in the case of 
hazardous events, such as the disaster prevention center, emergency facili-
ties or schools. For the case of an emergency, these buildings are furthermore 
equipped with storage batteries to supply them with electricity, even if the reg-
ular networks are down (Ishinomaki City, 2016c). Furthermore, a solar power 
plant in Shin Hebita District was opened in March 2016. The plant is supposed to 
deliver electricity for some of the public housing units on the newly constructed 
relocation site and secure a sufficient power supply in case of an emergency. 
The power generation of the plant amounts to 310,000 kWh/ year (Ishinomaki 
City, 2016c). To support the installation of solar panels on private houses and 
businesses, the city administration offers incentives on property taxes (Ishino-
maki City, 2016d).
9.4.1.7 Disaster resilience of social infrastructure
Building the disaster resilience of social infrastructure includes police and first 
responders [UN-8.7.1], the prison system [UN-8.7.2], education facilities [UN-
8.8.1] and health care and emergency facilities [UN-8.9.1]. In addition to this, 
an ongoing access to the basic administrative functions [UN-8.10.1] should be 
ensured. Directly after the disaster, the recovery of the basic functions for each 
of these aspects had priority (Ishinomaki City, 2011, p. 23). For instance, the 
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educational services continued in temporary locations throughout the city (Ishi-
nomaki City Reconstruction Department, 2013).
To ensure the long-term safety of these facilities, they should be located in safe 
areas. In Ishinomaki City, this specifically concerns the hospital and multiple 
schools. Planning the relocation of social infrastructure facilities requires the 
cooperation of the city planning division with various sectoral planning divisions 
(e.g., Health Section, Board of Education).
One example in Ishinomaki City, is the relocation of Ishinomaki City Hospital to 
its new location nearby the City Hall and Ishinomaki Station (Ishinomaki City, 
Downtown Creative Reconstruction Committee Member, 2015). The hospital 
was originally opened in Minamihama District in 1998. After the hospital was 
flooded and became unusable through the GEJE and Tsunami, it had to be de-
molished. The staff moved to temporary locations to maintain the main medical 
services. The city administration decided to relocate the hospital to its new place 
in order to keep it safe in case of another large-scale tsunami. The new building, 
which accommodates 180 hospital beds, was opened on 1 September 2016 and 
is now in operation (Ishinomaki Municipal Hospital, 2016). The reconstruction of 
the project occurred under the Miyagi Prefecture’s community health system 
rebuilding plan (Ishinomaki City Reconstruction Department, 2013).
Another example for increased resilience of social infrastructure is the relocation 
of educational facilities that were partly or severely damaged by the tsunami. The 
most tragic example is the complete inundation of Okawa Elementary School, 
where 74 children and 10 teachers died (O’Dwyer, 2016). Some schools were 
able to be recovered in their former facilities (i.e., Minato Elementary School, 
Minato Junior High School, Watanoha Elementary School). These schools will 
be protected from future tsunamis through the construction of protective infra-
structure and could reopen in April 2014. The planning procedures for Ogatsu 
District’s combined Elementary and Junior High School (which was constituted 
through merging the former Elementary Schools Ogatsu and Funakoshi with 
Ogatsu Junior High School) and Watanoha Junior High School started in mid-
2013 with the aim to move the schools to a new inland site. The schools are 
scheduled to reopen in 2017. Due to the relocation of these schools, the planning 
processes included the development of a basic concept and design before the 
construction work began. For the construction of Ogatsu District Elementary and 
Junior High School, the land had to be acquired. Watanoha Junior High School 
is developed as part of a land readjustment project, which is why the separated 
step of land acquisition was not necessary. Nevertheless, the implementation 
of the land readjustment project also requires time and effort (Ishinomaki City 
Reconstruction Department, 2013, 2016).
9.4.2 Political-institutional resilience
The following paragraphs analyze the spatial planning options used to build po-
litical-institutional resilience by addressing the resilience items proposal eval-
uation for disaster resilience, implementation of risk assessments, pre-event 
planning for disaster recovery and learning loops.
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9.4.2.1 Proposal evaluation for disaster resilience
The evaluation of new planning proposals for disaster resilience [UN-1.2.1] gets 
more and more important as time passes. Since the current spatial planning pro-
cesses prioritize the citizen’s safety, it does not take avoidable risks and prevents 
residential land-uses in hazardous areas (Ishinomaki City Planning Division, Em-
ployee, 2015; Ishinomaki City, Downtown Creative Reconstruction Committee 
Member, 2015). Nevertheless, the past shows that as time goes by, trade-offs 
between safety and convenience occur. One example for this is the relatively 
new urbanization of Minamihama District (Ishinomaki City, Downtown Creative 
Reconstruction Committee Member, 2015). The district does not have a long 
history as a residential area due to its direct exposure to the ocean (Ishinomaki 
City, Downtown Creative Reconstruction Committee Member, 2015). Therefore, 
it is necessary, that the city administration of Ishinomaki City secures that all 
future spatial plans are reviewed under the consideration of the plan’s disaster 
resilience. One possibility to achieve this goal is to keep the lessons learned 
through the GEJE alive (see Chapter 9.4.2.4).
9.4.2.2 Risk assessment
Risk assessment combines assembling the knowledge about possible hazards 
[UN-2.1.1], a city’s exposure and vulnerabilities [UN-2.1.2] and the knowledge 
about critical assets and their connections to each other [UN-2.1.3]. To illustrate 
this information, hazard maps [UN-2.1.4] are a helpful tool.
The hazard maps for Ishinomaki City were developed with the help of computer 
simulations using the concept of L1- and L2-tsunamis (see illustration 64). The 
map shows that – in case of a L2-tsunami – the entire area between the first and 
secondary levee will become inundated, thus revealing the importance of the 
construction of the secondary levee.
Illustration 64 | Results from the L2-tsunami simulation for Ishinomaki District (Ishinomaki 
City) | Ishinomaki City, 2011, References Section p. 7
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In Ishinomaki City, the entire area which is expected to be flooded in case of a 
L2-tsunami was designated as hazardous in accordance with Article 39 of the 
Building Standards Act (Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism, 
2011). This is an exception since many other cities allow the construction of 
residential buildings in areas with an expected inundation depth of less than 
2 m. In many cases this permission is connected with the requirement to apply 
specific building standards (see Chapter 8). In the central district, parts of Mi-
namihama-Kadonowaki District and Kama-Okaido District were designated as 
hazardous (Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism, 2011).
The importance to continuously update risk scenarios with the improvement 
of technical forecast methods [UN-2.2.1] and to consider the unexpected is il-
lustrated by the fact that Ishinomaki City had a tsunami hazard map prepared 
before the GEJE and Tsunami (Machizukuri Employee, 2015). The map did not 
consider the possibility of such a large scale event and was therefore misleading 
instead of helpful (O’Dwyer, 2016). Of course the revision of the risk scenarios 
should also include new risks that might occur in the future (e.g., the increased 
occurrence of heavy rainfalls due to global warming). In Ishinomaki City, these 
aspects are not thoroughly considered so far.
9.4.2.3 Pre-event planning for disaster recovery
Planning for post event recovery in advance of a disaster can help to use the 
window of opportunity more effectively [UN-2.1.2]. In the context of spatial plan-
ning, pre-event planning can include the preparation of spatial visions or plans 
for reconstruction. In the case of Ishinomaki City, the city administration did not 
have any post event recovery plans prepared before the GEJE and Tsunami; the 
relocation plan for the affected people was developed after the disaster (Ishi-
nomaki City Planning Division, Employee, 2015; Machizukuri Employee, 2015). 
Nevertheless, the city had a Master Plan, including the city’s guiding principle 
and additional concepts that could generally serve as a basis for the reconstruc-
tion process. Another existing plan was the revitalization plan for the city’s cen-
tral area that was already developed before the GEJE and Tsunami. Although the 
plan did not have any connection to the occurrence of the disaster, it was used 
as a basis for the development of the reconstruction plan for the area. In this 
regard, the existing plans helped to simplify the reconstruction process. One 
aspect from the revitalization plan, which was then included into the reconstruc-
tion plan, was the attraction of tourists (Machizukuri Employee, 2015).
In Ishinomaki City, the expert’s opinions on the usefulness of pre-event land-
use planning for after a disaster differ: On the one hand, preparing a recovery 
land-use plan in advance would be very complicated and expensive, since all 
possible hazards (e.g., tsunami, earthquake, flooding, sand storm) and their po-
tential impacts would have to be considered (Machizukuri Employee, 2015). As 
the GEJE shows, these estimations can easily be incorrect and the plan there-
fore be useless. Furthermore, the development of such a plan is associated with 
a necessity for action: If the plan determines certain areas as hazardous and 
includes possible relocation sites for the people, who live in this area, it would 
be necessary to relocate these households right away instead of waiting until 
a disaster occurs (which is also the actual intention of Article 39 of the Building 
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Standards Act) (Ishinomaki City, Downtown Creative Reconstruction Committee 
Member, 2015). This illustrates how thinking about certain aspects is directly 
linked with the need for action and the associated costs. Another reason against 
the development of the pre-event development of spatial disaster reconstruc-
tion plans is the citizen’s lack of interest to participate in the planning process. 
This lack of interest is caused by the low frequency of disasters like the GEJE 
and Tsunami, which only occurs once in a thousand years. The citizens were not 
willing to be concerned with reconstruction planning before the occurrence of 
the disaster because they did not expect to experience such an event during 
their lifetime (Ishinomaki City Planning Division, Employee, 2015).
On the other hand, the in advance preparation of such a plan, including the 
estimated damage from the tsunami, the determination of relocation sites for 
residential land-uses and required protective infrastructure would have acceler-
ated the implementation of the reconstruction plans (Ishinomaki City Planning 
Division, Employee, 2015). This aspect is especially relevant because time after 
a disaster is short and the requirement to initially develop the reconstruction 
plan before the actual reconstruction process can start, can result in unwanted 
developments: For instance, the city administration selected relocation sites on 
former agricultural land in the suburbs, instead of using the opportunity to fill 
in empty lots in the city center or renovating old houses on Hiyoriyama Moun-
tain (Ishinomaki City Consultant, 2015; Machizukuri Employee, 2015). Such a 
development contradicts with the city’s guiding principle of a compact city. To 
implement the compact city policy after the disaster, it would have been helpful 
to establish a plan to reach this goal in advance of the disaster (Ishinomaki City 
Consultant, 2015). To get the local citizens on-board for the development of a 
pre-event developed reconstruction plan, it should focus on the improvement of 
their everyday life – even if no disaster occurs. This means the plan could rather 
be considered as a vision for the city’s development that also considers the pos-
sibility of the occurrence of a hazardous event thoroughly (Ishinomaki City Con-
sultant, 2015). Aspiring to realize this vision, even if no hazardous event occurs, 
could also solve the problem of people living in hazardous areas, through their 
gradual relocation. In addition to this, involving the citizens into the selection of 
the relocation sites to a greater extent could also increase their preparedness 
and acceptance of the changing situation (Ishinomaki City, Downtown Creative 
Reconstruction Committee Member, 2015). Even if the development of such 
plans would be expensive, they would be very useful, according to one of Ishi-
nomaki City’s consultants (Ishinomaki City Consultant, 2015).
9.4.2.4 Learning loops
In order to advance political-institutional resilience, it is important to use past 
disasters to learn for the future (learning loops) [UN-2.1.3]. Therefore, it is im-
portant to collect lessons learned and prepare them for future use. One lesson 
learned from the GEJE, is the necessity to expect the unexpected. This is di-
rectly related to the necessity to have evacuation measures in place, even if the 
construction of protective infrastructure intends to completely protect the entire 
residential area from future tsunamis (Ishinomaki City, Downtown Creative Re-
construction Committee Member, 2015; Machizukuri Employee, 2015).
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In order to keep the memories of the tsunami’s destructive force active, there 
are several measures taken. One example is the preservation of the Okawa Ele-
mentary School, where 74 students and 10 staff members lost their life because 
they did not expect the tsunami to come so far inland (O’Dwyer, 2016). Keeping 
this monument can remind future generations of the destructive force of tsu-
namis and show the importance to evacuate even though the current location 
might feel safe. Another project, implemented by the Downtown Creative Re-
construction Committee, is the smart phone app “Ishinomaki Tsunami AR” that 
enables people to personally experience the GEJE and Tsunami’s impact on the 
city center of Ishinomaki City, by featuring pre- and post-tsunami pictures as well 
as future visions (see illustration 65 and 66). These pictures can be compared to 
the user’s current location in Ishinomaki City. The app also offers to experience 
the inundation height of the tsunami at the current location of the user (see illus-
tration 67). The intention behind the app is to keep the memories from the GEJE 
active and preserve them for visitors and future generations.
Only time will tell, if the lessons learned though the GEJE and Tsunami and 
the reconstruction process afterwards will be valued in the future. This includes 
that the land-use restrictions made in the aftermath of the GEJE (e.g., the des-
ignation of hazardous zones) will be maintained independently from the city’s 
future development. With the aging and shrinking population that Ishinomaki 
City currently has to face, it seems unlikely that the pressure to develop further 
residential areas will get so high that the city administration decides to repeal 
the land-use restrictions. However, the short history of the residential area in Mi-
namihama District (Ishinomaki City, Downtown Creative Reconstruction Com-
mittee Member, 2015) illustrates that such a disastrous decision was taken at a 
certain point in the past and if the lessons from the GEJE are not kept alive, this 
could happen again.
Illustration 65 | Post-tsunami picture from 
the Ishinomaki Tsunami AR app | Ishi-
nomaki Future Support Association, 
2015
Illustration 67 | Tsunami 
inundation level 
from the Ishinoma-
ki Tsunami AR app 
| Ishinomaki Future 
Support Associa-
tion, 2015
Illustration 66 | Future vision from the Ishi-
nomaki Tsunami AR app | Ishinomaki 
Future Support Association, 2015
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9.4.3 Socio-economic resilience
Socio-economic resilience can be addressed with the following resilience items: 
citizen participation, social connectedness and neighborhood cohesion and the 
provision of safe shelter. The following chapters analyze the ability of spatial 
planning options to address these items and explain how this was done.
9.4.3.1 Consideration of citizen’s needs
This item combines the coverage with grassroots organizations [UN-7.1.1] and 
their ability to use their networks [UN-7.1.2] in order to have their opinions heard 
during the planning process. In addition to grassroots organizations, participa-
tion processes should also specifically include vulnerable segments of the pop-
ulation [UN-7.1.4] to ensure the consideration of their needs.
The Basic Reconstruction Plan of Ishinomaki City does not specifically state 
goals regarding the participation of citizens in the city’s reconstruction process, 
which corresponds with the fact that citizen participation did not have particular 
importance during the planning for reconstruction in Ishinomaki City. Therefore, 
the involvement of the public corresponds with the basic legal requirements, 
which provide for a two-stage participation process consisting of the informa-
tion of the public (e.g., through information events) and the public display of the 
plans associated with the opportunity to submit comments (see Chapter 4.7). 
Corresponding with this, the city administration ensured the information of the 
citizens and enabled them to give their opinion on the reconstruction planning 
at citizen consultation meetings. Nevertheless, the city administration did not 
offer the possibility for active involvement by organizing planning workshops or 
similar events. Events that went beyond the legal requirements, were organized 
by grassroots organizations.
While some citizens were very interested in participating in the planning pro-
cesses for the reconstruction of Ishinomaki City, others were not. This was es-
pecially the case for people who lost relatives in the disaster and had to cope 
with their grief before they were able to focus on other issues (Ishinomaki City, 
Downtown Creative Reconstruction Committee Member, 2015).
Citizen information
According to the law, the citizens of Ishinomaki City were informed about the 
most important aspects of the reconstruction process. For instance, the city 
administration held a total of 33 briefings in the seven most affected districts: 
Kama District, Okaido District, Minato District, Central District, Kadonowaki Dis-
trict, Minamihama District, Watanoha District (Ishinomaki City, 2013d). At these 
meetings, the city administration informed the land owners from these districts 
about the planned reconstruction measures and the time frame for implemen-
tation. The meetings were held between 24 November and 17 December 2011 
(Ishinomaki City, 2013d). As the information material for Minamihama District 
illustrates (see illustration 68 on the next page), the spatial plans for each area 
had already been prepared by the local government prior to these meetings and 
a discussion about their general objective was not intended (Ishinomaki City, 
2013d).
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Citizen consultation
As described in Chapter 9.3, the city administration established a council with the 
purpose to implement a survey, to enable the incorporation of the citizen’s opin-
ions into the Basic Reconstruction Plan. The survey was conducted in May 2011 
to evaluate the situation after the GEJE. It inquired information about the citizen’s 
location before the GEJE, the damage situation of their houses and future plans 
for residence, including housing type and intended location. Furthermore, the sur-
vey also collected the citizen’s opinion on possible measures to increase the city’s 
disaster resilience (only offering engineering solutions) and additional aspects of 
the urban environment that the citizens might consider important (e.g., revitalized 
shopping street, green spaces, adjusting the infrastructure to the requirements of 
elderly people, etc.) (Ishinomaki City Reconstruction Department, 2011). In May 
and June 2012, the city administration conducted a second survey to collect cur-
rent information about the citizens plans for reconstruction. The survey gathered 
information about the intended reconstruction method and the intended location 
to live for private as well as public housing (Ishinomaki City, 2013e). This survey 
served as the basis for the decision about the reconstruction sites to rebuild the 
city (Ishinomaki City Reconstruction Department, 2013).
Regarding the Basic Reconstruction Plan, which set the basic guidelines for 
Ishinomaki City’s reconstruction process, the general public was invited to dis-
cuss the draft version of the plan in 15 opinion exchange meetings between 
15 November and 10 December 2011 (Ishinomaki City, 2013b). Between the 
Downtown 
Recovery Council
Morning
Meeting (Ended after a year)
Started April 2011
Started March 2011
Started December 2011
Downtown Creative 
Reconstruction 
Committee
Preparatory 
Committee for 
Townscape
Illustration 68 | Information brochure for the briefing in 
Kadonowaki-Minamihama District | Ishinomaki City 
Infrastructure Development Division, 2011
Illustration 69 | Formation of the Downtown Creative 
Reconstruction Committee | Own illustration adapted 
from Otsuka, 2014, p. 25
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10-23  November 2011, the citizens were also able to submit their written com-
ments on the draft version of the Basic Reconstruction Plan; an opportunity that 
twelve people, one organization and three companies used (Ishinomaki City, 
2013c).
Citizen’s active involvement
Grassroots organizations play an important role for the citizen participation in 
Ishinomaki City. One example is the machizukuri Man-bow, which was estab-
lished in 2001 to establish the Ishinomaki Mangattan Museum on Nakaze Island. 
After the disaster, the previously established machizukuri was very helpful be-
cause the incoming people could build on its experience, history and connection 
with local people (e.g., shop owners), which simplified the coordination of the 
reconstruction planning. The ability to use existing structures from the beginning 
and not having to establish them saved time. Therefore, Man-bow was able 
to serve as a contact point for the incoming specialists from the private sec-
tor (Ishinomaki City, Downtown Creative Reconstruction Committee Member, 
2015). To optimize the coordination of incoming NPOs, NGOs and special vol-
unteers (e.g., doctors), Man-bow initiated the establishment of the Ishinomaki 
Disaster Recovery Assistance Council (IDRAC) in May 2011. The network organi-
zation changed its name to Ishinomaki Future Support Association in November 
2012. (Ishinomaki Disaster Recovery Assistance Council, 2012).
In the central area of Ishinomaki City, the citizens – a mixture of shop owners 
and residents – started to think about the future of their neighborhood as soon 
as one month after the disaster. Developing from weekly morning meetings, 
that were established directly after the GEJE in order to exchange current infor-
mation, the Downtown Recovery Council was formed in April 2011 (Ishinomaki 
City, Downtown Creative Reconstruction Committee Member, 2015). The Down-
town Recovery Council, consisting of local citizens, the team of the Revival Ishi-
nomaki Project and members of Man-bow, met in three workshops to discuss 
their ideas for the reconstruction process of their neighborhood with experts 
from academia and representatives from the local government (Otsuka, 2014). 
At the first workshop, general ideas were collected, at the second workshop, 
these ideas were prioritized and at the third workshop, the council members 
revised and finalized their vision. Between the workshops, the planning experts 
edited and prepared the outcomes for the next meeting (Toyoshima, Kariya, Ut-
sumi, & Onuki, 2012). The finalized reconstruction plan “Spirit of Kawa-Minato, 
Ishinomaki” was submitted to the mayor of Ishinomaki City on 30 June 2011 
(Otsuka, 2014).
The Downtown Recovery Council evolved into the Preparatory Committee for 
Townscape and in December 2011, the Downtown Creative Reconstruction 
Committee was formed (see illustration 69). The role of this committee is to 
promote and coordinate the reconstruction work in the city center of Ishinomaki 
City (Ishinomaki City, Downtown Creative Reconstruction Committee Member, 
2015).
The Downtown Creative Reconstruction Committee has a board of up to 
45 members and more than 100 overall members. The committee is not an offi-
cial organization, which means that everyone is allowed to join. When meetings 
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are organized, people are invited via e-mail. If meetings include the development 
of specific plans that are supposed to be submitted to the city administration, 
concrete board members are personally invited based on their profession and 
knowledge. This includes staff from the city hall, the mayor, land owners (esp. 
the leaders of certain neighborhoods), and shop owners. For financial aspects, 
members of the chamber of commerce or staff from financial institutions are 
also included (Ishinomaki City, Downtown Creative Reconstruction Committee 
Member, 2015). The decision which board members are invited depends on the 
issues that are planned to be discussed. For instance, in case that attractions 
for tourists are discussed, the tourist association will be invited. For general dis-
cussions, all people who are related to the area should be invited. It is important 
to select the participants carefully in order to keep the number of meetings 
per person manageable because there are many meetings and various topics 
that need to be discussed (Ishinomaki City, Downtown Creative Reconstruc-
tion Committee Member, 2015). If citizens want to participate in a Downtown 
Creative Reconstruction Committee meeting, but are not invited, they are still 
able to attend, if they are somehow related to the issues under discussion. 
Nevertheless, in order to not unnecessarily complicate the complex process of 
coordinating the people’s concerns, it is important to minimize the number of 
participants per meeting. This is especially relevant for people who only disturb 
the discussion with unrealistic demands. The wider public is able to review a 
draft version of the plan and get their opinions included before the plan gets 
submitted to the city administration (Ishinomaki City, Downtown Creative Re-
construction Committee Member, 2015).
After the general reconstruction plan was developed in the first year after the 
disaster, the Downtown Creative Reconstruction Committee discussed town-
scape issues and developed according guidelines. The guidelines addressed 
Illustration 70 | Design for the riverside in Ishinomaki City | Downtown Creative Reconstruc-
tion Committee, 2013, p. 12
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topics such as “safety and security”, “facade of buildings”, “height of buildings”, 
which should generally be limited to 3-4 floors in order to preserve the town-
scape, “management of vacant land” and the “arrangement of parks” and were 
completed in 2012 (Ishinomaki City, Downtown Creative Reconstruction Com-
mittee Member, 2015).
In 2013, the Downtown Creative Reconstruction Committee discussed possi-
bilities to activate the central area in order to attract consumers and visitors to 
return to the area and developed a mid- and long-term reconstruction vision (see 
illustration 70).
Based on these ideas the Downtown Creative Reconstruction Committee devel-
oped an accessibility plan for the central area in 2014, which included consider-
ations regarding Ishinomaki’s train station and the relocation of the bus terminal 
to the city center to improve the access for visitors (Ishinomaki City, Downtown 
Creative Reconstruction Committee Member, 2015).
The plans that are developed by the Downtown Creative Reconstruction Com-
mittee are submitted to the Town Building Council’s Urban Area Working Group. 
The working group uses the plan’s content that it considers useful for the de-
velopment of the official reconstruction plans. The working group and the Town 
Building Council are not required to consider the content from the privately de-
veloped plans, but, according to one of the interviews, much of the content 
is considered (Ishinomaki City, Downtown Creative Reconstruction Committee 
Member, 2015). This productive cooperation between the public and private 
sector is specifically based on the committed work of the Urban Area Work-
ing Group’s chairman Prof. Dr. Michio Ubaura, who coordinates the planning 
processes between the private and public sector (Ishinomaki City, Downtown 
Creative Reconstruction Committee Member, 2015).
While the cooperation between the private and public sector is going well for 
some parts of the city, things are more complicated for the overall planning 
process. The government has problems to translate the citizen’s plan into official 
plans, which is especially problematic when the citizen’s plans include important 
issues that should not be neglected. The fact that a consultant of the city raised 
his concerns about disregarding the public’s opinion for official plans illustrates 
that there is some room for improvement in this context (Ishinomaki City Con-
sultant, 2015). This opinion is verified by the interviewee from the city admin-
istration, who also considers the city’s participation approach to be insufficient. 
Although the city administration tried to involve the citizens from the beginning 
of the planning process (e.g., through workshops) in order to get their agree-
ment on the reconstruction plans, the standards for a comprehensive participa-
tion process were not met (Ishinomaki City Planning Division, Employee, 2015).
9.4.3.2 Social connectedness and neighborhood cohesion
In order to build socio-economic resilience, it is important to create social con-
nectedness and neighborhood cohesion [UN-7.1.3]. Ishinomaki City did not fol-
low a specific aim to keep communities together throughout the reconstruction 
process. Nevertheless, there are still some interesting approaches, which are 
presented in the following paragraphs.
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Temporary Housing
The transfer from evacuation shelters to temporary housing sites differed be-
tween the suburban (peninsular) and urban area of Ishinomaki City. The com-
munities in the suburban areas were jointly transferred into temporary housing 
sites, keeping the communities together. In the urban area, the people had to 
apply for different temporary housing sites and were picked by the city admin-
istration via lottery. However, although this approach might have been fair, it 
resulted in the dispersion of former communities to multiple housing sites (see 
illustration 71) (Machizukuri Employee, 2015).
After three years in the temporary housing sites, people were able to build up 
new communities. The city administration tried to support the community build-
ing process in the temporary housing sites, e.g., through the establishment of 
community meeting rooms, but the situation was still problematic. Now that 
the new communities are established, the relocation to permanent housing dis-
perses these communities again (Ishinomaki City Planning Division, Employee, 
2015; Ishinomaki City Reconstruction Department, 2013).
Permanent Housing
Citizens could either apply individually or as a group for the transition to their 
permanent housing sites. The citizens were free to choose from housing sites 
anywhere in the city, there were no restrictions based on their location before 
the disaster. In the rural part of Ishinomaki City, some communities decided to 
relocate as a group if they were able to agree on one place for the entire com-
munity (Machizukuri Employee, 2015). The permanent housing sites in the city’s 
urban area were distributed via lottery, therefore only a small amount of citizens 
used the possibility for group relocation. The two main reasons for this are (Ishi-
nomaki City Planning Division, Employee, 2015):
1. The probability to obtain a certain housing lot was the same for the 
group relocation as it was for individual relocation, since all housing lots 
were distributed via lottery.
Illustration 71 | Allocation of temporary housing in the urban area of Ishinomaki City | Own 
illustration based on Toyoshima et al., 2012, p. 11
Temporary HousingBefore Disaster
Random 
Distribution
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2. The group relocation process requires a high amount of communica-
tion between the community members in order to agree on one option. 
Many citizens did not want to deal with the needs and emotions of each 
community member and preferred to choose the simpler solution to ap-
ply individually.
The high amount of individual households applying and the allocation of housing 
lots for public housing units through lottery, resulted in anew dispersion of the 
just established temporary housing communities (Machizukuri Employee, 2015).
Citizen Participation
As discussed in Chapter 9.4.3.1, the more comprehensive citizen participation 
in Ishinomaki City was organized by grassroots organizations. The discussion of 
local issues with the citizens and the transfer of the public’s ideas and visions 
into actual plans, temporarily improved the communication between the citizens 
and resulted in a feeling of ownership (Ishinomaki City Planning Division, Em-
ployee, 2015; Ishinomaki City, Downtown Creative Reconstruction Committee 
Member, 2015).
One module to enable people to meet and exchange their ideas is Machi Café. 
The community café was established in the city center of Ishinomaki City in 
June 2012 by the Miyagi branch of the Japan Institute of Architects (JIA) with the 
intention to offer an information platform for anyone and have a place to organize 
meetings with residents, volunteers, and experts and proactively develop a re-
construction plan based on the resident’s ideas (Sakurai & Kariya, 2013). Today, 
the café still is an important meeting place for local people as well as visitors 
to discuss the ongoing issues of the reconstruction process in Ishinomaki City.
Another approach of the citizen’s involvement to build community cohesion is 
Ishinomaki 2.0. The NGO was established in May 2011 by young citizens from 
Ishinomaki with the intention to use the disaster as a chance to improve the city. 
The organization pursues a variety of activities including the operation of the 
Irori business café, Kameshichi community café, and FUKKOU Bar. Furthermore, 
Ishinomaki 2.0 is responsible for the organization of the Stand Up Week, a yearly 
summer festival in Ishinomaki City (Ishinomaki 2.0, 2013, 2016).
Considering special requirements of elderly people
Because certain demographic groups, such as elderly citizens, have specific 
requirements regarding the urban environment, it is important to meet these 
requirements and enable them an active participation in the local community. In 
Ishinomaki City, the growing demographic group of elderly people is supposed 
to be integrated through the development of the city based on the compact 
city concept. This development should ensure the elderly to have all necessary 
establishments accessible on foot. Furthermore, the construction of apartments 
complexes which include age-appropriate apartments and a mixture of daycare 
services should address the residential needs of the elderly citizens (Ishinomaki 
City, Downtown Creative Reconstruction Committee Member, 2015).
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9.4.3.3 Provision of safe shelter
After a disaster, it is important to provide affected people with safe shelter [UN-
9.5.2]. The importance of this aspect is reflected in the fact that the provision of 
housing is one of the three most important aspects of the reconstruction pro-
cess in Ishinomaki City (Ishinomaki City Planning Division, Employee, 2015). This 
includes the accommodation in evacuation shelters directly after the disaster, 
temporary housing and the newly constructed permanent housing.
Directly after the disaster, there were around 70,000 to 80,000 people, who 
lived in evacuation shelters. All of these people had to be transferred into tem-
porary housing (Ishinomaki City Planning Division, Employee, 2015). Due to the 
urgency of the situation, the construction of the temporary housing sites had to 
begin without the previous estimation of the required number. The city adminis-
tration caught up on this later (Ishinomaki City Consultant, 2015).
In October 2013, there were 7,153 temporary housing units on 134 sites, which 
were dispersed over the entire area of the city. At that time, 15,377 citizens 
lived in 6,967 houses, while 186 houses were unoccupied. In addition to this, 
12,555 residents lived in 4,788 privately owned apartments, which were used as 
temporary housing (quasi-temporary housing)(Ishinomaki City Reconstruction 
Department, 2013). In October 2015, the remaining number of citizens in tem-
porary housing was 10,000. This means, that some people had to move from 
one temporary housing site to another in order to aggregate them at certain lo-
cations. The reason for the aggregation is that the major amount of land, where 
the temporary housing lots are located, is owned by the public and the land is 
needed for the implementation of planned reconstruction projects (Ishinomaki 
City Planning Division, Employee, 2015).
One very important concern of the reconstruction process was the construc-
tion of public housing and the implementation of land readjustment projects to 
enable the affected citizens to move into permanent housing as fast as possi-
ble (Ishinomaki City Planning Division, Employee, 2015). In Ishinomaki City, the 
permanent housing sites were planned based on the surveys that gathered the 
citizen’s intention for reconstruction. Nevertheless, the results of these survey 
were insufficient to estimate the correct number of required private and public 
housing. One reason for this was that people changed their mind, e.g., they 
applied for public housing to have a fallback plan and then decided to rebuild 
their house in its former location. For this reason, the city constructs more pub-
lic housing units than needed, which will most likely result in vacancies. There 
are 3,697 public housing units planned in the city center, 589 additional units 
are planned in the suburban peninsula area, which amounts to a sum of 4,286 
public housing units for the entire city (see table 25). Vacancies are expected to 
occur in the suburbs because many people consider it as inconvenient to live 
there. Some apartments in these areas are expected to stay vacant. The public 
housing sites, which are located close to the city center, on the other hand, are 
in demand (Ishinomaki City Consultant, 2015).
In addition to the newly constructed public housing, the city also leases about a 
hundred existing apartments to use them as public housing (Ishinomaki City Re-
construction Department, 2013). This solution is especially useful because of the 
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expected decline of residents in the future. While there is an estimated require-
ment for 4,600 public housing units at the moment, the number will decline 
with the decrease of the overall population. This is why the consulting agency 
suggested to rent existing private housing in order to use it for public housing 
instead of newly constructing all of the public housing that is currently required. 
The privately owned public housing units will become completely private again if 
the need for public housing decreases (Ishinomaki City Consultant, 2015).
9.4.4 Environmental resilience
The preservation or restoration of ecosystem health is the main aspect to build en-
vironmental resilience. The following chapter will investigate how spatial planners 
addressed this aspect throughout the reconstruction process in Ishinomaki City.
9.4.4.1 Ecosystem health
This aspect considers the knowledge about the importance of ecosystem ser-
vices [UN-5.1.1], aspects in order to maintain or restore the health of ecosys-
tems [UN-5.1.2] and the determination of the impact of planned land-uses on 
ecosystem services [UN-5.1.3].
The Basic Reconstruction Plan of Ishinomaki City considers the importance of 
ecosystem health for the people by stating the aim to establish renewable en-
ergy sources and to live with nature. Nevertheless, by taking a closer look it 
becomes noticeable that these measures only intend to get the greatest utility 
from the sea, river and earth (e.g., through the fishing or forestry industry). The 
plan does not include actual measures to secure the health of the ecosystem 
(Ishinomaki City Reconstruction Department, 2013).
Scheduled year of completion
District 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Total
Urban area Hebita 220 822 1 90 1,133
Kama-Okaido 150 59 477 44 730
City center 68 274 160 68 570
Kadowaki 151 151
Minato 20 158 67 183 428
Watanoha 61 165 194 115 44 579
Kanan-Kahoku 70 36 106
Urban area total 149 763 1,416 1,087 282 3,697
Peninsula Peninsula 3 15 17 3 38
Ojika 11 34 70 41 156
Kahoku 2 229 231
Ogachi 3 39 21 31 94
Hokujo 3 6 61 70
Peninsula total 17 93 114 365 589
Entire city total 149 780 1,509 1,201 647 4,286
Table 25 | Planned public housing in Ishinomaki City | Own illustration based on Ishinomaki 
City Reconstruction Department, 2016, p. 39
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This complies with the information from the interviews, which revealed that the 
environmental aspect is practically not considered in the reconstruction process 
(Machizukuri Employee, 2015). As one reason for this dissent, the time con-
straints after the disaster were stated. These constraints limited the possible 
options to consider environmental aspects to a greater extent. For instance, the 
need for a speedy construction of housing hampered the use of recycled build-
ing material (Machizukuri Employee, 2015). Steps that might be able to increase 
ecosystem health are the planned distribution of renewable energy sources on 
the large scale (e.g., the solar power plant in Shin Hebita District) and small scale 
(e.g., incentives for solar panels on private houses).
In Japan, the impact of spatial plans on ecosystem services are evaluated with 
the EIA, which is required for all major construction projects. Even though 
the construction of the seawall can be expected to have significant impacts 
for the coastal environment, it does not require the implementation of an EIA 
(see Chapter 4.7.1). This approach can be considered as a neglect of ecosystem 
health in favor of safety (Bird, 2013).
9.4.5 Spatial planning measures to build resilience
The following chapter summarizes the results from the analysis in the previous 
chapters. Thereby it examines the spatial planning options that were used to 
build engineering as well as evolutionary resilience and states which additional 
options would have been helpful for spatial planners to address these topics.
Which spatial planning options were used to build engineering 
resilience?
One of the main measures to build engineering resilience in Ishinomaki City 
was the designation of hazardous areas in accordance with Article 39 of the 
Building Standards Act in order to enable the relocation of affected citizens and 
to prevent the development of these areas in the future. The aim of this proce-
dure was to minimize urban land-uses at risk. The relocation sites were prepared 
through the implementation of group relocation programs or land readjustments 
projects. In some cases, this required the redetermination of former agricultur-
al land to urban area (e.g., in Shin Hebita District). For other areas, the spatial 
planners took differentiated land-use decisions: A part of Minamihama District 
is designed to be a park because any other land-use was considered to be too 
endangered. The area between the two seawalls in Kama-Okaido District is re-
stricted for residential land-uses, but free for industrial developments.
Spatial planners also increased engineering resilience through the mitigation of 
the hazard. This was achieved through the construction of a two-tier seawall sys-
tem and a river embankment along the mouths of Kitakami River. The planning 
and implementation of this system of protective infrastructure requires a com-
prehensive collaboration between spatial planners and sectoral planners as well 
as between the local, prefectural and national level. Parts of the affected area 
(e.g., in Kama-Okaido District) can be recovered on-site because of these pro-
tective measures. In these cases, land readjustment projects were used to reor-
ganize the existing property situation and widen existing roads to ensure a fast 
and unproblematic evacuation for future hazardous events. This improvement of 
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the city’s road network through widening and raising the main evacuation routes 
is another important aspect to build engineering resilience. In addition to this, 
the resilience of the social infrastructure was also improved (e.g., through the 
relocation of the city’s hospital and several schools).
The increase of engineering resilience is completed with the application of the 
building codes and incentives for the installation of solar panels on private hous-
es to increase the building’s independence from the local energy network in 
case of a disaster. These measures intend to build resilience by adapting the 
building structures. Furthermore, the establishment of various park and the gre-
enway along the river can help to improve the city’s climate.
With a combination of all these measures spatial planners were able to build 
Ishinomaki City’s engineering resilience. This especially applies for the planners’ 
main responsibilities like land-use planning and securing the application of build-
ing codes. Even though the improvement of the resilience of utility and social 
infrastructure requires the cooperation with various sectoral planning divisions, 
spatial planning also played an important role in this context.
Which spatial planning options were used to build evolutionary 
resilience?
Spatial planners’ can contribute their knowledge for the development of hazard 
maps and thereby help to build political-institutional resilience. To ensure a resil-
ient urban development, it is important that all spatial plans are checked for their 
accordance with the goal to build a disaster resilient city. At the moment, this 
is the case because the memories from the GEJE and Tsunami are still fresh. It 
is important to preserve these memories for the future to ensure that all rele-
vant documents (incl. spatial plans) are continuously assessed for possible risks. 
After the disaster, the local spatial planners did not have a document prepared 
that helped them to begin with the reconstruction process. Even though some 
of the content from the existing city center revitalization plan was adopted into 
the Basic Reconstruction Plan, the city administration basically had to start from 
scratch. Two of the interviewees agreed the pre-event developed reconstruction 
plan would have been a helpful tool to start the reconstruction process after the 
disaster (Ishinomaki City Consultant, 2015; Ishinomaki City Planning Division, 
Employee, 2015). The case of Ishinomaki City shows that spatial planners con-
tribution to build political-institutional resilience mainly consists of their ability 
to contribute to the assessment of risk (e.g., by preparing hazard maps) and 
their responsibility to review spatial plans for their integrated consideration of 
disaster risks.
Spatial planners can build socio-economic resilience through the integration of 
the local population into the planning process. The city administration of Ishi-
nomaki City missed this chance and only informed and consulted the citizens 
regarding the reconstruction process. Comprehensive participation processes 
in Ishinomaki City originated from grassroots organizations. The integration of 
these privately developed ideas for the reconstruction process were only in-
tegrated into the official plans because of the personal dedication of individual 
spatial planners. In some cases the translation of the citizen’s expectations into 
the actual plans, was problematic and resulted in frustration of some people 
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(Ishinomaki City Consultant, 2015). The relocation process in Ishinomaki City 
did not consider existing communities. The distribution of people via lottery was 
selected to be fair, but it also led to a random segmentation of former neighbors. 
Although the city administration tried to support group relocations, the oppor-
tunity was not commonly used. The example of Ishinomaki City shows that it is 
challenging for spatial planners to build socio-economic resilience, especially if 
they comply to legal requirements. For this reason, the personal commitment 
of grassroots organizations or key personalities is an important aspect for the 
improvement of socio-economic resilience.
As the interviews revealed, the spatial planners in Ishinomaki City did not actu-
ally intend to build environmental resilience (Machizukuri Employee, 2015). The 
continuous implementation of the EIA could help to address this aspect in the 
future.
Which spatial planning options were able to build resilience? 
Which additional spatial planning options would have been useful 
to build resilience?
In Ishinomaki City, the history of spatial planning as an engineering discipline 
becomes noticeable. While many spatial planning options were successfully 
applied to build engineering resilience, the existing options struggled to build 
evolutionary resilience.
The case study of Ishinomaki City helped to identify the following points for 
improvement in order to build evolutionary resilience:
Political-institutional resilience could be built through an improved cooperation 
between the three administrative levels (municipal, prefectural and national), 
which lead to some frictions and problems that are not specific to Ishinomaki 
City. This concerns spatial planners as well as all other experts involved and is 
based on the relatively new decentralized administrative system in Japan, which 
still needs some time to work out. The lessons learned after the GEJE will hope-
fully help to improve the political-institutional system and help to build resilience.
The spatial planners in Ishinomaki City struggled to use the legally available spa-
tial planning options to build socio-economic resilience. In this context it could 
be helpful to officially enable comprehensive participation processes after large 
scale disasters or to simplify the implementation of community relocation proj-
ects.
Finally, the implementation of the existing EIA for all projects planned in the af-
termath of the disaster (incl. the construction of the seawall) could have helped 
to build environmental resilience.
9.5 USING THE WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY
This chapter analyses the window of opportunity in Ishinomaki City after the 
GEJE and Tsunami. It illustrates how the window of opportunity was consti-
tuted, which plans had already been prepared in advance of the disaster and 
investigates which options would have helped to use the window of opportunity 
more effectively.
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How was the window of opportunity constituted in Ishinomaki 
City?
The experts in Ishinomaki City, who were interviewed for this research, all 
agreed on the existence of the window of opportunity after a disaster. However, 
each of the interviewees sees the characteristic of this windows differently:
 › Financial support: The financial support from the national government 
after the GEJE, enabled to plan and implement projects to revitalize Ishi-
nomaki City, which would have never been possible in normal times 
(Ishinomaki City Planning Division, Employee, 2015; Ishinomaki City, 
Downtown Creative Reconstruction Committee Member, 2015). This as-
pect is especially important for Ishinomaki as a city, which already had 
to suffer from demographic and economic problems and a tight budget 
before the disaster. The financial support offered the city administration 
a new chance to deal with these problems.
 › Human support: After the GEJE, many experts and volunteers moved 
to Ishinomaki City. For a city, which had been shrinking for the last 30 
years and which was left by many young people in favor of larger cities 
(Otsuka, 2014), this can be considered as an opportunity for a fresh start. 
First, the city was able to benefit from the expert knowledge from spa-
tial planners, architects and other professionals who came to the city 
(Ishinomaki City Consultant, 2015; Ishinomaki City, Downtown Creative 
Reconstruction Committee Member, 2015). Second, the large amount 
of young volunteers, who got attached to Ishinomaki City during their 
stay, offers the chance to improve the city, e.g., with the help of grass-
roots organizations like Ishinomaki 2.0. Many former volunteers already 
opened a shop or restaurant in Ishinomaki to revive the city center and 
help the city to recover.
 › Faster implementation of plans: The window of opportunity after the 
disaster helped to get plans implemented faster than in normal times 
(Machizukuri Employee, 2015). One example for this is Shin Hebita Dis-
trict, where almost 120 landowners reached a conclusion for 46 ha of 
the district in less than six months (Ishinomaki City Reconstruction De-
partment, 2013). By speeding up the implementation of the plans, the 
disaster helped to improve engineering resilience (e.g., through the con-
struction of evacuation buildings) and socio-economic resilience (e.g., by 
increasing the citizen’s consciousness for disaster risks) (Ishinomaki City 
Planning Division, Employee, 2015).
Did Ishinomaki City have any spatial plans for reconstruction 
prepared before the disaster?
Before the disaster, the city administration did not have any land-use plans – or 
other plans – for after the disaster prepared (Ishinomaki City Planning Division, 
Employee, 2015; Machizukuri Employee, 2015). The city administration started 
to develop the reconstruction plan after the GEJE and Tsunami (Ishinomaki City 
Planning Division, Employee, 2015). However, the revitalization plan for the city’s 
central area already existed at the time of the disaster. Therefore, the plan could 
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serve as a basis for the reconstruction of the area. The existence of the revital-
ization plan simplified the work on the reconstruction plan for the city adminis-
tration. For instance, one aspect of the revitalization plan was the focus on tour-
ism, which was then also integrated into the reconstruction plan (Machizukuri 
Employee, 2015). This aspect shows that it is very helpful to already have a 
guiding principle for the development of the city, even if it does not consider the 
possibility of a disaster. Such a principle can then be used for the development 
of a reconstruction plan if it becomes necessary.
How can the preparation of spatial plans for reconstruction before 
a disaster help to use the window of opportunity more effectively?
Planners and experts in Ishinomaki City agree on the statement that having 
a spatial plan for reconstruction prepared in advance of a disaster would help 
to accelerate the implementation of the reconstruction process (Ishinomaki 
City Consultant, 2015; Ishinomaki City Planning Division, Employee, 2015). To 
be most effective, such a plan should include an assumption of the damage 
through the hazardous event and the determination of relocation areas for res-
idential land-uses. Furthermore, the plan should determine structural counter-
measures to further secure the engineering resilience of the city (Ishinomaki 
City Planning Division, Employee, 2015). Even though the development of such 
a plan would be very expensive, it would also be very useful if a disaster occurs 
(Ishinomaki City Consultant, 2015).
Nevertheless, it must be considered that the preparation of a reconstruction 
plan prior to a disaster is connected to certain challenges: First, it is complicated 
and expensive to consider all possible hazards (e.g., tsunami, earthquake, flood-
ing, sand storm) for the preparation of the plan and estimate the required work 
and budget for the reconstruction process accordingly (Machizukuri Employee, 
2015). Second, the citizens were not very interested in participating in the de-
velopment of a reconstruction plan prior to the GEJE. This is caused by the low 
frequency of such a disaster, which only occurs once in a thousand years. The 
people therefore did not expect to experience an event like this in their lifetime 
(Ishinomaki City Planning Division, Employee, 2015). One idea to resolve this 
lack of interest could be the concentration on the general improvement in the 
citizen’s urban environment with steps that also get implemented if no disaster 
occurs (Ishinomaki City Consultant, 2015). In this way, the citizens might get the 
motivation to get involved into the planning process.
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10. CROSS-CASE SYNTHESIS
This chapter compares the analysis results from the case study analysis of Miya-
ko City and Ishinomaki City with each other and develops a cross-case synthesis. 
The analysis includes the ability of the different spatial planning options to build 
engineering and evolutionary resilience and the information gathered regard-
ing the window of opportunity. Furthermore, the chapter answers the research 
questions How can spatial planning help to build a city’s resilience after a disas-
ter? and How can spatial planning use the window of opportunity effectively 
to improve a city’s resilience after a disaster?
10.1 BUILDING ENGINEERING AND EVOLUTIONARY 
RESILIENCE IN MIYAKO CITY AND ISHINOMAKI 
CITY
Both case study sites use several spatial planning options to address engineering 
resilience. As a first step to reduce vulnerable land-uses at risk, hazardous land is ex-
cluded from future urban development through the designation of hazardous zones. 
The second step is the relocation of affected people, who used to live in these areas 
through relocation programs, land readjustment projects or, in case of Miyako City, 
the implementation of land readjustment and raising programs. In some areas, the 
spatial planners made differentiated land-use decisions, and designated certain ar-
eas with specific land-use zones (e.g., parks or industrial zones). The option to set 
up new residential areas through land readjustment projects is also used for the 
improvement of urban design, e.g., by establishing urban parks and greenways.
In both cities, the implementation of existing building codes and the provision 
of incentives for the installation of solar panels helps to build engineering resil-
ience. The generation of energy through solar power can increase the building’s 
autonomy from the local energy network. In Miyako City, additional building ad-
justments (e.g., raising the ground floor) are implemented.
To mitigate the hazard, both cities are planning to install protective infrastruc-
ture. In many places this involves a two-tier system with a seawall along the 
coast and a secondary levee, which is either constructed as a concrete seawall, 
a raised road or a raised green space. In Ishinomaki, both mouths of Kitakami 
River are planned to be framed by an embankment. The planning and imple-
mentation of this system of protective infrastructure requires a comprehensive 
collaboration between spatial planners and sectoral planners on various admin-
istrative levels (i.e., local, prefectural, national).
Miyako City and Ishinomaki City both used the reconstruction process to im-
prove the cities’ utility infrastructure. Land readjustment projects were espe-
cially useful to enhance the transportation network by readjusting and widening 
narrow and intricate roads. Furthermore, the relocation of affected social facili-
ties (e.g., the hospital in Miyako City’s Taro District and the city hospital and cer-
tain schools in Ishinomaki City) increased the disaster resilience of the cities’ so-
cial infrastructure. These projects also require the cooperation with the sectoral 
planning departments in charge. Table 26 on the next page gives an overview of 
the spatial planning options that were used to build engineering resilience.
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Miyako City Ishinomaki City
En
gi
ne
er
in
g 
re
si
lie
nc
e
Spatial planning options 
used to build engineering 
resilience
Minimization of exposure 
of urban areas
 › Land-use control in 
hazardous areas
 › Relocation through 
relocation programs 
or land readjustment 
projects
Differentiated land-use 
decisions
 › Land-use zoning
Adaptation of building 
structures
 › Building codes
 › Additional building 
requirements/ adjust-
ments
Hazard mitigation
 › Protective infrastruc-
ture
 › Land readjustment 
and raising program
 › Adaptation of urban 
structure through land 
readjustment projects
Minimization of exposure 
of urban areas
 › Land-use control in 
hazardous areas
 › Relocation through 
relocation programs 
or land readjustment 
projects
Differentiated land-use 
decisions
 › Land-use zoning
Adaptation of building 
structures
 ›  Building codes
 › Additional building 
adjustments 
Hazard mitigation
 › Protective infrastruc-
ture
 › Adaptation of urban 
structure through 
land readjustment 
projects
Ev
ol
ut
io
na
ry
 re
si
lie
nc
e
Spatial planning options 
used to build political- 
institutional resilience
 › Hazard maps and 
hazard simulations
 › Resilience evaluation 
of plans
 › Hazard maps and 
hazard simulations
 › Resilience evaluation 
of plans
Spatial planning options 
used to build socio- 
economic resilience
 › Citizen participation 
(information, consul-
tation, active involve-
ment)
 › Relocation through 
group relocation 
program
 › Provision of public 
housing
 › Citizen participation 
(information, consul-
tation)
 › Provision of public 
housing
Spatial planning options 
used to build environ-
mental resilience
 › Additional building 
adjustments
 › Additional building 
adjustments
Table 26 | Cross-case synthesis of engineering and evolutionary resilience | Own illustration
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Evolutionary resilience can be built by addressing political-institutional, so-
cio-economic and environmental resilience (see table 26).
Spatial planners in both case study cities helped to build political-institutional 
resilience by supporting the preparation of hazardous maps and simulations for 
the assessment of risks. Furthermore, both cities currently evaluate their spatial 
plans regarding disaster resilience. The reason for this, is probably the fresh 
memory from the GEJE and Tsunami, which results in a high awareness of the 
need to consider disaster risks for future land-use decisions. If this approach will 
be maintained in the future is directly connected with the city administration’s 
success to integrate the lessons learned from the disaster into their daily work. 
The case of Miyako City showed that the consideration of the experience from 
past disasters (in this case the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake) can help to 
improve the reconstruction process. Nevertheless, neither Miyako City nor Ishi-
nomaki City prepared a reconstruction plan in advance of the disaster. The lack 
of such a plan caused insecurities for the local spatial planners in both cities and 
delayed the start of the reconstruction process.
In Miyako City, socio-economic resilience was built through a comprehensive 
involvement of the local citizens into the reconstruction planning process. In ad-
dition, the spatial planners intended to keep communities together throughout 
the reconstruction process. This citizen focused approach helped to maintain 
and strengthen the cohesion of communities in Miyako City (Miyako City Plan-
ning Division, Employee A, 2015). In Ishinomaki City, the local government only 
implemented participation processes envisaged by the law (i.e., citizen infor-
mation and consultation). All of the more comprehensive offers for participation 
were made by grassroots organizations. Both cases show that meaningful pub-
lic participation could only be achieved with the personal dedication of individual 
spatial planners and consultants. The legal framework in Japan does not aim 
at the implementation of comprehensive participation processes. Miyako City 
and Ishinomaki City were both able to provide public housing for people who 
are unable to rebuild their houses on their own or find rental apartments on the 
regular housing market. In both cities, public housing was constructed to meet 
the requirements of the growing population group of the elderly.
Besides smaller adaptations regarding the provision of renewable energy on the 
district or building scale, both case study cities did not build environmental resil-
ience. One evidence for this is the omission to conduct an EIA for the construc-
tion of the seawall. This results in a lack of knowledge regarding the environmen-
tal impacts that the seawall will cause. The exclusion of environmental aspects 
from the reconstruction process resulted from the prioritization of other topics 
that were considered to be more urgent (e.g., safety, provision of housing).
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10.2 SPATIAL PLANNING OPTIONS TO BUILD 
RESILIENCE
The last chapter summarized the results from the case study analyses in Chap-
ter 8 and Chapter 9 and showed, which spatial planning options were used in 
order to build engineering and evolutionary resilience. This chapter will take an 
opposite approach and analyze the ability to address the various resilience items 
for each of the spatial planning options. Table 27 gives an overview of the results 
from this analysis. In this context, the chapter answers the first research ques-
tion How can spatial planning help to build a city’s resilience after a disaster?.
10.2.1 Spatial planning options for risk assessment to 
build resilience
The spatial planning options for risk assessment – the development of hazard 
maps and an EIA – are able to build political-institutional resilience. Furthermore, 
the implementation of an EIA can help to build environmental resilience, even 
though this option was not used in Miyako City and Ishinomaki City.
 › Hazard maps and hazard simulations are valuable tools for risk assess-
ment. Contributing to the development of such maps or simulations 
(e.g., by providing spatial information), is an important possibility of spa-
tial planners to contribute to political-institutional resilience. Both case 
study cities in this research developed hazard maps, which served as 
a basis for the land-use decisions taken. Therefore, this option can be 
considered as helpful to build political-institutional resilience.
 › The EIA undertakes a dual role for risk assessment. If implemented 
properly, it is useful to evaluate projects for potential risks (and thereby 
build political-institutional resilience). On the other hand, it is useful to 
evaluate the possible impact that a project might have on the environ-
ment, which can help to build environmental resilience. In the two case 
studies of this research, neither of the two options was used, which is 
why the (hypothetical) influence of this resilience item in table 27 was 
indicated with brackets.
10.2.2 Spatial planning options for risk management to 
build resilience
The spatial planning options to minimize the exposure of urban areas, make 
differentiated land-use decisions, adapt building structures and mitigate the haz-
ard are able to build engineering and evolutionary resilience. However, table 27 
shows that their emphasis is on the enhancement of engineering resilience.
Minimization of exposure
Exposure of vulnerable land-uses can either be reduced by controlling the future 
development in hazardous areas or through the relocation of existing land-uses 
in these areas to safer land.
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Table 27 | Spatial planning options to build resilience | Own illustration
Spatial planning options Engineering resilience items Evolutionary resilience items
A
ss
es
sm
en
t Hazard maps and hazard simulations ./.  › Risk assessment
Environmental Impact  
Assessment (EIA)
./.  › (Proposal evaluation for 
disaster resilience)
 › (Ecosystem health)
M
an
ag
em
en
t
Minimization of exposure of urban areas
Land-use control in  
hazardous areas
 › Vulnerable land-uses at 
risk
 › Disaster resilience of  
utility infrastructure
 › Disaster resilience of  
social infrastructure
./.
Relocation through relocation programs 
or land readjustment projects
 › Vulnerable land-uses at 
risk
 › Urban Design solutions
 › Disaster resilience of  
utility infrastructure
 › Disaster resilience of  
social infrastructure
 › Social connectedness and 
neighborhood cohesion (if 
group relocation program 
is used)
Differentiated land-use decisions
Land-use zoning  › Vulnerable land-uses at 
risk
./.
Adaptation of building structures
Building codes  › Building codes ./.
Additional building  
requirements
 › Building codes
 › Sustainable building de-
sign standards
./.
Provision of public  
housing
 › Provision of safe shelter
Hazard Mitigation
Protective infrastructure  › Protective infrastructure ./.
Land readjustment and raising program  › Vulnerable land-uses at 
risk
 › Urban Design solutions
 › Disaster resilience of  
utility infrastructure
 › Disaster resilience of  
social infrastructure
./.
Adaptation of urban structure through 
land readjustment projects
 › Urban design  
solutions
 › Disaster resilience of  
utility infrastructure
./.
Co
m
m
un
ic
at
io
n Citizen participation ./.  › Consideration of  
citizen’s needs
 › Social connectedness and 
neighborhood cohesion
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 › The land-use control in hazardous areas in Miyako City and Ishinoma-
ki City was implemented through the designation of hazardous zones 
based on Article 39 of the Building Standards Act. The designation was 
implemented based on the information from hazard maps and builds the 
basis for all further land-use decisions. Through the designation of haz-
ardous areas, the future land-use in both cities can be controlled, which 
reduces the amount of (future) vulnerable land-uses at risk. The reloca-
tion of existing vulnerable land-uses and utility and social infrastructure 
away from these areas (also considered in the paragraph below), fur-
thermore helped to build the disaster resilience of the utility and social 
infrastructure (e.g., through the relocation of schools and hospitals). Ac-
cordingly, the spatial planning option land-use control in hazardous areas 
is able to build engineering resilience.
 › Based on the designation of hazardous zones, both case study cities 
implemented the relocation of vulnerable land-uses as well as utility and 
social infrastructure away from hazardous areas. The relocation was im-
plemented by means of the group relocation program or land readjust-
ment projects. In accordance with the intention of the relocation, this 
spatial planning option was able to build engineering resilience. In cases, 
where the relocation of affected citizens was implemented by means 
of group relocation projects, which enabled existing communities to re-
locate as a group, the relocation was also able to build socio-economic 
resilience by preserving or strengthening the social connectedness and 
community cohesion.
Differentiated land-use decisions
In Japan, spatial planners are able to make differentiated land-use decisions by 
means of land-use zoning.
 › Land-use zoning was used in Miyako City and Ishinomaki City to desig-
nate specific land-uses to areas, which should not be developed as resi-
dential areas. One example for this is the designation of industrial zones 
in Kama-Okaido District in Ishinomaki City. This area was considered to 
be too dangerous for residential land-uses because it would become 
inundated in case of a tsunami. Industrial land-uses, on the other hand, 
were considered to be safe. Land-use zoning is able to build engineering 
resilience by reducing vulnerable land-uses (esp. residential) at risk.
Adaptation of building structures
Spatial planning options for the adaptation of building structures include the ex-
istence and frequent implementation of building codes and the requirement of 
additional building adaptations where they are considered to be useful. Further-
more, spatial planners are responsible to provide adequate housing options for 
citizens that are unable to afford safe housing on their own.
 › This option directly addresses the engineering resilience item building 
codes, which includes the existence, continuous implementation and up-
date of building codes. In Japan, the building code is established by the 
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Building Standards Act. Through the strict application of the  frequently 
updated building codes for the replacement of destroyed houses with 
new building structures, both case study cities were able to build their 
engineering resilience.
 › In addition to the requirements of the Building Standards Act, Miyako 
City set additional building requirements, which demand the owners of 
newly constructed houses in areas that are expected to become inun-
dated up to 2 m by L2-tsunamis to raise the house up to 1.5 m from the 
street level. Furthermore, both cities encourage landowners to add solar 
panels to the roof of their houses. A measure which helps to increase 
the building’s autonomy from the local energy network through sustain-
able building design standards. The combination of the measures of this 
options also helps to strengthen engineering resilience.
 › The provision of public housing is another option to build resilience. In 
some cases, people cannot afford to find adequate housing on the pri-
vate housing market. In this case they rely on the provision of public 
housing. For the construction of public housing, spatial planners should 
consider the various needs of different population groups. In the case 
of Miyako City and Ishinomaki City this especially concerns the elder-
ly. In contrast to the other spatial planning options regarding building 
structures, the provision of adequate and safe public housing can help 
to build socio-economic resilience, an aim which both case study cities 
were able to achieve.
Hazard mitigation
To mitigate the hazard, spatial planners in the case study cities are able to plan 
the construction of protective infrastructure or use the land readjustment and 
raising program. Furthermore, they can adapt the urban structure for on-site re-
construction through the implementation of land readjustment projects.
 › The solution to build protective infrastructure to increase the safety 
against future tsunamis was widely used in Miyako City and Ishinomaki 
City. Both cities plan a seawall along the coast, which, in many places is 
complemented by the construction of a secondary levee. In Ishinomaki 
City, the construction of a river embankment along the two mouths of 
Kitakami River is intended to further improve the safety of the cities built 
structure. The construction of protective infrastructure is able to build 
engineering resilience.
 › In some areas of Miyako City, the hazard is mitigated by raising the land 
and reconstructing the affected residential area on this artificially lifted 
land. The spatial planning option to implement these projects is the land 
readjustment and raising program. The program enables to extricate an 
area that was formerly exposed to future tsunamis from this exposure 
through raising it above the expected inundation height. This means, the 
program is able to reduce the vulnerable land-uses at risk by mitigating 
the hazards instead of limiting the vulnerable land-uses in hazardous ar-
eas. The implementation of the land raising program as part of a land 
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readjustment project also enables the chance to reorganize the area’s 
utility infrastructure (e.g., the road network). If social infrastructure is 
included in the raised area, the land readjustment and raising program 
is also able to increase the disaster resilience of social infrastructure. All 
three of the resilience items that are addressed by this spatial planning 
option address engineering resilience.
 › Some areas can be considered to be safe for on-site reconstruction be-
cause the protective infrastructure reduced the exposure to the hazard. 
For instance, this is the case in Miyako City’s Kuwagasaki District and 
Ishinomaki City’s Kama-Okaido District. In these areas, the adaptation of 
urban structure through land readjustment projects is able to increase 
the disaster resilience of the area’s utility infrastructure (e.g., by adjust-
ing the road network). By this means, the land readjustment projects are 
able to strengthen the area’s engineering resilience.
10.2.3 Spatial planning options for risk communication 
to build resilience
Finally, spatial planners are able to include the citizens into the planning and 
decision-making process after a disaster. This is their best option to build so-
cio-economic resilience.
 › Citizen participation can help to include the citizens’ requirements and 
needs into the reconstruction process. This is especially important to learn 
more about the special requirements of vulnerable population groups (e.g., 
the elderly). The case study cities showed that the Japanese law does not 
intend a comprehensive participation process. In Miyako City, the city ad-
ministration decided to use a comprehensive participation concept, which 
resulted in a strengthened socio-economic resilience. In Ishinomaki City, 
grassroots organizations took over the task to actively involve the citizens 
into the planning process. Here, the implementation of the citizens’ ideas 
into official plans experienced difficulties (Ishinomaki City Consultant, 
2015). In both cities the dedication of individual spatial planners and con-
sultants was an important aspect for the success of the participation pro-
cesses. Besides the ability to integrate the people’s needs into the plans, 
the cooperation as a community is also able to build social connectedness 
and neighborhood cohesion between the affected citizens. In this context, 
citizen participation is able to build socio-economic resilience.
10.2.4 Spatial planning options to build resilience
Based on the analysis in this chapter, the first research question How can spatial 
planning help to build a city’s resilience after a disaster? can be answered. As table 
27 shows, the spatial planning options investigated for this research were mainly 
able to address engineering resilience. This is especially the case for the planning 
options for risk management. With the exception of the relocation by means of 
the group relocation program and the provision of public housing, which both 
address socio-economic resilience, these spatial planning options are only able to 
build engineering resilience. In comparison to this, the spatial planning options for 
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risk assessment mainly address political-institutional resilience. This is the case 
because these options are able to enhance the processes that serve as the basis 
for effective risk management. Furthermore, can the implementation of an EIA 
help to build environmental resilience (even though this option was not used in 
the case study cities). Finally, spatial planners are able to build socio-economic 
resilience by involving the citizens into active participation processes and by taking 
their ideas and needs seriously. Nevertheless, the experience from the case study 
sites shows that the Japanese law does not support this option so far.
10.3 THE WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY
Regarding the window of opportunity, the case study analysis of Miyako City 
and Ishinomaki City obtained the results presented in table 28 on the next page. 
The experts agreed on the existence of a window of opportunity after a disaster. 
Their assessment regarding the constitution of this window, however, differed. In 
Miyako City, the opportunity for improvement was seen in the enhancement of 
socio-economic resilience, which could be achieved through the comprehensive 
participation processes in the ten most affected districts and the preservation of 
existing communities throughout the entire reconstruction process, which further 
increased the community cohesion. In Ishinomaki City, the financial support of 
the national government was regarded as an important chance to implement proj-
ects for the revitalization of the city, which would have been impossible to realize 
with the city’s regular budget. In addition to the financial support, Ishinomaki City 
also gained a large number of young immigrants after the disaster, who came as 
experts or volunteers to help and, at least partially, decided to stay for the long(er) 
term. In a city, which suffers from demographic change, this development is con-
sidered as a chance for a fresh start. Finally, the situation after the disaster helped 
to accelerate the implementation of plans, e.g., because the citizens considered 
the importance of the situation and were willing to compromise.
Neither Miyako City nor Ishinomaki City had reconstruction plans prepared be-
fore the GEJE and Tsunami occurred. Both cities followed a similar approach and 
adopted certain aims from existing spatial plans for their reconstruction plans. In 
Miyako City the main vision from the city’s Master Plan to live in harmony with 
nature was included into the Post-Disaster Reconstruction Plan. Ishinomaki City 
adopted some of the content from the revitalization plan for the city center (e.g., 
the goal to attract more tourists) into the Basic Reconstruction Plan.
Many of the experts in Miyako City and Ishinomaki City agreed on the useful-
ness to have a reconstruction plan available when a disaster occurs. This opinion 
is based on the uncertainty of the situation directly after the disaster. Most local 
planners had never experienced a situation like this and were insecure which 
steps to take. In a situation like this, a prepared reconstruction plan would have 
been a helpful tool.
On the other hand, the pre-event development of reconstruction plans is connected 
with a variety of problems, which were also identified through the case study analysis:
 › It is time-consuming and expensive to develop reconstruction plans for 
each potential hazard.
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Table 28 | Cross-case synthesis of the window of opportunity | Own illustration
Miyako City Ishinomaki City
The constitution of the 
window of opportunity
 › Window was used 
to build community 
cohesion through 
keeping communities 
together and compre-
hensive participation 
processes (socio-eco-
nomic resilience)
 › Financial support from 
national government 
enabled the imple-
mentation of a multi-
tude of revitalization 
projects
 › Human support from 
incoming experts and 
volunteers enabled a 
fresh start
 › Accelerated imple-
mentation of plans 
Pre-event developed plans  › No reconstruction 
plan developed before 
the disaster
 › Main vision from the 
city’s pre-existing 
Comprehensive Plan 
was adopted for the 
reconstruction pro-
cess
 › No reconstruction 
plan developed before 
the disaster
 › Some content from 
pre-existing plans 
(e.g., revitalization 
plan for the city 
center) was adopted 
for the reconstruction 
process
Plans to develop to use 
the window of opportunity 
effectively
 › Problems: Impossibil-
ity to foresee actual 
impact of disaster, 
people not interested 
to discuss options for 
relocation prior to the 
disaster
 › Alternative: Guidelines 
with steps to take 
in the aftermath of a 
disaster
 › Problems: Time-con-
suming and expensive 
to consider all import-
ant hazards, their im-
pact and the required 
work and budget to 
recover from them, 
people not interested 
to discuss reconstruc-
tion issues prior to the 
disaster
 › Reconstruction plan 
should include: as-
sumptions of dam-
ages, determination 
of relocation sites, 
structural countermea-
sures
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 › It is complicated to impossible to foresee the actual impact of the disas-
ter and estimate the required work and budget required for the recon-
struction.
 › The citizens are not interested to discuss options for relocation or gener-
al reconstruction issues prior to the disaster.
Regarding the solution to this problem, the experts in Miyako City and Ishinoma-
ki City had a differing perception. The expert from the Planning Division in Miya-
ko City suggested the development of guidelines that contain general steps to 
take in the aftermath of a disaster. This could help to overcome the uncertainty 
directly after the disaster to decide which steps to take first in order to start 
a successful reconstruction process. The expert from the Planning Division in 
Ishinomaki City and one of the city’s consultants agreed on the need to develop 
a spatial plan for the reconstruction process after a disaster. This plan should 
include assumptions of the damages that are expected, the determination of 
relocation sites and structural countermeasures (e.g., protective infrastructure) 
to mitigate the hazard. To motivate local citizens to participate in the planning 
process, the planned projects should improve their residential environment and 
be scheduled to still get implemented if no disaster occurs.
Coming back to the second research question How can spatial planning use the 
window of opportunity effectively to improve a city’s resilience after a disaster?, 
it can be stated that the existence of a pre-event developed reconstruction plan 
at the time of the disaster can help to achieve this aim. This opinion was shared 
by all of the experts interviewed in the context of this research.
A simple design of this plan could include an overview of the main steps to 
take in the aftermath of the disaster as proposed by an employee of Miyako 
City’s Planning Division (Miyako City Planning Division, Employee A, 2015). Such 
guidelines could help local spatial planners to prioritize their workforce on the 
most important things instead of pondering what to do. This could help to ac-
celerate the planning process. The guidelines could be prepared based on the 
experiences that spatial planners in Tohoku Region gathered during the recon-
struction process and then be provided for other cities.
Besides this more general approach, spatial planners could also use the chance 
to prepare a spatial reconstruction plan in advance of the disaster. A plan like 
this could include assumptions about the expected damages in case of a hazard-
ous event, information about the location of emergency shelters and possible 
temporary housing sites, the intended adjustment of the city’s structure (e.g., 
possible relocation projects or the construction of protective infrastructure). This 
plan would require the consideration of all potential hazards and a frequent up-
date of the information included, which is why some experts considered the 
development of such plans as unrealistic (Machizukuri Employee, 2015). To avoid 
the preparation of a plan that ends up in a drawer for the case that no hazardous 
event occurs, the content of the plan could be integrated into the city’s regular 
land-use plan. By this means, the general vision for the city’s development and 
the vision for the recovered city after the disaster could become one and the 
goals of the reconstruction plan would still get implemented (albeit in a longer 
amount of time). One example for this from Ishinomaki City is the hypothetical 
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relocation of people from Minamihama Area onto Hiyoriyama Mountain: Before 
the GEJE and Tsunami, the people in Minamihama lived in a hazardous area 
next to Hiyoriyama Mountain. The area of Hiyoriyama Mountain is inhabited by 
old people, who live in old houses that could have been renovated through re-
development projects in order to increase the buildings’ capacity. Thereby, the 
people from Minamihama Area would have been able to move to neighboring 
Hiyoriyama Mountain and live in safety. However, these plans were not devel-
oped before the disaster and because the time after the disaster did not al-
low the long negotiation process with the various landowners on Hiyoriyama 
Mountain, this idea was not realized (Ishinomaki City Consultant, 2015). If the 
relocation of the residents from Minamihama Area would have been included in 
Ishinomaki’s Master Plan, the project could have been developed independently 
from the occurrence of a disaster while still building the city’s overall resilience. 
If the citizens see the opportunity to improve their everyday living environment, 
which is intended even if no disaster occurs, this can also solve the problem that 
many citizens are not interested to discuss relocation options unless a disaster 
occurred.
Part B | Chapter 11
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11. FINAL CONCLUSION
The research results from Miyako City and Ishinomaki City deliver evidence that 
it was complicated for spatial planners to build evolutionary resilience. With cer-
tain expectations (e.g., strengthening socio-economic resilience through citizen 
participation, community relocation projects and the provision of public hous-
ing), the available spatial planning options mainly addressed engineering resil-
ience. The reason for this rests upon the technocratic tradition of spatial planning 
in Japan (Hohn, 2000). Japanese people are used to solve their problems with 
engineering rather than social solutions (Ishinomaki City Planning Division, Em-
ployee, 2015). However, as Chapter 3 illustrated, an engineering understanding 
of resilience is no longer state of the art. Instead, resilience can be understood 
as a combination of engineering, political-institutional, socio-economic and envi-
ronmental aspects, which mutually represent the urban system. To build urban 
disaster resilience, it is therefore important to address all of these aspects.
As the experience from Miyako City and Ishinomaki City suggests, the available 
spatial planning options were not sufficient to build evolutionary resilience. In 
order to enable the spatial planners to reach this goal, it is necessary to provide 
them with sufficient instruments. Examples for this could be the provision of 
municipalities with the financial opportunity to officially organize active citizen 
involvement processes for reconstruction planning or the improvement of group 
relocation projects. On the other hand, municipalities should be urged to use 
instruments that are already available. This includes the EIA to build environmen-
tal resilience. Providing spatial planners with sufficient options to plan for evo-
lutionary resilience would simultaneously help to build the political-institutional 
resilience of spatial planning itself – it would help to approach resilient urban 
planning. Another important aspect to strengthen the resilience of spatial plan-
ning includes an increased degree of flexibility, an aspect which also became 
apparent during the reconstruction process after the GEJE and Tsunami.
Even though this research bases on two case study sites in Japan and investi-
gated the reconstruction process after the GEJE and Tsunami, a careful attempt 
to adapt the research results to a more general context should be made. As de-
scribed in Chapter 3, the technocratic tradition of spatial planning is not solely a 
Japanese phenomenon. Instead, an engineering approach to spatial planning is 
commonly used by practitioners and policy makers (White & O’Hare, 2014). The 
research results point towards the assumption that White and O’Hare (2014) are 
right, when they state that the demands on spatial planning to build evolutionary 
resilience cannot be met if spatial planners are bound to technocratic planning 
tools (p. 942). This leads to the conclusion that the existing spatial planning op-
tions need to be revised in order to meet the current requirements of a changing 
environment more effectively. However, in order to determine which and how 
spatial planning needs to be changed in order to be enabled to build evolutionary 
resilience, further research is required.
Regarding the window of opportunity, the case studies of this research revealed 
that being prepared in advance of a disaster would help to accelerate the recon-
struction process and decrease uncertainties and insecurities of local spatial plan-
ners. Experts should decide carefully how this preparation should be formulated. 
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The spectrum reaches from general guidelines that include basic steps that 
spatial planners have to take in the aftermath of a disaster to comprehensive 
reconstruction plans, which include locations for possible reconstruction sites 
and intended protective infrastructure. In any case, cities should consider their 
approach to this topic based on a comprehensive risk assessment, local condi-
tions (e.g., available funding and staff) and the citizen’s opinion about this topic. 
Furthermore, spatial planners should be aware of the overall spatial vision that 
the city wants to achieve over the next years and establish spatial plans accord-
ingly. This vision can serve as a helpful outline for the future urban development 
independently from the occurrence of a disaster.
To broaden the results from this research additional case study sites in other 
countries should be investigated for spatial planning’s ability to build engineer-
ing and evolutionary resilience. The growing database could be used to develop 
an overview of the spatial planning options that are able to build evolutionary 
resilience and generate an evidence base to improve spatial planning’s compe-
tences.
Furthermore, the comprehensiveness of the research topic made it impossible 
to consider each relevant aspect in detail. For some aspects, further research is 
needed. For instance, this includes the various levels of uncertainty that spatial 
planners have to face in the aftermath of a disaster. To observe these processes 
closer, a thorough analysis of the case study data regarding this topic is planned. 
The results from this analysis are intended to be published in a scientific article.
To retain the experiences of the local spatial planners, they should be used to 
develop reconstruction guidelines. These guidelines could collect the most im-
portant steps and decisions taken in the aftermath of the GEJE and Tsunami and 
provide advice how to handle the difficult situation after a disaster. If shared with 
other cities, these guidelines could help with the preparation for the possible oc-
currence of a disaster. By this means, the spatial planners from Tohoku Region 
are able to help their colleagues in other places to build urban disaster resilience 
and thereby reduce the disaster risk in cities in Japan and abroad.
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High Vulnerable land-uses at risk: agriculture, economic activity, 
residential [UN-4.1.1, UN-4.1.2, UN-4.1.3] X
Existence, application and update of building codes designed 
to address risks identified in risk assessment [UN-4.2.1, UN-
4.2.2, UN-4.2.3] X
Urban design solutions that increase resilience [UN-4.3.1] X
Sustainable building design standards [UN-4.3.2] X
Impact of land-use and other policies on ecosystem services 
[UN-5.1.3] X
Adequacy of protective infrastructure and effectiveness of 
maintenance [UN-8.1.1, UN-8.1.2] X
Disaster resilience of utility infrastructure: incl. commu-
nication, electricity, water/ sanitation, gas, transportation 
[UN-8.2.1, UN-8.2.2, UN-8.2.3, UN-8.3.1, UN-8.3.2, UN-8.3.3, 
UN-8.4.1, UN-8.4.2, UN-8.4.3, UN-8.5.1, UN-8.5.2, UN-8.5.3, 
UN-8.5.4, UN-8.6.1, UN-8.6.2, UN-8.6.3, UN-8.6.4, UN-8.6.5, 
UN-8.6.6] X
Disaster resilience of social infrastructure: incl. law and order 
& first responder, education, healthcare, administration [UN-
8.7.1, UN-8.7.2, UN-8.8.1, UN-8.9.1, UN-8.10.1 ] X
Medi-
um
Extent to which any proposal in government is also evaluated 
for disaster resilience benefits or impairments [UN-1.2.1] X
Knowledge of hazards (also called perils) that the city faces, 
and their likelihood [UN-2.1.1] X
Knowledge of exposure and vulnerability [UN-2.1.2] X
Understanding of critical assets and the linkages between 
these [UN-2.1.3] X
Hazard Maps [UN-2.1.4] X
Process ensuring frequent and complete updates of scenari-
os [UN-2.2.1] X
Awareness of the role that ecosystem services may play in 
the city’s disaster resilience [UN-5.1.1] X
Ecosystem health [UN-5.1.2] X
Coverage of grassroots organization(s) throughout the city 
and effectiveness of grassroots networks [UN-7.1.1, UN-7.1.2] X
Social connectedness and neighborhood cohesion [UN-7.1.3] X
ANNEX A: TABLE OF RESILIENCE ITEMS
Table of resilience items sorted by spatial planning’s ability to influence them (main sphere of resilience 
addressed by each item is indicated on the right side of the table) | Own illustration
IV
Engagement of vulnerable segments of the population [UN-
7.1.4] X
Likely ability to meet needs for shelter/ safe places [UN-9.5.2] X
Planning for post event recovery and economic reboot [UN-
10.1.1] X
Learning loops [UN-10.1.3] X
Low/ 
None
Co-ordination of all relevant pre-event planning/ preparation 
activities, all event-response activities and all post-event 
activities for the city’s area, with clarity of roles and account-
ability across all relevant organizations [UN-1.1.1, UN-1.1.2, 
UN-1.1.5] X
Participation and coordination of all relevant organizations in 
the structure(s) defined [UN-1.1.3] X
Co-option of physical contributions by both public and private 
sectors [UN-1.1.4] X
Extent to which data on the city’s resilience position is shared 
with other organizations involved with the city’s resilience, 
community organizations and the public [UN-1.3.1, UN-1.3.2] X
Adequacy of financial planning for all actions necessary for 
disaster resilience [UN-3.1.1] X
Capital funding for long run engineering and other works that 
address scenarios in essential 2 and essential 8 [UN-3.1.2] X
Operating funding to meet all operating costs of disaster 
resilience activities [UN-3.1.3] X
Contingency fund for post disaster recovery (may be referred 
to as a “rainy-day fund”) [UN-3.2.1] X
Affordability of, and help with achieving safe housing [UN-
3.3.1] X
Domestic and non-domestic insurance coverage [UN-3.3.2, 
UN-3.3.5] X
Incentives to businesses and non-profit organizations to 
improve disaster resilience – disaster plans, premises etc. 
[UN-3.3.3, UN-3.3.4] X
Pursuit of all possible methods of financing and funding, as 
required [UN-3.4.1] X
Availability of skills and experience in disaster resilience – 
risk identification, mitigation, planning, response and post 
event response [UN-6.1.1] X
Exposure of public to education and awareness materials/
messaging [UN-6.2.1] X
Validation of effectiveness of education [UN-6.2.2] X
Availability, take-up of training [UN-6.3.1] X
Accessibility of education and training to all linguistic groups 
in the city [UN-6.4.1] X
Effort taken to learn from what other cities, states and 
countries (and companies) do to increase resilience [UN-
6.5.1] X
Extent to which employers act as a channel with employees 
[UN-7.2.1] X
VBusiness continuity planning [UN-7.2.2] X
Use of mobile and e-mail “systems of engagement” to enable 
citizens to receive and give updates before and after a disas-
ter [UN-7.3.1] X
Loss of Education data [UN-8.8.3] X
Health records and data [UN-8.9.2] X
Availability of emergency healthcare including facilities and 
urgent medical supplies for acute needs [UN-8.9.3] X
Assurance of continuity of all critical administration functions 
[UN-8.10.1] X
Assurance of continuity of computer systems and data critical 
to government continuity [UN-8.11.1] X
Assurance of continuity of computer systems and data critical 
to any of the above infrastructure [UN-8.11.2] X
Existence and effectiveness of early warning systems [UN-
9.1.1] X
Existence of emergency response plans that integrate profes-
sional responders and grassroots organizations [UN-9.2.1] X
“Surge” capacity of police also to support first responder 
duties [UN-9.3.1] X
Definition of other first responder and other staffing needs, 
availability – including fire, ambulance, healthcare, neighbor-
hood support etc. [UN-9.3.2] X
Definition of equipment and supply needs, and availability of 
equipment [UN-9.4.1] X
Likely ability to continue to feed population [UN-9.5.1] X
Ability to meet likely needs for staple goods [UN-9.5.3] X
Likely availability of fuel [UN-9.5.4] X X
Interoperability with neighboring cities/ states and other 
levels of government of critical systems and procedures [UN-
9.6.1] X
Emergency operations center [UN-9.6.2] X
Practices and rehearsals – involving both the public and 
professionals [UN-9.7.1] X X
Effectiveness of drills and training [UN-9.7.2] X X
Shadow financial arrangements for processing incoming aid 
and disbursing funds [UN-10.1.2] X
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ANNEX B: INTERVIEW GUIDELINES
INTERVIEW WITH MIYAKO CITY PLANNING DIVISION, 
EMPLOYEE A
Thank you for the opportunity to interview you to learn more about the recon-
struction process in Miyako City. I am a PhD student at TU Dortmund University 
in Germany. The main research question for my thesis is “How far can spatial 
planning help to improve a city’s resilience after a disaster?”. Therefore, I am 
very interested in the valuable experiences you gathered throughout your work 
in the reconstruction process. I want to collect lessons learned from you and 
use them to help spatial planners in other countries to better understand and 
use their opportunities to create resilience after a disaster. I would like to let you 
know that I will anonymize the information you give me in this interview when 
I use it for my thesis.
To make the analysis of the interview easier, it would be very helpful to record 
it. Would this be OK for you?
Introducing questions
First, I would like to ask you to please introduce yourself and tell me what your 
position in the reconstruction process of Miyako City is?
Could you please tell me about the reconstruction process after 3-11? Feel free 
to begin wherever you find it appropriate and explain the steps that were most 
important for you. Take your time; I will not interrupt you until you are finished.
Engineering resilience
The basic goals for the reconstruction process in response to the Great East 
Japan Earthquake include building infrastructural resilience – can you please ex-
plain which tools and approaches of spatial planning you used to approach this 
goal?
Do you think that the available tools and approaches were sufficient to build up 
infrastructural resilience? What would you improve if you could?
Socio-ecological resilience
Besides the sufficient infrastructure, resilience is also increased by socio-eco-
logical factors such as community connectedness or participation of vulnerable 
segments of the population (e.g. the elderly).
In the field of spatial planning, which tools and approaches did you use to in-
crease some of the things I just mentioned, like community connectedness or 
participation of vulnerable segments of the population or anything else related 
to this (socio-ecological resilience)?
Did you find these tools and approaches useful to reach the goal to build resil-
ience? Would you like to have additional tools to use? Which are these?
VIII
Additional challenges to be considered
The Basic Act on Reconstruction and Response to the Great East Japan Earth-
quake states in Article 2 that the changing needs of an aging society or global 
warming (e.g. sea level rise or rising possibility of heat waves) should be con-
sidered throughout the reconstruction process. Do you feel enabled to do this 
in your everyday work? If yes, how do you do this? If no, what would help to 
improve the current situation?
Do you see the uncertainty of future as a challenge? For example, the fact that 
you do not know about the height of a possible sea level rise or changes in 
weather. How do you consider these uncertainties in your work?
Did you take special measures to fulfill the changing needs of an aging society 
into account throughout the reconstruction process? Did you also consider glob-
al warming (e.g. sea level rise or changing temperatures) in your plans?
Window of opportunity
Do you think there is a window of opportunity after a disaster? If yes, did this 
opportunity help plans to be implemented faster?
Before 3-11, did the administration of Miyako City already have any land-use 
plans for after the disaster? If yes, were those plans useful? What were the 
problems? If no, do you think it would be helpful to have a recovery plan for the 
city developed in advance in order to use the window of opportunity better?
Is there anything else you would like to add?
Thank you for your time! After my return to Germany, I am going to use the 
information you just gave me to understand the possibilities and constraints of 
spatial planners in the reconstruction process after a disaster. This information 
will help me to answer my research question. If you are interested, I can send 
you the results of my research after I am done
IX
INTERVIEW WITH MIYAKO CITY CONSULTANT
Thank you for the opportunity to interview you to learn more about the recon-
struction process in Miyako City. I am a PhD student at TU Dortmund University 
in Germany. The main research question for my thesis is “How far can spatial 
planning help to improve a city’s resilience after a disaster?”. Therefore, I am 
very interested in the valuable experiences you gathered throughout your work 
in the reconstruction process. I want to collect lessons learned from you and 
use them to help spatial planners in other countries to better understand and 
use their opportunities to create resilience after a disaster. I would like to let you 
know that I will anonymize the information you give me in this interview when 
I use it for my thesis.
To make the analysis of the interview easier, it would be very helpful to record 
it. Would this be OK for you?
Introducing questions
First, I would like to ask you to please introduce yourself and tell me what your 
position in the reconstruction process of Miyako City is?
Could you please tell me about the reconstruction process after 3-11? Feel free 
to begin wherever you find it appropriate and explain the steps that were most 
important for you. Take your time; I will not interrupt you until you are finished.
Engineering resilience
The basic goals for the reconstruction process in response to the Great East 
Japan Earthquake include building infrastructural resilience – can you please ex-
plain which tools and approaches of spatial planning you used to approach this 
goal?
Do you think that the available tools and approaches were sufficient to build up 
infrastructural resilience? What would you improve if you could?
Socio-ecological resilience
Besides the sufficient infrastructure, resilience is also increased by socio-eco-
logical factors such as community connectedness or participation of vulnerable 
segments of the population (e.g. the elderly).
In the field of spatial planning, which tools and approaches did you use to in-
crease some of the things I just mentioned, like community connectedness or 
participation of vulnerable segments of the population or anything else related 
to this (socio-ecological resilience)?
Did you find these tools and approaches useful to reach the goal to build resil-
ience? Would you like to have additional tools to use? Which are these?
Additional challenges to be considered
The Basic Act on Reconstruction and Response to the Great East Japan Earth-
quake states in Article 2 that the changing needs of an aging society or global 
Xwarming (e.g. sea level rise or rising possibility of heat waves) should be con-
sidered throughout the reconstruction process. Do you feel enabled to do this 
in your everyday work? If yes, how do you do this? If no, what would help to 
improve the current situation?
Do you see the uncertainty of future as a challenge? For example, the fact that 
you do not know about the height of a possible sea level rise or changes in 
weather. How do you consider these uncertainties in your work?
Did you take special measures to fulfill the changing needs of an aging society 
into account throughout the reconstruction process? Did you also consider glob-
al warming (e.g. sea level rise or changing temperatures) in your plans?
Window of opportunity
Do you think there is a window of opportunity after a disaster? If yes, did this 
opportunity help plans to be implemented faster?
Before 3-11, did the administration of Miyako City already have any land-use 
plans for after the disaster? If yes, were those plans useful? What were the 
problems? If no, do you think it would be helpful to have a recovery plan for the 
city developed in advance in order to use the window of opportunity better?
Is there anything else you would like to add?
Thank you for your time! After my return to Germany, I am going to use the 
information you just gave me to understand the possibilities and constraints of 
spatial planners in the reconstruction process after a disaster. This information 
will help me to answer my research question. If you are interested, I can send 
you the results of my research after I am done.
XI
INTERVIEW WITH TARO DISTRICT CITIZEN A AND B
Thank you for the opportunity to interview you to learn more about the recon-
struction process in Miyako City. I am a PhD student at TU Dortmund Univer-
sity in Germany. The main research question for my thesis is “How far can 
spatial planning help to improve a city’s resilience after a disaster?”. This also 
includes the involvement of the people’s needs into the reconstruction pro-
cess. Therefore, I am very interested in the experiences you gathered over the 
last four and a half years. I want to collect lessons learned from you and use 
them to help spatial planners in other countries to better understand and use 
their opportunities to create resilience after a disaster. I would like to let you 
know that I will anonymize the information you give me in this interview when 
I use it for my thesis.
To make the analysis of the interview easier, it would be very helpful to record 
it. Would this be OK for you?
Introducing questions
First, I would like to ask you to please introduce yourself.
Could you please tell me about the development of this temporary housing com-
munity? Feel free to begin wherever you find it appropriate and explain the steps 
that you consider as most important. Take your time; I will not interrupt you until 
you are finished.
When you moved to the temporary houses, was your community moved to live 
together? Will you be able to relocate as a community when you move from the 
temporary into permanent houses? Do you think keeping communities together 
will improve the ability of people to cope with a disaster?
Socio-ecological resilience
To prepare a city for future disasters, it is not only important to build safe infra-
structure, but also to build social capacity or community connectedness. This 
can be reached by considering the people’s needs, especially the needs of vul-
nerable segments of the population (e.g. the elderly).
When spatial planners were planning the reconstruction of the city, did they use 
approaches that enabled the people to contribute their ideas into the process? If 
yes, how did this happen? If no, what do you think could be improved?
Additional challenges to be considered
Do you think spatial planners also consider additional challenges like the chang-
ing needs of an aging society or global warming (e.g. sea level rise or rising 
possibility of heat waves) throughout the reconstruction process? If yes, how is 
this done? If no, what do you think are the reasons for this?
Window of opportunity
Before 3-11, did the administration of Miyako City already have any plans for 
after the disaster? If yes, were those plans useful? What were the problems? 
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If no, do you think it would be helpful to have a recovery plan for the city devel-
oped in advance in order to react faster?
Is there anything else you would like to add?
Thank you for your time! After my return to Germany, I am going to use the 
information you just gave me to understand the possibilities and constraints of 
spatial planners in the reconstruction process after a disaster. This information 
will help me to answer my research question. If you are interested, I can send 
you the results of my research after I am done.
XIII
INTERVIEW WITH ISHINOMAKI CITY DOWNTOWN 
CREATIVE RECONSTRUCTION COMMITTEE MEMBER
Thank you for the opportunity to interview you to learn more about the recon-
struction process in Ishinomaki City. I am a PhD student at TU Dortmund Uni-
versity in Germany. The main research question for my thesis is “How far can 
spatial planning help to improve a city’s resilience after a disaster?”. Therefore, 
I am very interested in the valuable experiences you gathered throughout your 
work in the reconstruction process. I want to collect lessons learned from you 
and use them to help spatial planners in other countries to better understand 
and use their opportunities to create resilience after a disaster. I would like to 
let you know that I will anonymize the information you give me in this interview 
when I use it for my thesis.
To make the analysis of the interview easier, it would be very helpful to record 
it. Would this be OK for you?
Introduction questions
First, I would like to ask you to please introduce yourself and tell me what your 
position in the reconstruction process of Ishinomaki City is?
Could you please tell me about the reconstruction process after 3-11? Feel free 
to begin wherever you find it appropriate and explain the steps that were most 
important for you. Take your time; I will not interrupt you until you are finished.
Engineering resilience
The basic goals for the reconstruction process in response to the Great East 
Japan Earthquake include building infrastructural resilience – can you please ex-
plain which tools and approaches of spatial planning were used to approach this 
goal?
Do you think that the available tools and approaches were sufficient to build up 
infrastructural resilience? What would you improve if you could?
Socio-ecological resilience
Besides the sufficient infrastructure, resilience is also increased by socio-eco-
logical factors such as community connectedness or participation of vulnerable 
segments of the population (e.g. the elderly).
In the field of spatial planning, which tools and approaches were used to in-
crease some of the things I just mentioned, like community connectedness or 
participation of vulnerable segments of the population or anything else related 
to this (socio-ecological resilience)?
Did you find these tools and approaches useful to reach the goal to build resil-
ience? Would you like to have additional tools used? Which are these?
Additional challenges to be considered
The Basic Act on Reconstruction and Response to the Great East Japan Earth-
quake states in Article 2 that the changing needs of an aging society or global 
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warming (e.g. sea level rise or rising possibility of heat waves) should be con-
sidered throughout the reconstruction process. Do you think these points were 
integrated into the reconstruction process? If yes, how did this happen? If no, 
why do you think they were not integrated?
Do you see the uncertainty of future as a challenge for your work? For example, 
the fact that you do not know about the height of a possible sea level rise or 
changes in weather. How do you consider these uncertainties in your work?
Were special measures to fulfill the changing needs of an aging society taken 
into account throughout the reconstruction process? Was global warming (e.g. 
sea level rise or changing temperatures) considered?
Window of opportunity
Do you think there is a window of opportunity after a disaster? If yes, did this 
opportunity help plans to be implemented faster?
Before 3-11, did the administration of Ishinomaki City already have any land-use 
plans for after the disaster? If yes, were those plans useful? What were the 
problems? If no, do you think it would be helpful to have a recovery plan for the 
city developed in advance in order to use the window of opportunity better?
Is there anything else you would like to add?
Thank you for your time! After my return to Germany, I am going to use the 
information you just gave me to understand the possibilities and constraints of 
spatial planners in the reconstruction process after a disaster. This information 
will help me to answer my research question. If you are interested, I can send 
you the results of my research after I am done
XV
INTERVIEW WITH ISHINOMAKI CITY MACHIZUKURI 
EMPLOYEE
Thank you for the opportunity to interview you to learn more about the recon-
struction process in Ishinomaki City. I am a PhD student at TU Dortmund Uni-
versity in Germany. The main research question for my thesis is “How far can 
spatial planning help to improve a city’s resilience after a disaster?”. Therefore, 
I am very interested in the valuable experiences you gathered throughout your 
work in the reconstruction process. I want to collect lessons learned from you 
and use them to help spatial planners in other countries to better understand 
and use their opportunities to create resilience after a disaster. I would like to 
let you know that I will anonymize the information you give me in this interview 
when I use it for my thesis.
To make the analysis of the interview easier, it would be very helpful to record 
it. Would this be OK for you?
Introducing questions
First, I would like to ask you to please introduce yourself and tell me what your 
position in the reconstruction process of Ishinomaki City is?
Could you please tell me about the reconstruction process after 3-11? Feel free 
to begin wherever you find it appropriate and explain the steps that were most 
important for you. Take your time; I will not interrupt you until you are finished.
Engineering resilience
The basic goals for the reconstruction process in response to the Great East Ja-
pan Earthquake include building infrastructural resilience – what has been done 
to approach this goal?
Do you think that the available tools and approaches of spatial planning were 
sufficient to build up infrastructural resilience? What do you think could be im-
proved?
Socio-ecological resilience
Besides the sufficient infrastructure, resilience is also increased by socio-eco-
logical factors such as community connectedness or participation of vulnerable 
segments of the population (e.g. the elderly).
What tools and approaches did spatial planners in Ishinomaki City use to in-
crease some of the things I just mentioned, like community connectedness or 
participation of vulnerable segments of the population or anything else related 
to this (socio-ecological resilience)?
Do you think these things were helpful? What would you like to be different?
Additional challenges to be considered
The Basic Act on Reconstruction and Response to the Great East Japan Earth-
quake states that the changing needs of an aging society or global warming (e.g. 
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sea level rise or rising possibility of heat waves) should be considered through-
out the reconstruction process. Do you feel like this is happening? If yes, how? 
If no, what would help to improve the current situation?
Do you see the uncertainty of future as a challenge? For example, the fact that 
you do not know about the height of a possible sea level rise or changes in 
weather. How are these uncertainties considered?
Were special measures to fulfill the changing needs of an aging society taken 
onto account throughout the reconstruction process? Was global warming (e.g. 
sea level rise or changing temperatures) considered?
Window of opportunity
Do you think there is a window of opportunity after a disaster? If yes, did this 
opportunity help plans to be implemented faster?
Before 3-11, did the administration of Ishinomaki City already have any land-use 
plans for after the disaster? If yes, were those plans useful? What were the 
problems? If no, do you think it would be helpful to have a recovery plan for the 
city developed in advance in order to use the window of opportunity better?
Is there anything else you would like to add?
Thank you for your time! After my return to Germany, I am going to use the 
information you just gave me to understand the possibilities and constraints of 
spatial planners in the reconstruction process after a disaster. This information 
will help me to answer my research question. If you are interested, I can send 
you the results of my research after I am done.
XVII
INTERVIEW WITH ISHINOMAKI CITY PLANNING 
DIVISION, EMPLOYEE
Thank you for the opportunity to interview you to learn more about the recon-
struction process in Ishinomaki City. I am a PhD student at TU Dortmund Uni-
versity in Germany. The main research question for my thesis is “How far can 
spatial planning help to improve a city’s resilience after a disaster?”. Therefore, 
I am very interested in the valuable experiences you gathered throughout your 
work in the reconstruction process. I want to collect lessons learned from you 
and use them to help spatial planners in other countries to better understand 
and use their opportunities to create resilience after a disaster. I would like to 
let you know that I will anonymize the information you give me in this interview 
when I use it for my thesis.
To make the analysis of the interview easier, it would be very helpful to record 
it. Would this be OK for you?
Introducing questions
First, I would like to ask you to please introduce yourself and tell me what your 
position in the reconstruction process of Ishinomaki City is?
Could you please tell me about the reconstruction process after 3-11? Feel free 
to begin wherever you find it appropriate and explain the steps that were most 
important for you. Take your time; I will not interrupt you until you are finished.
Engineering resilience
The basic goals for the reconstruction process in response to the Great East 
Japan Earthquake include building infrastructural resilience – can you please ex-
plain which tools and approaches of spatial planning you used to approach this 
goal?
Do you think that the available tools and approaches were sufficient to build up 
infrastructural resilience? What would you improve if you could?
Socio-ecological resilience
Besides the sufficient infrastructure, resilience is also increased by socio-eco-
logical factors such as community connectedness or participation of vulnerable 
segments of the population (e.g. the elderly).
In the field of spatial planning, which tools and approaches did you use to in-
crease some of the things I just mentioned, like community connectedness or 
participation of vulnerable segments of the population or anything else related 
to this (socio-ecological resilience)?
Did you find these tools and approaches useful to reach the goal to build resil-
ience? Would you like to have additional tools to use? Which are these?
Additional challenges to be considered
The Basic Act on Reconstruction and Response to the Great East Japan Earth-
quake states in Article 2 that the changing needs of an aging society or global 
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warming (e.g. sea level rise or rising possibility of heat waves) should be con-
sidered throughout the reconstruction process. Do you feel enabled to do this 
in your everyday work? If yes, how do you do this? If no, what would help to 
improve the current situation?
Do you see the uncertainty of future as a challenge? For example, the fact that 
you do not know about the height of a possible sea level rise or changes in 
weather. How do you consider these uncertainties in your work?
Did you take special measures to fulfill the changing needs of an aging society 
into account throughout the reconstruction process? Did you also consider glob-
al warming (e.g. sea level rise or changing temperatures) in your plans?
Window of opportunity
Do you think there is a window of opportunity after a disaster? If yes, did this 
opportunity help plans to be implemented faster?
Before 3-11, did the administration of Ishinomaki City already have any land-use 
plans for after the disaster? If yes, were those plans useful? What were the 
problems? If no, do you think it would be helpful to have a recovery plan for the 
city developed in advance in order to use the window of opportunity better?
Is there anything else you would like to add?
Thank you for your time! After my return to Germany, I am going to use the 
information you just gave me to understand the possibilities and constraints of 
spatial planners in the reconstruction process after a disaster. This information 
will help me to answer my research question. If you are interested, I can send 
you the results of my research after I am done.
XIX
INTERVIEW WITH ISHINOMAKI CITY CONSULTANT
Thank you for the opportunity to interview you to learn more about the recon-
struction process in Ishinomaki City. I am a PhD student at TU Dortmund Uni-
versity in Germany. The main research question for my thesis is “How far can 
spatial planning help to improve a city’s resilience after a disaster?”. Therefore, 
I am very interested in the valuable experiences you gathered throughout your 
work in the reconstruction process. I want to collect lessons learned from you 
and use them to help spatial planners in other countries to better understand 
and use their opportunities to create resilience after a disaster. I would like to 
let you know that I will anonymize the information you give me in this interview 
when I use it for my thesis.
To make the analysis of the interview easier, it would be very helpful to record 
it. Would this be OK for you?
Introducing questions
First, I would like to ask you to please introduce yourself and tell me what your 
position in the reconstruction process of Ishinomaki City is?
Could you please tell me about the reconstruction process after 3-11? Feel free 
to begin wherever you find it appropriate and explain the steps that were most 
important for you. Take your time; I will not interrupt you until you are finished.
Engineering resilience
The basic goals for the reconstruction process in response to the Great East 
Japan Earthquake include building infrastructural resilience – can you please ex-
plain which tools and approaches of spatial planning you used to approach this 
goal?
Do you think that the available tools and approaches were sufficient to build up 
infrastructural resilience? What would you improve if you could?
Socio-ecological resilience
Besides the sufficient infrastructure, resilience is also increased by socio-eco-
logical factors such as community connectedness or participation of vulnerable 
segments of the population (e.g. the elderly).
In the field of spatial planning, which tools and approaches did you use to in-
crease some of the things I just mentioned, like community connectedness or 
participation of vulnerable segments of the population or anything else related 
to this (socio-ecological resilience)?
Did you find these tools and approaches useful to reach the goal to build resil-
ience? Would you like to have additional tools to use? Which are these?
Additional challenges to be considered
The Basic Act on Reconstruction and Response to the Great East Japan Earth-
quake states in Article 2 that the changing needs of an aging society or global 
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warming (e.g. sea level rise or rising possibility of heat waves) should be con-
sidered throughout the reconstruction process. Do you feel enabled to do this 
in your everyday work? If yes, how do you do this? If no, what would help to 
improve the current situation?
Do you see the uncertainty of future as a challenge? For example, the fact that 
you do not know about the height of a possible sea level rise or changes in 
weather. How do you consider these uncertainties in your work?
Did you take special measures to fulfill the changing needs of an aging society 
into account throughout the reconstruction process? Did you also consider glob-
al warming (e.g. sea level rise or changing temperatures) in your plans?
Window of opportunity
Do you think there is a window of opportunity after a disaster? If yes, did this 
opportunity help plans to be implemented faster?
Before 3-11, did the administration of Ishinomaki City already have any land-use 
plans for after the disaster? If yes, were those plans useful? What were the 
problems? If no, do you think it would be helpful to have a recovery plan for the 
city developed in advance in order to use the window of opportunity better?
Is there anything else you would like to add?
Thank you for your time! After my return to Germany, I am going to use the 
information you just gave me to understand the possibilities and constraints of 
spatial planners in the reconstruction process after a disaster. This information 
will help me to answer my research question. If you are interested, I can send 
you the results of my research after I am done.


